Charles D. Mierzejewsi v. Crary Brownell (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Both the plaintiff, Charles Mierzejewski, and the defendant, Crary Brownell, have moved for summary judgment on the grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata.   For reasons set forth below, the court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Brownell.

Factual and Procedural Background

This action is the third case brought against the defendant Brownell since 2002.   All three of the actions have included the same prayer for relief:  quiet title in the properties subject to the dispute.   The first action was Mierzejewski v. Brownell, MMX–CV–03–0100645 (the “First Case”).   In the First Case, Mierzejewski challenged the validity of the right of way and raised issues associated with its width and location.   Brownell prevailed in the First Case, with this court concluding, “The right of way runs along the northern property line of the Mierzejewski Property and is 20 feet in width, with the entire right of way being located on that property.”

Mierzejewski then brought a second action, Mierzejewski v. Laneri, MMX–CV–07–5003402 (the “Second Case”), in which he argued, essentially, that notwithstanding the First Case, the location of the right of way was uncertain.   At issue was whether the boundary line between the Mierzejewski and Laneri properties was a stonewall on the north side of the abandoned highway or the center line of it.   Brownell argued that this issue was determined in the First Case, but the trial court disagreed, concluding that the right of way was located entirely within the bed of the old highway and the boundary line of the Mierzejewski and the Laneri properties was a stonewall on the north side of the old roadbed.   The Laneris successfully appealed the Second Case to the Appellate Court, which held that “the defendants' southerly boundary line is the center line of the old abandoned highway.”

In both the First and Second Cases Mierzejewski unsuccessfully applied for certiorari to the Connecticut Supreme Court.   Mierzejewski now brings this case again seeking to quiet title to the right of way and injunctive relief against Brownell.

Brownell has pleaded five special defenses, including collateral estoppel, issue preclusion, claim preclusion, res judicata and the merger doctrine.   Brownell claims that the validity and legal existence of the right of way as well as its width (twenty feet) were determined with certainty in the First Case. Any remaining issue as to the location of the right of way was conclusively determined in the Second Case. He claims, essentially, that all claims asserted by Mierzejewski in this case have been or could have been litigated in the First and Second Cases.

Discussion of the Law and Ruling

The basis of this action and of Mierzejewski's argument on summary judgment is that some portions of the trial court's decision in the Second Case retain validity.   He is attempting to parse out the findings in the Second Case which benefit him;  for example, he tries to argue that the right of way is only 10 feet in width, when the width of the right of way was conclusively determined in the First Case.

Order in cases constitute a “carefully crafted mosaic” and the appellate court cannot disrupt a single tile if it affects the entire scheme.  Tyc v. Tyc, 40 Conn.App. 562, 672 A.2d 526 (1996).   In this case Mierzejewski wants to disrupt the scheme by asking this court to select only certain findings in a case where the entire case was remanded for only the purpose of entering judgment.

Whether a subsequent claim is barred by either collateral estoppel or res judicata is a question of law.  Sellers v. Work Force One, Inc., 92 Conn.App. 683, 886 A.2d 850 (2005);  Powell v. Infinity Insurance Company, 282 Conn. 594, 601, 922 A.2d 1073 (2007).

The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction ․ If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made.  (Citations omitted.)  Wade's Dairy, Inc. v. Fairfield, 181 Conn. 556, 559–60, 436 A.2d 24 (1980).  “Claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) have been described as related ideas on a continuum ․ Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., 248 Conn. 364, 373, 727 A.2d 1245 (1999).   More specifically, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion ․ prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim.   Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 58, 808 A.2d 1107 (2002);  R & R Pool & Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 257 Conn. 456, 466, 778 A.2d 61 (2001).   An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined ․ 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 27, comment (d) (1982).   An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered.   F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure (3d Ed.1985) § 11.19 ․ Bowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., supra, 374.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Efthimiou v. Smith, 268 Conn. 499, 506–07, 846 A.2d 222 (2004).

Powell v. Infinity Insurance Company, 282 Conn. 594, 600–01, 922 A.2d 1073 (2007).

Based upon a review of the trial court and appellate court decisions in the First and Second Cases and the affidavits submitted by the parties it appears that the First Case determined the legality and width, twenty feet, of Brownell's right of way.   The Second Case determined its location, the centerline of the old highway.   Notwithstanding the foregoing, Mierzejewski continues to argue that there are issues remaining to be determined.   The basis for his argument seems to be that the trial court decision in the Second Case still retains some validity even though it was reversed.   The court finds that position to be without merit.

All claims that the plaintiff now seeks to litigate either were or could have been litigated in the prior two cases.   His continued prosecution of this action is vexatious.   The court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendant Brownell and denies the summary judgment of the plaintiff Mierzejewski.

By the Court,

Aurigemma, J.

Aurigemma, Julia L., J.