James F. Clary v. Aamir Nadeem et al. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This case arises from a low speed rear-end collision on March 21, 2012, on East Main Street in Waterbury, Connecticut.   The plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in the accident.   At issue in the defendants' Motion To Strike are Count Two alleging reckless operation against Aamir Nadeem, the driver, and Count Four alleging negligent entrustment against Arshid Nadeem, the owner.

The parties recognize that there is a split in authority among the Superior Courts regarding the standard necessary to sustain Connecticut General Statute § 14–295 claim of recklessness against a defendant's motion to strike such a count.

Plaintiff further alleges that the defendant(s) violated certain statutes §§ 14–218a, 14–240(a), and 14–222 which constitute recklessness.

The court is relying on Practice Book § 10–25 which allows the plaintiff to plead in the alternative, sounding in both negligence and recklessness.   Robbins v. Gondek, 2008 Conn.Super. Lexis 650 5–6 (March 18, 2008);  Hand v. Moore, 2005 Conn.Super Lexis 2657 (September 26, 2005) [40 Conn. L. Rptr. 83].   In this case, the Court adopts the majority position concerning claims of recklessness.

Therefore the allegations contained in the Second Count are on their face, legally sufficient to survive the defendants' Motion To Strike.  Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 321 (2003).

Therefore the defendants' Motion To Strike Count Two of the amended complaint is hereby denied.

The defendant also moves to strike Count Four of the Amended Complaint claiming negligent entrustment of the subject vehicle by the owner Arshid Nadeem.

The Court relies on its decision in Crespo v. Gomez et al., CV13–6017453 (Waterbury, J.D.), to address this claim and the supporting cases.   Morin v. Machrone, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 10 6003593 (May 20, 2011, Roche, J.);   see also Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 520, 165 A. 678 (1933) (establishing the common-law cause of action for negligent entrustment in Connecticut).  “The alleged negligence of the defendant driver on [the day of the accident] is not the determinative factor in an action for negligent entrustment.   Instead, the proper focus is on whether the entrustor was negligent in entrusting a vehicle to an incompetent driver.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Morin v. Machrone, supra.   In Morin, this court granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's cause of action for negligent entrustment because “the plaintiff ha[d] not alleged specific facts showing th[at the driver] had a past history of incompetencies or other dangerous propensities, that [the defendant] had any actual or constructive notice of these incompetencies or propensities, or that [the driver's] incompetence resulted in the plaintiff's injuries.”  Id. Marron v. Grala, Superior Court, J.D. New Britain, Docket # CV12–6016399 (Jan. 2, 2013) (J. Shortall, J.T.R.)

In the present case, in Count Four (including, by incorporation, Count One), the plaintiff only alleges that the driver Aamir Nadeem was negligent at the time of the collision, that Nadeem was operating the vehicle owned by Arshid with his knowledge and permission, that as owner, he knew or should have known of Aamir's propensity to drive said vehicle in such a negligent manner that it was foreseeable he would cause damage or injuries to others and that Arshid is responsible because he negligently entrusted the vehicle to Aamir.   These allegations are legally insufficient.   Therefore, the defendants' Motion To Strike the said Count Four is granted.

BY THE COURT

V. Roche, J.

Roche, Vincent E., J.