Eric Alvarez v. Commissioner of Correction (2013)

THE COURT:  Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, a 1976 case (as read), in order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and prison officials will be found to have violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution if by virtue of their deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs, they refuse to provide care or treatment to that inmate.

Under Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (as read), when the State takes a person into its custody and holds them there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume responsibility for safety and general wellbeing.   The rationale for this principle is simple enough:  when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, at the same time fail to provide for his basic human needs, for example, food, clothing, shelter, medical care and reasonable safety, it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment.   Contemporary standards of decency required no less.

Although accidental inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care to a prisoner would not violate the Eighth Amendment, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Amendment because it constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, contrary to contemporary standards of decency.

A claim that the conditions of prisoner's confinement violate the Eighth Amendment requires an inquiry into the prison official's state of mind.   Whether one characterizes the treatment received by the prisoner as inhuman conditions of confinement, failing to attend to his medical needs or a combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the deliberate indifference standard.

And in Connecticut under Farady v. Commissioner of Correction, 288 Conn. (2008) (as read), the standard of deliberate indifference includes both subjective and objective components.   First the alleged deprivation must be in objective terms sufficiently serious;  second, the government official must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.   An official acts with requisite deliberate indifference, when that official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.   The official must both be aware of facts from which the indifference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the same inference.

Thus, an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.   Accordingly, to establish a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must prove that the official's actions constituted more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interest or safety.   Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault requiring proof of a state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness.

The Court has heard testimony today from the petitioner and the respondent's witness, Dr. Berkowitz.   The Court has also reviewed some of the exhibits that had been admitted as full exhibits.   The petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that the respondent is deliberately indifferent to his medical needs for his diabetic neuropathy.   The petitioner himself testified that he cannot prove deliberate indifference.

Dr. Berkowitz is an extremely experienced podiatrist who has treated the petitioner for the past six years and is very familiar with his condition.   The Court found his testimony to be very credible and saw no bias on his part by the fact that he works for the DOC one day a week.   The Court found that Dr. Berkowitz has been very attentive to the petitioner's needs, and I saw no deliberate indifference on his part.

The petitioner has provided no evidence that the shoes that he would like to purchase from an outside vendor is more therapeutic than the special diabetic shoes he currently wears as prescribed by Dr. Berkowitz.   Dr. Berkowitz' concern is that these shoes may be more harmful than protective.

As to the petitioner's feet and the ulcers, Dr. Berkowitz also testified that they may be a manifestation of the disease itself and not from the shoes.

It is well established that mere disagreement over proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim.   As long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, and I'm quoting Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, 288 Conn. 344.

In the Court's opinion, the shoes that he currently wears are adequate.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied and judgment enters for the respondent.

And for the record, the petitioner is provided his right to appeal.

Hunchu Kwak, Judge

Kwak, Hunchu, J.