Manuel Vasquez v. LLC (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court concerning motions by the defendants Fleet Car Lease, Inc. (“Fleet”) and Edward Robinson for directed verdict and to set aside the verdict and to enter verdict on the plaintiff's complaint in favor of the defendants.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an accident that occurred on June 3, 2008 on Interstate 94 in Greenwich, Connecticut.   The defendant, Edwin Robinson, was operating his tractor-trailer from Rhode Island to New Jersey when he sought to repair a leaky hub seal originating in the rear wheel assembly of his trailer.   Unfamiliar with the geographical area, Mr. Robinson made inquiries at a Pilot Truck Stop in Orange as to where the repairs could be effectuated.   A representative of the truck stop gave him the name of a repair shop, co-defendant Road Service Network, LLC and/or Orlando Otero, Sr. Orlando Otero, Sr. referred Mr. Robinson to his son, Orlando Otero, Jr. in Bridgeport.

Although Mr. Robinson planned on having only the hub seal repaired, Orlando Otero, Jr. convinced him to have additional brake work done on all the wheels of the trailer.   After Otero, Jr. completed the repairs Mr. Robinson resumed driving his tractor trailer southbound on I–95. In or near Stamford Mr. Robinson noticed some smoke coming from the rear passenger side of the trailer.   He pulled over and called Orlando Otero, Jr. to discuss the situation.   Mr. Otero assured Mr. Robinson that the truck was simply burning off grease and/or oil from the repair job and that he could safely proceed with the operation of his vehicle.   Relying on these representations, Mr. Robinson resumed driving.   He had only traveled a few miles when the front driver side wheel assembly disengaged from the trailer striking the vehicle of the plaintiff Manuel Vasquez and causing the injuries that are the subject matter of this litigation.   After the accident, the Connecticut State Police arrived and Mr. Robinson's truck was towed to a weigh station.   Mr. Robinson learned that the spindle nuts were improperly attached on all the wheels that Mr. Otero had worked on.   Mr. Robinson was not issued any traffic citations for the accident.   Thereafter, the truck was repaired by East Coast Services.   Following completion of those repairs, Mr. Robinson drove the truck without incident to New Jersey.   On January 10, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $100,125.16 in economic damages relating to the medical bills for treatment of his injuries, and $818,000 in non-economic damages.   The jury further answered interrogatories finding that the defendant, Mr. Robinson:  (1) was not negligent in hiring Mr. Otero to provide repair services to his truck, but (2) was negligent in relying upon Mr. Otero's advice concerning the smoke coming from his truck, (3) Robinson and Fleet were 30% at fault, and (4) Mr. Otero and his repair shop were 70% at fault.

Fleet and Robinson submit that based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could not have found that the defendant, Mr. Robinson, breached his duty of care to the plaintiff, or that his actions proximately caused the accident.   They further argue that the verdict in the plaintiff's favor must be set aside because the jury has provided logically irreconcilable and inconsistent answers to interrogatories which they claim to be the probable result of juror confusion or mistake.

II. STATEMENT OF LAW

A motion for directed verdict may only be granted if the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff nevertheless determines that a jury could not reasonably and legally reach any other conclusion.   Although generally disfavored, a directed verdict “should be ordered whenever a jury could reach no other conclusion without speculation.”  Williams v. Chameides, 26 Conn.App. 818, 822, 603 A.2d 1211, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 923, 608 A.2d 689 (1992).

Practice Book § 16–35 authorizes the filing of motions to set aside verdicts.   A trial court has the legal discretion to “set aside a verdict on a finding that the verdict is manifestly unjust because, given the evidence presented, the jury mistakenly applied a legal principle or because there is no evidence to which the legal principles of the case could be applied.”  Card v. State, 57 Conn.App. 134, 138 (2000).   Moreover, a trial court has authority to set aside a verdict where the jury's verdict is based on the jury's inconsistent response to the interrogatories.  “It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting answers in order to take the case away from the jury on a theory that gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences.   When a claim is made that the jury's answers to interrogatories in returning a verdict are inconsistent, the court has the duty to attempt to harmonize the answers.”  Norrie v. Heil Co., 203 Conn. 594, 606, 525 A.2d 1332 (1987).

Litigants have a constitutional right to have factual issues resolved by a jury.  Seals v. Hickey, 186 Conn. 337, 350, 441 A.2d 604 (1982).  “In considering a motion to set aside the verdict, the court must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably supports the jury's verdict.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Boyce v. Allstate Inc. Co., 236 Conn. 375, 381, 673 A.2d 77 (1996).   Even though a court has the power to set aside a jury verdict if it finds that it is contrary to the law or evidence, it should not do so if it finds some evidence in support of the verdict.  PAR Painting, Inc. v. Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc., 61 Conn.App. 317, 322, 763 A02d 1078, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 951, 770 A.2d 31 (2001).   Generally speaking, “[a] court is empowered to set aside a jury verdict when, in the court's opinion, the verdict is contrary to the law or unsupported by the evidence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  O'Connor v. Board of Education, 90 Conn.App. 59, 64, 877 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 912, 882 A.2d 675 (2005).   However, “[i]f the trial court finds that the verdict is so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, then it is his duty to set aside the verdict.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Vickers v. Jessup, 32 Conn.App. 360, 370 629 A02d 457 (1993).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants raise three arguments in support of their motions.

A. Defendants first claim that the court must enter a directed verdict because the plaintiff has failed to prove the defendant Edward Robinson breached his duty of care to the plaintiff.   They maintain that the plaintiff did not adduce sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant breached the duty to act like a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.   Although the jury found that Mr. Robinson was not negligent and acted reasonably in relying upon Mr. Otero's shop to perform repairs to his truck, its verdict indicates that it found that Mr. Robinson did not reasonably rely upon Mr. Otero's advice concerning the smoke that came from his truck.   It does not follow that Robinson discharged his duty to the plaintiff merely by relying upon Mr. Otero's expertise.   Viewing all of the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, there was sufficient evidence to establish a breach of duty by Mr. Robinson toward the plaintiff.

B. The defendants next claim that directed verdict must enter because the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.  “[T]he test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries ․ The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection ․ This connection must be based upon more than conjecture and surmise.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Weigold v. Patel, 81 Conn.App. 347, 355, 840 A.2d 19, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 918, 847 A.2d 317 (2004).   It is not the court's function to determine if a different conclusion could have been reached.  “The fundamental inquiry of proximate cause is whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligent conduct.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Malloy v. Colchester, 85 Conn.App. 627, 633, 858 A.2d 813, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 907, 863 A.2d 698 (2004).   Defendants argue that the harm that occurred, i.e., the disengaged truck tire striking plaintiff's car was not within the scope of foreseeable risks associated with Mr. Robinson's conduct.

The jury did not find Mr. Robinson acted negligently in relying upon Mr. Otero to perform his truck repairs.   However, it did determine that Mr. Robinson did not act reasonably when he continued to drive his truck after he saw smoke coming from the rear wheel and that it was within the scope of foreseeable risks that the tire would disengage.   Whether Mr. Robinson had knowledge or could have reasonably known that the spindle nut was improperly attached until after the incident, he continued to operate the truck on the highway after seeing the smoke emanating from the rear wheel area.   Thus, once Mr. Robinson noticed that there was a problem, it was unreasonable for the jury to conclude that he was negligent in continuing to operate the truck.   As a result, the jury further could reasonably find his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.

C. Finally, the defendant, argues that the verdict must be set aside because the jury has provided logically irreconcilable and inconsistent answers to interrogatories which the defendants argue to be the probable result of juror confusion or mistake.   The standard for a trial court to review a jury's responses to interrogatories is particularly narrow.

It is true that a fact finder may not make inconsistent factual determinations based on the same evidence.   Thus, answers to special interrogatories or findings in a special verdict must be consistent with each other, and when they are not, the verdict is inconsistent.  Treglia v. Zanesky, 67 Conn.App. 447, 461 (2001).  “To justify the entry of a judgment contrary to the entry of a judgment contrary to a general verdict upon the basis of answers to interrogatories, those answers must be such in themselves as conclusively to show that as a matter of law judgment could only be rendered for the party against whom the general verdict was found;  they must negate every reasonable hypothesis as to the situation provable under the issues made by the pleadings ․” (Citation omitted).

As to Interrogatory 1a, the jury found that Mr. Robinson was not negligent in choosing “to have the automobile transport trailer service by an unqualified mechanic.”   Thus, the jury found that Mr. Otero was not unqualified and that it was not unreasonable for Mr. Robinson to rely upon the expertise of Mr. Otero and his shop.

In Interrogatory 1b, the jury found that Mr. Robinson was negligent in that “he continued to drive the vehicle on the highway even after he noticed smoke coming from one or more of the wheels, and became aware that oil was leaking from the wheels and that the wheels had not been properly repaired.”   Implicit in this finding is the fact that Mr. Robinson relied upon the advice of Mr. Otero whereby Mr. Otero told Mr. Robinson that he could safely continue driving the truck on the highway.   Defendants submit that it is impossible to reconcile the finding that Mr. Otero was qualified to perform the repairs, and that Mr. Robinson reasonably relied upon his mechanical repairs, with the finding that Mr. Robinson unreasonably relied upon Mr. Otero's advice concerning the cause of the smoke.   The court disagrees.   It was possible for the jury to find that Mr. Robinson could reasonably rely upon Mr. Otero's expertise as a mechanic but that once he saw smoke emanating from the truck tires, it was not reasonable for him to continue driving.   Thus, it would not follow that the jury was confused by the interrogatories and made a mistake in finding that Mr. Robinson was negligent.   The jury heard evidence from Mr. Robinson and the experts in this case.   The weighing of such evidence is the very function of the jury, and it was free to give such evidence whatever weight it felt was appropriate on the issue.  Smith v. Lefebre, 92 Conn.App. 417, 421–22, 885 A.2d 1232 (2005);  Weiss v. Bergen, 3 Conn.App. 810, 813, 779 A.2d 195, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 908, 782 A.2d 1254 (2001).   The fact that the defendants disagree with the jury's conclusion does not mean that its answers to interrogatories were fatally inconsistent.  “[I]f there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's verdict, unless there is a mistake in law or some other valid basis for upsetting the result other than a difference of opinion regarding the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, the trial court should let the jury work their will.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 189, 745 A.2d 789 (2000).   The plaintiffs' argument fails to provide or elicit anything to establish that there was ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality on its part or that it incorrectly applied the law to the facts, O'Connor v. Board of Education, supra, 90 Conn.App. 64;  Vickers v. Jessup, supra, 32 Conn.App. 370.   The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably supports the jury's verdict.   See Margolin v. Kleban & Samor, P.C., 275 Conn. 765, 783–84, 882 A.2d 653 (2005).   The motion to set aside verdict is denied.

SOMMER, J.

Sommer, Mary E., J.