Dominic Reid v. Michelle Shelton (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (# 112)

The plaintiff, Dominic Reid, commenced this action by way of a two-count complaint served on the defendant, Michelle Shelton, on June 3, 2011.   Counts one and two of the complaint sound in breach of contract and unjust enrichment, respectively.   Both counts allege that Reid and Shelton contracted to marry in October 2007 and that Reid conveyed an engagement ring to Shelton as consideration for their agreement.   On or about July or August 2008, the parties' relationship broke down and their engagement terminated.   Following these events, Reid made demand upon Shelton for return of the engagement ring, which Shelton has neglected and refused to return.   Reid subsequently initiated the present case seeking money damages and interest as a result of Shelton's failure to return the engagement ring.

On April 22, 2013, Shelton moved to dismiss Reid's complaint arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   In support of her motion, she presents three primary reasons why the court must dismiss Reid's claims.   First, General Statutes § 52–572b bars actions arising from the breach of a promise to marry.   Second, the alleged contract does not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds as codified in General Statutes § 52–550(a)(3).   And third, Reid has failed to bring his claims within the statute of limitations period prescribed in General Statutes § 52–581.

Reid filed a memorandum objecting to Shelton's motion on May 10, 2013.   He argues that § 52–572b does not preclude actions seeking the return of property given in consideration of a promise to marry.   He further argues that he commenced the present action within the statute of limitations.¹  On May 28, 2013, the court heard oral argument from both parties at the short calendar.

As more fully addressed below, the court concludes that none of the deficiencies alleged by Shelton implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction.   Accordingly, Shelton's motion to dismiss is denied.

LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).  “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2012).  “Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”  St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003).  “In general, a motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action.”  Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).

I

GENERAL STATUTES § 52–572b

Shelton argues that Reid's claims are barred by § 52–572b, known as the “Heart Balm Act.” The relevant language of the statute provides that “[n]o action may be brought upon any cause arising from ․ breach of a promise to marry.”   Shelton contends that this language deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.   Contrary to Shelton's contention, the language of the statute does not clearly indicate that it is intended to operate as a jurisdictional bar.

Indeed, “[i]t is well settled that statutes are to be read as favoring subject matter jurisdiction, absent a clear indication of legislative intent to limit it.”  Sivilla v. Philips Medical Systems of North America, Inc., 46 Conn.App. 699, 703, 700 A.2d 1179 (1997).   Furthermore, our Supreme Court has determined that statutes using language similar to § 52–572b do not implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction.   For instance, the Court has noted that “[i]n asserting that a failure to comply with General Statutes § 20–325a(b) creates a jurisdictional problem, the defendants rely primarily on the portion of the statute that provides:  ‘No person ․ shall commence or bring any action ․’ We note that similar language is found in the statute of frauds;  General Statutes § 52–550;  and in the statute of limitations for tort actions set forth in General Statutes § 52–577.   Neither of those statutes creates a jurisdictional bar.”  (Emphasis added.)  McCutcheon & Burr, Inc. v. Berman, 218 Conn. 512, 527 n.16, 590 A.2d 438 (1991).

Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that “[a] proceeding may still be maintained which although occasioned by a breach of contract to marry, and in a sense based upon the breach, is not brought to recover for the breach itself.”  Piccininni v. Hajus, 180 Conn. 369, 373–74, 429 A.2d 886 (1980).   Thus, Reid may maintain a cause of action so long as he “is not asking for damages because of a broken heart or a mortified spirit.”  Id., 373.   Ascertaining whether Reid seeks damages for these reasons requires an examination of the facts alleged in his complaint.   See Bouchard v. Sundberg, 80 Conn.App. 180, 198, 834 A.2d 744 (2003) (“[i]n determining whether an action is barred by § 57–572b ․ we consider the underlying conduct alleged in the plaintiff's complaint”).

Accordingly, the proper procedural vehicle to attack his claims is a motion to strike, not a motion to dismiss.  “[I]f a pleading ․ on its face is legally insufficient, although facts may indeed exist which, if properly pleaded, would establish a cause of action upon which relief could be granted ․ a motion to strike is required ․ A motion to dismiss, by contrast, properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544, 590 A.2d 914 (1991);  see also Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 629–30, 941 A.2d 266 (2008) (“[a] motion to strike ․ rather than a motion to dismiss, is the proper vehicle to attack the legal sufficiency of a complaint”).

In the present case, Reid has alleged that Shelton failed to return an engagement ring given in consideration for their agreement to marry.  “[T]he majority rule appears to be that a gift made in contemplation of marriage is conditional upon a subsequent ceremonial marriage ․ and that the existence of a Heart Balm Act does not affect common law principles governing a gift to a fiancée made on condition of marriage, which condition is broken by the donee.”  (Citations omitted.)  Piccininni v. Hajus, supra, 180 Conn. 372–73.  “Denial of recovery of property transferred in contemplation of marriage is not necessary to the accomplishment of the object of this legislation, and to so hold would have the undesirable effect of placing it within the power of a recipient to renounce a promise and yet retain property bestowed in anticipation of performance.”  Id. 374.   Consequently, even if § 52–572b were considered jurisdictional in nature, Reid's allegations fall outside the statute's scope.

II

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Shelton next argues that Reid's claims are barred by the statute of frauds, specifically § 52–550(a)(3).²  As previously discussed in part I of this decision—and as Shelton's counsel conceded at oral argument—the statute of frauds does not create a jurisdictional bar.   See McCutcheon & Burr, Inc. v. Berman, supra, 218 Conn. 527 n.16 (1991);  see also Gello v. Stevens, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5030093 (December 14, 2010, Robinson, J.) (“it is improper for the defendants to use the statute of frauds as a vehicle to assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss”).

Accordingly, Reid's alleged failure to comply with § 52–550(a)(3) is not a proper basis to dismiss his claims.

III

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Shelton's last argument is that Reid has failed to bring his claims within the limitations period prescribed in § 52–581.³  The court concludes that this alleged failure, like the others argued by Shelton, does not bring its subject matter jurisdiction into question.

A statute of limitations defense “must be specially pleaded and cannot be raised by a [motion to dismiss].”  Ross Realty Corp. v. Surkis, 163 Conn. 388, 391, 311 A.2d 74 (1972);  see also Practice Book § 10–50.   Our Supreme Court has held, however, that “[w]here ․ a specific time limitation is contained within a statute that creates a right of action that did not exist at common law, then the remedy exists only during the prescribed period and not thereafter ․ In such cases, the time limitation is not to be treated as an ordinary statute of limitation, but rather is a limitation on the liability itself, and not of the remedy alone ․ [U]nder such circumstances, the time limitation is a substantive and jurisdictional prerequisite, which may be raised [by the court] at any time, even by the court sua sponte, and may not be waived.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757, 766–67, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993);  see also St. Paul Travelers Cos. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 815, 12 A.3d 852 (2011) ( “[u]nlike a statute of limitations that is merely procedural, a subject matter jurisdictional statute of limitations may not be waived, and a court may address it sua sponte”).

In the present case, Reid has not brought his claims pursuant to a statute that creates a right of action that did not exist at common law.   Accordingly, a motion to dismiss is not the proper procedural vehicle for Shelton to raise the statute of limitations.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Shelton's motion to dismiss is denied.

Mullins, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Reid does not address Shelton's argument regarding the statute of frauds in his memorandum..  FN1. Reid does not address Shelton's argument regarding the statute of frauds in his memorandum.

FN2. Section 52–550(a)(3) provides that “[n]o civil action may be maintained in the following cases unless the agreement, or a memorandum of the agreement, is made in writing and signed by the party, or the agent of the party, to be charged:  ․ (3) upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage ․”.  FN2. Section 52–550(a)(3) provides that “[n]o civil action may be maintained in the following cases unless the agreement, or a memorandum of the agreement, is made in writing and signed by the party, or the agent of the party, to be charged:  ․ (3) upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage ․”

FN3. Section 52–581 provides that “[n]o action founded upon any express contract or agreement which is not reduced to writing, or of which some note or memorandum is not made in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or his agent, shall be brought but within three years after the right of action accrues.”.  FN3. Section 52–581 provides that “[n]o action founded upon any express contract or agreement which is not reduced to writing, or of which some note or memorandum is not made in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or his agent, shall be brought but within three years after the right of action accrues.”

Mullins, Raheem, J.