Nhidi Gupta v. Naveen Garg (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS

On August 28, 2012, the plaintiff, Nhidi Gupta, filed a five-count complaint against the defendant, Naveen Garg. The plaintiff alleges the following facts relevant to all counts of the complaint.   The plaintiff resides in Ontario, Canada, and the defendant resides in Quebec, Canada.   The parties were married on July 3, 2010, but separated in July 2011.   The parties currently live apart and are in the process of divorce, the action for which was filed in Ontario, Canada.   From July 2010, through July 2011, the parties resided together in West Hartford, Connecticut, while the defendant completed his medical residency at Saint Francis Hospital in Hartford, Connecticut.

In count one of the complaint (civil assault), the plaintiff alleges that, at various times during the parties' marriage, the defendant intentionally caused the plaintiff to suffer the “imminent apprehension of physical harm” by refusing to consummate their marriage, reacting violently when she asked why and threatening the plaintiff with physical harm.   In count two (civil battery), the plaintiff alleges that, throughout their marriage, the defendant physically struck her on several occasions.   In count three (false imprisonment), the plaintiff alleges that the defendant placed a pillow over her head, held her down and did not permit her to leave.   In count four (intentional infliction of emotional distress), the plaintiff alleges that the defendant made “numerous statements of an extreme and outrageous nature,” including but not limited to, derogatory name-calling.   In count five (negligent infliction of emotional distress), the plaintiff alleges that not only did the defendant call her names, but he also reacted violently when she asked him why he would not consummate their marriage and told her she was “useless, worthless, as a wife.”   Those statements were made with a lack of due care or with reckless disregard for the consequences and effect such statements would have on the plaintiff.   As a result, the plaintiff incurred emotional pain and other subsequent suffering.

As to all counts, the plaintiff alleges that as a direct and proximate cause of the defendant's acts, she has sustained damages, including treatment expenses for psychological counseling and other medical treatment, lost wages and emotional stress and upset.

On December 18, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, accompanied by a memorandum of law, on the grounds that (1) the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, or alternatively (2) Connecticut is a forum non conveniens because an alternative and adequate forum exists, and (3) a prior pending action seeking the same relief currently exists in Canada.   The motion has been fully briefed by both parties and was heard at short calendar on March 11, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).  “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2011).  “When a [trial] court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ․ The motion to dismiss ․ admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone ․ Where, however, as here, the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).

The defendant argues that the court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over him because the requirements of Connecticut's longarm statute, General Statutes § 52–59b, have not been met.   The defendant further argues that, even if the statutory requirements are met, he does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum and thus the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would violate constitutional principles of due process.   The plaintiff counters that the court may assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the tortious conduct alleged in the complaint meets the requirements of the longarm statute and, further, the court would not violate due process by exerting personal jurisdiction over the defendant because both the minimum contacts and reasonableness inquiries are met.¹

“[I]f a challenge to the court's personal jurisdiction is raised by a defendant, either by a foreign corporation or by a nonresident individual, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 118, 918 A.2d 867 (2007).  “When a defendant files a motion to dismiss challenging the court's [personal] jurisdiction, a two-part inquiry is required.   The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state longarm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant].   If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 606, 674 A.2d 426 (1996).   Neither party has requested an evidentiary hearing and therefore this court “will accept ․ all undisputed factual allegations for the purpose of determining whether the [plaintiff has] sustained [her] burden of proving that the court [has] personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] under the [longarm statute].”  Id., 608–09.

Connecticut's longarm statute provides, in relevant part:  “As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual ․ who in person or through an agent:  (1) Transacts any business within the state;  (2) commits a tortious act within the state ․;  (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state ․ if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce;  (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state;  or (5) uses a computer ․ or a computer network ․ located within the state.”  General Statutes § 52–59b(a).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the parties resided together in Connecticut from July 2010, through July 2011, while the defendant completed his medical residency.   Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that during that time the defendant committed several tortious acts against her, including civil assault and battery, false imprisonment and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.   Therefore, the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support a finding that the defendant's conduct satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of § 52–59b(a)(2).

Once this court finds that § 52–59b(a)(2) authorizes the assertion of longarm jurisdiction over the defendant, it must then determine whether the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with the principles of due process.   See Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., supra, 236 Conn. 606.   The defendant argues that any exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would violate due process because he lacks minimum contacts with Connecticut.   In response, the plaintiff argues that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is reasonable and that the defendant's alleged tortious and prolonged course of conduct constitutes sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut so as not to violate the principles of due process.

The due process clause “protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cogswell v. American Transit Ins Co., supra, 282 Conn. 523, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).  “The federal due process clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate [or individual] defendant that has certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., supra, 236 Conn. 606 n.6.

“The due process test for personal jurisdiction has two related components:  the ‘minimum contacts' inquiry and the ‘reasonableness' inquiry.   The court must first determine whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 524.  “The twin touchstones of due process analysis under the minimum contacts doctrine are foreseeability and fairness.  [T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ․ is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 41, 495 A.2d 1034 (1985);  see World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

“As long as it creates a substantial connection with the forum state, even a single act can support jurisdiction.”  Cashman v. Cashman, 41 Conn.App. 382, 389, 676 A.2d 427 (1996).  “Whether sufficient minimum contacts exist for a court to have jurisdiction is clearly dependent on the facts of each particular case.”  Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 52, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).  “In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984).  “Each defendant's contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually.”  Id., 790.

In the present case, the following facts are uncontested.   Both parties are residents of Canada and were married in Canada.   They lived in Connecticut for one year, from July 2010, through July 2011, while the defendant completed his medical residency.   At this time, both parties reside in Canada where they are involved in divorce proceedings.   In his affidavit, which is attached to the motion to dismiss, the defendant admits to residing in Connecticut from July 2008, until July 2011, during his medical residency.   However, in his affidavit the defendant states that he returned to Canada at the end of his residency and has had no contacts with Connecticut since July 2011.   He further states that he owns no property and has no assets in Connecticut, does not regularly do or conduct business in Connecticut and derives no revenue from Connecticut.   The plaintiff fails to contradict the affidavit or to allege any personal contacts, between the defendant and Connecticut, aside from the allegation that the defendant committed “specific tortious acts” within the state.   Therefore, the court finds that the defendant lacks sufficient minimum contacts with the state so as to satisfy the requirements of due process.

Additionally, it would be fundamentally unfair to the defendant to be haled into court in this state.  “Once minimum contacts have been established, [t]he second stage of the due process inquiry asks whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’—that is, whether it is reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case.   See [International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ] ․ [Therefore] [w]hile the exercise of jurisdiction is favored where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of minimum contacts at the first stage of the inquiry, it may be defeated where the defendant presents a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 525.

“[T]he court must evaluate the following factors as part of [the] reasonableness analysis:  (1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant;  (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case;  (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;  (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy;  and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn.App. 634, 640, 736 A.2d 190, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 920, 742 A.2d 359 (1999).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the parties were married in Canada, currently reside in Canada and are engaged in divorce proceedings in Canada.   The plaintiff also has instituted claims against the defendant similar to those in the present action in the Superior Court of Justice, Family Court Branch, in Ontario, Canada.   As previously discussed, in his affidavit the defendant asserts that his only connection with Connecticut is that he lived in the state for three years (from July 2008, through July 2011) while completing his medical residency in Hartford.   Upon completing his residency, he immediately returned to Canada and currently has no assets or property in the state, has not maintained any connections with the state and does not conduct business with the state.   The defendant further asserts—and the plaintiff does not dispute—that any and all witnesses necessary for the present action reside in either Canada or India.   Any discovery necessary for the present action is also necessary for the Canadian action.   Finally, the defendant asserts that the costs of defending against two similar actions brought in geographically distant locations are extensive.   It is clear, then, from the undisputed facts that the defendant's only connection with the forum is that he resided in Connecticut for three years while completing his medical residency and that the tortious conduct alleged in the complaint occurred in this state.

While the longarm statute authorizes the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant as a result of the tortious conduct alleged to have occurred in Connecticut, he has insufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut and it would be unreasonable for this court to require the defendant to defend against two similar actions involving the same parties and almost identical claims where he has had no contact with Connecticut since July 2011.   Accordingly, exercising personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant would violate principles of due process.   Based on this finding, the court need not address the defendant's remaining two arguments.²

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is hereby granted.

Peck, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In her objection to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff makes the additional argument that the defendant waived his right to file a motion to dismiss challenging the court's personal jurisdiction.   The plaintiff argues that the defendant, in his motion for an extension of time to file a responsive pleading, dated October 16, 2012, failed to specifically indicate a request for an extension of the deadline to file a responsive pleading, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 10–30 and 10–32.   The plaintiff cites no authority to support this argument, nor did she object to the defendant's motion for extension of time.   Therefore, this court finds no merit in the plaintiff's argument that the defendant waived his right to file a motion to dismiss..  FN1. In her objection to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff makes the additional argument that the defendant waived his right to file a motion to dismiss challenging the court's personal jurisdiction.   The plaintiff argues that the defendant, in his motion for an extension of time to file a responsive pleading, dated October 16, 2012, failed to specifically indicate a request for an extension of the deadline to file a responsive pleading, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 10–30 and 10–32.   The plaintiff cites no authority to support this argument, nor did she object to the defendant's motion for extension of time.   Therefore, this court finds no merit in the plaintiff's argument that the defendant waived his right to file a motion to dismiss.

FN2. Although the defendant argues that the doctrine of forum non conveniens precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction in the present case, he has failed to provide the court with a sufficient basis upon which to grant the motion to dismiss for reason of forum non conveniens..  FN2. Although the defendant argues that the doctrine of forum non conveniens precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction in the present case, he has failed to provide the court with a sufficient basis upon which to grant the motion to dismiss for reason of forum non conveniens.

Peck, A. Susan, J.