Kathleen M. Avery v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO REARGUE (# 122)

FACTS

On September 20, 2012, the plaintiff, Kathleen M. Avery, in her capacity as executrix of the estate of Paul Michael Avery (Avery), filed a complaint for medical malpractice alleging negligence against the defendant, Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. The plaintiff alleges the following facts.   Avery was a quadriplegic with muscular dystrophy and was under the care of the defendant.   The defendant employed registered nurses, licensed practical nurses and home health aides to care for the decedent at his residence.   Avery relied on a bilevel positive airway pressure (BIPAP) machine and/or mechanical ventilator for assistance in breathing.   On June 20, 2012, the defendant's employee removed the BIPAP machine from Avery and failed to replace the machine prior to leaving the room.   Subsequently, Avery was found apneic and had to be resuscitated during transport to the hospital.   He was then admitted to the intensive care unit for hypercarbic respiratory failure and anoxic encephalopathy.   This condition worsened, which led to Avery's death on December 13, 2010.

On November 8, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.   On December 21, 2012 the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion, as well as a request for leave to amend the complaint to include an amended good faith letter.   Oral argument was first held on January 28, 2013 where this court granted the plaintiff's request for leave to amend and allowed both parties two weeks to file supplemental memoranda addressing the sufficiency of the amended opinion letter.   The matter was again heard at the short calendar on March 18, 2013.   On April 17, 2013, this court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the amended opinion letter sufficiently meets the requirements of General Statutes § 52–190a.   In doing so, the court held that (1) it is appropriate to consider the plaintiff's amended opinion letter in response to a motion to dismiss and (2) the amended opinion letter does not need to be served on the defendant, pursuant to Practice Book § 10–12(c).  Thereafter, the defendant filed the instant motion to reargue on May 2, 2013.

DISCUSSION

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).  “The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss] are:  (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;  (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person;  (3) improper venue;  (4) insufficiency of process;  and (5) insufficiency of service of process.”  Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book § 143, which is now § 10–31.

“[T]he purpose of a reargument is ․ to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts ․ It also may be used to address ․ claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court ․ [A] motion to reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity to have a second bite of the apple ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hudson Valley Bank v. Kissel, 303 Conn. 614, 624, 35 A.3d 260 (2012).  “The granting of a motion for reconsideration ․ is within the sound discretion of the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Allen v. Allen, 134 Conn.App. 486, 504, 39 A.3d 1190 (2012).   For the reasons set forth below the court grants the defendant's motion for reconsideration and issues the following decision.

The defendant argues that the court is required to decide the motion to dismiss based on the facts and circumstances that were presented prior to the amended complaint in light of the recent Supreme Court's decision in Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 63 A.3d 940 (2013), issued subsequent to this court's initial decision.   Additionally, the defendant continues to argue that personal jurisdiction cannot be cured by mailing a copy of the amended complaint to the plaintiff's counsel pursuant to Practice Book § 10–12(a).

Contrary to the defendant's argument, the decision in Santorso does not have a controlling effect in the present case.   The issues confronted by the Supreme Court in Santorso were whether (1) the plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the trial court had granted the defendant's motion to strike rather than a motion to dismiss and (2) the plaintiff's action could be saved by the accidental failure of suit statute.   Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, supra, 308 Conn. 338–39.   The only language in Santorso that is relevant to the present case is where the court reiterated that “the written opinion letter, prepared in accordance with the dictates of [General Statutes] § 52–190a, like the good faith certificate, is akin to a pleading that must be attached to the complaint in order to commence ․ the action [properly].”  Id., 350–51.   This language, however, is merely a recitation of the holding in Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 397, 21 A.3d 451 (2011).   Thus, the Santorso decision neither addresses nor resolves the Superior Court split as to whether amending a good faith letter is an appropriate response in a pending motion to dismiss.

In Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn. 1, 30 n.17, 12 A.3d 865 (2011), the court was also “not presented with an opportunity to resolve a division in the Superior Court authority concerning whether amendment of the defective pleading, including the substitution of a new opinion letter for one that appears not to comply with 52–190a(a) or one that was not filed at all, is an appropriate response to a pending motion to dismiss ․” Furthermore, a review of recent Superior Court cases reveals at least five cases decided after Morgan that continue to allow the consideration of a subsequently amended or attached written opinion letter in the context of a motion to dismiss.   See Sanchez v. Miller, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 11 6008316 (September 23, 2011, Cosgrove, J.) (considering an opinion letter that was amended after the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff failed to attach an adequate written opinion letter from a similar healthcare provider);  Demars v. Slevinsky, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 12 6005278 (October 12, 2012, Calmar J.) (54 Conn. L. Rptr. 788, 790) (allowing the plaintiff to file an amended opinion letter in response to a motion to dismiss in order to address the omission of the author's credentials);  Kissel v. Center for Women's Health, P.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV 12 6013562 (September 6, 2012, Karazin, J.T.R.) (54 Conn. L. Rptr. 682, 685) (holding that “to the extent that the written opinion letter existed prior to the commencement of this action, then the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may deny the defendants' motions to dismiss and consider the written opinion letter that is attached to the amended complaint”);  Xicohtencatl v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 11 6018319 (October 18, 2011, Burke, J.) (considering the plaintiff's amended complaint to which an opinion letter was attached, but ultimately dismissing the amended complaint because the opinion letter was not sufficient);  Meleny–Distassio v. Weinstein, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV 12 6015461 (February 1, 2013, Adams, J.T.R.) (same).  Therefore, the Superior Court split that allows the consideration of an amended opinion letter continues to exist.   Accordingly, the court did not overlook a principal of law by considering the plaintiff's amended opinion letter in the context of a motion to dismiss.

The defendant's second argument, that the plaintiff is required to serve process with respect to the amended opinion letter, is also unavailing.   As the court previously held in its decision denying the defendant's motion, the defendant was not deprived of its due process rights because the defendant had fair and actual notice of the instant suit.   The plaintiff properly served the defendant with the original summons and complaint, along with the original opinion letter on September 20, 2012.  “Proper service of process ․ promotes the public policy of ensuring actual notice to defendants.”  Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 685, 986 A.2d 290 (2010);  see also Genung's, Inc. v. Rice, 33 Conn.Sup. 554, 542, 362 A.2d 540 (App.Sess.1976) (“chief purpose of service is to ensure actual notice that an action is pending”).   Here, the defendant had actual notice of the present suit because the plaintiff properly served the defendant with the original complaint and opinion letter.   The plaintiff was not required to serve the amended opinion letter because the court never granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.   Furthermore, the amended complaint that was mailed to the defendant's counsel, pursuant to Practice Book § 10–12(c), does not contain any new or additional claims for relief against the defendant.   The only modification to the plaintiff's amended complaint is an amended opinion letter.   The amended opinion letter is substantively identical to the original opinion letter that was attached to the complaint at the commencement of this instant suit.   The only difference between the opinion letters is that the credentials of the similar health care provider are further elaborated and there is an additional paragraph detailing the events that transpired on June 20, 2010.   These technical changes to the opinion letter merely amplify the original facts alleged in support of the plaintiff's cause of action.   The rest of the amended opinion letter incorporates, word for word, the plaintiff's original letter and remains written by the same author.   Therefore, the plaintiff's amended complaint and opinion letter merely substitute omitted facts in the original opinion letter that were already in existence at the commencement of this action and, some of which, are alleged in the original complaint.   Accordingly, the defendant's due process rights were not violated because it had fair and actual notice of the instant suit based on the plaintiff's original complaint and opinion letter.

Moreover, the defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied even if this court does not take into consideration the amended opinion letter because the original opinion letter sufficiently satisfies the requirements of General Statutes §§ 52–184c and 52–190a.   The defendant first argues that the author of the plaintiff's original opinion letter is not a similar health care provider pursuant to § 52–184c.   Specifically, the defendant contends that there is no information that the author is trained and experienced in the same specialty.¹  The plaintiff argues that the original opinion letter sufficiently specifies the author's credentials and meets the requirements of § 52–184c.

“[T]he attachment of a written opinion letter that does not comply with § 52–190a constitutes insufficient process and, thus, service of that insufficient process does not subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court.”  Morgan v. Hartford Hospital, supra, 301 Conn. 401.  Section 52–190a(a) requires that “the claimant or the claimant's attorney ․ obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider, as defined in [General Statutes § ]52–184c, which similar health care provider shall be selected pursuant to the provisions of said section, that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion.”

Section 52–184c(a) provides, in relevant part:  “The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.”  “In defining a cause of action against a health care provider, § 52–184c incorporates the definition of health care provider set forth in General Statutes § 52–184b, which, in turn, provides that a health care provider ‘is any person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by this state to provide health care or professional services ․” Bruttomesso v. Northeastern Connecticut Sexual Assault Crisis Services, Inc., 242 Conn. 1, 7, 698 A.2d 795 (1997);  see also Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth and Women's Center, 135 Conn.App. 679, 689, 42 A.3d 521, cert. granted, 305 Conn. 921 (2012).  “If the defendant health care provider is not certified by the appropriate American board as being a specialist, is not trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or does not hold himself out as a specialist, a ‘similar health care provider’ is one who:  (1)[i]s licensed by the appropriate regulatory agency of this state or another state requiring the same or greater qualifications;  and (2) is trained and experienced in the same discipline or school of practice and such training and experience shall be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.”  General Statutes § 52–184c(b).

In the present case, the defendant is a corporation that engages in home health care and is not alleged to be certified or held out as a specialist.   Therefore, an appropriate similar health care provider is a registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, and/or home health aides experienced in the home health care within the five-year period prior to the incident.

The defendant cites to Bell v. Hospital of Saint Raphael, 133 Conn.App. 548, 36 A.3d 297 (2012), in support of its argument that the author is not a similar health care provider because the letter does not adequately discuss the author's training and experience.   In Bell, the plaintiff, in her individual capacity and as the administratrix of the decedent's estate, brought a medical negligence action against the Hospital of Saint Raphael.  Id., 549.   The court held that the opinion letter did not set forth sufficient information to demonstrate that its author was a similar health care provider.  Id., 560.   Notably, the only description of the author's qualifications that appeared at the end of the letter were the initials, “RN, BSN, ICP.” Id., 552.   Based on this lack of explanation regarding the author's training and experience in the discipline, the court held that it could not conclude the author was a similar health care provider because “the only thing that may be gleaned from the opinion letter is that the author is a registered nurse with a bachelor of science degree in nursing.”  Id., 560.   The Appellate Court stated that it does not “interpret this court's case law to require that the letter contain a complete exposition of the health care provider's bona fides, but merely that it discloses that the health care provider possesses the qualifications set forth in § 52–184c.”   Id., 561 n.6. Unlike the facts in Bell, the opinion letter in the present case sufficiently describes the author's credentials.²  Specifically, the plaintiff's opinion letter is written by a registered nurse with a master's degree in health services administration.   Additionally, the letter states that her credentials include over ten years of experience in home health care management from 2001 to 2011.   Furthermore, the author is currently the director of operations for a large home health care agency and her responsibilities include clinical oversight for the organization.   Therefore, based on the description of the author's qualifications contained within the opinion letter, it is clear that the author is a qualified similar health care provider.

The defendant's reliance on Patenaude v. Norwalk Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 11 6022949 (September 12, 2012, Richards J.) is also unavailing.   In Patenaude, “[t]he author of the opinion letter state[d] in the addendum paragraph that she is licensed in the State of Connecticut and is familiar with the standard of care as it relates to the practice of nursing in the year 2007 in the United States.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because “the author's qualifications fail[ed] to address ․ that the author was trained and experienced in nursing as the result of active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the July 30, 2007 incident that gave rise to th[e] claim.”  Id. Specifically, “the author's only reference to the five-year period prior to July 30, 2007, was that she had been an independent medical-legal nurse consultant since 2002.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id. Unlike the facts in Patenaude, the letter in the present case specifically states that the author's experience includes over ten years of home health care management.   Furthermore, the author was the area director for Bayada Nurses, a national home care organization, from 2001 to 2011.   The incident that gave rise to this claim occurred on June 20, 2010.   Thus, the author in the present case clearly had more than the requisite five-year experience in the field prior to the date of the incident.

The defendant next argues that the opinion contained in the original opinion letter does not reference the events of June 20, 2010, that form the basis of the author's opinion.   Specifically, the defendant argues that there is no support in the opinion letter that the defendant was negligent on June 20, 2010.   In response, the plaintiff maintains that the letter is sufficiently detailed because the author specifically states that Avery's mother was interviewed regarding the events of June 20, 2010.   Additionally, the plaintiff contends that the opinion letter clearly relates to the events of June 20, 2010, when read together with the complaint.

Section 52–190a(a) requires “the claimant or the claimant's attorney ․ [to] obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider ․ that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion.”  “[A] written opinion satisfies the ‘detailed basis' requirement of § 52–190a(a) if it sets forth the basis of the similar health care provider's opinion that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence by express reference to what the defendant did or failed to do to breach the applicable standard of care.   In other words, the written opinion must state the similar health care provider's opinion as to the applicable standard of care, the fact that the standard of care was breached, and the factual basis of the similar health care provider's conclusion concerning the breach of the standard of care.   This level of detail is sufficient because it satisfies the requirement of § 52–190a(a) that the written opinion shall include both the opinion of the similar health care provider that ‘there appears to be evidence of medical negligence’ and a ‘detailed basis for the formation of such opinion,’ that is, a statement setting forth the facts then known to the health care provider on which that opinion of medical negligence is predicated.”  Wilcox v. Schwartz, 303 Conn. 630, 643–44, 37 A.3d 133 (2012) (quoting General Statutes § 52–190a(a)).

In Wilcox, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the opinion did not meet the detailed basis requirement because it did not include “particulars as to what the defendant did that he was not supposed to do or failed to do that he was supposed to do.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 635.³  The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiffs' argument that the trial court's conclusion was incorrect and reversed the judgment.   On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants challenged the Appellate Court's determination that the opinion contained sufficient detail to comply with § 52–190a(a) on the grounds that it “fails to identify the particular negligent act or acts that caused the damage to [the plaintiff] ․ [and] does not expressly identify the standard of care.”   Id., 637–38.   The court noted that “the opinion provides that the standard of care required [the defendant] to protect [the plaintiff's] biliary structures during the ․ surgery and that his failure to do so caused injury to those structures.   Although the defendants may disagree with the standard of care identified in the written opinion and with the author's assertion that [the defendant] had deviated from it, that disagreement does not render the opinion insufficient under § 52–190a(a) when the information contained therein was sufficient to place the defendants on notice of the nature of the alleged medical negligence.”  Id., 647–48.   Further, the court disagreed with the defendants' contention that the opinion was deficient in that it “does not state explicitly that the standard of care required [the defendant] to take measures to ‘protect’ the [plaintiff's] biliary structures.”   Id., 646 n.9. The court stated that the written opinion was sufficient because the language, “when read in proper context, expresses the view of its author that the standard of care required [the defendant] to take appropriate measures to protect [the plaintiff's] biliary structures from injury during the surgery and, further, that he failed to do so.”  Id.

Similarly, the original opinion letter in the present case also satisfies the “detailed basis” requirement of § 52–190a(a).   The letter states that the author “reviewed all pertinent documentation from Mr. Avery's medical record, the citation report issued by the State of Connecticut [d]epartment of [p]ublic [h]ealth on September 22, 2010, and the [p]lan of [c]orrection submitted by [the defendant] on October 12, 2010.   Additionally, I have interviewed Mr. Avery's mother at length regarding the events of June 20, 2010.   Based upon this, it is my opinion that there was a breach in the standard of care by [the defendant] and their clinical supervisory staff ․” (Emphasis added.)  (Plaintiff's Ex. B.) Additionally, the author opined that (1) the defendant breached the standard of care because home health aides were performing suctioning to clear Avery's airway even though the physician's order required the suction to be made by skilled nursing staff and the law prohibits nursing assistants from performing this activity;  (2) Avery was left unattended at times even though the physician's order required him to be under direct supervision of a qualified adult caregiver at all times and that the failure to follow physician orders is in violation of § 19–13–D68(e) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies;  and (3) the use and/or assessment of BIPAP and mechanical ventilation equipment are outside the scope of practice of home health aide duties and responsibilities.  (Plaintiff's Ex. B.) The contents of this medical opinion sufficiently meets the Wilcox standard because it lists the applicable standards of care and the fact that the standards of care were breached.   Furthermore, the letter also states the factual basis of the similar health care provider's conclusion concerning the breach of the standard of care on June 20, 2010.   It is clear that the author's opinion was based on events that occurred on the date of the incident because the letter specifically states that the author interviewed Avery's mother at length regarding the events of June 20, 2010.   Even if there is any ambiguity, as the defendant argues, that the opinions in the letter are not connected with the events that transpired on June 20, 2010, there is no reason, and we are aware of none, why the written opinion must be read in isolation from the complaint.   Indeed, to comply with § 52–190a(a), the written opinion necessarily will mirror at least some of the allegations in the complaint;  if it does not, it will not fulfill its purpose of substantiating the plaintiff's good faith belief that reasonable grounds exist for the action.”  Wilcox v. Schwartz, supra, 303 Conn. 646 n.9. Here, the plaintiff's complaint alleges, inter alia, that (1) Avery was under the care of the defendant on June 20, 2010;  (2) a home health aide provided home health service to Avery in his home on June 20, 2010;  and (3) on that same date, the home health aide removed the BIPAP machine from Avery and then left him unattended, while failing to replace the machine prior to leaving the room.   Therefore, the author's opinions are clearly based on the events that transpired on June 20, 2010, when the original opinion letter is read in conjunction with the complaint.   As such, the plaintiff's original opinion letter sufficiently satisfies the requirements set forth in § 52–190a.   Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied because the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. It is difficult to discern the defendant's exact argument in its memorandum because it discusses facts from another case.   Specifically, the defendant's memorandum argues that the opinion letter is not written by an experienced nurse who took care of patients on a medical floor in a hospital and that the decedent underwent abdominal surgery.   These are clearly not the same facts that are in the present case, making it difficult to comprehend the defendant's argument..  FN1. It is difficult to discern the defendant's exact argument in its memorandum because it discusses facts from another case.   Specifically, the defendant's memorandum argues that the opinion letter is not written by an experienced nurse who took care of patients on a medical floor in a hospital and that the decedent underwent abdominal surgery.   These are clearly not the same facts that are in the present case, making it difficult to comprehend the defendant's argument.

FN2. The full description of the author's qualifications in the original opinion letter states:  “By way of background, I am a[r]egistered [n]urse with a[m]aster's degree in [h]ealth [s]ervices [a]dministration from Salve Regina University.   My credentials include 10+ years of experience in home health care management in Rhode Island having worked as the [a]rea [d]irector for the Rhode Island offices of Bayada Nurses, a national home care organization from 2001 to 2011.   I am currently the [d]irector of [o]perations for Nursing Placement, Inc., a large home health care agency in Rhode Island which provides skilled nursing and rehabilitation, [h]ospice and home health aide services.   My responsibilities include both clinical and fiscal oversight of the entire organization which services approximately 700 clients throughout Rhode Island and employs approximately 350 people.”.  FN2. The full description of the author's qualifications in the original opinion letter states:  “By way of background, I am a[r]egistered [n]urse with a[m]aster's degree in [h]ealth [s]ervices [a]dministration from Salve Regina University.   My credentials include 10+ years of experience in home health care management in Rhode Island having worked as the [a]rea [d]irector for the Rhode Island offices of Bayada Nurses, a national home care organization from 2001 to 2011.   I am currently the [d]irector of [o]perations for Nursing Placement, Inc., a large home health care agency in Rhode Island which provides skilled nursing and rehabilitation, [h]ospice and home health aide services.   My responsibilities include both clinical and fiscal oversight of the entire organization which services approximately 700 clients throughout Rhode Island and employs approximately 350 people.”

FN3. In Wilcox, the written opinion that the plaintiffs submitted with their complaint stated:  “I have reviewed the relevant records and information that were provided to me with regard to ․ [the injured plaintiff].   I can conclude that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, there are deviations from the applicable standards of care pertaining to the care and treatment of ․ [the plaintiff] provided by [the defendant] and that the care and treatment provided by [him] was not provided in a manner consistent with the standards of care that existed among general surgeons at the time of the alleged incident.   Specifically [the defendant] failed to prevent injury to ․ [the plaintiff's] biliary structures during laparoscopic [gallbladder] surgery and failed to accurately document the surgical procedure of March 12, 2006.   As a result of [the defendants'] negligent treatment ․ [the plaintiff] sustained severe, painful and permanent injuries.   My opinions are based [on] my education, training and experience as a physician, and my examination of ․ [the plaintiff's] medical records.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wilcox v. Schwartz, supra, 303 Conn. 634–35..  FN3. In Wilcox, the written opinion that the plaintiffs submitted with their complaint stated:  “I have reviewed the relevant records and information that were provided to me with regard to ․ [the injured plaintiff].   I can conclude that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, there are deviations from the applicable standards of care pertaining to the care and treatment of ․ [the plaintiff] provided by [the defendant] and that the care and treatment provided by [him] was not provided in a manner consistent with the standards of care that existed among general surgeons at the time of the alleged incident.   Specifically [the defendant] failed to prevent injury to ․ [the plaintiff's] biliary structures during laparoscopic [gallbladder] surgery and failed to accurately document the surgical procedure of March 12, 2006.   As a result of [the defendants'] negligent treatment ․ [the plaintiff] sustained severe, painful and permanent injuries.   My opinions are based [on] my education, training and experience as a physician, and my examination of ․ [the plaintiff's] medical records.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wilcox v. Schwartz, supra, 303 Conn. 634–35.

Wilson, Robin L., J.