Kristina Ivanisin v. John Ivanisin (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

A review of the record reveals that the plaintiff, Kristina Ivanisin, instituted this application for visitation utilizing form JD FM 161, claiming that she is the mother of the child.   The respondents are the adoptive parents of the child.   The respondents filed a motion to dismiss (112) together with a Memorandum of Law and a Motion for Permanent Injunction (114) together with an affidavit.   The parties appeared before the undersigned on June 3, 2013 to argue their respective positions.

The respondents claim that the matter should be dismissed because the applicant lacks standing as her parental rights had been previously terminated in the Rockville juvenile court and the child was lawfully adopted by the respondents.   Since the applicant is no longer the “parent” in the eyes of the law, the applicant could only proceed under Connecticut General Statutes (CGS) § 46b–59 as a non-parent seeking visitation with a child.   Under CGS § 46b–59, a non-parent seeking visitation with a child must allege and prove that she has a parent-child relationship with the minor child and that a denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm to the child.   The applicant has failed to allege these necessary facts.   As a result, this matter must be dismissed.

The respondents request a permanent injunction pursuant to CGS § 52–471(a) to bar the applicant from any and all contact with the respondent, his wife and his legally adopted child and to bar her from any and all contact with the child's school, teachers, coaches and instructors and to bar her from appearing at any place where she has knowledge that the respondents or the child will be and to bar her from filing any further applications, petitions or motions pertaining to the child.

Sec. 52–471(a) states:  Any judge of any court of equitable jurisdiction may, on motion, grant and enforce a writ of injunction, according to the course of proceedings in equity, in any action for equitable relief when the relief is properly demandable, returnable to any court, when the court is not in session.   Upon granting of the writ, the writ shall be of force until the sitting of the court and its further order thereon unless sooner lawfully dissolved.

In support of their request for injunctive relief, the respondents cite Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals and Healthcare, 196 Conn. 451, 457–58 (1985):  “To be entitled to such relief, the party must show:  (1) probable success on the merits of their claim;  (2) irreparable harm or loss;  and (3) a favorable balancing of the results or harm which may be caused to one party or the other, as well as to the public, by the granting or denying of the temporary relief requested.”

It appears from a review of the case law that a permanent injunction may issue only after a trial on the merits.  Gerdis v. Bloethe, 39 Conn.Sup. 53, 55 (1983) (citing O.H. Canfield Company v. United Construction Workers, 134 Conn. 623, 626 (1948)).   Moreover, for an injunction to issue, the moving party must demonstrate irreparable and substantial harm in the absence of an adequate remedy at law.  Stocker v. City of Waterbury, 154 Conn. 446, 449 (1967).   While having to defend a single case is costly and inconvenient, it does not rise to that level.   While an injunction may issue to prevent substantial irreparable harm that has not yet occurred, the future harm cannot be based purely on supposition;  there must be “specific acts or a pattern of behavior” that will cause irreparable harm.  Nicholson v. Connecticut Halfway House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507, 511 (1966).

The respondents claim that the actions of the applicant constitute imminent and irreparable harm.   This court is hard-pressed to equate the filing of a visitation complaint in a court of law with harassment.   Notwithstanding the fact that the applicant failed to allege the proper facts and utilized the incorrect form, there is no evidence that the applicant's actions have risen to the level of harassment or severe harm.   With the dismissal of this matter, the applicant is on strong notice that she no longer has any legal rights vis-a-vis this child and that if she continues to file applications which have no legal basis, she may very well be ordered to pay attorneys fees and suffer an injunction or even a restraining order pursuant to CGS § 46b–15 if her behaviors escalate.   Moreover, the relief requested by the respondents is overly broad in that it even seeks to bar the applicant from appearing in a public place where the respondents or the child will be.   Notwithstanding, the applicant, Kristina Ivanisin, is on strong notice that further efforts to institute legal proceedings or otherwise harass the respondents will be dealt with harshly.

It does not appear to the court that this self-represented party filed these proceedings, knowing that she had no legal basis to proceed.   For that reason, the request for attorneys fees will be denied this time.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.   The motion for attorneys fees is denied.   The motion for permanent injunction is denied.

Shluger, J.

Shluger, Kenneth L., J.