Patricia Boussie v. Meghan Heafy (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 117)

FACTS

On July 13, 2011, the plaintiff, Patricia Boussie, filed a three-count complaint for negligence against the defendants, Meghan Heafy, Robert Lombardi and the Property and Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford, respectively.¹  The plaintiff alleges the following facts.   On July 3, 2009, the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by the defendant.   The defendant was traveling southbound and was stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of Village Street and Clintonville Road in North Branford.   After the traffic light turned green, the defendant proceeded into the intersection and was broadsided by a vehicle driven by Heafy, who was heading eastbound on Clintonville Road. The crash caused the defendant's vehicle to hit a third vehicle that was waiting in the intersection.   As a result of the incident, the plaintiff sustained various injuries and losses.

The plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that her injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence in that he failed to:  (a) keep an adequate and proper lookout for other vehicles on the roadway;  (b) apply his brakes or slow down or otherwise avoid the collision;  (c) stop, drive around or otherwise avoid Heafy's vehicle;  (d) stop, drive around or otherwise avoid the third vehicle awaiting in the intersection;  and (e) warn the plaintiff of the impending collisions.

On March 20, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum in support, portions of the plaintiff's deposition testimony, a police accident report and an affidavit by the defendant.²  In response, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the motion on April 15, 2013 accompanied by a memorandum in support, relevant portions of the Connecticut driver's manual, civil jury instructions and portions of the plaintiff's deposition testimony.   The defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's objection on May 2, 2013.   This matter was heard at short calendar on May 13, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534–35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).  “The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ․ and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Anastasia v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 307 Conn. 706, 711, 59 A.3d 207 (2013), quoting DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107, 116, 49 A.3d 951 (2012).  “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 365, 2 A.3d 902 (2010).  “A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).

The defendant argues that he cannot be held negligent because he entered the intersection by way of a green light.   The plaintiff argues that issues regarding negligence are not appropriate for consideration under the summary judgment standard and that the defendant was negligent because he failed to look both ways before entering the intersection.   The plaintiff relies on the Connecticut driver's manual, along with General Statutes §§ 14–241 and 14–242, to support her argument that a legal duty exists for the defendant to proceed through intersections with reasonable care.

“The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established:  duty;  breach of that duty;  causation;  and actual injury ․ Contained within the first element, duty, there are two distinct considerations ․ First, it is necessary to determine the existence of a duty, and then, if one is found, it is necessary to evaluate the scope of that duty ․ The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand ․ If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant.”  Sic v. Nunan, 307 Conn. 399, 406–07, 54 A.3d 553 (2012).

At the outset, it is noted that contrary to the plaintiff's argument, General Statutes §§ 14–241 and 14–242 do not create a legal duty for the defendant to exercise reasonable care in the present case.   Specifically, § 14–242(a) prohibits a driver from turning a vehicle “unless such movements can be made with reasonable safety.”   Importantly, however, §§ 14–241 and 14–242 pertain only to drivers who make turns at an intersection.   In the present case, the defendant did not intend to make a turn and did not make a turn as he proceeded into the intersection.   Thus, any duty of care that may arise from §§ 14–241 and 14–242 do not apply in the present factual scenario.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's reliance on the Connecticut driver's manual is also unavailing.   First, the plaintiff cites to no authority that requires a driver in Connecticut to read the driver's manual.   Thus, it would be unfair to impose a legal duty based on the driver's manual for drivers who did not read it.   Additionally, the driver's manual is not a law that creates a legal duty for drivers to look left and right at every intersection.³  Instead, the driver's manual is intended to provide driving advice and techniques to novice drivers.   Finally, the court is unaware of any statute or case law that imposes a legal duty based on the driver's manual's charge to exercise reasonable care.

Despite the plaintiff's unsuccessful reliance on the Connecticut driver's manual, along with General Statutes §§ 14–241 and 14–242, to establish a legal duty, our appellate courts have held that “[a]n operator of a motor vehicle is always under a duty to exercise reasonable care ․ and to keep a reasonable lookout for persons or traffic that he or she is likely to encounter.”  (Citation omitted.)  State v. Carter, 64 Conn.App. 631, 642, 781 A.2d 376, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 914, 782 A.2d 1247 (2001).  “[A] driver is entitled to assume that other users of the highway will obey the law, including lawful traffic regulations, and observe reasonable care, until he knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the assumption has become unwarranted.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sic v. Nunan, supra, 307 Conn. 408 (acknowledging that there are certain foreseeable risks of accidents associated with the operation of a motor vehicle).  “It does not mean that one charged with negligence must be found actually to have foreseen the probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable, but the test is, would the ordinary man in the defendant's position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Figlar v. Gordon, 133 Conn. 577, 581–82, 53 A.2d 645 (1947).

“The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant [breached] that duty in the particular situation at hand.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, supra, 306 Conn. 538–39.  “[T]he test for the existence of a legal duty entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Mazurek v. Great American Ins. Co., 284 Conn. 16, 29, 930 A.2d 682 (2007).

Thus, in the present case, the court must first look to the circumstances surrounding the accident to determine if a reasonable person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that he could be hit by another vehicle if he enters the intersection immediately after the signal turns green, without first checking for the presence of crossing traffic.   Here, an ordinary person in the defendant's position should have known that there is a likelihood of some drivers failing to stop after the traffic signal turns red.   This is supported by the driver's manual where it specifically states:  “Do not rely on traffic signals to tell you that no one will be crossing in front of you.   Some driver's do not obey traffic signals or signs.”  (Plaintiff's Ex. A.) Given the likelihood of crossing traffic failing to stop at a red light signal, the court concludes that the defendant should have known the risk of entering an intersection without first checking for crossing traffic, even when he has the right of way.

“A simple conclusion that the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable, however, cannot by itself mandate a determination that a legal duty exists ․ [The court must also make] a determination of the fundamental policy of the law, as to whether the defendant's responsibility should extend to such results.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 386, 650 A.2d 153 (1994).   Here, it is sound policy to impose a duty on the driver of an automobile, who is stopped at an intersection, to make sure that no cars are still in or entering an intersection prior to accelerating through the intersection after the traffic signal turns green.   Such a duty decreases traffic accidents by encouraging drivers to pay attention to other automobiles at an intersection, in addition to the traffic signal.

Moreover, such a duty does not pose an undue burden on drivers.   It is unlike the proposed duty in Sic v. Nunan, supra, 307 Conn. 410, where the defendant was lawfully stopped at an intersection when it was rear-ended and thrust into on-coming traffic and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle.  Id., 412.   The plaintiff argued that “the defendant's conduct in failing to position the wheels of his vehicle so as to minimize the risk that he might be thrust into [the plaintiff's] travel lane constituted a breach of the defendant's duty of care.”  Id., 405.   The court, however, held that “[e]ven if it was foreseeable that lawfully stopping at an intersection can result in injuries to oncoming motorists ․ the plaintiff's argument that public policy supports the imposition of a duty in this case is ․ unavailing.”  Id., 410.   Specifically, the court reasoned that a duty for drivers to position the wheels in a certain manner “would not only open up innumerable avenues of additional liability for drivers ․ but also would make a determination of which direction the wheels of a vehicle should be positioned in the multitude of potential intersection situations very difficult, if not impossible, for drivers to ascertain.”  Id., 410–11.   In contrast, the duty to make sure no crossing traffic is in or about to enter an intersection after a signal turns green is dissimilar to the burdensome and challenging duty of positioning wheels in a certain manner at an intersection.

Accordingly, a legal duty exists for the defendant to proceed through an intersection with caution.   Namely, “[w]hen the light change[s] to green, [a driver is] required to act as would a reasonably prudent person with the knowledge that she had the green light in her favor and that she could not proceed in disregard of the presence of other vehicles ․” Gorman v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 146 Conn. 383, 386, 151 A.2d 341 (1959) (despite the fact that the traffic signal was green, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover because she did not proceed through the intersection as a reasonably prudent person by driving through the intersection without checking for other vehicles);  see also Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975) (denial of summary judgment where the driver of an automobile, who had the right of way, collided with another vehicle at an intersection but did not look down the road from where the other automobile came);  Turbert v. Mather Motors, Inc., 165 Conn. 422, 429, 334 A.2d 903 (1973) (“when faced with a green light at an intersection [a driver] must act as a reasonably prudent person with a knowledge that he cannot proceed in disregard of other vehicles in the intersection”).   This rule is corroborated by General Statutes § 14–299(b)(1), which provides, in relevant part:  “[v]ehicular traffic facing a green signal may proceed straight through [an intersection] ․ except that such traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and vehicles lawfully within a crosswalk or the intersection at the time such signal was exhibited ․” (Emphasis added.).

In the present case, the defendant, as an operator of a motor vehicle, was under a duty to use reasonable care and to keep a reasonable lookout for traffic that he was likely to encounter.   More specifically, the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care by checking for any vehicles still in or entering the intersection after the traffic signal turned green.   Having determined that a legal duty exists for the defendant to exercise reasonable caution when driving through an intersection, the court must determine whether the defendant has met his burden in showing the absence of any genuine issue as to whether he checked for crossing traffic before proceeding into the intersection.

“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment ․ the defendant ha[s] an obligation to negate the factual claims as framed by the complaint.”  Mott v. Wal–Mart Stores East, LP, 139 Conn.App. 618, 628, 57 A.3d 391 (2012).   Here, the plaintiff specifically alleges that her injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence because he failed to keep an adequate and proper lookout for other vehicles on the roadway.   Thus, in order to prevail on the instant motion for summary judgment, the defendant must provide evidence that shows he did maintain an adequate and proper lookout for other vehicles in the intersection.   The evidence presented by the defendant, however, does not establish that he checked for vehicles that were already in or entering the intersection before proceeding.   Rather, the defendant's affidavit merely states that he entered the intersection of Village Street and Clintonville Road when the traffic signal was green and was struck by a vehicle traveling eastbound.  (Defendant's Ex.) He further attested that he was struck by Heafy's vehicle after he was almost through the intersection and that he was not at fault for the accident.  (Defendant's Ex.) The police report states that Heafy failed to stop at the red light and struck the right side of the defendant's vehicle in the middle of the intersection.  (Defendant's Ex.) The plaintiff's deposition states that as the light turned green and the defendant proceeded into the intersection, the plaintiff saw a car coming towards her.   (Defendant's Ex.) When asked how far the defendant had driven into the intersection when the accident occurred, the plaintiff stated, “I don't think we had ma[d]e it to halfway ․” (Defendant's Ex.) Notably, the defendant's exhibits are inconsistent as to the location of the initial impact.⁴  Furthermore, the exhibits do not show that the defendant fulfilled his duty by checking for vehicles already in or entering the intersection before he proceeded southbound on Village Road. The only relevant evidence that addresses this duty is in the plaintiff's deposition where she was asked whether the defendant looked to the left or the right when the vehicle entered the intersection.   The plaintiff's response to the question was, “I don't know.”   (Defendant's Ex.) This statement is clearly insufficient to prove that the defendant checked for other vehicles in the intersection before proceeding.   Moreover, there is no evidence that shows Heafy's automobile was not already in the intersection at the time the defendant's traffic signal turned green.   In fact, the plaintiff stated in her deposition that “[t]here was a car coming at us, and my son started [driving through the intersection].”  (Defendant's Ex.) Thus, the plaintiff's deposition seems to suggest that Heafy's vehicle may have already been in the intersection before the defendant proceeded southbound.   Accordingly, the defendant has not met his burden in showing that he maintained an adequate and proper lookout for other vehicles prior to entering the intersection.   Thus, a material issue of fact remains as to whether the defendant breached his duty to use reasonable care.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Robert Lombardi filed the instant motion for summary judgment and will, hereafter, be referred to as “the defendant” in this memorandum.   Counts one and three are not directed against Robert Lombardi and will not be addressed in this memorandum..  FN1. Robert Lombardi filed the instant motion for summary judgment and will, hereafter, be referred to as “the defendant” in this memorandum.   Counts one and three are not directed against Robert Lombardi and will not be addressed in this memorandum.

FN2. This case was initially scheduled to be tried on May 9, 2013.   The defendant filed a motion for permission to file summary judgment, which was granted on March 4, 2013, and the court subsequently continued the original trial date..  FN2. This case was initially scheduled to be tried on May 9, 2013.   The defendant filed a motion for permission to file summary judgment, which was granted on March 4, 2013, and the court subsequently continued the original trial date.

FN3. Specifically, the Connecticut driver's manual states, in relevant part:  “Before you enter an intersection, look both left and right for approaching vehicles and/or crossing pedestrians.   When stopped, look both left and right just before you start moving ․ Do not rely on traffic signals to tell you that no one will be crossing in front of you.   Some driver's do not obey traffic signals or signs.   Look left and right at an intersection, even if other traffic has a red light or a stop sign.   This is especially important just after the light has turned green.   This is when people on the cross street are most likely to hurry through the intersection before the light changes to red.   Some drivers who fail to pay attention may not stop.   Make sure you can clearly see crossing traffic before entering an intersection.”  (Plaintiff's Ex. A.).  FN3. Specifically, the Connecticut driver's manual states, in relevant part:  “Before you enter an intersection, look both left and right for approaching vehicles and/or crossing pedestrians.   When stopped, look both left and right just before you start moving ․ Do not rely on traffic signals to tell you that no one will be crossing in front of you.   Some driver's do not obey traffic signals or signs.   Look left and right at an intersection, even if other traffic has a red light or a stop sign.   This is especially important just after the light has turned green.   This is when people on the cross street are most likely to hurry through the intersection before the light changes to red.   Some drivers who fail to pay attention may not stop.   Make sure you can clearly see crossing traffic before entering an intersection.”  (Plaintiff's Ex. A.)

FN4. The court cannot infer that Heafy's vehicle entered the intersection after the defendant started driving even if the evidence was clear that the defendant was hit after he was almost through the intersection.   Such an inference would be properly left to a finder of fact to determine..  FN4. The court cannot infer that Heafy's vehicle entered the intersection after the defendant started driving even if the evidence was clear that the defendant was hit after he was almost through the intersection.   Such an inference would be properly left to a finder of fact to determine.

Wilson, Robin L., J.