IN RE: William E. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

In this child protection proceeding, pursuant to a petition filed on February 29, 2012, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) seeks to terminate the parental rights of father, John E., and mother, Rochelle E., to their three minor children, William, Michael and Michelle.   On October 11, 2012, mother tendered to the court a signed, written consent to terminate her parental rights.   After canvassing mother and making the findings that mother's consent was made knowingly and voluntarily, with a full understanding of all of the consequences, and with the effective assistance of counsel, the court accepted mother's consent to terminate her parental rights to all three children and granted DCF's motion to amend the petition to reflect consent as the basis for termination of mother's parental rights.   J. Elgo. The remaining issue of whether termination of mother's rights is in the children's best interests was consolidated to be considered and decided at the trial of the petition to terminate father's parental rights.

There are no other known pending proceedings affecting the custody of the minor children.   There are no claims of Indian tribal affiliation.   This court has jurisdiction.   Trial in this matter proceeded on November 7, 8, 9, 19 and 20.   Evidence consisted of:  the testimony of six witnesses called by DCF (two social workers, the court-appointed psychologist, the children's clinical therapist, the children's foster mother, and the guardian ad litem of the children);  the testimony of two witnesses called by father (mother and a family acquaintance/friend);  thirty documentary exhibits introduced by DCF;  and one video exhibit introduced by father.   The court has carefully considered all of the evidence and concludes that clear and convincing evidence establishes a ground for termination of father's parental rights and that termination of both mother's and father's parental rights is in the best interests of each of the three children.

BACKGROUND AND CASE PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Father, John E., is sixty-four years of age and mother, Rochelle E., is fifty years of age.   They were married about thirty-three years ago.   Father and mother have four adult children who no longer live in the family home.   Father and mother also have three minor children (the subject of these proceedings) who were born to mother's sister but were taken in by mother and father shortly after the children's births in 1998 and 1999 because of the sister's drug addiction and the effects of her drug abuse on these infants during the pregnancies.   The minor children were all born prematurely and were addicted to cocaine at birth because of their biological mother's drug addiction.   The children were born with low birth weights and with medical complications.   John E. and Rochelle E. adopted the three minor children on May 17, 2001, and have raised them since that time with financial assistance provided by the state of Connecticut.

The minor children are William, presently fifteen years old, who was born on March 13, 1998, and twins Michelle and Michael, presently thirteen years old, who were born on July 23, 1999.

DCF became involved in this matter on August 20, 2010, when the New Haven police department notified DCF that it was executing a search warrant of the parents' home in light of allegations by the parents' adult daughters that father had engaged in sexual abuse of them for many years, from when they were very young girls through the girls' attainment of the age of majority.²  The young women also alleged that the abuse had been video-taped and the police were searching for the evidence.

On August 20, 2010, in light of the police reports to the DCF investigator when she met them at the parents' home and in light of her learning that the police had found adult pornographic video tapes and magazines in the downstairs area of the home in easy access to the children, DCF removed the minor children from the home under its statutory authority to take a 96–hour hold.   On August 23, the DCF investigator interviewed the adult daughters.   On August 24, DCF filed a motion for an ex parte order of temporary custody (OTC) of the minor children, with supporting affidavits from DCF and the police.   The affidavit of the DCF investigator reported the finding of offensive videos and pornography in the home, allegations about very questionable sleeping arrangements in the home, and extreme concern for the children if they were to remain in the home.   The investigating police detective's affidavit reported that he had executed the search and seizure warrant at the parents' home, and that he had discovered evidence substantiating the allegation that sexual abuse had occurred and that father had been the perpetrator.   The affidavit also averred that an extensive amount of pornographic material was seized, including VHS videos and home videos made by father depicting the abuse.   The affidavit further related that pornographic material was “scattered” around the residence in plain view and a CD was also located in the bedroom of the minor child, Michelle, with other illicit material.

The motion for an ex parte OTC was granted by the superior court for juvenile matters at Middletown, J. Rubinow, based on the court's determination that the children were in immediate physical danger from their surroundings, and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the children had been made by DCF. The required preliminary hearing on the OTC was conducted on September 3, 2010.   Mother and father waived their right to a hearing within ten days, and agreed to sustain the OTC, with the children remaining in the temporary custody of DCF. The parents entered denials of the neglect allegations.   Specific steps were reviewed with mother and father in detail by the court, J. Burgdorff.   The parents signed the steps and they were entered as orders by the court.³  These steps required father, inter alia, to attend individual counseling and make progress toward the goals of understanding the effects of sexual abuse on children and the necessity of ensuring the safety of children.   The steps also required father to cooperate with service providers for recommended parenting and family counseling.   Judge Burgdorff explicitly reviewed each specific step requirement for father on the record on September 3, 2010.   When asked by the judge whether he had any questions, father responded in the negative.

On September 20, 2010, father was arrested for the alleged sexual and physical abuse of his now adult daughters throughout their childhoods.   Father is charged with fifteen counts of sexual assault and one count of Risk of Injury to a Minor.   Mother is also the subject of pending criminal charges of Risk of Injury on the basis of allegations that she was aware of father's actions and failed to safeguard her daughters.   Mother and father deny the criminal charges which remain pending.

One of the videos found by the police in their judicially authorized search of father's home was a home-made video depicting father's adult daughter, Jennifer, engaging in sexual activity with another woman, and the male voice-over in the video has been identified as that of father.   In an Administrative Case Review (ACR) session at DCF in October 2010, father told DCF that he had indeed recorded that video.   At that case review conference father also informed DCF that the pornographic material the police found was in the living room and dining room of the home, to which the minor children would not have had access because father had ordered that these areas were “off limits” to the children.   At this ACR, father's attorney also related that father would not participate in counseling and that the attorney planned to file a motion to vacate the OTC and/or to change the specific steps.   No such motion was ever filed.

Father continued to refuse to follow any of the orders of the specific steps and in March 2011, after DCF indicated to father and his attorney that an evaluation of father was needed, father refused and his attorney again indicated a plan to file a motion to vacate the order of specific steps.   Once again, no such motion was ever filed.

The trial on the neglect petition was scheduled to proceed in May 2011, but, in an accommodation to father's attorney, the trial was rescheduled for the summer of 2011.   On July 1, 2011, father and mother submitted to the court signed nolo contendere pleas on the neglect allegations.   A thorough canvass of mother and father was conducted by Judge Elgo, and father assured the court that:  he was not under the influence of any medication, drugs or alcohol that would affect his ability to understand the proceedings or affect the decisions he was making on that day;  he had enough time to confer with his attorneys about the decision to enter the nolo contendere plea;  he had reviewed with his lawyer DCF's allegations and the evidence DCF had proffered to support its case;  he understood that DCF had the burden of proving the neglect allegations;  he understood he was giving up his rights to remain silent, to have a trial before the judge, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present a defense at the trial;  he understood that, once the court accepted his plea, he could not take it back;  no one had threatened him to induce him to enter a plea;  no one had made him any promises to induce him to enter a plea;  the plea was voluntarily entered by him;  and he understood that, if the court accepted the plea, his children would be adjudicated neglected.   The court also ordered specific steps that included the obligation of father to participate in counseling;  cooperate with providers for recommended parenting, individual, and family counseling as referred by DCF;  cooperate with all court-ordered evaluations, and immediately move out of the family home.   Father's counsel was consulted by the court and counsel confirmed that father understood the steps.   The court further inquired, and father assured the judge that he understood the steps, but equally important, that he understood the significance of the steps with respect to reunification with the children.

In September 2011, father's counsel advised that father could attend counseling so long as father was not required to make any admissions that would affect him with regard to the pending criminal charges related to the allegations by the adult daughters.   Father, however, continued to refuse to participate in counseling.   In January 2012, DCF attempted once again to provide some parenting education and arranged for a parent educator to meet with father at the library at which visitation with the children took place.   Father stormed out of the session upon the educator's arrival and declared that he was not going to permit anyone to judge or persecute him anymore.

DCF filed the petition to terminate parental rights on February 29, 2012.   In subsequent conversations between DCF and father about the needed services, father responded that he was not going to engage in any services because he did not need to be told what to do or how to raise children, and father reminded DCF that he had already raised four children to adulthood.

As a younger man, father was engaged in work doing painting and remodeling and he also ran a catering business.   Outside of the pending criminal charges set forth above, father does not have an arrest history and he has no criminal convictions.   Father receives social security benefits.   The family lived in New Haven for a long period of time, but financial struggles led to foreclosure and they lost their home.   They then moved to Essex.   Mother's present place of residence is uncertain.   For the last two years, father claims to have maintained a residence separate from that of mother, pursuant to court order, but father has not provided the address of a fixed place of residence and he uses his adult son's address for purposes of receiving mail.

Trial of the parents' criminal charges has not as yet taken place and the charges remain pending.   In these termination proceedings, father had moved the court to postpone the termination trial until after the criminal trial had been completed.   Father did not pursue the motion, however, and, indeed, father withdrew the motion.

ADJUDICATORY FINDINGS AND DISPOSITION as to PETITIONS TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS

Termination of parental rights is the complete severance of the legal relationship, with all of its rights and responsibilities, between a child and his or her parent, rendering the child free for adoption.  General Statutes § 17a–93(e).   Because of the natural rights of parents in their children, recognized in the law on a constitutional level, interference with the parent-child relationship cannot be legitimately invoked or acted upon under the law “absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972);  See also In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 43 (2006).

In General Statutes § 17a–112(j), the Connecticut General Assembly has codified the limited circumstances in which there may be consideration by the superior court of a petition by DCF to terminate a parent's rights to a child, and the statute also sets forth strict guidelines for decision-making as to the serious and sensitive matter of terminating parental rights.   Unless a parent consents to termination of his or her parental rights, DCF is required to prove by the very highest civil standard, clear and convincing evidence, that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent, where necessary, and to reunify the parent with the child.   Secondly, DCF must establish, by that same high standard, at least one of the bases of termination set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j).  Finally, as to both consenting and non-consenting parents, DCF must prove, again by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of a parent's rights is in the best interests of the child.

The termination-of-parental-rights statute has been construed to require that consideration of termination be separated into two phases.   In the initial adjudicatory phase the court must assess whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify and whether one or more statutory grounds for termination exist.   If that is decided in the affirmative, the court then engages in the dispositional phase in which it determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child.  In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 465, 486, confirmed on other grounds, 300 Conn. 463 (2011).

Reasonable Efforts

Although neither General Statutes § 17a–112(j) nor the federal legislation from which the phrase originates, defines “reasonable efforts,” the Connecticut Supreme Court has construed the term to mean everything reasonable, not everything that is possible.  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 147 (2009).   Reasonable efforts are, therefore, modest, moderate, average and/or fair approaches to reunification.

DCF arranged for regular visitation of father with his children.   DCF made many referrals to service providers and made program recommendations.   DCF also requested participation in a psychological evaluation in its attempts to assist father to identify and address potential problems.   Father refused all DCF requests.   Father violated the court's orders in ignoring and refusing DCF's assistance, and in refusing to engage in any rehabilitation.   All of the reasonable efforts of DCF were met with total and complete resistance by father.

The clear and convincing evidence reveals that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify father with his minor children.

Termination Basis—Failure to Rehabilitate

In its termination petition, DCF has alleged that father has failed to rehabilitate, invoking General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i), which provides in pertinent part:

[T]he child has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ (and the parent) has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․

As the Connecticut Supreme and Appellate Courts have frequently declared:

[P]ersonal rehabilitation ․ refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Summer S., 124 Conn.App. 540, 545, 5 A.3d 972 (2010).

In re Zowie N., 135 Conn.App. 470, 503, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 916 (2012).

Parental rehabilitation refers to the restoration or development of a parent's skills and ability to serve a constructive, responsible and useful role in the life of the particular child, with utmost focus on that child's needs and that child's age.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).   The concept encompasses not only whether a parent has developed the ability to manage his own life, but also whether the parent has developed, in a timely manner, the ability to adequately address the needs of the child.  In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234 (2011).

DCF must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that father had failed to rehabilitate as of the date of the filing of the termination petition, February 29, 2012, and the court is limited to consideration of events preceding the date of the filing of the termination petition, or the latest amendment thereof, in deciding whether the invoked statutory basis for termination exists.   Practice Book § 35a–7(a);  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357 (2001).   However, the court may rely upon post-petition events in evaluating whether a parent's degree of rehabilitation supports a finding that restoration is foreseeable within a reasonable time.  In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748 (2002);  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357 (2001);  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000);  Practice Book § 35a–7.

Termination of a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent, but is ordered so as not to subject a child to the denial of care-giving that the child needs.   Reasonable time must be on a case-by-case basis, depending, again, on the age and needs of the child.  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 231 (2000).   The ultimate issue in a termination proceeding is whether the parent, as of the date of the petition, was better able to resume the responsibilities of parenting than he had been at the time of the children's commitment.  In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 367 (1999).

While there may be dispute in this case as to such things as allegations made against father by his adult daughters, or what was or was not contained in some of the videos found by the police, there are two uncontroverted, indeed admitted, facts in this matter:  (1) father made a disturbing explicit video, with his own voice over, of his own daughter engaging in sex with another woman;  and (2) father permitted pornographic material in the home, in otherwise commonly used living areas, while his own adolescent and teenage children lived in the home.   Based on these uncontroverted facts alone, father needed to engage in counseling and educational sessions to begin to assist him in recognizing and understanding appropriate boundaries and adhering to them, as well as the dangers of having pornographic materials accessible to adolescent and teenage children.

Father simply refused to acknowledge the need to even consider addressing these volatile issues, and father repeatedly advised that he did not need any assistance at all.   Father put his pride above all else, not even beginning to consider the well-being and safety of his children.   Father not only had no natural sense of appropriate boundaries, but also father did not recognize the prurient nature of his interest in pursuing sexual activities with his own children.   Father further refused to take any measures to learn about these issues, even in the face of the potential loss of his children as a result of his failure to engage in any services or evaluations.

The court understands father's contention that the video father recorded may not violate any criminal statute, however, that does not render the incident one that can be ignored in the child protection court, which is obliged to consider the ability of parents to safely care for and protect their children.   Parents' conduct need not be “criminal” in order for this court to conclude that the conduct significantly calls out to this court to assure the safety and protection of the children.   It is almost incomprehensible that father is unable to recognize that the bizarre, shocking and frightening conduct in which he engaged negatively reflects on his ability to safely care for his children.   On the basis of the video and the pornography in the home alone, father needed to engage in counseling and therapy so that he could begin to understand the effects of his behavior and the danger it posed to developing adolescents.

Moreover, even if father were accurate in his frequently professed belief that there is nothing wrong with him, father would have benefited from engaging in DCF-recommended evaluations.   Indeed, if father were accurate in his self-assessment, that could have been verified in the evaluations that were ordered by the court and to which DCF made referrals.   Father's obstinacy, his unequivocal refusal to even start a program, even after his lawyer had made arrangements to insure that the programs would not subject father to the potential of self-incrimination, underscores the significance of father's problems and the continued jeopardy into which his children were placed and would remain if father failed to get help.   It also once again demonstrates father's inability to address exceedingly troubling problems as well as his inability and lack of willingness to put his children's needs above his own, despite the potential for significant harm to the children and potential loss by father of his parental rights.

Even in situations in which there has not been proof of sexual misconduct by a parent, failure of the parent to engage in therapy and/or sexual offender treatment in the reunification efforts has been viewed by the Connecticut Appellate court as an appropriate basis for the trial court's termination based on failure to rehabilitate.  In re Jazmine B., 121 Conn.App. 376, 384–85 (2010).   Just as the trial judge in the Jazmine B. matter, this court has little, if any, confidence that father will ever be in a position to assure the safety and well-being of his minor children.   Moreover, unlike the father in the Jazmine B. matter, father John E. has not even attempted to engage in any way whatsoever in any parenting training, much less therapy.   Father's refusal to participate demonstrates in crystal clear terms that he has absolutely no interest in safeguarding the welfare of his children.

Even if all of the allegations in the initial affidavits are unfounded and even if there is an acquittal of father on all of the criminal charges, the admitted facts of the video and the presence of pornography in the living room and dining room of the home suffice as a completely appropriate basis for father to be ordered to engage in therapy, evaluation, and/or parental assistance to help him to recognize the extreme violation of standards of propriety and boundaries with one's children, as well as the dangers to one's children, that such behavior portrays and engenders.   Father's staunchly declared position that he is just fine, needs no help, needs no changes, and his refusal to even consult with anyone constitute not only a failure to rehabilitate, but also an absolute self-imposed roadblock to rehabilitation and reunification with his children.

On two occasions, father stood before a superior court judge and related that he understood the specific steps, and that he understood the need to adhere to the orders contained therein in order to be reunited with his children and to avoid the potential of termination of his parental rights.   Almost immediately thereafter, father advised DCF that he was not going to adhere to even the most basic of the steps and father has not moved from that position in all of the time that this matter has been pending.

DCF has established by clear and convincing evidence that father has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage a belief that, considering the age and needs of his children, he could assume a responsible parenting position in their lives within a reasonable time.

Best Interests of the Children

The best interests of children encompass sustained growth and development, well-being, continuity, safety and stability of their environment.  In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 733–34 (2010), appeal dismissed, 300 Conn. 294 (2011);  In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 763–64 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920 (2008).

DCF visitation supervisors report that, while the parents regularly took advantage of visitation opportunities with the children, the visitations were frequently not positive experiences for the children.   Supervisors described the atmosphere as one controlled by father.   Father countered that the children simply engaged in appropriate and respectful behavior.   There came a time when it became necessary to have the children's visits with mother at a separate time than the visits with father.   In his visits, father would constantly remind the children of the necessity of calling mom or dad and would berate the children when they failed to do so.   Father also made a point of reminding the children that mother and father had made significant sacrifices to raise them.   Supervisors also noted that the parents devoted more attention and provided more lavish gifts to the oldest child, William, than they did to the twins.

The three minor children suffered from medical problems during their infancy and one of them, Michael, continued to suffer into his early childhood, because of their victimization by their biological mother by her drug use during her pregnancies.   The fact that the three children have done so well in attaining relatively healthy status at this stage of their lives has been attributed by court-appointed psychologist, James Connolly, to the dedicated efforts of mother Rochelle E. in caring for the children.   Dr. Connolly's praise of mother, however, was not all-inclusive.   He was critical of mother in that she permitted father to maintain a highly sexualized atmosphere in the family home, and after his second interview with mother in August 2012, Dr. Connolly expressed disappointment in mother's inability to have made any rehabilitative progress.

The children were interviewed and evaluated by Dr. Connolly in August 2011.   Dr. Connolly found all three children to be more polite, controlled, docile and more socially naïve than other children of their age.

William is now fifteen years of age.   When he was interviewed by Dr. Connolly, William was thirteen.   Dr. Connolly describes William as a tall young man who indicated in August 2011, that he missed his parents but was feeling fondness for and security in his relationship with his foster mother.   William did want to return to his parents' care at the time of the interview, but was not certain if that would ever happen.   William is a “B or C” student and procures help for some of his academic deficiencies.   He plays basketball and football, and he enjoys riding his bike and playing video games.   Dr. Connolly noted that William seemed preoccupied and seldom smiled during the interview, but William did not appear to be suffering from any diagnosable psychological disorder.

Michael was twelve years old when he saw Dr. Connolly in August 2011.   Dr. Connolly found Michael to be physically much smaller than his older brother and also found Michael to be intellectually curious.   Michael expressed fondness for his foster parents and described enjoying attending summer camp.   Dr. Connolly noted that Michael had come a long way from his long duration of childhood illness.   Dr. Connolly found Michael to be free from major emotional difficulties and of average intelligence.

Michelle was twelve years old when she saw Dr. Connolly in August 2011.   She was more willing to talk about life in her foster home than either of her brothers had been, and she related that she was fond of her foster mother.   Dr. Connolly noted that Michelle had difficulty maintaining attention to a task or subject.   Michelle's understanding of the reasons for her removal, as she related it to Dr. Connolly, was that she did not believe her mother had done anything wrong, but that her father may have.

The guardian ad litem appointed by the court in this matter in 2010, Kathryn Steadman, is an experienced lawyer who is well-versed in child protection matters, and has served as a guardian to more than one hundred children.   She poignantly described the transformation she has seen in the children since the have been removed from their home.   The children now are much more open, making eye contact and engaging in discussions.   They do not keep secrets about their lives, they're much less guarded, and they have become very comfortable in their foster home.   Attorney Steadman described the visitation of the children with their mother and father as “parent-focused” rather than “child-focused.”   She also described the children as “frenzied” in trying to get their father's attention, and she described father as either needing to be in charge or disengaged at times.   Attorney Steadman opined that the children have a bond with their father and their mother, but that it is not a healthy bond.   She also opined that the children have enormous potential, and that the children's best interests would be served by termination and allowing them to move on.

The children were enrolled by DCF in therapy with Eliza Borecka relatively soon after their removal from their parents' home in 2010.   The referral was for mental health services, with the goal of helping the children adjust to their new environment.   William and Michael have come to the point where they see the therapist only once a month.   Michelle, however, continues to see the therapist on a weekly basis, but she appears to have made a great deal of progress.

Ms. Borecka described Michelle as very quiet, closed-up and suppressed at first and Michelle remained that way for the first year of counseling.   There was a significant change after the summer camp of 2011, when Michelle revealed that she could no longer keep secrets.   Over a period of time, Michelle described physical abuse by her mother with no prevention or intervention by her father.   Although there was no revelation of sexual abuse, there was a revelation of Michelle and her older sister Jennifer sleeping in their father's bed with him, while the girls were in pajamas and father was in his boxer shorts.   Michelle's behavior became more problematic from time to time after removal from her parents' home and the experts in this matter attribute that to her reliving traumatic events and bringing them to the fore.   The boys confirmed the physical abuse.   Michelle has come to the point at which she wants parental rights terminated.   Michael also revealed to Ms. Borecka that he had been hit and advised that William had been hit as well.   In October 2012, each of the children brought up the topic of termination and Michael joined Michelle in stating that he does not want to return to his parents.   William sadly disclosed being hit by his mother, but was more focused on what he believes was his parents lying to him.   William wants to stay in his current placement, but is confused as to family issues and adoption.   William appears to carry the weight of not wanting to make his parents unhappy, but wanting to move on from them and be content in his own life and with foster family.

It is clear that the termination of both mother's and father's parental rights would permit these children to open up, get over what they need to leave in the past to the extent that is possible, and work toward the future.   They cannot do that with the fear of possibly returning to their parents' care.   They do not deserve to feel guilty because they were provided care as infants and children because of the reckless actions of their biological mother.   They should be free to feel safe and secure, with an opportunity to grow and be free.   The clear and convincing evidence establishes that termination of mother's and father's parental rights is in the best interests of each of these three children.

MANDATED FACTUAL FINDINGS

In accordance with the directives of General Statutes § 17a–112(k), the following factual findings are specifically found as to father:

1. DCF Services

As is set forth in detail above, the DCF services and programs have been timely, appropriate, reasonable and accommodating.

2. Reunification Efforts

DCF has been diligent in its reunification efforts.

3. Feelings and Emotional Ties

The children are all placed together in their foster home and they have all adjusted very well to their foster home.   Indeed, Dr. Connolly noted that he does not recall ever having seen teen-age children, who usually rebel at such changes, become so comfortable after removal from their parents' home.   There are some bonds with the parents, but any positive aspects are far outweighed by the negative aspects.   The foster parents are committed to the children and each of the children has expressed a stronger and stronger desire to remain with the foster parents.

4. Compliance with Court Orders

Except for regularly visiting with his children and perhaps moving from his wife's home, father has not complied with any of the court-ordered specific steps, especially those directed at the very problem which brought this matter to DCF's attention.

5. Children's Ages

William was born on March 13, 1998;  he is fifteen years of age.   Michael and Michelle were born on July 23, 1999;  they are thirteen years of age.

6. Parental Efforts and Parental Contact with Children and Others

Father has visited with the children but has done nothing else.   He has made no efforts to recognize, much less address, his serious problems.   In addition, in his visits with the children, father places undue responsibility on the children to contact him or mother, and also questions the children's loyalty to him and mother.   He frequently reminds the children of the supreme sacrifices father believes he and mother have made for the children.   These three children should not be made to experience this fear and guilt, nor should they remain subject to it in the future.

7. Interference with Reunification

There has not been any conduct by anyone that has prevented the maintenance of a meaningful relationship between father and his children, nor have economic circumstances stood in the way of development of a meaningful relationship.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

Mother's consent to the termination of her parental rights has been accepted by this court and this court has found, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, that grounds exist to terminate father's parental rights.   This court has also found that termination of father's and mother's parental rights is in the children's best interests.   On the basis of these findings, the petitions to terminate the parental rights of father, John E., and mother, Rochelle E., to William E., Michael E., and Michelle E. are granted.

DCF is appointed the statutory parent of each of the three children.

DCF shall file, within thirty days, a report as to the status of each of the children and shall also timely file any additional reports as are required by law.

DCF may petition the superior court for the adoption of any of the children pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–129b, or, if an adoption is accomplished in the Probate Court, the clerk of that court shall forward a written notice to the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Middletown when and if any such adoption is finalized.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

BY THE COURT,

Constance L. Epstein, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Thus entitled in accordance with the intent and spirit of General Statutes § 46b–124(b) and Practice Book § 32a–7..  FN1. Thus entitled in accordance with the intent and spirit of General Statutes § 46b–124(b) and Practice Book § 32a–7.

FN2. A complaint had previously been lodged with DCF in 2009, but the complaint was not substantiated and DCF did not take any further action at that time..  FN2. A complaint had previously been lodged with DCF in 2009, but the complaint was not substantiated and DCF did not take any further action at that time.

FN3. The specific steps issued on September 3, 2010 for mother and father, marked as Petitioner's Exhibits 6 and 6A in the termination trial, reflect that the steps ordered for mother were signed by father and vice versa.   The only difference in the two is the specificity of the programs at Sterling center and the other facility named, and, in either event, the order for father specifically addresses what he was supposed to do regardless of his possible confusion in signing the steps addressed to mother..  FN3. The specific steps issued on September 3, 2010 for mother and father, marked as Petitioner's Exhibits 6 and 6A in the termination trial, reflect that the steps ordered for mother were signed by father and vice versa.   The only difference in the two is the specificity of the programs at Sterling center and the other facility named, and, in either event, the order for father specifically addresses what he was supposed to do regardless of his possible confusion in signing the steps addressed to mother.

Epstein, Constance L., J.