Stephen Donnelly v. Rental Car Finance Corp. et al. (2013)

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants Rental Car Finance Corporation (“RCF”) and Corrado Vaccaro (“Vaccaro”) move for summary judgment on counts one and two, alleging negligent entrustment, of the four-count revised complaint filed by plaintiff Stephen Donnelly, a Hartford police officer.   For the following reasons, the court grants the motion.

The plaintiff claims that RCF owned a 2008 Dodge Charger and that RFC leased the car to Thrifty Car Rental (“Thrifty”) at 296 Allen Street in New Britain.   The plaintiff provides evidence showing that Vaccaro ran the daily operations and held himself out as the owner of Thrifty.¹  On October 24, 2008, Thrifty, in turn, leased the car to defendant Errol Santousse.   Santousse allegedly drove into the plaintiff as the latter approached the vehicle on foot to investigate suspicious activity, causing the plaintiff significant injuries.

Although the federal Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, ordinarily bars suits against entities that rent or lease motor vehicles, an exception exists for cases in which the plaintiff can establish the negligence of the rental company.  49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2);  Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 10, 993 A.2d 955 (2010).   The plaintiff seeks to avail himself of this exception by alleging negligent entrustment.

The leading Connecticut appellate authority on negligent entrustment of an automobile is still the venerable case of Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 165 A.678 (1933).   There the Court stated:  “When the evidence proves that the owner of an automobile knows or ought reasonably to know that one to whom he intrusts it is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought reasonably to anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence, and such incompetence does result in such injury, a basis of recovery by the person injured is established.   That recovery rests primarily upon the negligence of the owner in intrusting the automobile to the incompetent driver.”  Id., 520.   See also Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. King, 304 Conn. 179, 190 n.4, 39 A.3d 712 (2012) (citing Greeley with approval).

The plaintiff commendably concedes that there is no evidence that RCF negligently entrusted the car to Santousse and therefore that judgment should enter in favor of RCF. The plaintiff also concedes that Vaccaro complied with General Statutes § 14–153 by inspecting, without incident, Santousse's driver's license and signature.²  The issue is whether Vaccaro nonetheless was negligent in some other way in entrusting the vehicle to Santousse.

The plaintiff supplies evidence that Santousse was from Hartford and that, in the seven months preceding the accident, the Hartford police seized, towed, or impounded forty-one vehicles leased by the New Britain Thrifty dealership.   The plaintiff also provides evidence showing that the Thrifty rental agent who handled the transaction with Santousse did not complete the rental contract with regard to Santousse's destination or source and did not record why Santousse was leasing the car, whether he owned his own vehicle, or whether he had his own automobile liability insurance.

This evidence does not show negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Santousse.³  The evidence that New Britain Thrifty vehicles became involved in Hartford police incidents does not at all address whether Santousse was fit to drive.   Nor is it evidence, without indulging in gross and unfair stereotyping of Hartford residents, that Santousse had engaged in or intended to engage in criminal activity.   The same is true with regard to the allegedly missing information in Santousse's rental contract.   Initially, it is not clear from a review of the contract that Thrifty had any obligation to record this information.   Further, some of the information in question refers to Santousse's financial circumstances, which are irrelevant.   The possibility that Santousse did not have insurance, for example, could result simply from the fact that he did not own a car.   None of this evidence sheds light on Santousse's competence to drive a motor vehicle.

In the absence of any additional evidence that the defendants knew or should have known that Santousse was an incompetent driver or a likely to commit a crime, the defendants' compliance with § 14–153 suffices to discharge their responsibility in entrusting the vehicle to him.   Accord Hollis v. Alamo Financing, LP, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. HHD CV08–5024043 (February 4, 2011, Robaina, J.) [51 Conn. L. Rptr. 434].   Thus, Vaccaro is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   See Practice Book § 17–44.

Accordingly, the court grants the summary judgment motion of defendants Rental Car Finance Corporation and Corrado Vaccaro.

It is so ordered.

Carl J. Schuman

Judge, Superior Court

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant disputes some of these facts but, for purposes of the summary judgment motion, the court construes the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.   See SS–II, LLC v. Bridge Street Associates, 293 Conn. 287, 293, 977 A.2d 189 (2009)..  FN1. The defendant disputes some of these facts but, for purposes of the summary judgment motion, the court construes the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.   See SS–II, LLC v. Bridge Street Associates, 293 Conn. 287, 293, 977 A.2d 189 (2009).

FN2. Section 14–153 provides:  “Any person, firm or corporation which rents a motor vehicle without a driver for a period of thirty days or less shall inspect or cause to be inspected the motor vehicle operator's license of the person initially operating such motor vehicle, shall compare the signature on such license with that of the alleged licensee written in his presence and shall keep and retain for a period of one year a record of the name of such licensee, the number of his license and the date of issue thereof, the registration number of the motor vehicle so rented and the mileage reading displayed by the odometer of such vehicle at the time such vehicle leaves and returns to the lessor's place of business, which record shall be subject to the inspection of any police officer, any Department of Motor Vehicles inspector or any Department of Motor Vehicles employee designated by the commissioner;  provided no person shall rent or lease any motor vehicle without a driver to a minor without the written consent of a parent or guardian of such minor.”.  FN2. Section 14–153 provides:  “Any person, firm or corporation which rents a motor vehicle without a driver for a period of thirty days or less shall inspect or cause to be inspected the motor vehicle operator's license of the person initially operating such motor vehicle, shall compare the signature on such license with that of the alleged licensee written in his presence and shall keep and retain for a period of one year a record of the name of such licensee, the number of his license and the date of issue thereof, the registration number of the motor vehicle so rented and the mileage reading displayed by the odometer of such vehicle at the time such vehicle leaves and returns to the lessor's place of business, which record shall be subject to the inspection of any police officer, any Department of Motor Vehicles inspector or any Department of Motor Vehicles employee designated by the commissioner;  provided no person shall rent or lease any motor vehicle without a driver to a minor without the written consent of a parent or guardian of such minor.”

FN3. The plaintiff's brief also asserts that, although the rental agreement called for Santousse to return the vehicle by 11:22 a.m. on October 27, 2008, the accident occurred twelve hours later and Thrifty failed to call the police or determine why the vehicle had not come back on time.   The plaintiff supplies no citations to the exhibits to support these assertions.   In any event, they do not support the contention that Thrifty negligently entrusted the vehicle to Santousse three days earlier..  FN3. The plaintiff's brief also asserts that, although the rental agreement called for Santousse to return the vehicle by 11:22 a.m. on October 27, 2008, the accident occurred twelve hours later and Thrifty failed to call the police or determine why the vehicle had not come back on time.   The plaintiff supplies no citations to the exhibits to support these assertions.   In any event, they do not support the contention that Thrifty negligently entrusted the vehicle to Santousse three days earlier.

Schuman, Carl J., J.