IN RE: Kasmaesha C.1 (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This case presents a petition by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) asking that the parental rights of Jellyenid R.-C. and Ivan C. be terminated.

On June 25, 2012, DCF filed a petition to terminate parental rights.   The parents were properly served.   They appeared in court and were appointed counsel.

The statutory grounds alleged in the petition against the father were that the children had been abandoned and had been found in a in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and the parents had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the children.   The ground with respect to mother was also failure to rehabilitate.  C.G.S. 17a–112(j)(B)(i).

The matter was tried to the court on May 21, 2012.   The respondent mother was present and was represented at trial by counsel as well as a guardian ad litem.   Also present were attorneys for DCF and the child.   Father failed to appear but his attorney was present.   The attorneys were given the opportunity to cross examine witnesses as well as call witnesses and present evidence.   The petitioner offered fourteen exhibits.   The court also took judicial notice of the neglect adjudication.   The respondents and children's attorney did not present evidence.   The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction of the matter and that there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor child.   The court has carefully considered the petition, all of the evidence and testimony presented, and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law.   On the basis of the evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respective parents.

FACTS

The court finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.

Procedural History

On March 5, 2011 DCF invoked a 96–hour hold on behalf of the children.   An ex-parte Order of Temporary Custody was issued on March 9, 2011.   It was sustained by agreement on March 18, 2011.   The children were adjudicated as neglected on September 29, 2011.   The petition to terminate parental rights was filed on June 25, 2012.   Specific steps were issued at the time the OTC was sustained and again at the time of the adjudication and disposition.

Children and Parents

Mother was born in Hartford in 1989.   She has four siblings and has maintained a close relationship with her sister Joselin.   She was raised primarily by her mother in an environment characterized by domestic violence between her mother and various male partners.   Records indicate that DCF was involved with the family due to the children's exposure to domestic violence.   There does not appear to have been a significant relationship with her father.   She dropped out of school in the eleventh grade after becoming pregnant.   Records indicate that mother was using marijuana at the time her children were born.

She was hospitalized at the Institute of Living in March of 2011 under a Physician's Emergency Committal (PEC) due to psychotic behaviors.   She had come into Hartford Hospital accompanied by her two children and reported that she had placed a fetus in the freezer.   She was uncooperative and eventually was brought by security to the psychiatric division.   Upon discharge from the IOL she was referred to Community Health Services for outpatient treatment but failed to follow through.   She was hospitalized again in September of 2011 under a PEC after being found disorganized and suicidal.   She was brought to St. Francis via ambulance and admitted to their psychiatric unit.   Upon discharge she was referred to outpatient programs in Bridgeport.   Mother however missed numerous intake appointments despite DCF assistance and when she eventually showed up stated she did not need mental health treatment or medication and left the office.   She was hospitalized a third time under a PEC in September of 2012 after exhibiting out of control behavior at her sister's apartment in Bridgeport, telling her sister that she could see her social worker on television.   She was admitted to St. Vincent hospital in Westport and was diagnosed with Schizophrenia paranoid type.   She was discharged to a partial hospitalization program and eventually cooperated with treatment.   A visiting nurse comes to her home to administer medication on a daily basis and she receives monthly injections of Haldol.

During the period after the children were removed and the filing of the TPR petition mother has reported approximately twelve different residences.   She claims to have lived with friends, relatives, and shelters.   Mother has moved between Hartford, Bridgeport, Florida, and Glastonbury, residing in each location for variable durations.   She recently signed a lease for an apartment in Bridgeport which is without furniture and a monthly rent that exceeds her income.   She shares the apartment with her current boyfriend who is a convicted felon with a record for domestic violence.   He does not appear on the lease.

Mother is not employed and her income consists of $700 a month in SSI benefits.

Father was born in 1980 in Puerto Rico and was raised by his maternal grandmother.   He moved to New York with his mother at age thirteen.   He completed high school and attended some college.   He has worked as a truck driver and in construction.   He has been incarcerated for narcotic offenses.   He reported no substance abuse issues and was evaluated and was deemed not to be in need of treatment.   He has a criminal record involving narcotic offenses violations of probation, escape and firearm violations.

Kasmaesha was born on 1/19/2007.   She was placed in a nonrelative foster home in March of 2011 along with her younger brother and has remained there since.   She is diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Disturbance of Anxiety and Depressed Mood. She is receiving counseling at the Village for Families and Children and is accompanied by her foster mother.   Her therapist reports improvement and reduced levels of anxiety.   She is bonded to her foster mother.   She is also bonded to her biological mother and has said she has two mommies.   Her moods were affected by the parent's inconsistencies in visitation.

At the time of her removal DCF Social Worker Bahre observed two linear marks on the child's back as well as a circular scar consistent with a cigarette burn.   Mother provided conflicting accounts as to the burn.   In response to questions by the social worker, Kasmaesha indicated that mother was responsible for the injuries.   The marks were caused by mother's belt and that mother caused the burn.

Zariel was born on 5/16/2009.   He too has remained in the same foster home since March of 2011.   He is bonded to his foster mother but also has an affectionate relationship with his biological mother.   He received Birth to Three services for speech and is eligible for special education.

Prior to the commencement of the trial, the court found that the respondent mother was not competent.   A guardian ad litem was appointed for her.

In making its decision to proceed to trial and to grant no further continuances for mother to regain her competency, the court reviewed the case of In re Alexander V., 223 Conn, 557, 564, 613 A.2d 780 (1993).   In examining the due process issues implicated, our Supreme Court found that “there is a cognizable risk that a parent unable to assist his or her attorney or to understand the proceedings might suffer an erroneous termination of parental rights regardless of whether a guardian ad item has been appointed pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 45a–708(a).”  In re Alexander V., supra, 563.   In weighing that risk, the court had reviewed the procedural safeguards set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), to provide assistance in the decision to proceed with the trial.   As previously found, in the case of In re Aida M. and Carmelo O., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, H12–CP96–000640, and H12–CP96–00064 (March 25, 1997, Foley J.), the court concludes that the multi-factored balancing test set forth in Matthews must be considered to ensure that all due process rights of the incompetent parent have been addressed before proceeding to a trial on the merits.   It is an effort to balance the interests of the incompetent mother in maintaining her family free of coercive state interference with the interest of the children in a safe and healthy childhood.   The first of the four concerns in Matthews is:

1. “Is it likely that the evidence presented could be refuted by a competent parent?”   In this case there is clear and convincing evidence of failure to rehabilitate.   There were numerous items in evidence that mother was suffering from debilitating mental health issues which affected her ability to parent effectively.   She was unable to address her children's developmental needs.   She missed numerous supervised visits, was often distracted and had to be directed to interact with her children.   She lived a chaotic life marked by transiency.   She had no income and no means to support her children.

2. The second concern is “whether the parent could be restored to competence within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child?”   The evaluators were of the opinion that due to the depth and persistence of the respondent's mental illness that no intervention could restore her to competency.

3. “If the mother were competent, is there proof of the existence of or prospect of an existing parent-child relationship?”   There is evidence that a parent child relationship exists but due to mother's mental health issued she will never be able to safely parent these children.

4. “Was the respondent mother effectively represented by counsel and the guardian ad item, given the difficulties attendant to such representation?”   In this case, prior to the date scheduled for trial, the guardian met with the respondent and her attorney to develop a trial strategy.   She attended the trial and conferred with mother and the attorney for mother.   After the direct exam of each witness the court recessed and gave mother, her attorney, and the GAL an opportunity to discuss issues to be raised on cross examination.

The court concludes that all of the factors to be considered by the court under a Matthews' analysis support proceeding to trial.   The likelihood of an erroneous termination decision is slight in view of the substantial evidence establishing the failure to rehabilitate.   That remote possibility is greatly outweighed by the child's needs, and the opportunity for counsel and her guardian to prepare with for the trial.   The court concludes that the due process protections to which he is entitled have been provided to mother in the conduct of this trial.   Permitting any further delay, will not necessarily result in any further improvement in mother's condition and the children's best interests require the court to proceed without further delay.

Reasonable Efforts

In order to terminate parental rights absent consent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence that it made “reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent ․ unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).  “Because the two clauses are separated by the word ‘unless,’ this statute plainly is written in the conjunctive.   Accordingly, the department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts” (Emphasis in original.)  In re Jorden P., 293 Conn. 539, 552, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).

In reviewing reasonable efforts, “[t]he word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.   Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632, 847 A.2d 883 (2001).   The court must look to events that occurred prior to the date the petition was filed to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made.  In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47, 887 A.2d 415 (2006).

The court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents.   The primary issues leading to the children's removal were the mother's mental health issues, transiency, parenting, and income.

At the time the children were removed father was incarcerated.

The Department (DCF) made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their mother.   Recognizing that mother's mental illness was the principle factor in the removal DCF made numerous referrals to treatment programs to address mother's illness.   Mother was referred to inpatient and outpatient treatment at the IOL, Community Health Services, St. Francis Hospital inpatient psychiatric services, Bridgeport Hospital Reach program.   After mother's discharge in the fall of 2012 she was referred to Southwest Mental Health Services for outpatient treatment.

To address mother's lack of stable housing, DCF made referrals to South Park Shelter and the Sumerican Shelter.   It also attempted to make referral to supportive housing in April of 2011 but mother refused to cooperate.

DCF referred mother to Radiance Innovative Services for parenting education and visitation services.   DCF has also assisted mother with bus passes to attend weekly visitation.   When mother was inconsistent in attending those visits, which negatively impacted the children and when DCF began supervising visits on February 28, 2013 due to mother's completion of the Radiance program, DCF provided door-to-door transportation to facilitate visitation.

The court finds that the respondent father is unwilling to benefit from reunification services.   In January of 2012, the court approved permanency plan was reunification with the father.   When the children were committed it was felt that father needed to improve his parenting skills, address substance abuse, and domestic violence.   He was referred to and completed the Father to Father parenting program at My People's clinical Services.   He cooperated with a substance abuse evaluation following a DCF referral to ADRC. He was provided weekly visitation which he consistently attended and was observed to be appropriate and affectionate with the children.   He reported to DCF that he had obtained a two-bedroom apartment which is when it began to unravel.   DCF discovered that father had never lived at his reported residence and also that he did not appear to be living at a second apartment as he had claimed.   Relatives said they did not know where he was.   In February of 2012 he stopped visiting the children.   He also terminated contact with DCF and stopped participating in services.   In February of 2013, he finally contacted DCF about arranging a visit with the children.   He never followed through despite the social worker's efforts to engage him.   It's clear from his conduct that he is unwilling to benefit from reunification services.   He willfully stopped visits and cut off communications with DCF.

Adjudication

Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes Sec. 17a–112(j) is an independent ground for termination.  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263.   The petitioner is required to prove at least one of the grounds alleged in its petition by clear and convincing evidence.

Failure to Rehabilitate—General Statutes § 17a–112(i)(B)(i) as to Respondent Mother and Father

If the parents of a child who has been found by the court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding fail to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a reasonable position in the life of the child grounds for termination exists.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(B)(i).

Personal rehabilitation, [as used in the statute] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage his own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Zowie N., 135 Conn.App. 470, 503, 41 A.3d 1056, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 916, 46 A.3d 170 (2012).   Furthermore, “[i]n making its determination, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234, 19 A.3d 233 (2011).

The parent's compliance with the court ordered expectations entered at the time of the neglect adjudication are relevant but not dispositive to the rehabilitation finding.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157 (1989).   The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parents than he or she was at the time of the commitment.  In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112 (1992).

The presenting issues at the time of the child's removal were:  the mother's mental health, parenting skills, and housing.   With respect to father it was parenting and the ability to provide a home for the children.

At the time of the neglect adjudication the court issued Specific Steps to facilitate reunification between mother and her children.   At the time the petition was filed mother for the most part failed to comply with the court expectations.   She was not home for scheduled visits.   She would provide DCF with information as to her whereabouts but was seldom there long enough to allow DCF time to confirm it.

Mother failed to cooperate with the most critical step namely to engage in counseling to address her mental illness.   At the time the petition was filed, mother had been hospitalized twice for psychotic behavior.   Both times when discharged, she was referred to outpatient programs and both times she failed to follow through with treatment recommendations.

After completing, the IOL program in April of 2011, mother was referred to Community Health Services for mental health treatment and she failed to follow through.   She failed to cooperate with a referral to Institute for Hispanic Families in June of 2011.

After her hospitalization in the fall of 2011, mother was referred to the REACH program at Bridgeport Hospital but failed to keep several intake appointments.   With DCF assistance she rescheduled and then advised the hospital she had no mental health issues, did not need treatment or medication.   She was eventually admitted into the program and began attendance in July of 2012 but was discharged in August of 2012 due to noncompliance.

Following her third hospitalization at St. Vincent in Bridgeport, mother was discharged into that hospital's outpatient program and eventually began to cooperate.   She was compliant with attendance and medication management.   She was referred to FSW for ongoing mental health treatment and is cooperative with that program.

At the time the petition was filed mother was transient so she failed to comply with the expectation regarding housing.   She was not employed.   She has since obtained an apartment but lacks the income to pay the rent.   She reports to be living with a Juan M. a convicted felon with a record for domestic violence.

Regarding visitation, mother attended twenty-two of seventy possible visits.   She often had to be directed by the supervisors to pay attention to the children and act in an appropriate manner.   After the petition was filed, mother completed a parenting program and due to the extraordinary efforts of her DCF social worker has been consistent in visiting the children.   She has been appropriate in her behavior and affectionate towards the children.   The children look forward to seeing her and are affectionate with her.

With respect to father:  there was initial compliance with the Specific Steps and the plan was for reunification with him.   In February of 2012 however, the respondent apparently chose not to resume his role as a parent to his two children.   He broke off communications with DCF and stopped visiting the children.   He refused to cooperate with referrals for counseling and failed to respond to several requests by DCF to contact them.   It's clear and not contradicted that father is in no position to resume the role of a responsible parent within the foreseeable future considering the age and needs of the children.

Mother's situation is a little different.   It's obvious that at the time the petition was filed that mother had failed to rehabilitate as contemplated by the statute.

She was transient and at times psychotic.   She was not in treatment and was not visiting her children.   The evidence presented at trial shows that since her third hospitalization which was subsequent to the filing of the petition mother has been addressing her mental illness.   She has been consistent with visitation.   She has leased an apartment.   Even considering these developments, which are subsequent to the petition being filed, the court finds that DCF introduced sufficient evidence to show mother has failed to rehabilitate to a position where she could resume a responsible role as a parent to her two children.   Parenting requires more than the ability to manage one's own affairs.   She leased an apartment but doesn't have sufficient income to meet the rent.   She shares the apartment with a convicted felon with a record for domestic violence.   This is not exactly a nurturing environment for young children.   While there has been an improvement in her mental health it is relatively short lived.   The court cannot ignore the findings in the competency evaluation that there is a chronic defect in her ability to use goal directed thinking to solve problems and that she suffers from a thought disorder that results in global impairment of her ability to develop insight and problem solve.   Any progress she has made is a case of too little too late to allow the court to find that she has rehabilitated within the meaning of the statute.

ABANDONMENT (As to Father)

The petitioner alleges that the petitions should be granted as to respondent father on the ground of abandonment.   The court may grant a petition for termination of parental rights “if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j).  In this CT Page 812–I context, “[a]bandonment focuses on the parent's conduct ․ A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criteria in determining abandonment ․ [Section 17a–112(j)(3)(A) ] defines abandonment as the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․

“Section 17a–112[ (j)(3)(A) ] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.   The commonly understood general obligations or parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 839–40, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 403 (2005).

The evidence was not contradicted that father ceased all contact with his children in January of 2012.   He has not provided financial support.   He has not attended visits nor has he acknowledged holidays or birthdays.   He has not participated in their education or expressed concerns or interest in their wellbeing.   It is clear he has abandoned the children within the meaning of the statute.

DISPOSITION

General Statute § 17a–112(k) Criteria:

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory ground alleged by the petitioner for the termination of the parent's parental rights has been proven.   Before making a decision on whether or not to terminate the respondents' parental rights, the court must now consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set out in General Statute § 17a–112(j).  In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345 (1994).   These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

(1) The timeliness, nature, and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

As referenced above the Department offered numerous services to facilitate the reunion of the parents with their children.

(2) Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify mother and father and children by referring the parents to parenting programs, individual counseling, housing assistance, case management services and providing visitation.

(3) The terms of any court orders entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations.

The court issued specific steps to the parties.   DCF has fulfilled its expectations by making timely and appropriate referrals for services.   Mother had essentially failed to comply at the time the petition was filed but has been fulfilling her expectations as of late.   Father initially complied in part but then chose to sever his ties to the children, DCF, and the court.

(4) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

The children are bonded with their mother.   They are also bonded with their foster mother.   Kasmaesha has referred to having two mommies.   The children have lived in the same foster home since March of 2011.   They report feeling safe, loved, and cared for by their foster mother.   The foster mother will adopt.   The children express regret over not seeing their father.

(5) The Age of the Child

Kasmaesha is six.   Zariel is four.

(6) The effort the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

The respondent mother has been unable to adjust her circumstances or conduct to allow reunification with the girls.   She failed to participate in a timely fashion in treatment that would address her mental illness.   She remained transient throughout most of the case which interfered in treatment as well as visitation with her children.   She has maintained contact with DCF. Her contact with the children was sporadic over the first two years after their removal but has been more consistent as of late.   Father has not maintained contact with DCF or his children.   He has made no effort to adjust his circumstances in over a year to allow for reunification.

(7) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

The parents did not face any unreasonable interference from any person or economic circumstance preventing them from establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children.   Mother was provided, at no cost to her, several programs that would have addressed her mental illness.   Father was provided with parenting programs at no cost to him.   Mother was provided with transportation assistance for visitation.   They were provided attorneys at no cost to represent them in court.

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

The court must now address the issue of whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.   This is part of the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding.  In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 511.

In determining the issue of the best interests of the child, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and the court has concluded by clear and convincing evidence that there is no permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Kasmaesha and Zariel that is less restrictive than termination of the parental rights at issue.   The parents are incapable of resuming their parental roles and no alternatives have been proffered.   See In re Azareon Y., 139 Conn.App. 457, 60 A.3d 742 (2012), cert. granted in part, 307 Conn. 950, 60 A.3d 739, and cert. granted in part, 308 Conn. 928, (2013);  In re Julianna B., 141 Conn.App. 163, 61 A.3d 606 (2013).

The court has considered Kasmaesha and Zariel's best interests, including their health, safety and need for permanency.  “It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents.   There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty ․” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982).   While bonded to their mother, the children are also bonded to their foster parent, with whom they have lived since March of 2011.   The mother's recent improvements are relatively minor and too tenuous to deprive the children of the stability and permanency that they are entitled to.   The respondent father by his actions has made it clear that he has no intentions of resuming a parental role.   The foster mother accompanies Kasmaesha to her counseling appointments which have a positive impact on the child.   She participated in Birth to Three with Zariel.   She has been providing them with a stable and nurturing environment, and she is willing to adopt.   Based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of Jellyenid R.-C. and Ivan C. is in the best interest of the children.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence, statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights, the court further finds by clear and convincing evidence upon all the facts and circumstances presented that it is in the child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of Jellyenid R.-C. and Ivan C. Accordingly, it hereby terminates their parental rights to Kasmaesha and Zariel.

The court appoints The Department of Children and Families as Statutory Parent for the children.

BY THE COURT,

Dannehy, J.

Dannehy, Michael R., J.