240833 v. Warden (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The petitioner, Jason Casiano, initiated this matter by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on May 11, 2010, challenging the constitutionality of his sentence.   In particular, the petitioner, who was a juvenile at the time he was sentenced, claims that his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment was violated, having received a fifty year sentence with no opportunity for early release.   The respondent has moved for summary judgment, claiming that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that under the recent Appellate Court decision in State v. Riley, 140 Conn.App. 1, 58 A.3d 304, cert. granted, 308 Conn. 910, 61 A.3d 531 (2013), as a matter of law, he is entitled to judgment in this case.   Citing the dissent in State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 1, as well as the recent United States Supreme Court cases on juvenile sentences, the petitioner claims that his sentence is unconstitutional.   Because this court is bound to apply the majority law of the Appellate Court which supports the respondent's position, and because there are no disputed issues of material fact, the court grants the motion for summary judgment.

Procedural Background

In the underlying criminal case, the petitioner was charged with felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54c, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree with a deadly weapon in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 and 53a–134(a)(2) and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree with a deadly weapon in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–48 and 53a–134(a)(2), with the enhanced penalty for the use of a firearm during the commission of a class A, B or C felony pursuant to General Statutes § 53–202k.   On February 4, 1997, the petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to the charges and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of fifty years imprisonment on April 4, 1997.   The petitioner appealed his conviction to the Appellate Court, which affirmed it.  State v. Casiano, 55 Conn.App. 582, 740 A.2d 435 (1999).¹  The Supreme Court denied the petitioner's petition for certification.  State v. Casiano, 252 Conn. 942, 747 A.2d 518 (2000).

On November 24, 1997, the petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court in which he raised various claims related to trial counsel's conduct in the pretrial proceedings.   See Casiano v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV 97 0329867S (October 3, 2001, Ginocchio, J.).   On June 4, 2002, the court denied the amended petition.   On October 14, 2003, the Connecticut Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal of the trial court's denial of his amended habeas petition.   See Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 79 Conn.App. 828, 832 A.2d 77 (2003).   The petitioner did not file a petition for certification to appeal the decision of the Connecticut Appellate Court.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a federal habeas petition, and asserted the same grounds as his first state court petition.   That petition was denied for failure to exhaust state court remedies.   Casiano v. State Jail/Prison DOC Warden, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:04 CV 1612(JCH) (D.Conn.2006).   On April 8, 2008, the petitioner filed a second federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the court dismissed as time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).   See Casiano v. Department of Correction, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:08–CV–745 (RNC) (D.Conn.2008).   The petitioner requested reconsideration of the dismissal, which the court denied on September 12, 2008.   Casiano v. Department of Correction, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:08–CV–745 (RNC) (D.Conn.2008).

The petitioner filed this second state habeas petition on May 11, 2010.   In his second amended petition, filed on September 19, 2012, the petitioner alleges that his sentence is unconstitutional because General Statutes § 53a–35a(2), which authorizes the penalty for felony murder, and General Statutes § 54a–125a, which prohibits early release for those convicted of felony murder, violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment as applied to the petitioner, who was sixteen years old at the time of the offense.   He makes this claim in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which have annunciated limitations on sentencing juveniles under the eighth amendment.   On November 6, 2012, the respondent filed a return, denying the material allegations of the petition and asserting the special defense of waiver.

The respondent then filed the present motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, on January 11, 2013.   On February 5, 2013, the petitioner filed an objection to the respondent's motion.   The respondent filed a reply to the petitioner's objection on February 22, 2013.   The court heard oral argument on the motion on March 13, 2013.   The respondent, both in its reply and at oral argument, withdrew its motion to dismiss.   Accordingly, this decision addresses the respondent's motion for summary judgment, and the objection thereto.

Having considered the written and oral arguments of the parties, the court grants the motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

A habeas court may grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, affidavits and any other evidence submitted show that there is no genuine issue of material fact between the parties requiring a trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lawrence v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn.App. 759, 761, 9 A.3d 772 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 936, 17 A.3d 474 (2011), citing Practice Book § 23–37.  “The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ․ and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact ․ A material fact ․ [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Anderson v. Schoenhorn, 89 Conn.App. 666, 670, 874 A.2d 798 (2005).

The respondent argues that its motion for summary judgment should be granted pursuant to our Appellate Court's recent decision in State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 1, in which the Appellate Court had the first opportunity to apply the recent United States Supreme Court cases involving juvenile sentencing and found the state's sentencing procedures constitutional.   The petitioner counters the respondent's motion by arguing that genuine issues of material fact exist in the present case because the petitioner did not admit the facts alleged by the state at the change of plea hearing or at the petitioner's sentencing.   The petitioner further claims that a material fact exists as to whether mitigation of the petitioner's sentence was available at the time of his sentencing, and provides the court with transcripts from the testimony of his mother, father and himself at the prior habeas proceeding and his school records as evidence that it was available at that time.   The court finds that these facts are not material to the court's summary judgment determination because they are not necessary to decide whether the respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the analysis articulated by the Appellate Court in the Riley decision.

In Riley, the juvenile defendant, who had been sentenced to 100 years imprisonment for the crimes of attempt to commit murder, first degree assault, murder and conspiracy to commit murder, alleged that the manner in which his sentence was imposed was unconstitutional pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S.Ct. 2455.   In Miller, the Supreme Court held that policymakers cannot prescribe mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles in homicide cases unless the sentencing court follows a certain process and considers certain characteristics particular to juveniles.  Id.

The Riley court began by noting that “[i]n a trilogy of recent eighth amendment decisions ․ the United States Supreme Court has significantly altered the landscape of juvenile sentencing practices.”  (Citations omitted.)  State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 10.   The Riley court explained:  “The [United States Supreme Court first] invalidated the death penalty for all juvenile offenders in Roper v. Simmons, [543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) ].   Next, in Graham v. Florida, supra, 130 S.Ct. at 2030, the court categorically barred life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses.   Neither of these cases, however, seemed to suggest that life without parole sentences were constitutionally impermissible for juvenile homicide offenders.   See id., 2027 (‘[t]here is a line between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual’ ․ );  Roper v. Simmons, supra, 572 (noting that, to extent that prospect of death penalty deters juvenile offenders, life without possibility of parole is ‘a severe sanction, in particular for a young person’);  see also State v. Allen, supra, 289 Conn. 581 (‘[t]he scope of Roper ․ is narrow:  it applies only where an individual under eighteen years of age is sentenced to death’) ․” State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 12–13.

As to Miller, the Riley court found that the Supreme Court did not categorically bar life without parole for juveniles;  instead, the court found that Miller “mandate[d] only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing [a sentence of life without parole].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 13, citing Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2471.  “[I]t is clear that the majority in Miller was principally concerned with ‘sentencing scheme[s] that [mandate] life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders'—these statutory schemes were deemed contrary to the eighth amendment ․ It is equally apparent that life without parole sentences still can be imposed pursuant to an individualized sentencing process, where the sentencing ‘judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.’  ․ We believe that Miller, which invalidated two sentencing schemes in which the sentencing courts had no discretion, and in which the defendants were unable to present any evidence in mitigation, requires only the opportunity to present such evidence to a court permitted to consider it, and to impose a lesser sentence in its discretion.”   (Citations omitted.)  State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 14–16.

The Riley court further noted that the sentencing procedures at issue in that case differed from those scrutinized in Miller, emphasizing that the sentencing court in Riley was not mandated to sentence the defendant to life without parole.  State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 16 (“Instead, our sentencing statutes permit the court a great deal of discretion in determining an appropriate sentence.”)  “A sentencing judge [in Connecticut] has very broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the[se] statutory limits ․ In determining an appropriate sentence, the trial court may consider responsible unsworn or out-of-court information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person's life and circumstance ․ The presentence investigation report, which the trial court is required to review ․ informs the sentencing process and play[s] a significant role in reaching a fair [result] ․ It serves this function by inquiring into a wide range of issues, including the circumstances of the offense, the attitude of the complainant or victim, or of the immediate family where possible in cases of homicide, and the criminal record, social history and present condition of the defendant ․ Thus, the presentence investigation report compiles for the court an array of information, which is potentially mitigating or critical in nature.”   (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 17.  “Moreover, our rules of practice permit a defendant to supplement or challenge the information contained in the presentence investigation report at the sentencing hearing.”  Id. “The defendant is thus sentenced by a court that is empowered to conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [it] may consider or the source from which it may come ․ This inquiry is certainly expansive enough to encompass information regarding the defendant's age, maturity, upbringing, mental health, and development.   Indeed, the sentencing court's mandatory review of the presentence investigation report ensures that many of these issues will be considered.”  Id., 18.

As a result, the Riley court found that the manner in which the defendant's sentence was imposed was constitutional, holding:  “We believe that our current sentencing procedures afford juvenile defendants sufficient opportunity, and courts ample discretion, for meaningful mitigation of juvenile sentences.   This individualized sentencing process therefore comports with the eighth amendment.”  Id., 19.   Thus in Riley, the majority of the Appellate Court approved a sentence of 100 years of imprisonment due to the discretionary nature of the trial court's sentencing process.

In the dissenting opinion in Riley, cited by the petitioner in his objection, Judge Borden indicated his belief that the majority misinterpreted the Miller decision.  “[The majority's reading of Miller ] ignores the reasoning of Miller related to the science regarding the juvenile brain on which it, and its progenitor, Graham, are based.   It ignores the instruction of Miller that, in imposing such a sentence on a juvenile, the court must take into account the qualitative differences between the juvenile and adult brains that the science tells us exist ․ Finally, the majority ignores the reasoning of Miller that mandates, based on Graham, that every juvenile given a life sentence without the possibility of parole must at some time in the future be afforded a ‘second look,’ namely, a meaningful opportunity to be heard to establish that his sentence be modified or that he be released because he had matured and had overcome the mental, psychological and environmental deficits that the court identified as attendant to the juvenile brain.”   (Citation omitted.)  State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 23.

The Supreme Court has granted certification in State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 1 to determine whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the defendant's sentence in that case was appropriately imposed under the eighth amendment as interpreted by the Miller and Graham decisions.   As of the date of this decision, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue.   This court is bound by the law as it exists at this time and in particular, as annunciated by the majority of the Appellate Court.

Applying the majority decision in Riley to the present case it is undisputed that the underlying criminal court was not mandated to sentence the petitioner to life without parole.   Pursuant to General Statutes § 53a–35a(2), the statute that authorizes the penalty for felony murder, the petitioner was exposed to between twenty-five and sixty years incarceration.   The transcript reveals that the sentencing judge, Devlin, J., reviewed and considered the presentence investigation report and the letters that accompanied it before sentencing the petitioner.   The transcript further indicates that petitioner's counsel reviewed the presentence investigation report, and had no objections to the information contained in the report.   The sentencing judge also offered petitioner's counsel an opportunity to make remarks on behalf of the defense.   Therefore, the petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the sentencing procedures approved by the Riley decision.

The majority opinion in Riley determined that the current individualized sentencing procedures in this state provided the petitioner with sufficient opportunity, and the court with ample discretion, to meaningfully mitigate the petitioner's sentence.   Therefore, the manner in which the petitioner was sentenced as to the crime of felony murder under §§ 53a–35a(2) and 54a–125a comports with the eighth amendment pursuant to State v. Riley, supra, 140 Conn.App. 1. As a result, the respondent's motion for summary judgment as to the petitioner's claims must be granted.

CONCLUSION

As there are no disputed issues of material fact and the respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the respondent's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Cobb, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. After pleading nolo contendre to the charges, the petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to suppress certain incriminating statements to the police.   The Appellate Court rejected those arguments, and affirmed the conviction.  State v. Casiano, supra, 55 Conn.App. 582..  FN1. After pleading nolo contendre to the charges, the petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to suppress certain incriminating statements to the police.   The Appellate Court rejected those arguments, and affirmed the conviction.  State v. Casiano, supra, 55 Conn.App. 582.

Cobb, Susan Quinn, J.