Louise Luby v. Bianca Moore et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 116)

FACTS

This case comes before the court by way of a two-count amended complaint filed by the plaintiff, Louise Luby, against the defendants, Bianca Moore, Julia Moore, Stephen Best ¹ and Amica Mutual Insurance Company (Amica) on March 15, 2013.²  In her complaint, Luby alleges that she was operating her motor vehicle on December 21, 2011, traveling westward on Interstate 691 in Meriden when she was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Bianca Moore.   As a result of the collision, Luby suffered numerous injuries and incurred various medical expenses.

Count one of Luby's complaint is directed at Bianca Moore, Julia Moore and Best and alleges that the accident was due to Bianca Moore's negligent and careless operation of her vehicle.   Luby further alleges that Julia Moore and Best are vicariously liable for Bianca Moore's negligence pursuant to:  (1) an agency relationship;  (2) a lease or rental agreement subject to General Statutes § 14–154a; 3  (3) Julia Moore's and Best's permission to operate the vehicle;  and (4) the family car doctrine.   Luby invokes the statutory presumptions of family car and agency created by General Statutes §§ 52–182 ⁴ and 52–183,⁵ respectively.⁶

Count two of Luby's complaint is directed at Amica and alleges that the motor vehicle insurance policy providing coverage for Bianca Moore and Stephen Best has been exhausted and is inadequate to fully compensate Luby for her injuries and losses.   Luby seeks underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to her contract with Amica and General Statutes § 38a–36 et seq.

On August 28, 2012, Best moved for summary judgment on the grounds that:  (1) Bianca Moore was not operating the vehicle as Best's agent, servant or employee;  (2) § 14–154a is inapplicable because Best did not lease or rent the vehicle to Bianca Moore;  (3) Best did not grant permission to Bianca Moore to operate the vehicle nor would such permission furnish a basis to hold Best vicariously liable for Bianca Moore's negligence;  and (4) Bianca Moore was neither a member of Best's family nor household and thus the family car doctrine does not apply.   In support of his motion, Best has attached:  (1) a sworn affidavit completed by him on August 13, 2012, and (2) a copy of the judgment dissolving his marriage to Julia Moore, dated July 14, 2008.

On January 25, 2013, Luby filed an objection to Best's motion.   In support of her objection, Luby has attached:  (1) a sworn affidavit completed by her on January 24, 2013;  (2) the state police accident report from her accident with Bianca Moore;  (3) excerpts from Best's deposition, conducted on October 2, 2012;  (4) excerpts from Bianca Moore's deposition, conducted on September 25, 2012;  and (5) excerpts from Julia Moore's deposition, conducted on January 8, 2013.   Amica objected to Best's motion on February 27, 2013, and attached to its objection:  (1) excerpts from Best's deposition, conducted October 2, 2012;  and (2) excerpts from Julia Moore's deposition, conducted on January 8, 2013.

Best replied to Luby's objection on January 25, 2013.   The matter was argued at short calendar on March 4, 2013.

DISCUSSION

ISTANDARD OF REVIEW

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).  “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way ․ [A] summary disposition ․ should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party ․ [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).

“In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17–45].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

Luby and Amica both conceded at oral argument that there was no agency relationship between Bianca Moore and Best at the time of the accident.⁷  Luby also conceded at oral argument that the family car doctrine is not applicable to the facts of the present case, however, Amica did not make the same concession.   Accordingly, the only issues that remain for the court to address are whether:  (1) Best may be held vicariously liable as a vehicle lessor or renter under § 14–154a;  (2) Best granting Bianca or Julia Moore permission to operate the vehicle created a basis to hold him vicariously liable for Bianca Moore's negligence;  and (3) the family car doctrine applies.

Having reviewed the briefs of the parties, their positions at oral argument and the evidence they have submitted, this court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact that:  (1) Bianca Moore did not lease or rent the vehicle that she was operating from Best and therefore, § 14–154a is inapplicable;  (2) Best did not grant Julia or Bianca Moore permission to use the vehicle nor is permission by itself a sufficient basis to hold him vicariously liable for Bianca Moore's negligence;  and (3) Bianca Moore's use of the vehicle was not within the scope of the family car doctrine.   Accordingly, and as more fully discussed below, summary judgment is granted in favor of Best.

II

GENERAL STATUTES § 14–154a

Best first argues that he cannot be held vicariously liable under § 14–154a because Bianca Moore was not operating a vehicle that was leased or rented to her by him at the time of the accident.   Specifically, Best argues that Bianca Moore's vehicle was in the exclusive possession and control of Julia Moore, who was awarded ownership of the vehicle under the terms of the July 14, 2008, divorce decree and judgment dissolving their marriage.   Best attests in his affidavit that, to the best of his knowledge, the vehicle has never been leased or rented to anyone by anyone, including him.

Luby argues in response, that Best made the initial down payment on the vehicle and gave it to Julia Moore in return for her agreement to pay off the loan, taxes, insurance and registration.   This transaction, Luby argues, effectively created a lease or rental arrangement, and Best may thus be held liable under § 14–154a.

Luby's argument is not persuasive.   A lease is defined as “[a] contract by which the rightful possessor of personal property conveys the right to use that property in exchange for consideration.”   Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009);  see General Statutes § 42a–2A–102(17) (“ ‘[l]ease’ means the transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a period in return for consideration”).   The evidence reflects that there was no such arrangement in place when Bianca Moore's accident occurred.   No party disputes that on July 14, 2008, Best and Julia Moore executed a separation agreement and stipulation that granted Julia Moore sole ownership of the vehicle.   These terms—and the Superior Court's decree—are plainly inconsistent with those of a lease or rental agreement.   Although it appears that Best failed to transfer title to Julia Moore as required by the agreement and the Superior Court's order, there is little disputing that the terms of the agreement entitle Julia Moore to sole ownership of the vehicle and do not require that she provide consideration to Best to maintain continuing possession of it.

Best and Julia Moore's mutual understanding of this agreement is reflected in their deposition testimony and Best's affidavit.   Neither party disputes that, subsequent to their divorce, Best never had possession or control over the vehicle, stored the vehicle at his premises, operated, maintained, or serviced the vehicle, made loan payments on the vehicle, paid for the maintenance of the vehicle or rode in the vehicle as a passenger.   It is further undisputed that Julia Moore paid off the loan on the vehicle, paid taxes on the vehicle and operated the vehicle free of any restrictions from Best.⁸

It is thus apparent that to the extent any prior lease or rental arrangement existed, it was superseded by the subsequent separation agreement and divorce decree.   The uncontroverted evidence reflects that neither Best nor Julia Moore believed that her possession of the vehicle was pursuant to any lease or rental agreement, but instead understood Julia Moore to have exclusive possession of the vehicle following the effective date of the separation agreement and divorce decree.   Even if either of them believed otherwise—and there is no evidence that they did—Best could not have leased the vehicle to Julia Moore after the date of the divorce decree since, by its express terms, he was no longer the rightful possessor of the vehicle and had no possessory rights to it to convey to her.

Accordingly, because Best did not lease the vehicle to Julia Moore, § 14–154a is inapplicable.

III

PERMISSION

Best next argues that Luby's allegation that he granted permission to Bianca or Julia Moore to operate the vehicle is without legal effect.   Specifically, Best argues that he did not grant permission to either Bianca or Julia Moore to operate the vehicle, that he had no authority to grant anyone permission to use the vehicle and that permission by itself is not a valid basis to impose liability upon him.

Luby has yet to fully expound the legal theory underlying her allegation that Bianca Moore operated the vehicle with Best's permission.   Although she cites Best's deposition testimony for the purpose of establishing that he gave permission to Bianca and Julia Moore to operate the vehicle, she fails to provide any analysis or case law to support her argument that permission alone is a sufficient basis to hold Best vicariously liable for Bianca Moore's negligence.

As more fully addressed in part II, supra, the uncontroverted terms of the separation agreement and divorce decree provide that Julia Moore—not Best—became the sole owner of the vehicle on July 14, 2008.   Consequently, she did not need Best's permission to possess or control the vehicle.   More importantly, Best could not have granted her permission to use the vehicle since, by agreement and court decree, it was not his property.

Even assuming that Best could have effectively granted Julia or Bianca Moore permission to use the vehicle, Luby has cited no cases—and the court's independent research could not locate any cases—that identify any basis to hold him vicariously liable based on the fact of permission alone.   While it is true that an owner's grant of permission to use a vehicle is a fact often present in certain causes of action arising out of vehicle accidents—such as those sounding in agency, negligent entrustment or, as will be more fully addressed below, the family car doctrine—there are no statutory or common-law causes of action that impose liability on an individual solely because he or she granted a third party permission to use his or her vehicle.   See Pettway v. Johnson, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 92 296135 (April 26, 1993, Fuller, J.) (9 Conn. L. Rptr. 33, 34) (“there is no cause of action at common law or by statute against a defendant who neither owned nor operated the vehicle involved in the accident and where the claim only is based upon the giving of permission to drive the vehicle”);  Knapp v. Chamberlain, 5 Conn.Sup. 97, 98 (1937) (“[t]hat portion of [the] allegation which asserts that the defendant ․ was driving [the co-defendant's] car with the latter's permission at the time of the collision is ․ alone ․ not sufficient to impose liability on [the co-defendant] for [the defendant's] negligence”).   Our case law indicates that it is only when a plaintiff can establish that the owner granted permission to another under circumstances warranting the imposition of liability that the owner may be held vicariously liable.

Accordingly, mere permission is, by itself, an insufficient basis on which to hold Best vicariously liable for Bianca Moore's negligence.

IV

FAMILY CAR DOCTRINE

Best next argues that Julia Moore was neither a member of his family nor a member of his household and thus the common-law family car doctrine is inapplicable.   He further argues that his relationship to Bianca Moore does not bring it within the statutory presumption created by § 52–182.

As previously noted, Luby has conceded that the family car doctrine is not applicable to the facts of this case.   Amica, however, has not made that concession, and cites to several cases that it contends support its position that Bianca Moore's use of the vehicle was within the scope of the family car doctrine.

Before assessing the parties' arguments, it is instructive to review the principles underlying the family car doctrine.  “It has long been settled in Connecticut that when a car is maintained by its owner for the ‘general use and convenience of his or her family,’ the owner is jointly and severally liable for the negligence of a family member, who, having general authority to drive the car, uses it negligently while embarked on a family purpose, that is, for the pleasure or convenience of the family as a unit, or of an individual member of it.   Thus, the right of the plaintiffs to recover rests on their ability to establish facts which render the family car doctrine applicable, and consequently, the defendant presumptively liable as the owner of such a family car ․ This rule is grounded in the belief that one who chooses to conduct his or her activities through others is nonetheless required to conduct them so that third parties are not injured by a breach of any legal duty on the part of those acting for the principal while they are acting on behalf of and within the scope of authority granted by the principal.   When a member of a family maintains a car for the pleasure, use and convenience of the family, and its purposes, he or she makes such pleasure and use a personal concern, thereby making those family members who use or enjoy the car his or her agents, as if they were pursuing the affairs of the owner.”  (Citations omitted.)  Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 225–26, 518 A.2d 77 (1986).

As an initial matter, Luby may not rely on the statutory presumption created by § 52–182.  Section 52–182 provides that “[p]roof that the operator of a motor vehicle ․ was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle ․ was being operated as a family car ․ within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.”   A plain reading of the statute reveals that former stepdaughters are not among the categories of relation triggering the benefit of the presumption.   Accordingly, § 52–182 is inapplicable.

Nevertheless, ascertaining that Luby is not entitled to the benefits of the statutory presumption does not end the court's inquiry.  “While [§ ]52–182 statutorily establishes presumptions that the family car doctrine applies when certain specified persons or relationships are involved, the statute does not fully define or limit the applicability ․ of the family car doctrine.”   Toscano v. Corker, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford at Norwalk, Docket No. CV 09 5012300 (November 9, 2010, Adams, J.) (51 Conn. L. Rptr. 54, 55).  “A plaintiff that is not able to use the presumption afforded by § 52–182 continues to have a viable claim if the ‘facts, without regard to the provisions of [§ 52–182], afford a sufficient basis for finding that the vehicle is a family car.’  “ Auth v. Wesley, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 03 0822570 (June 14, 2007, Graham, J.) (43 Conn. L. Rptr. 608, 609), quoting Hunt v. Richter, 163 Conn. 84, 89–90, 302 A.2d 117 (1972).   Thus, the burden remains with Best to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Bianca Moore was not operating the vehicle as a family car.   Based on the undisputed facts ⁹ in the record, the court concludes that Best has satisfied that burden.

Amica invokes a litany of cases in support of its argument that the family car doctrine is applicable in the present case.   None of these cases save Amica's argument from its fatal flaw, however, which is that at the time of the accident, neither Julia nor Bianca Moore were members of Best's family.  “The family car doctrine is a common-law rule providing that, when a motor-car is maintained by the paterfamilias for the general use and convenience of his family, he is liable for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to drive it, while the car is being used as a family car ․” (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 9, 882 A.2d 597 (2005).

Little of Amica's argument is directed to the issue of whether Bianca Moore can properly be considered a member of Best's family.   Instead, Amica focuses largely on other aspects of the family car doctrine, such as ownership, title and the original purpose of the vehicle.   Amica does contend that “the fact that ․ Best left the family and lived elsewhere does not alter the purpose for and use of the car and does not alter its status as a family vehicle,” ¹⁰ but it asserts this conclusion without any analysis or argument to support it.   In any event, while it may be true that the purpose, use and status of the car was as a family vehicle, the question whether the family making use of the vehicle was that of Best is not as inconsequential as Amica suggests.   Notably, out of the numerous cases cited by Amica regarding the family car doctrine, none involve factual circumstances in which the individual sought to be held liable had “left the family” for which he or she supposedly maintained the vehicle.   This is not unexpected, however, since our case law has consistently recognized that the doctrine applies when a vehicle is furnished by the owner for the owner's family.   See Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 9 (family car doctrine applicable “when a motor-car is maintained by the paterfamilias for the general use and convenience of his family ” [emphasis added] );  accord Hunt v. Richter, supra, 163 Conn. 88;  Cima v. Sciaretta, 140 Conn.App. 167, 169 n.3, 58 A.3d 345, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 912, 61 A.3d 532 (2013);  see also Mitchell v. Resto, 157 Conn. 258, 258, 253 A.2d 25 (1968) (“[the plaintiff] correctly makes no claim under our common-law family car doctrine since the operator was not a member of the owner's household”);  61 C.J.S. 52, Motor Vehicles § 962 (2012) (“[a]s a general rule, in order for the family purpose doctrine to apply, the owner must have given permission to a family member to drive the vehicle and must have relinquished control over the vehicle to that family member ” [emphasis added] );  8 Am.Jur.2d 275, Automobiles § 632 (2007) ( “[t]he ‘family-purpose’ doctrine is not applicable where there is no family”).   Thus, to determine whether the family car doctrine is applicable in this case, the court must determine whether Bianca Moore was a member of Best's family at the time of the accident.

It is generally recognized that an owner's family is not necessarily limited to his or her blood relatives, but includes those individuals who reside in his or her household.  “[A] family group is not necessarily confined to those of [the vehicle owner's] own kindred;  it includes all those members of the collective body of persons living in [the owner's] household for whose convenience the car is actually maintained and who have general authority to use it.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id., 10 n.9. Accordingly, for Bianca Moore to be considered a member of Best's family, it must be shown that she was a person living in Best's household and that the vehicle was actually maintained for her use.   Even if she fails to meet this criteria, however, the doctrine may still be applicable to Best if it can be shown that she was driving the vehicle under the immediate direction and permission of a member of Best's household.  “It is clear that the common-law rule of the family car doctrine requires the operator of the vehicle to be a member of the owner's household ․ except where the operator is under the immediate direction of a member for whose benefit the vehicle was furnished, whom he is driving with the approval and consent of the owner.”  (Citations omitted.)  Hunt v. Richter, supra, 163 Conn. 88.  “[T]he liability of a vehicle owner under the family car doctrine encompasses liability for the negligent operation of a family car by a nonfamily member third party operator if a covered family member with general, unrestricted authority to use the vehicle for his or her own pleasure and convenience was a passenger in the vehicle and the third party was operating the family car with the consent of that family member.   In such cases, the negligent third party steps into the shoes of the family member for the purpose of applying the family car doctrine to the owner of the vehicle.”  (Emphasis added.)  Cima v. Sciaretta, supra, 140 Conn.App. 177.

In the present case, it is evident that the family car doctrine is not applicable.   The evidence reflects that at the time of the accident, Bianca Moore was neither a member of Best's household nor was she operating the vehicle with the permission of a member of his household.   In fact, when the accident occurred, Best and Julia Moore had been divorced for over three years and none of the parties had resided together for longer than that.   Amica glosses over this fact and implies that it was the intended purpose of the vehicle at the time it was purchased that forever determines whether the doctrine applies.   But this proposition is not found in our case law and, more importantly, fails to recognize the significant and purposeful choice of Best and Julia Moore to end their marriage, divide their assets and go their separate ways.   While the doctrine may have been applicable while the Moores resided with Best, it cannot be said that because they once shared a household, Best remains forever liable for all future negligent use of the vehicle by the Moores.   Thus, the intentional and mutual division of the family group was sufficient to render the doctrine inapplicable insofar as Amica attempts to apply it to Best. See Toscano v. Corker, supra, 51 Conn. L. Rptr. 55 (family car doctrine not applicable because “at the time of the accident [the daughter] did not live with [the father] or live in the family house”);  Krappatsch v. Thompson, 15 Conn.Sup. 146, 148 (1947) (doctrine inapplicable where vehicle “was kept exclusively for the use of a son who maintained a separate and distant residence and who used it at all times solely for his own purposes”).

In addition, extending the family car doctrine to encompass former family members who no longer reside with the owner as the result of divorce would prove significantly problematic to courts tasked with dividing marital property in dissolution actions.   These courts would then have to consider—in addition to various other statutory criteria—whether assigning ownership of family vehicles would risk creating unintended future liabilities for any of the parties.

The cases cited by Amica are unavailing, since they each involve a vehicle operator who was either a member of the owner's family or operating the vehicle under the direction of a member of the owner's family.   See Silverman v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 145 A.2d 826 (1958) (vehicle operator was son of owner);  Mulvey v. Barker, 138 Conn. 551, 86 A.2d 865 (1952) (vehicle operator was wife of owner);  Perfetto v. Wesson, 138 Conn. 506, 86 A.2d 565 (1952) (vehicle operator was husband of owner);  Dibble v. Wolff, 135 Conn. 428, 65 A.2d 479 (1949) (vehicle operator was under direction of owner's wife);  Durso v. A.D. Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392 (1941) (vehicle operator was member of family that controlled corporate vehicle owner);  Baker v. Paradiso, 117 Conn. 539, 169 A. 272 (1933) (vehicle operator was son of owner);  Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 138 A. 365 (1927) (vehicle operator was live-in housekeeper, who court determined was member of family group);  Cima v. Sciaretta, supra, 140 Conn.App. 167 (vehicle operator was under direction of owner's son);  Chen v. Bernadel, 101 Conn.App. 658, 922 A.2d 1142 (2007) (same);  Cook v. Nye, supra, 9 Conn.App. 221 (vehicle operator was daughter of owner).¹¹  Amica has cited no cases where a court has applied the family car doctrine to hold a vehicle owner vicariously liable for the negligence of a nonfamily member operator who was not at least operating the vehicle with direction from a member of the owner's family.

Accordingly, because Julia and Bianca Moore were not members of Best's family or household, the family car doctrine cannot be used to hold Best vicariously liable for Bianca Moore's negligence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Best's motion for summary judgment is granted.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Julia Moore is the former spouse of Stephen Best and biological mother of Bianca Moore.   Stephen Moore was Bianca Moore's stepfather during his marriage to Julia Moore, but is not otherwise related to her.   Julia Moore and Stephen Best divorced on July 14, 2008, approximately three years prior to the events giving rise to the present case..  FN1. Julia Moore is the former spouse of Stephen Best and biological mother of Bianca Moore.   Stephen Moore was Bianca Moore's stepfather during his marriage to Julia Moore, but is not otherwise related to her.   Julia Moore and Stephen Best divorced on July 14, 2008, approximately three years prior to the events giving rise to the present case.

FN2. Luby's initial complaint did not name Julia Moore as a defendant and was served on Bianca Moore, Best and Amica on April 11, 2012.   Luby subsequently filed an amended complaint on January 22, 2013.   On February 11, 2013, the court, Frechette, J., granted Luby's request to cite in Julia Moore as a defendant.   See Docket Nos. 122.05 and 122.10.   On March 11, 2013, Luby served Julia Moore with an amended complaint, which was then filed with the court on March 15, 2013..  FN2. Luby's initial complaint did not name Julia Moore as a defendant and was served on Bianca Moore, Best and Amica on April 11, 2012.   Luby subsequently filed an amended complaint on January 22, 2013.   On February 11, 2013, the court, Frechette, J., granted Luby's request to cite in Julia Moore as a defendant.   See Docket Nos. 122.05 and 122.10.   On March 11, 2013, Luby served Julia Moore with an amended complaint, which was then filed with the court on March 15, 2013.

FN3. General Statutes § 14–154a(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner.”.  FN3. General Statutes § 14–154a(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner.”

FN4. General Statutes § 52–182 provides that “[p]roof that the operator of a motor vehicle or a motorboat, as defined in [General Statutes § ] 15–127, was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle or motorboat was being operated as a family car or boat within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.”.  FN4. General Statutes § 52–182 provides that “[p]roof that the operator of a motor vehicle or a motorboat, as defined in [General Statutes § ] 15–127, was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle or motorboat was being operated as a family car or boat within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.”

FN5. General Statutes § 52–183 provides that “[i]n any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment.   The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.”.  FN5. General Statutes § 52–183 provides that “[i]n any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment.   The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.”

FN6. The operative complaint at the time Best filed for summary judgment did not specifically cite §§ 52–182 or 52–183.   The parties have addressed the applicability of these statutes in their pleadings, however, and Luby has subsequently amended her complaint to cite them.   Accordingly, the court will consider their relevance to the present case..  FN6. The operative complaint at the time Best filed for summary judgment did not specifically cite §§ 52–182 or 52–183.   The parties have addressed the applicability of these statutes in their pleadings, however, and Luby has subsequently amended her complaint to cite them.   Accordingly, the court will consider their relevance to the present case.

FN7. The parties' concession that Bianca Moore was not Best's agent permits the court to find in favor of Best with respect to that issue.   See Schimmelpfennig v. Cutler, 65 Conn.App. 388, 392–93, 783 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 934, 785 A.2d 230 (2001)..  FN7. The parties' concession that Bianca Moore was not Best's agent permits the court to find in favor of Best with respect to that issue.   See Schimmelpfennig v. Cutler, 65 Conn.App. 388, 392–93, 783 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 934, 785 A.2d 230 (2001).

FN8. See Best Aff. ¶¶ 14–21, 24–26, 33, August 13, 2012;  Best Dep. 18:14–21, October 2, 2012;  Julia Moore Dep. 17:1–14, January 8, 2013..  FN8. See Best Aff. ¶¶ 14–21, 24–26, 33, August 13, 2012;  Best Dep. 18:14–21, October 2, 2012;  Julia Moore Dep. 17:1–14, January 8, 2013.

FN9. The following facts are not in dispute:  Best and Julia Moore were married on or about August 13, 2005.   On July 14, 2008, their marriage was dissolved by decree of the Superior Court.   Julia Moore and Best have no mutual children.   Bianca Moore is Julia Moore's child and resided with her and Best during the course of their marriage.   Bianca Moore is not Best's biological child and he has not adopted her.   Neither Julia Moore nor Bianca Moore have resided with Best since before the effective date of the divorce decree..  FN9. The following facts are not in dispute:  Best and Julia Moore were married on or about August 13, 2005.   On July 14, 2008, their marriage was dissolved by decree of the Superior Court.   Julia Moore and Best have no mutual children.   Bianca Moore is Julia Moore's child and resided with her and Best during the course of their marriage.   Bianca Moore is not Best's biological child and he has not adopted her.   Neither Julia Moore nor Bianca Moore have resided with Best since before the effective date of the divorce decree.

FN10. Amica's Objection to Best's Mot. Summ. J., at 1..  FN10. Amica's Objection to Best's Mot. Summ. J., at 1.

FN11. Amica also cites to Brockett v. Jensen, 154 Conn. 328, 225 A.2d 190 (1966), and argues that in Brockett “the Supreme Court found that the family car doctrine applied against an owner even when she was only the record owner of the vehicle which her twenty year old son had purchased for his personal and work needs.”   Amica's Objection to Best's Mot. Summ. J., at 11.   Amica overstates the court's holding in this case.   Although the court held that the trial court did not err in applying the doctrine to the facts of the case, its treatment of the family car doctrine was brief and largely incidental to the primary issue before it, which was whether the defendant owned the vehicle..  FN11. Amica also cites to Brockett v. Jensen, 154 Conn. 328, 225 A.2d 190 (1966), and argues that in Brockett “the Supreme Court found that the family car doctrine applied against an owner even when she was only the record owner of the vehicle which her twenty year old son had purchased for his personal and work needs.”   Amica's Objection to Best's Mot. Summ. J., at 11.   Amica overstates the court's holding in this case.   Although the court held that the trial court did not err in applying the doctrine to the facts of the case, its treatment of the family car doctrine was brief and largely incidental to the primary issue before it, which was whether the defendant owned the vehicle.

Wilson, Robin L., J.