Ronald Bozelko v. Alfred D'Albero et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTIONS TO RECUSE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Mr. Bozelko has filed another Motion to Recuse on May 7, 2013 and a supplement to that motion on May 20, 2013.   The court has filed two previous memorandums on March 22, 2013 which denied Mr. Bozelko's previous motions for recusal and which raise many of the same points relied on by Mr. Bozelko in these more recent filings.

In these May 2013 filings Mr. Bozelko proceeds by way of affidavit listing the various factors which he claims require disqualification.

Generally the court relies on the discussion in St. Germain v. LaBrie, 108 Conn.App. 587, 595–596 (2008), where

The court will not discuss the points raised in paragraphs 4A, B, C, D, H, I, J, M, 0, Q, P, or R since either the court has previously addressed them in its March 22nd memorandum and found no reason for recusal or disqualification based on these allegations or they constitute complaints against adverse rulings by the court which as St. Germaine indicates do not establish evidence of bias sufficient to support disqualification.

The court will briefly discuss other issues raised by Mr. Bozelko in his affidavit of May 6, 2013.

Mr. Bozelko makes the following points:

E.  The continuing setting trial dates without discovery, depositions, and pending motions being rule upon.

Mr. Bozelko does not provide a timeframe for this allegation.   The court has held seven hearings since December 18, 2012 to resolve discovery disputes and other motions and has filed five opinions on the consolidated cases.   It has made rulings in court on the matters raised, perhaps more to the point the court has granted every motion for continuance filed by Mr. Bozelko except the last one filed a few days before the scheduled trial which did not go forward in any event.

As to L, Mr. Bozelko states the court refused to enter an order on continuances and vaguely refers to the fact that notice was given to him by the caseflow coordinator “always off record.”   The court had the caseflow coordinator notify all parties by fax of its rulings on continuance requests as a convenience to all parties including Mr. Bozelko so they would not have to wait for the clerk to process the motions followed by a mailing.

F. Inquiring ex parte of the Affiant if there is any insurance coverage for any of the plaintiff's claims.

This is unclear.   The inquiry was certainly not “ex parte” since it was made in open court and obviously directed at all parties since Attorney Doyle provided the answer to the court's inquiry.   The court, given the broad nature of the complaint referring to monies Mr. Bozelko advanced from an estate and from his own resources, wished to know if any insurance company was a necessary party in a situation where there was coverage for monies the estate lost.   Interestingly that scenario would only arise if Mr. Bozelko prevailed on his complaint.

K. The prior determination of admissible evidence prior to trial by making statements on the Affiant's Applications for Subpoena's as follows:  “Court to review at trial whether any documents are to be introduced into evidence or subject to inspection by Plaintiff.”

The “prior determination” claim is belied by the very statement of the court wherein court indicated it would review documents to decide if they should come into evidence or be subject to review by plaintiff.

N. The denial of due process to the Affiant under the U.S. Constitution and Constitution of the State of Connecticut of a hearing by an independent decider on the Affiant's motion to disqualify.

This assumes some kind of prima facie case has been made out for disqualification.   The court concludes this has not been done.   To grant such an “independent hearing on the state of this record would mean any time such a claim has been made such a hearing must be held.”

As to 4G, S, and T the court cannot ascertain what they allege or even mean.

(b)

The plaintiff has filed a supplemental motion dated May 17, 2013.   In his affidavit the plaintiff makes further allegations that he says require recusal.   The court will not comment on repetitive claims.   But only address new claims.

Paragraph 8, regarding continuances, says the court has avoided ruling on requests for continuances.   This is not true, the court has granted every continuance the plaintiff has filed except the last one.

Paragraphs 9, 11, and 15 regarding alleged HIPAA violations are meritless, see 45 CFR § 164.502(a)(1)(a), also cf 45 CFR 165.512(e)(4)(I).

Interestingly Mr. Bozelko in one of his requests for continuance said he had to have dental surgery done and needed two days of rest.   The court in its order, made to all parties, in this litigation that has been going on 6 and 7 years, would be satisfied with much less information.   The health care provider would only provide to the party (not directly to the court) a letter indicating that some medical procedure is required and that therefore the party cannot appear in court on a specific date or dates.   Even these documents would not be made part of the record, also see 45 CFR 164.502(b)(1).

Paragraph 16 is not true.   As the court has noted in the past it would take steps to accommodate the plaintiff regarding his physical problems, see court's Memorandum of Decision denying motion to transfer in these two files, dated March 22, 2013.

Paragraph 18 is difficult to understand;  there apparently is a claim that the court's statement that it orders the transcript after a trial in order to decide a case violates the Canons and would deny the plaintiff a fair and unbiased trial.   Thus, to the court, a claim without any merit.

Paragraph 19 claims the judge refuses to issue written orders or oral orders, only comments.   If this is true how has he been able to file motions to reargue.   He claims all this occurs when the court knows he cannot afford transcripts—presumably where the court issued rulings.   But Mr. Bozelko never indicated he could not afford transcripts;  there is a procedure for an indigent to obtain them.   In fact the court presumed he could afford them;  he apparently pays someone to type his motions and memos—around 70 motions since the beginning of March 2013.   In a chambers conference he said, with other counsel present, that he has ordered transcripts but then felt he did not need them.

Paragraph 20 states the court signs the Affiant's applications for fee waivers in an “unintelligible signature and fails to print his name as the application requires”.   The court takes no umbrage at the “unintelligible” portion of the statement and agrees its signature is sometimes difficult to read.   But to get to the only relevant point, apparently the clerk's office had no difficulties in determining the court was the party signing in the box designated “Judge” and there is no claim that any of this resulted in the failure to process a requested fee waiver.

Paragraph 21:  “The Judge questioned to the plaintiff's trial experience.”   The court knew Mr. Bozelko had practiced law and at one point merely asked if he had had any trial experience possibly because of his reaction or statement concerning something that came up during one of the hearings before it.   The court has no memory of the context of the statement and Mr. Bozelko does not elaborate.

In any event the motion to disqualify and its supplement, dated May 7 and May 21, 2013 are denied as lacking merit.   It concludes no reasonable person would conclude from examining these allegations that the court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Thomas J. Corradino

Judge Trial Referee

Corradino, Thomas J., J.T.R.