C.J. Mozzochi, Ph.D. v. Matthew L. Stone et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

In this action for libel based on defendant's allegation in the underlying case that plaintiff committed the crime of extortion, defendants moved to dismiss the action because the alleged defamatory statement was made in a pleading in the course of judicial proceedings.   The defendants rely on a number of superior court decisions like Jonas v. Delallo, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 10 5029297 (December 11, 2012, Bellis, J.) (55 Conn. L. Rptr. 226), which supports their proposition that a motion to dismiss is the proper vehicle for disposing of a cause of action arising from an alleged defamatory statement made in a pleading.

In Jonas, the court interpreted our Supreme Court's decision in Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 272 Conn. 776, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005), as standing for the proposition that absolute immunity is properly considered in a motion to dismiss.  Jonas v. Delallo, supra, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 228 (explicitly holding that “the defendants' absolute immunity arguments implicate this court's subject matter jurisdiction”).

Connecticut courts have recognized absolute immunity as a defense in certain retaliatory civil actions.   See Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 344, 927 A.2d 304 (2007).   Specifically, our courts “consistently have held that absolute immunity bars defamation claims that arise from statements made in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial hearings.”  Id. See Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 80, 856 A.2d 372 (2004);  Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 494–95, 529 A.2d 171 (1987).  “It is well settled that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged [as] long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy ․ In making [the] determination [of whether a particular statement is made in the course of a judicial proceeding], the court must decide as a matter of law whether the ․ statements [at issue] are sufficiently relevant to the issues involved in a proposed or ongoing judicial proceeding, so as to qualify for the privilege.   The test for relevancy is generous, and ‘judicial proceeding’ has been defined liberally.”  Jonas v. Delallo, supra, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 230, citing Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459, 465–67, 935 A.2d 103 (2007).

“The Restatement (Second) of Torts ․ provides that ‘[a]n attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.”   Jonas v. Delallo, supra, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 230, quoting 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 586, p. 247 (1977).   The privilege necessarily extends to statements made in courts, as well as those contained in pleadings, briefs and affidavits.   See McManus v. McSweeny, 78 Conn.App. 327, 335, 827 A.2d 708 (2003);  Jonas v. Delallo, supra, 55 Conn. L. Rptr. 230.

Plaintiff's claim that the claim of extortion was not pertinent to the subject of the controversy is without merit.

Motion to Dismiss granted.

Wagner, J.T.R.

Wagner, Jerry, J.T.R.