Leonard Rangel v. LLC (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 110)

The plaintiff, Leonard Rangle, alleges that he is a tenant in a complex owned by the defendant, Manchester Tarragon, LLC.¹ On April 9, 2010, the plaintiff alleges that he slipped and fell while exiting the defendant's building due to defective conditions present on the landing and doorway.   Specifically, the plaintiff claims that he lost his footing due to the slipperiness of the cement caused by rainwater from the night before and the morning of his fall and that the premises were defective because the treads on the steps were worn, there was no protection over the entrance area and the defendant failed to provide a non-skid surface or a railing.

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stewart v. Watertown, 303 Conn. 699, 709–10, 38 A.3d 72 (2012).   “Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where ․ the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation ․ [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975).   “[T]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care [however] is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003).

The defendant raises the “storm-in-progress” rule articulated in Kraus v. Newtown, 211 Conn. 191, 558 A.2d 240 (1989), to demonstrate that it did not owe a duty of care in this case.   In Kraus, the Supreme Court held that, “in the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in fulfilling the duty owed to invitees upon his property to exercise reasonable diligence in removing dangerous accumulations of snow and ice, may await the end of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow from outside walks and steps.   To require a landlord or other inviter to keep walks and steps clear of dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or snow or to spread sand or ashes while a storm continues is inexpedient and impractical.”  (Emphasis added.)  Kraus v. Newton, 211 Conn. 191, 197–98, 558 A.2d 240 (1989).

“By its terms, Kraus is limited to absolving a landowner of the duty to remove ‘dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or snow or to spread sand or ashes' during an ongoing storm.”   Pescatore v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 05 5000117 (March 21, 2007, Pickard, J.) (43 Conn. L. Rptr. 123, 124).   Further, “Connecticut cases since Kraus have all involved storms that include freezing rain, snow, or ice.”  Id. The court therefore does not believe it appropriate to expand the reach of that decision.

The issues of negligence, what the duty of a landlord would have been under the circumstances then and there existing and whether the defendant here took appropriate steps to fulfill such a duty to whatever extent it existed remain.   Since the court finds that Kraus does not absolve the defendant of its duty, the defendants have therefore failed to meet their burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact as to this issue.   The defendant has failed to establish that it did not owe a duty to the plaintiff that was breached by a failure to exercise the degree of care a reasonable person would have exercised under like circumstances.   It has also not demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the harm alleged was not foreseeable to it as owner of this complex.

Accordingly, as genuine issues of material fact exist, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

HILLER, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff withdrew the complaint as to the other defendant, Tarragon Management, LLC, on July 11, 2012.   Therefore, all references to “the defendant” in this memorandum refer solely to Manchester Tarragon, LLC..  FN1. The plaintiff withdrew the complaint as to the other defendant, Tarragon Management, LLC, on July 11, 2012.   Therefore, all references to “the defendant” in this memorandum refer solely to Manchester Tarragon, LLC.

Hiller, Arthur A., J.