Asucena Martinez–Vasquez, Administratrix v. Victor M. Arenas et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO REARGUE, MOTION TO STRIKE

This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 2, 2011, which resulted in the death of Kelvin Luna (the decedent).   The plaintiff, Asucena Martinez–Vazquez, both as administratrix of the decedent's estate and in her individual capacity as the decedent's spouse, filed an initial twenty-three-count complaint on August 10, 2012, and since has filed three additional amended complaints against the defendants, Victor Arenas, Abel G. Rodriguez and Abel Quality Construction, LLC. The third amended complaint, filed on March 5, 2013, is now the operative complaint.¹  Pending before the court is a motion to strike counts eight and eleven, which allege recklessness, pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295, against Rodriguez.   These counts are identical throughout the various iterations of the complaint.

The plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of counts eight and eleven.   At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Rodriguez owned the defendant, Abel Quality Construction.   On or about April 2, 2011, Arenas, the permissive operator of a motor vehicle owned by Rodriguez, and, acting as the agent, servant and/or employee of Rodriguez and Abel Quality Construction, suddenly and without warning, violently collided into the passenger side of the decedent's vehicle.   As a result of Arenas' carelessness and recklessness, the decedent suffered multiple injuries and ultimately died.

As to count eight, in her capacity as administratrix of the decedent's estate, the plaintiff alleges that at the time of the accident, Arenas deliberately and/or with reckless disregard operated the motor vehicle at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any person in violation of General Statutes § 14–222.   Rodriguez knew that Arenas was intoxicated, had a propensity to drive while intoxicated and did not have a valid driver's license, but permitted him to drive the motor vehicle.   As a result of Rodriguez's reckless conduct, the decedent suffered several severe injuries, which ultimately resulted in his death.   The plaintiff suffered emotional pain and suffering, the loss of the ability to enjoy life's pleasures and activities, and medical and funeral expenses.

As to count eleven, the plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations in count eight.   She additionally alleges, in her individual capacity, that as a result of Rodriguez's reckless actions, the plaintiff was caused to suffer and will continue to suffer loss of consortium, loss of society, affection, assistance and conjugal fellowship.   In her prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks double or treble damages.

On October 16, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts eight and eleven of the original complaint and the corresponding prayer for relief.²  On October 26, 2012, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike, which was accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law.   The motion appeared on the short calendar as an arguable matter.   When only the plaintiff appeared, the court took the motion on the papers, and thereafter, on December 11, 2012, denied the motion to strike.   On December 27, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to reargue, which the court, Peck, J., granted on February 25, 2013, for the reason that the record was unclear as to whether the defendant had notice of the scheduled argument date of December 10, 2012.   Thereafter, the matter was heard at short calendar on February 25, 2013, at which time counsel for both parties appeared and the court granted the defendant additional time to file a reply to the plaintiff's objection to the motion to strike.   On March 4, 2013, the defendant filed its reply to the plaintiff's objection.   The matter was heard again at short calendar on March 18, 2013.

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116–17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).  “[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004).

In support of its motion, the defendant owner (Rodriguez), argues that counts eight and eleven of the complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive damages pursuant to § 14–295 for the alleged recklessness of a defendant operator.   In her objection to the motion to strike, the plaintiff argues that a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle recklessly operated by another may be held vicariously liable pursuant to §§ 14–295 and 52–183.   The plaintiff further argues that, while the defendant asserts that it is not liable for punitive damages, § 14–295 expressly or implicitly authorizes the imposition of vicarious liability for double or treble damages, as distinct from punitive damages, against a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle resulting from the recklessness of a defendant operator.   Finally, the plaintiff argues that, when it amended § 14–295 in October 2003, the Connecticut General Assembly intended to impose vicarious liability against a owner of a motor vehicle for the operator's statutory recklessness.   At oral argument and in its reply to the plaintiff's objection, the defendant cites several Superior Court cases that support his argument that a non-operator owner may not be vicariously liable for punitive damages resulting from the recklessness of a defendant operator in violation of the motor vehicle statutes enumerated in § 14–295.

General Statutes § 14–295 provides:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222, 14–227a, 14–230, 14–234, 14–237, 14–239 or 14–240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.   The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.”  General Statutes § 52–183 provides, in relevant part:  “In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment.   The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.”

In Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 840–41, 836 A.2d 394 (2003), our Supreme Court analyzed § 52–183 and determined that while the statute “relieves an injured plaintiff of the burden of going forward with evidence of an agency relationship between the non-operator owner and the operator of the vehicle that caused the plaintiff's injuries, there is nothing in the statutory language to suggest that the liability of the vehicle's owner for the negligent or reckless conduct of the vehicle's operator is any greater than that of an employer for the tortious conduct of his employee.   Because an employer is not vicariously liable for punitive damages arising out of the conduct of his employee, we see no reason to conclude that § 52–183 impliedly gives rise to such liability on the part of a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle.”   The court ultimately held that “ § 52–183 does not abrogate the common-law principle that punitive damages may not be assessed against parties whom the law holds vicariously liable for the acts of others.”  Id., 843.

In light of Matthiessen v. Vanech, there is a split of authority among the judges of the Superior Court as to whether double or treble damages pursuant to § 14–295 applies to vicariously liable parties.   See, e.g., Hollis v. Alamo Financing, L.P., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 08 5024043 (October 7, 2009, Rittenband, J.) [48 Conn. L. Rptr. 620] (denying the defendants' motion to strike, which argued that there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages under common law, and finding that in order to sustain the validity of a recklessness claim pursuant to § 14–295, a plaintiff need only allege the statutorily required facts);  Goss v. Wright, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 5001164 (March 15, 2006, Lopez, J.) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 882, 883) (agreeing with the plaintiff that “if the legislature intended to exclude owners other than owners of rented or leased motor vehicles, it could have done so at the time that [§ 14–295] was amended.   However, it chose not to do so”);  Santillo v. Arredono, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 442323 (March 21, 2001, Blue, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 458, 459) (determining that “the [agency] statute [§ 52–183] facially applies to any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle ․ [and such damages] are the classic type of damages subject to the multiplier effect of § 14–295.   The legislative reference to damages for recklessness in § 52–183 can reasonably be read as encompassing double or treble damages imposed under § 14–295” (internal quotation marks omitted));  see also Batchelor v. Veliz, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 01 0185583 (March 31, 2003, Lewis, J.T.R.).   But see, e.g., Reis v. Hendel, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 6016353 (September 7, 2011, Sheldon, J.) [52 Conn. L. Rptr. 526] (holding “that a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle that is neither leased nor rented may not be held liable for double or treble damages under § 14–295 for another operator's violation of the statute”);  Moncrieffe–West v. Transportation General, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 10–6012915 (December 2010, Burke, J.) (51 Conn. L. Rptr. 96, 98) (holding that “[t]he plain language of [§ 14–295] does ․ [state] unequivocally that only one who ‘deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of [one of the statutorily enumerated traffic laws]’ may be subject to § 14–295 damages”);  Zwicker v. Sabetta, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5008853 (February 1, 2008, Skolnick, J.T.R.) [45 Conn. L. Rptr. 9] (finding that “[t]he very language of § 14–295 supports the conclusion that punitive damages cannot be assessed against a non-operating owner of a motor vehicle”).

In the present case, the plaintiff argues that it seeks double or treble damages, as opposed to punitive damages, as mischaracterized by the defendant in his motion to strike, and that such damages are recoverable against the defendant pursuant to § 14–295.³  In support of this position, the plaintiff asserts that, when it amended § 14–295 in October 2003, had the legislature intended to exclude all non-operators from vicarious liability for double or treble damages, it would have done so.   This court agrees.   See Goss v. Wright, supra, 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 883.   Further, the plain language of § 14–295 does not limit an award of double or treble damages to the operator of the motor vehicle.   Rather, in pertinent part, it simply states that the trier of fact may award such damages if the injured party pleads that “another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle” in violation of one of the enumerated provisions.   Therefore, the statute allows for the possibility that more than one party may be subject to double or treble damages including a non-operator owner.

Finally, §§ 14–295 and 52–183, can reasonably be read together as encompassing vicarious liability for double or treble damages imposed under § 14–295 in that § 52–183 specifically establishes an agency relationship between the owner and operator of a motor vehicle in civil actions for damages arising out of the negligent or reckless operation of a motor vehicle.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, upon reargument, the defendant's motion to strike is denied.

Peck, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on October 26, 2012, and a second amended complaint on December 13, 2012..  FN1. The plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on October 26, 2012, and a second amended complaint on December 13, 2012.

FN2. The prayer for relief in the original complaint sought neither double or treble damages nor punitive damages.   Nonetheless, the motion to strike, which addressed to this version of the complaint, seeks to strike counts eight and eleven and the corresponding prayer for relief, on the ground that punitive damages are not available to a plaintiff seeking recovery under § 14–295.   The amended complaint, filed on October 26, 2012, added double or treble damages.   It was not until the second amended complaint, filed December 13, 2012, that punitive damages were added to the prayer for relief.   The same prayer for relief is contained in the most recent version, the third amended complaint filed on March 5, 2013.   Because neither party raised this discrepancy in the pleadings by motion, objection or at oral argument, the court addresses the motion to strike on its merits..  FN2. The prayer for relief in the original complaint sought neither double or treble damages nor punitive damages.   Nonetheless, the motion to strike, which addressed to this version of the complaint, seeks to strike counts eight and eleven and the corresponding prayer for relief, on the ground that punitive damages are not available to a plaintiff seeking recovery under § 14–295.   The amended complaint, filed on October 26, 2012, added double or treble damages.   It was not until the second amended complaint, filed December 13, 2012, that punitive damages were added to the prayer for relief.   The same prayer for relief is contained in the most recent version, the third amended complaint filed on March 5, 2013.   Because neither party raised this discrepancy in the pleadings by motion, objection or at oral argument, the court addresses the motion to strike on its merits.

FN3. As previously noted, it was not until her second and third amended complaints that the plaintiff added punitive damages (in addition to double or treble damages) to her prayer for relief..  FN3. As previously noted, it was not until her second and third amended complaints that the plaintiff added punitive damages (in addition to double or treble damages) to her prayer for relief.

Peck, A. Susan, J.