Domenic Setaro v. James R. Strol (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

I

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The defendant, James R. Strol, seeks to enforce a settlement agreement that he asserts he entered into with the plaintiff, Dominic Setaro, on October 23, 2012.   The motion to enforce the settlement agreement was heard on January 22, 2013 and was followed by a briefing schedule completed on April 17, 2013.   Based upon a thorough review of the record and applicable law, the motion is granted.

The parties to this action are the owners of neighboring businesses on Chase Avenue in Waterbury.   Although their properties are side by side on Chase Avenue, the plaintiff's property extends behind the rear of the defendant's property line.   Between the parties' property lines is a passway, identified as Leach Place.   The parties' dispute involves the defendant's placement of cars for sale beyond his property line onto Leach Place and further onto an adjoining, paved area owned by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff filed a complaint to quiet title on October 20, 2006.   Although the defendant admits to parking cars for sale on a portion of the plaintiff's land, he counters with claims of adverse possession and prescriptive easement.   Since the inception of this case, eleven pretrials and status conferences have been scheduled, as well as six court trials, which have all been continued.   The last scheduled trial was to occur on October 23, 2012.   On that day, the court met with the parties in an attempt to mediate and settle the parties' differences before proceeding to trial.

At the end of a lengthy settlement conference, the parties represented to the court that they had reached an agreement in principal for a new boundary line between their properties.   The agreement was memorialized by a hand-drawn line, accompanied by specific measurements, on an existing class A–2 survey map of the property owned by the defendant.   Defendant's Exhibit A. The map was initialed by the parties and their attorneys and presented to the court for review, but not in open court.   At that time, the court commented to the attorneys in the presence of their clients that the plaintiff appeared to be unfairly transferring far more than half of Leach Place, to which he might be entitled under his claim, as well as a portion of the land to which he held title.   The plaintiff's attorney responded that the entire area of Leach Place and the paved area of the plaintiff's land were in dispute in light of the defendant's claim of adverse possession.   It was also pointed out to the court that the defendant was transferring a desirable, thirty-foot section of land over his own property, as well as a portion of Leach Place to which he had asserted his own legal claim.   This smaller transfer of land by the defendant was important because it fulfilled the plaintiff's stated desire for a second point of egress to Chase Avenue.   Upon a further review of the map by the court, it appeared that the disputed area was divided approximately in half.   Based upon all of these factors, the agreement appeared to the court to be fair and reasonable.

The following factors are important to an understanding of the continuing dispute between the parties, as well as the court's decision to grant the plaintiff's motion.   First, the hand drawn boundary line on the map, initialed by the parties, represents the plaintiff's proposal to the defendant on the day of trial, which the defendant has accepted and now seeks to enforce.   Second, the hand drawn boundary line has three specifically identified measurements associated with points of reference to existing survey map features.   Importantly, there is a handwritten number “12 1/2',” with an arrow pointing from the westerly edge of Leach Place into the plaintiff's parcel of land to the agreed upon boundary line.   This is ultimately important to this case because the width of Leach Place is twenty five (25) feet.   Therefore, the total distance between the easterly edge of Leach Place and the agreed upon boundary line totals thirty-seven and a half (37 1/2) feet.

The plaintiff now asserts that this thirty-seven and a half (37 1/2) foot measurement should begin at an entirely different point on the map.   This different point is the curb of Chase Avenue at the northwesterly corner of the defendant's property.   This different point on Chase Avenue is not highlighted, written upon or referred to in any writing by the parties on the map.   Moreover, the number 37 1/2 does not appear in any context on the map.

The court finds that these first two factors strongly militate in favor of the defendant's motion to enforce the agreement.   A third factor emphasized by the plaintiff, however, that the agreement was represented to the court only as the agreement of the parties “in principle,” appears to militate toward the denial of the motion and requires further examination.

At the conclusion of the pretrial at which the parties presented the agreement in principle, the court scheduled a status conference to be held several weeks later.   The reasons for the continuation of the case and the status conference were several.   First, the parties intended to employ the services of the original surveyor to physically mark the property with the new boundary line.   If the parties agreed to the physical marking, they would finalize the matter with a written agreement, including a new A–2 Map and Survey.   A physical inspection of the new boundary line was necessary because of a significant outcropping of rock on the plaintiff's property that potentially interfered with egress to Chase Avenue.   This determination was a critical element of the agreement between the parties.   At the time the agreement of the parties was reached “in principle,” this critical fact was unknown because the survey map used for the agreement did not include topographical features.   Furthermore, during the pretrial discussions with the court, the parties discussed additional boundary issues beyond those within the pleadings of this case.   The parties were interested in discussing solutions to these additional problems in an attempt to finalize a so-called global solution to their property disputes.   At no time, however, did the parties state that the agreement in principle was contingent upon an agreement on other issues unrelated to this litigation.

Based upon these facts, the defendant asserts there is a legally enforceable settlement agreement.   The plaintiff responds that there was no final agreement and that the written map represents a misunderstanding and mutual mistake of the parties and, therefore, is not a legally enforceable settlement agreement.   The court disagrees.

II

DISCUSSION

Although the parties agree that Audubon Parking Associates, Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 626 A.2d 729 (1993), is controlling authority in this case, they disagree as to whether there is an enforceable agreement.   The court will begin with a review of the applicable law and then its applicability to the facts of this case.

“A trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous.”  Id., 811.  “Summary enforcement is not only essential to the efficient use of judicial resources, but also preserves the integrity of settlement as a meaningful way to resolve legal disputes.   When parties agree to settle a case, they are effectively contracting for the right to avoid a trial.   The asserted right not to go to trial can appropriately be based on a contract between the parties.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 812.

“ ‘Once reached, a settlement agreement cannot be repudiated by either party.   Whether the parties in fact concluded a settlement agreement is determined by the intention of the parties manifested by their words and acts.’  Hess v. Dumouchel Paper Co., 154 Conn. 343, 347, 225 A.2d 797 (1966).   A settlement agreement need not be signed or in writing to be enforceable.  Nanni v. Dino Corp., 117 Conn.App. 61, 66, 978 A.2d 531 (2009).   Nor must the agreement be reported to the court or otherwise placed on record.  DAP Financial Management Co. v. Mor–Fam Electric, Inc., 59 Conn.App. 92, 755 A.2d 925 (2000);  Montgomery v. Smith, 40 Conn.Sup. 358, 359, 499 A.2d 444 (1985).”   Wells v. Staples Connecticut, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 07 5002035 (July 21, 2010, Riley, J.).  “The intention of the parties is a question of fact, and when that is ascertained it is conclusive.  Ballard v. Asset Recovery Management Co., 39 Conn.App. 805, 809 [667 A.2d 1298 (1995), cert. denied, 236 Conn. 906, 670 A.2d 1306 (1996) ].”   Mott v. Wal–Mart Stores, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5027022 (November 8, 2011, Silbert, J.) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 829, 830).   Further, “[t]he Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized that settlement agreements, voluntarily and fairly made, should be held valid and enforced by the Courts.  Tallmadge Brothers, Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 252 Conn. 479, 746 A.2d 1277 (2000).”   Ravenswood Construction, LLC v. Bysiewicz, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 04 0103857 (June 1, 2006, Booth, J.).

The plaintiff asserts he did not voluntary reach an agreement with the defendant because there was no meeting of the minds and, therefore, any perceived agreement is based upon the mutual mistake of the parties.   Neither party, however, has presented evidence of a mutual mistake, such as that an outcropping of rock interfered with the plaintiff's egress to Chase Avenue under the agreement.   Although mutual mistake would have been a credible claim if there was evidence to support it, the court finds that the defendant's claim of mutual mistake is unsustainable as a matter of fact and law.   If there was a mistake, the court finds it was unilaterally made by the plaintiff.

An excellent discussion of the applicability of mistake in the context of the enforcement of settlement agreements may be found in the Superior Court case of Behling v. Bennett, Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 98 0089600 (April 24, 2002, Shapiro, J.), as follows:  “The concept that a contract will not be enforced due to mistake ‘rests on the equitable theory that the instrument sought to be reformed does not conform to the real contract agreed upon and does not express the intention of the parties and that it was executed as the result of mutual mistake, or mistake of one party coupled with actual or constructive fraud, or inequitable conduct on the part of the other.’  Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 531, 441 A.2d 151 (1981).   Our Supreme Court described mutual mistake as applying ‘where, in reducing to writing an agreement made or transaction entered into as intended by the parties thereto, through mistake, common to both parties, the written instrument fails to express the real agreement or transaction ․ In short, the mistake, being common to both parties, effects a result which neither intended.’  (Internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted.)  Id. at 532.

“To prevail on a claim of mutual mistake, a claimant must satisfy the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence.   See Back v. Peoples National Fire Ins. Co., 97 Conn. 336, 340, 116 A. 603 (1922).   As to a claim of unilateral mistake, where fraud is absent, but the party claims that inequitable conduct led to his mistake, his burden of proof is also that of presenting clear and convincing evidence.   See Lopinto v. Haines, supra, 185 Conn. at 535.”

Based upon a fair preponderance of the evidence, the court concludes there was an agreement between the parties to settle their disputed property claims, as reflected on the map as proposed by the plaintiff.   Defendant's Exhibit A. The court further finds there to be no evidence in the record of mutual mistake.

Finally, the court finds that there is insufficient evidence to meet the required higher standard of clear and convincing evidence needed to support the plaintiff's claim of a unilateral mistake.   The plaintiff's claim that the map does not reflect his understanding of the agreement is unsupported by any evidence in the record other than his own testimony.   In fact, all the other evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the map, as the plaintiff's proposal, is the agreement of the parties.   The only possible alternative conclusion to be drawn, accepting the plaintiff's testimony as true, is that he did not understand the map both when he proposed it and later initialed it.   Absent clear and convincing evidence of fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the defendant, the claim of unilateral mistake is additionally unsustainable.   Again, in support of this conclusion, the court emphasizes the fact that the agreement was proposed by the plaintiff.

III

CONCLUSION

The court orders that, within thirty days, deeds be drawn, signed and recorded based upon the Class A–2 Lot Line Revision Map dated December 4, 2012.   Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. In particular, the deeds shall be drawn according to the line on this map, identified as “Property Line As Formerly Agreed Upon (TYP).”  The parties shall share the reasonable cost of a new survey and map of the boundary line, if required by either party to accurately draw a metes and bounds description for the purpose of any deed to be recorded in the land records pursuant to this order.   Upon the recording of the deeds and payment of any costs associated with a survey and map, the claims of the parties shall be withdrawn.

BY THE COURT

MARK H. TAYLOR

Taylor, Mark H., J.