Chava Pesha Sandman v. III (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE (# 109)

I. INTRODUCTION

The defendants, Anthony DeCaprio III (DeCaprio) and Treadwell Electric Company, Inc. (Treadwell), filed the instant motion to strike that is now before the court.   For the reasons that follow, the motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part.

II. FACTS

In the plaintiff's February 1, 2011 amended complaint, she alleges the following facts.   On November 6, 2008, as the plaintiff was driving her car on the main road leading in and out of Quinnipiac University in Hamden, CT, DeCaprio was operating a truck owned by his employer, Treadwell, and traveling in an easterly direction on Mount Caramel Avenue near the intersection of the entrance to the university.   As the plaintiff drove out onto Mount Caramel Avenue, DeCaprio struck her vehicle with enough force to propel her vehicle off the road and into a metal light pole, thereby causing a second collision.   The impact of these collisions caused the plaintiff to sustain several injuries.   Among her injuries were a loss of consciousness, several fractured bones, several lacerations, abrasions and contusions, blood loss, anxiety, and mental distress.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants caused her injuries and losses, pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295.¹  Specifically, in count two, she alleges that DeCaprio's reckless driving caused her injuries because he was traveling unreasonably fast, in violation of General Statutes § 14–218a, and that he was speeding, in violation of General Statutes § 14–219.   She also alleges that DeCaprio was driving his vehicle too fast and in reckless disregard for his ability to slow down or bring the vehicle to a stop to avoid colliding with the plaintiff.   In count five, the plaintiff alleges that Treadwell is liable for DeCaprio's reckless driving.

On February 14, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to strike counts two and five of the plaintiff's amended complaint.   On March 16, 2011, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike.   On February 19, 2013, the court heard oral argument on this matter at short calendar.

III. DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ․ A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ․ [T]he facts ․ alleged in the complaint ․ [are] construe[d] ․ in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ Thus, if facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ․ A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).

With respect to count two, the defendants argue that this count must be stricken because the plaintiff has failed to allege the elements of § 14–295.   Specifically, they contend that the plaintiff's allegations are insufficient because she only alleges that DeCaprio operated his truck “recklessly” rather than using the exact words of the statute, namely, that DeCaprio operated his truck with “reckless disregard.”   The defendants claim that the plaintiff must allege not only that DeCaprio violated §§ 14–218a and 14–219, but also specifically allege that DeCaprio acted “deliberately or with reckless disregard” when he violated those particular statutes.

The defendants further argue that the plaintiff has failed to allege that DeCaprio's violation of §§ 14–218a or 14–219 was a “substantial factor” in causing her injuries.   In connection with this claim, the defendants assert that the plaintiff's allegation that her injuries were “caused by” DeCaprio's reckless driving, in violation of §§ 14–218a or 14–219, does not recite the statutory language of § 14–295, which requires the plaintiff to allege that DeCaprio's violation of §§ 14–218a and 14–219 was a “substantial factor” in causing her injuries.

With respect to count five, the defendants argue that Treadwell cannot be held vicariously liable for the recklessness of its employee.

The plaintiff counters that the allegations in both counts two and five are sufficient.   Specifically, with respect to count two, the plaintiff argues that the allegation that the defendant operated his vehicle “recklessly” as opposed to with “reckless disregard” is a distinction without a difference.   As a result, she argues that the allegation that DeCaprio operated his truck recklessly, in violation of §§ 14–218a and 14–219, satisfies the requirements of the statute.

The plaintiff further responds that she has alleged that DeCaprio's reckless driving, in violation of §§ 14–218a and 14–219, caused her injuries and losses, and thus, she has satisfied the statutory requirement that the defendant's actions were a substantial factor in causing her injuries.   Again, although she did not use the exact statutory language, namely, that defendant's actions were a “substantial factor” in causing her injuries, she contends that her allegation that her injuries were “caused by” the defendant subsumes within it an allegation that the defendant's actions were a substantial factor in causing her injuries.   As such, she argues that she has met the statutory requirements.

As to Count Five, the plaintiff alleges that because a minority of Superior Court cases have permitted a claim for damages against an employer for the recklessness of the employer's driver, that the court should not strike this count.

In the present case, starting with count two, the plaintiff has pleaded sufficiently the statutory elements of § 14–295.   Indeed, in addition to construing the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is well established that “pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 667, 748 A.2d 834 (2000).   Construing the plaintiff's complaint in this manner demonstrates that the defendants' semantical challenges cannot withstand scrutiny.   When read broadly, as this court must, the plaintiff's allegations that DeCaprio's reckless driving, in violation of §§ 14–218a and 14–219, caused her injuries, satisfy the elements of the statute.

Additionally, the plaintiff was not required to allege anything beyond the elements of § 14–295.   This court follows the majority view, in that the plaintiff only need allege the elements of the statute to have pleaded sufficiently a cause of action under § 14–295.   See Urena v. Castillo, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 08 5017037 (October 29, 2008, Bellis, J.).   Given that the plaintiff has met the requirements of the statute by alleging that DeCaprio operated his motor vehicle recklessly, in violation of §§ 14–218a and 14–219, and that such violation caused the plaintiff's injuries and losses, the motion to strike count two is denied.

As to count five, the court agrees with the defendants.   In Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 837, 836 A.2d 394 (2003), our Supreme Court stated:  “[A]t common law, there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages ․ and [therefore] ․ the owner of a motor vehicle is not vicariously liable for punitive damages resulting from the driver's reckless operation of the vehicle.”

Furthermore, as aptly articulated in Hronis v. EBO Logistics, LLC, 641 F.Sup.2d 139, 140 (D.Conn.2009), “there is nothing in the language of § 14–295 that suggests that the legislature intended to abrogate the common-law rule or impose vicarious liability on owner/employers for the conduct of reckless employees.  [B]y its plain language, § 14–295 applies only to an operator of a vehicle, and not to its nonoperating owner ․ The last sentence of § 14–295, concerning the owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle, does not change this analysis ․ Indeed, § 14–295 by its own terms applies only to vehicles operated by a defendant.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Thus, this court follows Hronis, which counsels against imposing § 14–295 punitive damages for vicarious liability on a nonoperating owner of a motor vehicle for the recklessness of the motor vehicle's driver.   Accordingly, the motion to strike count five is granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to strike is denied with respect to count two, and granted with respect to count five.

Mullins, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 14–295 provides:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222, 14–227a, 14–230, 14–234, 14–237, 14–239 or 14–240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.   The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.”.  FN1. General Statutes § 14–295 provides:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222, 14–227a, 14–230, 14–234, 14–237, 14–239 or 14–240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.   The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.”

Mullins, Raheem, J.