Daniel Chamberlin v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Woodstock (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

(Administrative Appeal Hearing, January 10, 2013)

The plaintiffs, Daniel Chamberlin, Chamberlin Family LLC, and Chamberlin Family Land Trust, appeal from the denial of a common driveway permit application by the defendant planning and zoning commission of the town of Woodstock (the commission).¹  Chamberlin Family LLC, of which Daniel Chamberlin is principal/managing member, is the owner of a nineteen plus acre piece of undeveloped property (the Chamberlin lot).²  (Record [R.], Exhibits C2, pp. 4–5, C4, pp. 123–29.)   The Chamberlin lot is located adjacent to the strip of land subject to this appeal known as “Dewing School House Road” on various surveys recorded in the town of Woodstock land records and in various deeds recorded in the land records.  (R., Exhibits C3, pp. 35–49, C4, pp. 107–09, D1, D32.) The Chamberlin lot is an approved lot, Assessor's Map 7270, Block 37, Lot 36, and is zoned for single-family residential use.  (R., Exhibit D7.)

On December 7, 2011, the plaintiffs submitted to the commission an application seeking permission to extend the existing public portion of Dewing School House Road with a common driveway, for a distance of about 1200 feet, to provide access and frontage to the Chamberlin lot.  (R., Exhibit D1.) The application included a plan and road profile showing how the application conformed to the standards for a common driveway set forth in chapter 5, § 4.3, of the Woodstock subdivision regulations.  (R., Exhibits C2, D1.)

The commission held several meetings on the application on December 15, 2011, January 19, February 16, and March 15, 2012.  (R., Exhibits C1, C2, C3, C4.) At these meetings, it was brought to the commission's attention that, in 1992, it had approved an application for a new subdivision lot (the Gracia lot) that, like the plaintiffs' lot, had access only over a portion of Dewing School House Road, beyond the public portion.  (R., Exhibits C3, pp. 37–49, 78–79, C4, p. 103.)   Also at these meetings, several abutting property owners made claims, that the legal status of the strip of land known as Dewing School House Road was either uncertain, or that they owned the discontinued portion in fee unencumbered by any easement right in favor of other existing, approved residential lots along the discontinued road.  (R., Exhibits C3, pp. 35–49, C4, pp. 107–09, D32.) Further, the town attorney advised the commission that it had no jurisdiction to decide title, discontinuance or access issues in the context of acting on the plaintiffs' permit application under the subdivision regulations.  (R., Exhibit D33.) The town attorney further advised the commission, based in part on the 1992 Gracia lot approval, that the commission accept the plaintiffs' claim of access to the lot for purposes of the application.  (R., Exhibit D33.)

At the final meeting on March 15, 2012, the commission voted to deny the plaintiffs' common driveway extension application on the ground of lack of clarity of title to the land on which the driveway would be placed.  (R., Exhibit C4, pp. 133–34.)   Notice of the March 15, 2012 denial was published in the town of Woodstock Villager on March 23, 2012.  (R., Exhibit E1.) The plaintiffs served this appeal on the defendant commission on April 4, 2012.   (Marshal's return.)

I

AGGRIEVEMENT

“[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a plaintiff's appeal ․ [I]n order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 660, 664, 899 A.2d 26 (2006).   “Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring an action, in other words, statutorily aggrieved, or is classically aggrieved.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 393, 941 A.2d 868 (2008).  “[Statutory] [s]tanding concerns the question [of] whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”  (Internal quotations marks omitted.)  Id., 393–94.

“Because aggrievement is a jurisdictional question, and therefore, the key to access to judicial review, the standard for aggrievement is rather strict.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gladysz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 256 Conn. 249, 257, 773 A.2d 300 (2001).   The burden of proving aggrievement is on the plaintiff.  Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493, 400 A.2d 726 (1978).  “The determination of aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and a plaintiff has the burden of proving the fact.”  Id.

In the present case, the plaintiffs rely on General Statutes §§ 8–28 and 8–8 as grounds for statutory aggrievement.  Section 8–28 provides in relevant part:  “Any appeal from an action or decision of a planning commission shall be taken pursuant to the provisions of section 8–8.”   In relevant part, § 8–8(b) states that “any person aggrieved by any decision of a board ․ may take an appeal to the superior court ․” Section 8–8(a)(1) provides:  “ ‘Aggrieved person’ means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board ․ In the case of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, ‘aggrieved person’ includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board.”

The plaintiffs, at the hearing before this court, submitted a copy of the deed to the Chamberlin lot establishing ownership of land that abuts or is within 100 feet of the discontinued portion of Dewing School House Road. The defendants have not submitted any evidence to the contrary, nor do they dispute the fact that the plaintiffs' property is within 100 feet of the land involved in this appeal.   Accordingly, the plaintiffs are found to be statutorily aggrieved pursuant to § 8–8(a)(1).

ANALYSIS

The regulations governing common driveway permit applications are set forth in chapter 5, § 4.3, of the Woodstock subdivision regulations.  “When reviewing a subdivision application, the function of a municipal planning commission is to approve or disapprove a proposed subdivision.   This is an administrative function, neither legislative nor judicial ․ A municipal commission must approve a subdivision proposal if it conforms to the regulations adopted and promulgated by the commission.   The proposal must be denied if it does not meet the requirements of the regulations ․ Because a commission is not a court of law, its authority is stringently limited.   It can only apply its regulations to the proposals which appear before it.   It cannot make law.”  (Citations omitted.)  Gagnon v. Municipal Planning Commission, 10 Conn.App. 54, 57, 521 A.2d 589, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 807, 525 A.2d 521 (1987).

“In reviewing a decision of a zoning board, a reviewing court is bound by the substantial evidence rule, according to which, [c]onclusions reached by [the board] must be upheld by the trial court if they are reasonably supported by the record.   The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters solely within the province of the [board] ․ The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the [board] supports the decision reached ․ If a trial court finds that there is substantial evidence to support a zoning board's findings, it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the board ․ If there is conflicting evidence in support of the zoning commission's stated rationale, the reviewing court ․ cannot substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the commission ․ The agency's decision must be sustained if an examination of the record discloses evidence that supports any one of the reasons given.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Loring v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 287 Conn. 746, 756, 950 A.2d 494 (2008).

“[W]hen [an] ․ agency has stated its reasons for its actions, a court should not reach beyond those stated purposes to search the record for other reasons supporting the commission's decision ․ Rather, the court should determine only whether the assigned grounds are reasonably supported by the record and whether they are pertinent to the considerations which the authority was required to apply under the zoning regulations ․ The principle that a court should confine its review to the reasons given by a zoning agency ․ applies [only] where the agency has rendered a formal, official, collective statement of reasons for its action ․ It does not apply to mere utterances of individual members of the agency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Clifford v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 280 Conn 434, 439–40 n.6, 908 A.2d 1049 (2006).

“[I]t is not the function of the court to retry the case.   Conclusions reached by the [zoning authority] must be upheld by the trial court if they are reasonably supported by the record.   The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters solely within the province of the agency ․ The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the agency supports the decision reached.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Konigsberg v. Board of Aldermen, 283 Conn. 553, 582, 930 A.2d 1 (2007).

In the present case, the board has clearly stated its reason for denying the plaintiffs' common driveway application.   That stated reason for denying the application was “lack of clarity” of title to the land on which the driveway would be placed.³  (R., Exhibits C4, p. 117, 133.)   Accordingly, the court's review is limited to determining whether that ground is reasonably supported by the record and whether it is pertinent to the considerations which the commission was required to apply under the zoning regulations.   The plaintiffs claim that the commission's inquiry should have been limited to whether the driveway permit application complied with the Woodstock subdivision regulations.   Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the commission is prohibited, when processing permit applications, from deciding issues of title, ownership, or property rights.

The defendants do not dispute the fact that the commission does not have the authority to decide issues of title, ownership or property rights, but instead argue that the plaintiffs do not have a sufficient interest in the subject property in order to have standing to bring an application or petition.   Although the commission lacks the power to decide issues of property rights, the issue of whether an applicant has standing to apply is an issue properly considered by planning and zoning commissions.   See Richards v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 170 Conn. 318, 327, 365 A.2d 1130 (1976) (agreeing with defendant commission that applicant, who was not an owner, possessed requisite interest in subject property to apply for permit).   When examining standing, “it is not possible to extract a precise comprehensive principle which adequately defines the necessary interest which a nonowner must possess in order to have standing to apply for a [permit].⁴  The decisions have not been based primarily on whether a particular applicant could properly be characterized as an optionee or a lessee, but, rather, on whether the applicant was in fact a real party in interest with respect to the subject property.”   Id., 323.   Relevant considerations in determining whether an applicant is a real party in interest are:  “[1][w]hether the applicant is in control of the property, [2] whether he is in possession or has a present or future right to possession, [3] whether the use applied for is consistent with the applicant's interest in the property, and [4] the extent of the interest of other persons in the same property ․” Id., 323–24.

After reviewing the considerations set forth in the Richards case, this court concludes that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a substantial legal interest in the discontinued portion of Dewing School House Road and therefore lacked standing to pursue their application.   Pursuant to Richards, the first consideration is “whether the applicant is in control of the property.”   Id. There is no dispute that the plaintiffs do not own the subject property on which the discontinued portion of Dewing School House Road lies, nor do they have the right to exclude others from the discontinued road.  (R., Exhibits C3, p. 39, C4, pp. 102–03.)   Further, the record reflects that the land in question is often used by several abutters for vehicular access, walking and hiking.   Accordingly, the record shows that the plaintiffs lacked control over the subject property.

With regard to the second consideration, the plaintiffs did not prove that they were in possession of Dewing School House Road or that they have a present or future right to possession.   The plaintiffs were unable to establish ownership in the subject land, and they abandoned their claim that the discontinued portion of the road is subject to public access rights.  (R., Exhibit C3, p. 39.)   Further, as previously noted, the plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that they do not own the subject land.   Although the plaintiffs assert that they could possibly hold an access easement over the land, they have failed to present any documentation or other evidence establishing such an easement.   Accordingly, the plaintiffs presented no evidence to the commission that they were in possession of the land or that they have a present or future right to possession of the land.

The third consideration is “whether the use applied for is consistent with the applicant's interest in the property ․” Richards v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 170 Conn. 323.   As noted previously by the court, the plaintiffs have not established ownership or any other right or legal interest in the land.   Therefore, given the plaintiffs' failure to establish any interest in the subject property, it is not possible to consider whether the use applied for is consistent with that interest.   Accordingly, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the third consideration.

The last consideration is the extent of the interest of other persons in the same property.  Id. Having failed to present evidence showing the extent of their own interest in the subject property, the plaintiffs have not shown that they have a greater interest in the property than other persons.   The evidence in the record fails to clarify whether the town, abutting landowners or some combination of the two, along with the plaintiffs, have an interest in the subject parcel.   This lack of evidence precludes a determination that the plaintiffs have the requisite interest in the parcel to apply for the permit.

Further, the plaintiffs' reliance on Gagnon v. Municipal Planning Commission, supra, 10 Conn.App. 54, and Cybulski v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 43 Conn.App. 105, 682 A.2d 1073, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 949, 686 A.2d 123 (1996), is misguided.   The issue in Gagnon was whether a zoning and planning commission could consider the effect a land owner's application would have on easements held by third parties over the applicant's land.   Gagnon v. Municipal Planning Commission, supra, 10 Conn.App. 55–56.   There was no dispute over whether the applicant held title to the affected land.   The court noted that the “commission does not have authority to determine whether the claimed right of way was a legally protected and enforceable prescriptive easement, since that conclusion can only be made by judicial authority in a quiet title action governed by General Statutes § 47–31.”  Id., 58.   The court did not consider the issue of standing as presented in the present case where the applicant has failed to establish a substantial interest in the affected land.   The question was whether the applicant's use of his own land would affect easement rights held by third parties.

Similarly, the plaintiffs' reliance on Cybulski is not persuasive.   The court in that case considered whether there was substantial evidence presented during a commission's hearing regarding the status of an affected road as a town road.  Cybulski v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 43 Conn.App. 105.   In doing so, the court recognized that the status of the affected parcel as a public road was a factor to be considered in the commission's decision and that there was substantial evidence in the record, which was uncontradicted, to support the commission's finding that the road at issue was a town road.   Unlike that case, in the present case there is no evidence in the record to support a finding by the commission as to the legal status of the discontinued portion of Dewing School House Road.⁵ Both the plaintiffs and the defendants agree that the legal status of the subject land is unclear.

Having reviewed these facts and the record before the commission in their totality, this court finds that the plaintiffs failed to show that they had the requisite interest in the subject property to apply for the permit at issue.   The plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence to show that they had control of the property, that they were in possession of or had a present or future right to possess the property or that the use applied for was within their interest in the property.   Accordingly, the plaintiffs did not establish that they had standing to bring the original application.⁶

CONCLUSION

The court has carefully examined the record before the commission and concludes that it supports the decision reached.   The commission's action in denying the plaintiffs' application to build a common driveway was not shown to be illegal or arbitrary because the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the application.   Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

THE COURT

CALMAR, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The commission and the intervening defendants, abutting land owners, will be referred to collectively as the “defendants.”.  FN1. The commission and the intervening defendants, abutting land owners, will be referred to collectively as the “defendants.”

FN2. As principal/managing member of Chamberlin Family LLC at all times relevant to this appeal, Daniel Chamberlin has been the real party in interest, the equitable owner and decision maker with respect to the nineteen acres.  (R., Exhibits C2, pp. 4–5, C4, pp. 123–29.)   The original application listed Daniel Chamberlin as trustee rather than managing partner of the record owner LLC. During the final commission meeting on March 15, 2012, commissioner Durst raised several substantive issues with regard to the listed owner on the application.  (R., Exhibit C4, pp. 124–29.)   Commissioner Durst questioned whether the listed applicant gave the appearing plaintiff authority to apply for the permit.  Id. It is not necessary for the court to address the substantive issues of this argument as the appeal is dismissed for other reasons set out in this opinion..  FN2. As principal/managing member of Chamberlin Family LLC at all times relevant to this appeal, Daniel Chamberlin has been the real party in interest, the equitable owner and decision maker with respect to the nineteen acres.  (R., Exhibits C2, pp. 4–5, C4, pp. 123–29.)   The original application listed Daniel Chamberlin as trustee rather than managing partner of the record owner LLC. During the final commission meeting on March 15, 2012, commissioner Durst raised several substantive issues with regard to the listed owner on the application.  (R., Exhibit C4, pp. 124–29.)   Commissioner Durst questioned whether the listed applicant gave the appearing plaintiff authority to apply for the permit.  Id. It is not necessary for the court to address the substantive issues of this argument as the appeal is dismissed for other reasons set out in this opinion.

FN3. At the March 15, 2012 hearing before the commission, vice chair Fortin moved to deny the application “based on the lack of clarity of title to the land that the driveway would be placed on.”  (R., Exhibit C4, p. 117, 133.)   The motion to deny the application passed unanimously with one commissioner abstaining from voting.  Id..  FN3. At the March 15, 2012 hearing before the commission, vice chair Fortin moved to deny the application “based on the lack of clarity of title to the land that the driveway would be placed on.”  (R., Exhibit C4, p. 117, 133.)   The motion to deny the application passed unanimously with one commissioner abstaining from voting.  Id.

FN4. Our Supreme Court has recognized several instances in which a nonowner may have the requisite interest in a particular parcel.   See Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 426, 431, 226 A.2d 380 (1967) (a nonowner party who contracted to purchase the property had standing to apply for a permit);  Loew v. Falsey, 144 Conn. 67, 73–74, 127 A.2d 67 (1956) (an equitable owner may be deemed the actual legal title holder of the property for purposes of filing an application);  and Michel v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 28 Conn.App. 314, 324, 612 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 823 (1992) (applying the standard set forth in Richards v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 170 Conn. 318, and holding that a lessee of property had standing to apply for a zone change and special exemption permit for the leased property).   Unlike the appellants in those cases, the plaintiffs in this case have not provided evidence that they have a legal or equitable right to the parcel of land subject to this dispute..  FN4. Our Supreme Court has recognized several instances in which a nonowner may have the requisite interest in a particular parcel.   See Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 426, 431, 226 A.2d 380 (1967) (a nonowner party who contracted to purchase the property had standing to apply for a permit);  Loew v. Falsey, 144 Conn. 67, 73–74, 127 A.2d 67 (1956) (an equitable owner may be deemed the actual legal title holder of the property for purposes of filing an application);  and Michel v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 28 Conn.App. 314, 324, 612 A.2d 778, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 923, 614 A.2d 823 (1992) (applying the standard set forth in Richards v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 170 Conn. 318, and holding that a lessee of property had standing to apply for a zone change and special exemption permit for the leased property).   Unlike the appellants in those cases, the plaintiffs in this case have not provided evidence that they have a legal or equitable right to the parcel of land subject to this dispute.

FN5. The plaintiffs also cite to Moscovitz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 16 Conn.App. 303, 311–12 n.8, 547 A.2d 569 (1998) (“[A] planning commission cannot base its denial of subdivision approval on the existence of a deed restriction if the application otherwise meets the regulations ․ The responsibility of enforcing restrictive covenants in deeds is allocated to neighboring landowners, not to a municipal commission.”  (Citations omitted.)), and Patrell v. Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 09 4009623, (June 28, 2011, Purtill, J.T.R.) (same), both of which fail to address the issue before this court..  FN5. The plaintiffs also cite to Moscovitz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 16 Conn.App. 303, 311–12 n.8, 547 A.2d 569 (1998) (“[A] planning commission cannot base its denial of subdivision approval on the existence of a deed restriction if the application otherwise meets the regulations ․ The responsibility of enforcing restrictive covenants in deeds is allocated to neighboring landowners, not to a municipal commission.”  (Citations omitted.)), and Patrell v. Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 09 4009623, (June 28, 2011, Purtill, J.T.R.) (same), both of which fail to address the issue before this court.

FN6. Having determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the permit application, the court need not address the issues regarding whether the permit application complied with the zoning regulations..  FN6. Having determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the permit application, the court need not address the issues regarding whether the permit application complied with the zoning regulations.

Calmar, Harry E., J.