New Haven Truck and Auto Body, Inc. v. David Bunning et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

In this case the plaintiff New Haven Truck and Auto Body, Inc. (plaintiff) has filed an amended two-count complaint against the defendants Dave Bunning and DCR Trucking, LLC (Bunning or defendant) seeking money damages and other relief.   The complaint sounds in breach of contract and unjust enrichment and alleges in substance that Bunning and the plaintiff agreed that the plaintiff would perform certain mechanical and auto body repair services to Bunning's truck, that the plaintiff provided such services, that the sum of $36,104.21 remains unpaid, and that Bunning refuses to pay said sum.   Bunning admits that the plaintiff is a Connecticut corporation engaged in the business of mechanical and auto body repairs, and that DCR LLC, is a limited liability company with a place of business in Connecticut.   All of the other allegations are not admitted, and Bunning has filed seven special defenses.   In the special defenses Bunning alleges that the plaintiff:  (1) Received payment in full;  (2) The claims are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel and/or unclean hands;  (3) Accord and satisfaction;  (4) The claims are barred by Connecticut General Statutes Section 14–65f(a) in that prior to performing any work, the plaintiff failed to obtain from Bunning a written authorization that provided a maximum cost for the work done and parts supplied;  (5) The claims are barred by Connecticut General Statutes 14–65f(c) in that the plaintiff failed to obtain the consent of Bunning to exceed the estimate provided;  (6) Any amounts due to the plaintiff must be set off by the damages caused to Bunning by the substantial and incomplete work done by the plaintiffs;  and (7) The claims are barred by Connecticut General Statutes 14–65f(b) in that, for any repairs which was not known when the vehicle was originally dropped off, the plaintiff failed to notify Bunning of the maximum costs and to obtain Bunning's authorization before commencing any repairs.

The court finds that Bunning has proven the allegations of the fourth, fifth and seventh special defenses and that Connecticut General Statutes 14–65f bars the plaintiff from collecting any balance still alleged to be owing for work performed on Bunning's truck.

The court finds the following facts and reaches the following conclusions.   The plaintiff is engaged in the business, among other things, of mechanical and auto body repairs, servicing both automobiles and major truck repair.   On February 26, 2010 Bunning met with William Snow, owner of the plaintiff, and one of the plaintiff's employees to discuss doing refurbishing and restoration of Bunning's 1996 Kenworth W900 truck.   At that meeting Bunning had a written estimate from a company in Virginia, Peterbilt of Bristol, LLC, dated February 17, 2010 in the amount $17,500.29, which defined the scope of the work that the plaintiff was to perform on Bunning's truck (Exhibit 1).   This estimate had been prepared by Peterbilt based on telephone conversations with Bunning and photographs of the truck sent to Peterbilt by Bunning.   Peterbilt had never seen the truck.   At the meeting on February 26, 2010 the plaintiff told Bunning that his costs, not including painting the whole truck, would probably be between $2,000 and $5,000 over the Peterbilt estimate.

Bunning dropped his truck off at the plaintiff's shop on or about March 5, 2010 and the plaintiff started working on the truck within a few days thereafter.   The first written authorization to work on the truck signed by Bunning was on March 22, 2010 (Exhibit 5), which was approximately two weeks after the plaintiff had started work on the truck.   The document stated that the estimate was “$20,000 +” and the work was described as “Repaint & custom work to customer spec.   Price accordingly.”

The plaintiff and an independent fabricator worked on the truck on almost a daily basis until May 13, 2010.   Bunning used to stop in about twice a week during the time the plaintiff had the truck and make expensive changes and additions to the work being done on the truck.   Bunning was frequently advised by the plaintiff that the changes being requested by him were causing the costs to rise but no precise costs were mentioned.   The plaintiff and its employee, John Oswald, indicated the rising costs by making a sound like a cash register, “cha ching, cha ching” and “ding, ding, ding.”   Bunning would say that the increasing work and costs were included in the Peterbilt estimate and he would be told by the plaintiff that they were not.   Despite these contradictory positions the work continued until the job was essentially finished on May 13, 2010.

On May 13, 2010 one of Bunning's employees drove the truck from the plaintiff's place of business and Bunning met with William Snow to discuss payment.   Bunning had already paid $7,500 and made a $20,000 payment on his credit card at that meeting.   Snow told Bunning that the total charges exceeded $50,000 but that he was willing to accept $10,000 more if Bunning would also pay the independent metal fabricator, Ernie Ferrucci, his bill of $6,200.   This proposal was acceptable to Bunning who said he would get his checkbook out of his car.   However, when Bunning got to his car he drove away.   Snow called him at his office and Bunning said he would pay the bill on the following Tuesday.   Bunning made no further payments and refused to accept Snow's telephone calls.   The plaintiff paid Ferrucci's bill of $6,200.   On September 15, 2010 the plaintiff sent an itemized bill for $63,604.21 to Bunning (Exhibit 3).   After giving Bunning credit for the $27,500 paid, the plaintiff is seeking the balance of the bill, $36,104.21, plus attorneys fees.

The fourth, fifth and seventh special defenses allege that the plaintiff's claim is barred because the plaintiff has failed to comply with Connecticut General Statutes Section 14–65f(a), 14–65f(c) and 14–65f(b), respectively.   The three portions of Section 14–65f relied upon by Bunning in his special defenses are as follows:

(a) Prior to performing any repair work on a motor vehicle, a motor vehicle repair shop shall obtain a written authorization to perform the work, on an invoice signed by the customer, that includes an estimate in writing of the maximum cost to the customer of the parts and labor necessary for the specific job authorized.   A repair shop shall not charge for work done or parts supplied without a written authorization or in excess of the estimate unless the customer gives consent orally or in writing.

(b) If the repair shop is unable to estimate the cost of repair because the specific repairs to be performed are not known at the time the vehicle is delivered to the repair shop, the written authorization required by this section need not include an estimate of the maximum cost of parts and labor.   In such a case, prior to commencing any repairs, the repair shop shall notify the customer of the work to be performed and the estimated maximum cost to the customer of the necessary parts and labor, obtain the customer's written or oral authorization and record such information on the invoice.

(c) If, during the course of performing repair work, the repair shop discovers that repairs other than those authorized are needed or that the cost of authorized repairs will exceed the estimate, the repair shop shall not proceed with the repairs without first obtaining the customer's additional written or oral consent and recording such information on the invoice.

The plaintiff did not comply with the provisions of Section 14–65f which Bunning claims bars any recovery in this use.   The plaintiff claims that the statute is not applicable to the type of transaction entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, and that even if it were applicable, the plaintiff complied with the law.   The court does not agree.

The first claim by the plaintiff is that Section 14–65f is not applicable because it does not apply to a “restorations project” because a custom restoration on a truck is nothing like repairing a customer's damaged motor vehicle.  Section 14–65f(a) provides that “prior to performing any repair work on a motor vehicle” the motor vehicle repair shop must obtain a written authorization to perform the work.   Our courts have held that this statute must be construed broadly.  “This history demonstrates that §§ 14–63 through 14–65k are remedial in nature, and we must, therefore, construe them broadly to accomplish their purpose and “liberally ․ in favor of those the legislature intended to benefit.”  Small v. Going Forward, Inc., 281 Conn. 417, 424, 915 A.2d 298 (2007);  id.”  Jim 's Auto Body v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 285 Conn. 794 (2008).   The court finds that whether the repair work is labeled as a “restoration” or a “repair” it is covered by the statute.   See Hill v. Desocio, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, 2012 WL 5447934 (October 10, 2012, Wilson, J.), where the work to be done was “for the repair and restoration” of two vehicles.   Exhibit 3, which is the final bill for $63,604.21 submitted to the defendant by the plaintiffs, reflects many items described as “repair.”   Chapter 246 of the General Statutes includes the statutes concerning “Motor Vehicles.”   Section 14–51(3) which is in the subsection entitled “Dealers and Repairer's Licenses,” provides that “Repairer includes any person, firm or corporation ․ engaged in repairing, overhauling, adjusting, assembling or disassembling any motor vehicle ․”

The plaintiff in making its claim that the statutes are not applicable, refers to the legislative history and claims that the purpose of the statute was to give “uninformed consumers” an idea of what their auto repair bill would be.   There is no language in any of the statutes from which one could conclude that they only apply to “uninformed” customers.   The statute as adopted uses the terms “customer” and “motor vehicles,” not consumers and auto.   The meaning of the term “customer” was considered in Jim 's Auto Body v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 285 Conn. 794 (2008), and the court found that an insurance company which had issued a policy insuring an individual's motor vehicle which was damaged in an accident was a customer as that term is used in Section 14–65f.   Bunning was clearly a “customer” as that term is used in 14–65f.

The plaintiff also claims that Section 14–65f is not applicable to repairs and custom restoration work on a trailer truck.  Section 14–65f is included in Chapter 246 which also includes Section 14–1 Definitions.  “Motor vehicle” is defined in 14–1 was “any vehicle propelled or drawn by any nonmuscular power ․” “Tractor” or “truck tractor” is defined as a motor vehicle designed and used for drawing a semitrailer.”   The definition is clear.   Bunning's truck is a motor vehicle.   If the legislature intended to exclude the type of motor vehicle involved in this case it would have done so by an appropriate exception, which it did not do.

The defendants have established that the Connecticut General Statute 14–65(f) is applicable to the repairs and restoration work done on its truck by the plaintiff.   The plaintiff also claims that even if Section 14–65f does apply, that the plaintiff “met the minimum requirements of the statute.”   The court does not agree.

The fourth special defense alleges a failure to comply with Section 14–65f.   In its post trial memorandum the plaintiff claims that Bunning signed a repair authorization, Exhibit 5, authorizing repairs “up to $20,000+.”  The exhibit does not include the words “up to” and there is no explanation of the effect of “+” after the figure of $20,000 on the exhibit.   In any event the exhibit fails to satisfy Section 14–65f(a) in that it was not signed before work commenced on the truck, there is no breakdown of the maximum costs for parts and labor, and there is no estimate of the maximum costs.   The court construes the “+” after $20,000 as indicating more costs above $20,000 without any indication on the authorization of how much higher the costs might go.   The making of sounds like a cash register indicates that the price is going up, and Bunning was told that the price was going up, but the evidence was clear that no actual numbers were ever mentioned during the course of the repairs.

The fifth special defense alleges that the claims are barred by Connecticut General Statutes 14–65f(c) because the plaintiffs failed to obtain the permission of Bunning when the costs exceeded the estimate provided.   The evidence is that Bunning specifically objected to the claims by the plaintiff that the costs were rising because of the extensive changes and additions that Bunning was making to the work being done.   It was Bunning's claim that these additions were all covered by the Peterbilt estimate while the plaintiff claimed they were not.   Whether they were included in the scope of the Peterbilt estimate or not, the plaintiff never mentioned what the costs were, did not obtain the consent of Bunning, and did not record the information on the invoice.   Other than the invoice for $20,000+ Bunning was never presented with an invoice listing the costs of parts and labor until he received the itemized bill for $63,604.21 (Exhibit 3) on September 15, 2010.

The seventh special defense claims that the plaintiff has failed to comply with Section 14–65f(b) which provides that in the event that the repair shop is unable to determine the cost of the repairs initially then the authorization need not include an estimate of the maximum costs.   However, before any work is done the repair shop shall notify the customer of the work to be done and the estimated costs, obtain the customer's written or oral authorization, and record such information on the invoice.   The evidence indicated that the plaintiff put down the figure of $20,000+ because he could not estimate the total cost.   As the job progressed and the costs increased the plaintiff was required to notify Bunning of the total costs before doing the work, obtain his approval, and record the information on the invoice.   The conduct of the plaintiff in not notifying Bunning of the total costs until September 15, 2010 violated Section 14–65f(b).

The court finds that Section 14–65f is applicable to this case and that the defendants have proven that the plaintiff's claims are barred as alleged in special defenses 4, 5 and 7. The finding that the special defenses bar recovery on the breach of contract count also applies to the count of unjust enrichment.  “The plaintiff is not entitled to recover from an illegal transaction created by the plaintiff's failure to adhere and comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 14–65f.”   R & M Automotive, Inc. v. Clapp, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain at New Britain, 1993 WL 392979 (Sept. 28, 1993, Morelli, Trial Referee) [10 Conn. L. Rptr. 188].   This conclusion requires that a judgment enter in favor of the defendants on both counts of the complaint and makes it unnecessary for the court to consider the other claims made by the parties.   A judgment may enter in favor of the defendant on both counts of the complaint.

William L. Hadden, Jr.

Judge Trial Referee

Hadden, William L., J.T.R.