IN RE: Magdalena A. (2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On August 1, 2012, the petitioner, Joette Katz, the commissioner of the department of children and families (the department or DCF), filed a petition pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112 to terminate the parental rights of respondents Samantha C.¹ and Luis A., the mother and father of the minor child Magdalena A. (Maggie), born on December 10, 2010.   For the reasons set forth below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner, overrules the respondents' objections to the permanency plan, and terminates the parental rights of Samantha C. and Luis A. with respect to Maggie.

I

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The department received a referral from Danbury Hospital on January 19, 2011, stating that Maggie, then five and a half weeks old, had been brought to the emergency room by her parents Samantha C. and Luis A., who reported that Luis A. had slipped and fallen while holding the child.   Samantha C. and Luis A. noticed bruising on Maggie's abdomen, so they took her to the hospital.   After x-rays revealed fractures of Maggie's ribs, her left clavicle, both of her tibias and her right fibula, Danbury Hospital contacted the department's hotline to report suspected child abuse.

On January 20, 2011, the department filed a motion for an order of temporary custody and a neglect petition in this court.   The order of temporary custody was granted on January 20, 2011 and sustained on January 26, 2011.   The court (Sommer, J.) ordered preliminary specific steps for the respondents at that time.

On June 1, 2011, the respondents entered written pleas of nolo contendere to the neglect petition.   Maggie was adjudicated neglected and committed to the department until further order of the court.   Judge Sommer issued final specific steps to the respondents on that date.

The department filed a motion for review and approval of a permanency plan for Maggie on October 14, 2011.   The proposed permanency plan was for termination of parental rights and adoption.   Luis A. filed a motion in opposition to the permanency plan on October 22, 2011, and Samantha C. filed an objection to the plan on November 1, 2011.   On December 9, 2011, the court (Sommer, J.) approved, with the agreement of all parties, an amended permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption, with a concurrent plan of reunification with Luis A. The court again issued specific steps to Luis A.

Maggie's paternal grandmother, Magdalena M., moved to intervene in the neglect case on November 23, 2011.   The department conducted a guardianship study and recommended against the paternal grandmother's intervention.   Judge Sommer denied the motion to intervene on January 25, 2012.

Luis A. and Samantha C. moved for revocation of commitment and transfer of guardianship of Maggie to Magdalena M. on January 7, 2012 and January 9, 2012, respectively.   The court held an evidentiary hearing on June 1, 2012 and July 25, 2012, and it denied both motions on August 16, 2012.   In re Magdalena A., Superior Court for juvenile matters at Danbury, Docket No. D03–CP11–002814–A (August 16, 2012, Sommer, J.).

The petition for termination of parental rights was filed on August 1, 2012.   On September 5, 2012, the petitioner moved for approval of the permanency plan.   Luis A. filed a motion in opposition to the plan on September 17, 2012.   Samantha C. filed a motion in opposition to the plan on October 5, 2012.   The court approved the permanency plan on October 10, 2012, without prejudice to the objections of the respondents.   The respondents' motions in opposition to the plan were consolidated for trial with the petition for termination of parental rights.

II

FINDINGS OF FACT

The hearing on the termination of parental rights petition commenced in this court on January 16, 2013.   The hearing continued on January 18 and 23, 2013, and it concluded on January 25, 2013.   The respondent mother and the respondent father appeared and were represented by counsel.   The minor child Maggie was represented by counsel.   The department was represented by an assistant attorney general.

Neither the respondent mother nor the respondent father has claimed to have Native American tribal affiliation.   The court is not aware of any proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of the minor child.   The court has jurisdiction.

The court heard testimony from John Leventhal, M.D., Professor of Pediatrics, Yale University School of Medicine, Department of Pediatrics;  Raul Arguello, M.D., Chairman of Pediatrics, Danbury Hospital;  Terri Stanco (formerly Terri Torok), DCF investigator;  David Mantell, Ph.D., forensic clinical psychologist;  Victor Claudio, DCF social worker;  Magdalena M., the mother of the respondent father Luis A. and the paternal grandmother of Maggie;  and the respondent father Luis A. The court reviewed documents that were entered into evidence and took judicial notice of the following:  the January 20, 2011 ex parte order of temporary custody;  the affidavits in support of the department's motion for an order of temporary custody;  the January 26, 2011 order sustaining the order of temporary custody;  the June 1, 2011 adjudication of neglect and commitment of Maggie to the department;  the June 1, 2011 specific steps ordered for the respondent parents:  the respondent father's October 22, 2011 motion in opposition to the permanency plan;  the respondent mother's November 1, 2011 objection to the permanency plan;  the December 9, 2011 order approving, by agreement of the parties, the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption with a concurrent plan of reunification with the respondent father;  the specific steps ordered for the respondent father on December 9, 2011;  and the August 16, 2012 memorandum of decision denying the motions to transfer custody and guardianship to the paternal grandmother.   After considering all of the testimony and documentary evidence presented and judicially noticed, and having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence, unless otherwise specified.

The Respondent Mother Samantha C.

Samantha C. is 22 years old.   She was born on April 17, 1991 in Danbury, Connecticut, to Michael D. and Carrie C. She is the second of her parents' three children.   She has an older brother Michael C. and a younger brother Kyle C.

Samantha C.'s parents abused drugs and alcohol and were violent toward each other.   Samantha C. was a neglected child due to her parents' substance abuse and domestic violence.   Samantha C.'s maternal grandparents became her guardians in 1999.   She lived with them until 2009, when she moved to the home of Luis A. and his family.

Except for a period of time when she lived with her grandfather, Samantha C. resided with Luis A. and his family until he was incarcerated in September 2011.   She then moved to her cousin's home, where Luis A. joined her upon his release.   They resided together until May 2012, when their relationship ended.   Samantha C. moved to her aunt's home.   Samantha C. was residing with her aunt at the time of the termination of parental rights trial.

Samantha C. attended school until the 11th grade.   As of the adjudicatory date, she reported that she had enough credits to get her high school diploma or her GED, but she had not obtained either one.   Samantha C. has been employed at the Christmas Tree Shop, Burlington Coat Factory, Home Goods, the Dollar Tree, the Irish Pub in Ridgefield and the New Colony V Diner.   She was unemployed for approximately two months in the summer of 2012.   At the time of the termination of parental rights trial, Samantha C. was working at the New Colony V Diner and at a store called Five Below.

Apart from what she witnessed as a child, Samantha C. has no history of domestic violence or substance abuse.   She reported a mental health history to Dr. Mantell.   She stated that she was diagnosed as a child with ADD and ADHD, for which she was prescribed Ritalin.   She also indicated that she had been told that she was bipolar, and she had been prescribed Risperdal, only to be advised later that she did not need the medication.

Following an administrative case review on March 15, 2011, the department advised Samantha C. of several agencies to contact for the services recommended by the department and ordered by the court.   By letter dated March 17, 2011, the department identified Catholic Family Services, Danbury Hospital's Community Center for Behavioral Health (CCBH), and Community Health Center (CHC) as resources for her to obtain mental health counseling.   Samantha C. attended an intake assessment at CHC on August 8, 2011, nearly five months later, and only two individual sessions.   After many missed appointments, she was discharged from CHC on November 28, 2011 for non-attendance.   The department was advised in January 2013 that Samantha C. had an intake appointment scheduled with Catholic Charities for January 22, 2013, three days before the last day of the termination of parental rights trial.

The department also indicated in its March 17, 2011 letter to Samantha C. that it had completed her referral for parenting services through the ParentNet Program at the Danbury Regional Child Advocacy Center.   Samantha C. received a certificate for completing fifteen hours of the “ParentNet, Parenting People Program” on December 20, 2011.

Samantha C. has a criminal record.   On March 10, 2011, Samantha C. was arrested in connection with the injuries sustained by Maggie and charged with three counts of assault in the 2nd degree, General Statutes § 53a–60, and one count of risk of injury to a minor, General Statutes § 53–21.   These felony charges were pending at the time of the termination of parental rights trial.   In addition, Samantha C. was arrested on June 20, 2012 and charged with disorderly conduct, General Statutes § 53a–182, and threatening in the 2nd degree, General Statutes § 53a–62.   These charges remain pending as well.   Samantha C.'s criminal history also includes earlier arrests for larceny, breach of peace and assault.

Samantha C. has never been married.   She was in a relationship with Maggie's father, Luis A., for twelve years.   They met in middle school when she was 9 years old and he was 12 years old.   Their relationship ended in May 2012.

Maggie is Samantha C.'s only child.   Samantha C. endured a painful twenty-six-hour labor when she gave birth to Maggie.   Samantha C. is barred from residing with Maggie under the terms of a March 11, 2011 protective order entered in her pending felony case.

The Respondent Father Luis A.

Luis A. is 23 years old.   He was born on January 12, 1990 in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. He is the son of Luis A.G. and Magdalena M. Luis A. lived in Puerto Rico until he was about 4 years old.   His parents moved from Puerto Rico to Redding, Pennsylvania and then to Danbury, Connecticut.   He has lived in Danbury since he was around 5 or 6 years old.

Luis A. is the oldest of his parents' four children.   He has one brother, Leonardo A., and two sisters, Elaina A. and Emily A. Luis A.'s siblings reside with their mother in Danbury.

Luis A.'s father abused drugs and alcohol.   Luis A. witnessed domestic violence between his parents during his childhood.   He has a history with the department as a child victim of neglect due to his exposure to his father's substance abuse and domestic violence in the home.

Luis A. attended Danbury High School through the 11th grade.   He dropped out after an argument with a teacher.   He has an inconsistent work history.   He worked briefly for Subway.   He also worked for a roofing company.   He had a job at Target that he lost when he was incarcerated in September 2011.   He regained his position upon his release, but then his job was eliminated due to budget cuts within the company.   At the time of the termination of parental rights trial, Luis A. was working as a caregiver, assisting an elderly man with tasks around his house.

Luis A. has a mental health history.   He has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder.   He advised Dr. Mantell that he was taking Risperdal and Cogentin.   It appears that he was compliant with his medication from September 2011 to December 2011, while he was incarcerated.   He was released with some of his medication and a voucher to obtain refills until he could locate a provider in the community.   Luis A. was not able to use the voucher, so the department's social worker Claudio encouraged him to find a provider and engage in therapy as soon as possible so that he could continue with his medication.   It appears that Luis A. failed to do so.

Following the March 15, 2011 administrative case review, the department also advised Luis A. of several agencies to contact for the services recommended by the department and ordered by the court.   By letter dated March 17, 2011, the department identified Catholic Family Services, CCBH and CHC as resources for Luis to obtain mental health counseling.

Luis A. did not attend an intake assessment at CCBH until a year later, on March 19, 2012.   He only met with his doctor twice for his monthly medication management, once in April 2012 and again in June 2012.   He was scheduled to have an individual therapy session every other week, but he attended only one session with his therapist, in June 2012.   From March 19, 2012 until the adjudicatory date, Luis A. went to CCBH a total of three times.   In late August 2012, he indicated to the department that he was no longer participating in any treatment.   Despite reporting in October 2012 that he was returning to therapy through CCBH, it appears that Luis A. was not fully engaged in mental health treatment despite repeated recommendations and written referrals.

The department also indicated in its March 17, 2011 letter to Luis A. that it had completed his referral for parenting services through the ParentNet Program at the Danbury Regional Child Advocacy Center.   Luis A. attended some of the ParentNet sessions, but he missed too many classes to complete the program.   The department referred Luis A. to the Families Network Nurturing Fathers Program in March 2012.   He attended his first class on April 17, 2012, and he ultimately failed to complete the program.   He did not participate in the parenting class offered through the Travisano Network.

Luis A. has an acknowledged history of marijuana use.   The department referred Luis A. to the Midwestern Connecticut Council on Alcohol (MCCA) in its March 17, 2011 letter, He failed to attend three scheduled substance abuse evaluations at MCCA in April 2011.

Following his release from incarceration at the end of 2011, Luis A. was supposed to attend individual and group substance abuse programs through the Travisano Network.   Luis A. failed to attend any individual sessions.   He was to begin the group program with a class on January 4, 2012, but he did not attend.   He attended one class on January 11, 2012, and he missed classes on January 18, 2012 and January 25, 2012.   He did not call to explain his absences.   By January 30, 2012, Luis A. was not permitted to continue the eight-week course because he had missed too many classes.   Luis A. also had three positive urine tests for marijuana at the Travisano Network in January 2012.

Luis A. returned to MCCA for an evaluation and screening on April 17, 2012.   He tested positive for marijuana and cocaine at that time.   He was referred to the men's Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP) beginning the following day, a program that included three-hour group sessions three times each week.   Luis A. attended one group session on April 25, 2012, and he cancelled three scheduled individual sessions.   He was discharged from MCCA for non-attendance on May 31, 2012, after several unsuccessful attempts were made to contact him.

In June 2012, Luis A. advised Claudio that he intended to comply with services in order to work toward reunification with Maggie.   By letter dated June 7, 2012, Claudio indicated that he would assist Luis A. to reconnect with MCCA. Claudio said that Luis A. was expected to successfully complete substance abuse treatment, show that he had the ability to abstain from all illegal substances, engage in counseling, and connect with a psychiatrist to monitor his medication.   He reminded Luis A. that in order to be considered for reunification, he had to demonstrate stable housing and employment.

Luis A. had another evaluation at MCCA on June 16, 2012.   MCCA recommended that he re-engage in the IOP. Luis A. failed to attend the IOP, and he was discharged due to his lack of attendance on July 17, 2012.

In October 2012, Luis A. expressed the desire to engage in treatment once again.   Claudio testified that he spoke with Luis A. several times about MCCA, and Luis A. agreed that he wanted to engage in treatment.   The department continued to make referrals for him.

On October 22, 2012, Luis A. attended yet another evaluation and screening at MCCA. He tested positive for marijuana and cocaine.   He admitted that he had used cocaine since he was 18 years old.   He also reported that he drank alcohol to excess on occasion.   MCCA again referred Luis A. to the IOP, and it indicated that Luis A. would be monitored closely for inpatient care.   MCCA also recommended that Luis A. see MCCA's treating psychiatrist, attend Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings, and participate in case management.   Luis A. attended only one group session and no individual sessions at MCCA. He refused to participate in AA, NA and case management.   He was discharged from the program on November 30, 2012.

Luis A. does not have an adult criminal record He had five placements as a juvenile for assault in the 2nd degree, larceny, breach of peace, having a pellet gun in the mall, and having a knife in his car, which was discovered during a motor vehicle stop.   He was incarcerated in late 2011 for violating his probation by using marijuana.

Luis A has one child, Maggie.   He has never been married.   He was in a long-term relationship with Samantha A., whom he met in middle school.   As noted above, that relationship ended in May 2012.

The Minor Child Magdalena A.

Maggie was born on December 10, 2010.   She is the only child of Samantha C. and Luis A. She is named after Luis A.'s mother, Magdalena M. Maggie has been in the same DCF-licensed foster home since she was discharged from Danbury Hospital on January 20, 2011.

Maggie is thriving in her foster home.   Maggie is attached to her foster parents, who have been her caregivers for nearly all of her life.   She hugs and kisses them and asks them to pick her up.   She is very comfortable in their home.   She relates to her foster parents as parental figures, because they are the only caregivers she has known.   Maggie's foster parents are willing to adopt her.

Maggie is a very personable and inquisitive child.   She enjoys music and loves to dance and sing.   She is engaging with her foster parents.   Her behavior is age appropriate—like a typical two-year-old, she plays nicely at times and throws toys at other times.   She does well in daycare, with the exception of one reported biting incident.   She likes being read to and looking at pictures by herself.

Maggie is friendly and affectionate with everyone.   She interacts with the department's staff during the supervised visits in the same way that she interacts with Samantha C. and Luis A. She calls all women, including Samantha C., her foster mother, and the DCF case aide, “Mom” or “Mommy.”   She calls all men, “Dad” or “Daddy.”

Maggie's injuries, described more fully below, have healed well.   She required no additional follow up or specialty care.   She received physical therapy through Birth to Three services for mild developmental delays.   She was discharged from Birth to Three on March 7, 2012, and she has remained on target developmentally.

Maggie was healthy at birth, and she continues to be a healthy child except for some respiratory issues, which may be asthma-related.   She has not had any new fractures while she has been in foster care.

Danbury Hospital Admission and Order of Temporary Custody

Samantha C. and Luis A. brought Maggie to the Danbury Hospital emergency room in the early morning hours of January 19, 2011.   They reported that Luis A. fell while holding Maggie.   They noticed that Maggie was bruised, so they took her to the emergency room to be examined.

The emergency room physician ordered a chest x-ray of Maggie.   The chest x-ray revealed that Maggie had two rib fractures in different stages of healing.   The emergency room physician considered the possibility that Maggie was the victim of child abuse and notified Raul Arguello, M.D., the Chairman of Pediatrics at Danbury Hospital.   Dr. Arguello admitted Maggie to the hospital.

Dr. Arguello testified that, as part of the child abuse evaluation, he examined Maggie and ordered additional tests and blood work to see if she had any other injuries.   The hospital performed a skeletal survey, CT scans of Maggie's head and abdomen, an eye examination, and an orthopedic evaluation.   Maggie had multiple bruises on her abdomen, but her CT scans and her eye examination were normal.   Maggie had no retinal hemorrhaging or organ damage.

Maggie's skeletal survey showed that she had multiple fractures.   In addition to her fractured ribs, Maggie had a healing fracture of the left clavicle, a fracture of the right distal fibula, and bucket handle fractures of the right distal tibia and the left tibia.   The fractures were not new.   Maggie did not need any casting.

Dr. Arguello concluded that Maggie's multiple fractures were inconsistent with the report from her parents that Luis A. fell that night while holding Maggie.   He spoke with Luis A., and Luis A. offered no explanation for the fractures.   The fractures raised Dr. Arguello's concerns regarding child abuse, because it appeared that Maggie had been injured in the past.   He said that a bucket handle fracture is almost synonymous with child abuse.   In his view, based on the multiple fractures and the timing of the fractures, Maggie's injuries were not accidental.   Danbury Hospital held Maggie on a social hold for safety issues, and physician's assistant Ernie Handau contacted the DCF hotline to report the suspected abuse.²

Michael Pitruzzello was the DCF hotline worker on call that night.   He arrived at Danbury Hospital at approximately 6:00 a.m. on January 19, 2011.   He first interviewed Handau, the reporter, then he spoke with Luis A., Samantha C., the paternal grandmother Magdalena M., and Magdalena M.'s friend Mary B. Pitruzzello transitioned the case to the department's investigator, Terri Stanco (then known as Terri Torok), when she came to the hospital later that morning to continue the investigation.

Stanco interviewed Samantha C. and Dr. Arguello at the hospital.   She went to the Danbury police station to speak with Luis A. Stanco spoke briefly with Luis A., and he agreed to meet with Stanco at the department's offices the following day.   Stanco also interviewed Samantha C. at the police station on January 19, 2011.   Danbury police officers were also present.

Stanco reported that during the interview at the police station, Samantha C. stated that she might have been too rough with Maggie and might have hurt her, but had not intended to do so.   Samantha C. said that Maggie was very strong, and that she kicked and fussed.   Stanco said that Samantha C. also acknowledged that she became frustrated with Maggie “a couple of times per week,” and that on at least one occasion Luis A. had to intervene.   Luis A. confirmed to Stanco that Samantha C. was frustrated with Maggie at least once, because the child kept soiling her diaper while Samantha C. was changing her, so he took over the parenting and told Samantha C. to take a nap.   Luis A. described Samantha C. as very angry and red in the face at the time.

On January 20, 2011, the department sought an order of temporary custody for Maggie because it concluded that Maggie was not safe in her home environment, where Samantha C. and Luis A. shared responsibility for all of her care.³  Samantha C. was Maggie's primary caretaker, and Luis A. took care of her at night so that Samantha C. could sleep.   The department did not know who had caused Maggie's injuries.   It placed Maggie in a foster home for her safety.

Review by Dr. Leventhal

On January 19, 2011, the department contacted John Leventhal, M.D., Professor of Pediatrics at the Yale University School of Medicine, to evaluate Maggie's case.   Dr. Leventhal has been the medical director of Yale's child abuse program for more than thirty years, and he is board-certified in the sub-specialty of child abuse pediatrics.

Under a contract between the department and Yale University, the department consults with Dr. Leventhal in cases where child abuse is suspected.   Dr. Leventhal consults with the department on approximately fifty cases each year.   Dr. Leventhal was qualified as an expert in the area of child abuse pediatrics.

In connection with the request for consultation., Dr. Leventhal reviewed the child's Danbury Hospital emergency department records, her x-rays and her CT scans.   Dr. Leventhal also reviewed the department's records.   Dr. Leventhal explained that he reads a child's records to learn about the child's history, and then he assesses the child's injuries and considers whether the history provided could be a reasonable explanation for the injuries.

Dr. Leventhal routinely consults with other specialists when reviewing x-rays, CT scans and other tests.   Dr. Leventhal reviewed Maggie's x-rays and CT scans with a pediatric radiologist.   He noted that on occasion he and the pediatric radiologist have interpreted a child's x-rays and CT scans differently from how they have been read at the child's initial treating hospital.

Upon review of her x-rays from Danbury Hospital, Dr. Leventhal observed that Maggie had six fractures:  a healing fracture of the left clavicle;  a healing fracture of the left sixth rib along her back;  a healing fracture of the right fifth rib under her arm;  a bucket handle fracture of the left distal tibia;  a bucket handle fracture of the right distal tibia;  and a fracture of the right distal fibula.   Dr. Leventhal provided a report on his initial findings to the department on January 31, 2011.

Dr. Leventhal requested a follow-up skeletal survey of Maggie.   It is his practice to obtain a subsequent skeletal survey when evaluating fractures in cases of suspected child abuse.   The follow-up skeletal survey is particularly helpful in dating fractures.   It may also show a fracture that was not apparent on the original x-rays or indicate that what was thought to be a fracture is only a slight variation in a bone and not a fracture.

Dr. Leventhal explained that fractures through the bone—such as Maggie's clavicle, rib and fibula fractures—usually heal in the same way.   In general, callus formation, which is new bone growth, will be apparent in an x-ray taken seven to ten days after the fracture occurs.   Over the following three to five weeks, the callus will peak and then decrease.

Maggie's second skeletal survey was done on February 7, 2011, about two and a half weeks after her initial x-rays.   Dr. Leventhal testified that the follow-up skeletal survey showed continued healing of the clavicle and sixth left rib fracture, while the right fifth rib fracture was completely healed.   He said that this indicated that the two rib fractures appeared to be of different ages.   He also observed that the left bucket handle fracture was gone, and the right fibula fracture and right tibia bucket handle fracture were still healing.   This also suggested that the fractures occurred on at least two different occasions.   No new fractures appeared on the follow-up x-rays.

Dr. Leventhal stated that clavicle fractures are common in children, but not in children five and a half weeks old, as Maggie was on January 19, 2011.   He thought that Maggie's chest might have been squeezed, resulting in the clavicle fracture and the two rib fractures.   He said that studies have shown that such rib fractures occur when a child is grabbed under the armpit and the child's ribs are squeezed.   The compression from the child's sternum back toward the child's spine rotates the ribs, causing them to fracture.   Dr Leventhal testified that fractured ribs, especially in a child of Maggie's age, are considered diagnostic of child abuse.   This, in addition to the fact that Maggie had six unexplained fractures, was very concerning to him.

Dr. Leventhal explained that the fracture in Maggie's right distal fibula, near the growth plate in her ankle, occurred from some kind of twisting or jerking mechanism.   He said that force would have been required to cause such a fracture in a child as small as Maggie.

The bucket handle fractures—also called classic metaphyseal (CMT) lesions, CMT fractures or corner fractures in Maggie's tibias were near the growth plates as well.   Dr. Leventhal said that these fractures are seen mostly in children less than six months to a year old.   The fracture occurs from sharp jerking or twisting of a child's ankle.   Force is required to cause such an injury.   This type of fracture is diagnostic of child abuse.

Dr. Leventhal testified that the bucket handle fractures in Maggie's tibias were harder to date because sometimes such fractures heal without any callus.   He said that the fracture in her left tibia had disappeared in the second survey, and it had healed without a callus.   The bucket handle fracture in her right tibia had some elevation of the bone next to it, which suggested that was part of the healing process.   The fractures in Maggie's right tibia and her right fibula appeared to have occurred around the same time, but they could have happened in two episodes on the same day or a day or two apart.

Dr. Leventhal said that, based on his training and experience, none of Maggie's six fractures could have occurred accidentally.   When Maggie was x-rayed at Danbury Hospital on January 19, 2011, her x-rays showed four fractures that were already healing.   Those fractures were not caused by the fall that occurred while she was held in Luis A.'s arms earlier that night.   In addition, the fall did not explain the bucket handle fractures.   There was no history to suggest how these fractures, which are caused by jerking of a child's legs, occurred.   Dr. Leventhal stated that some of Maggie's fractures were considered diagnostic of child abuse, and nothing indicated that these were accidental injuries.

Before preparing his follow-up report to the department, Dr. Leventhal reviewed the records of Maggie's birth.   He wanted to see if there was anything in Maggie's birth records that could account for some of the fractures, since clavicle fractures (and rarely, rib fractures) have been reported to occur in children at birth.   Dr. Leventhal indicated that these fractures tend to occur in very large babies, weighing nine or ten pounds, who have had difficult vaginal deliveries.   He noted that nothing in Maggie's birth records were of concern:  Maggie was born by vaginal delivery at term, she weighed six pounds, three ounces, and her Apgar scores were normal.

Dr. Leventhal also reviewed the records of Maggie's visit to the Danbury Hospital emergency room on December 29, 2010.   The hospital note said that Maggie had epistaxis, or nose bleeding, and she was vomiting blood.   Dr. Leventhal said that bleeding from the nose and/or vomiting of blood were very unusual in a nineteen-day-old infant.   When he interviews a family in a suspected child abuse case, he always asks whether the child had any previous bruises or bleeding from the nose or mouth, because bleeding from the nose or mouth may be related to an injury or trauma to the child's face that had not been properly recognized.   He wondered whether Maggie had suffered an injury to her face or—and he thought this less likely—whether her rib fractures had caused a small injury to a lung, so she was coughing up blood.

Dr. Leventhal testified that he did not examine Maggie.   He felt that the information that he needed was available in her medical records.   He noted that an ophthalmologist had already determined that Maggie did not have retinal hemorrhages.   This is part of the examination in suspected child abuse cases.   He also confirmed that the whites (selera) of Maggie's eyes were white, which ruled out brittle bone disease (osteosgenes imperfect or OI).   The whites of the eyes of children with brittle bone disease have a bluish cast.   The CT scan of Maggie's head showed no evidence of any kind of abusive head injury or shaken baby syndrome.   The orthopedist had determined that no casting was necessary for her fractures.

Dr. Leventhal said that six fractures do not occur spontaneously.   In his opinion, a medical cause for Maggie's six fractures seemed unlikely.   Maggie did not have brittle bone disease or show any evidence of congenital abnormalities.   Dr. Leventhal concluded that Maggie's fractures were consistent with serious physical abuse.

Individual Psychological Evaluations of the Respondent Parents and Interactional Evaluations With the Minor Child

On March 29, 2011, David Mantell, Ph.D., a forensic clinical psychologist, conducted court-ordered individual psychological evaluations of Samantha C. and Luis A. and interactional evaluations of each of them with Maggie.   Dr. Mantell has been engaged in the practice of forensic psychology for thirty-five years.   He has been certified by the department as one of its child protection evaluators for many years.   Dr. Mantell testified, and his written report was admitted into evidence.   Dr. Mantell was qualified as an expert in forensic psychology specializing in the field of child abuse and neglect.

Dr. Mantell interviewed Samantha C. and Luis A. separately and together.   He reviewed with them the contents of the background material provided by the court.   He observed each parent interacting with Maggie.   He also asked Samantha C. and Luis A. to complete six diagnostic tools as part of their evaluations:  the Child Abuse Potential Inventory;  the Parents Stress Inventory;  the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory;  the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI3);  the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI2);  and the Conflict Tactic Scale.

Dr. Mantell found Samantha C. to be very pleasant and cooperative during the evaluation.   He said that she seemed to be at ease and overly calm.   According to Dr. Mantell, Samantha C. did not demonstrate a degree of anxiety and concern that was proportionate to the gravity of the situation.   She appeared to be confident that, since she said she was not responsible for Maggie's injuries, the child would be returned to her if she cooperated with the department and did what was expected of her.

Dr. Mantell noted that Samantha C. said that she was angry because the department had misquoted her as suggesting she might have caused Maggie's injuries, but she did not seem to be concerned about the outcome.   She did not appear to be worried or upset about the fact that Maggie was diagnosed with multiple injuries that were deemed to be inflicted and not accidental.   Dr. Mantell cautioned, however, that he was seeing her sometime after the fact, so she would have had time to acclimate to the situation.

Dr. Mantell reported that Samantha C. described herself as a satisfactorily adjusted person, broadly satisfied with her life and her living situation, but with some unfulfilled goals.   She told Dr. Mantell that when she was younger she had been diagnosed with impulse control and behavioral problems.   Her pattern of oppositional defiant behavior had led to three placements in juvenile detention, primarily because she was running away.   Samantha C. had also been diagnosed once with bipolar disorder.   Dr. Mantell observed that Samantha C. did not seem to think that she had those difficulties any more, and she did not behave as if she had those issues.   He said that she expressed no sense of herself as a person with any life problems that required mental health intervention.

For Dr. Mantell, the fact that Samantha C. had impulse control and behavioral issues when she was younger was relevant for three reasons.   First, these difficulties had risen to such a level that she was placed in juvenile detention three times.   In addition, she had been quoted—though she subsequently denied saying it—as having told the department that sometimes she did become frustrated with Maggie, and she might have been too rough with her.   And finally, as described below, when Dr. Mantell observed her with Maggie during the evaluation, she became frustrated and angry with Maggie at one point and then caught herself.

Dr. Mantell also conducted a parent-child interaction between Samantha C. and Maggie as part of the evaluation.   He described evaluations of this type as relatively short, providing a sampling of behavior and an opportunity to observe the child and the parent.   He said that Maggie was cranky and difficult during the interaction, and it was a challenge for Samantha C. to try to calm and soothe her.   Samantha C. held Maggie facing away from her.   When she held Maggie close to her, the child fussed, and when she held her facing away from her again, the child calmed.   Dr. Mantell reported that Samantha C. was, for the most part, very appropriate, handling the child confidently and competently, and appearing to take great pleasure in the child.   He noted, however, the moment when Samantha C. became angry with Maggie, apparently because Maggie was not happy.   Samantha C. became tense and raised her voice.   She said, “Okay!” in a sharp tone.

Dr. Mantell said that he found it odd that Maggie looked at him as much as Maggie looked at Samantha.   He observed that Maggie did not appear to recognize Samantha.

Samantha C.'s Child Abuse Potential Inventory was, according to Dr. Mantell, not interpretable because it was so defensive.   The Child Abuse Potential Inventory is not a test to confirm or refute whether a particular person has or has not abused a particular child.   Rather, the test identifies certain personal characteristics, background characteristics or relationship characteristics in that person that correlate with factors identified as putting people at risk to abuse children.

Samantha C. scored in the clinically elevated range on the Parent Stress Inventory.   The Parent Stress Inventory is a questionnaire developed to describe the characteristics of a particular child, and then to describe the parenting experiences of a parent in caring for that child.   Samantha C.'s score indicated that she was experiencing less pleasure and satisfaction from Maggie than do most parents when asked to describe their relationships with their children.   Dr. Mantell explained that Samantha C. perceived the child as being relatively unrewarding in terms of how she viewed Maggie's behavior and the impact of that behavior on her.

Dr. Mantell said that the MCMI3 is a clinical personality inventory, a self-report instrument designed to assess a person's personality characteristics and whether that person is reporting any clinical personality patterns.   This diagnostic tool incorporates the American Psychiatric Association's five-segment system of categorizing the clinical characteristics of a person evaluated for a diagnosis.   The first segment (Axis I) refers to clinical symptoms such as anxiety, depression, hallucinations, and other clinical presentations.   The second segment (Axis II) refers to personality characteristics—patterns of thinking and feeling identified in a person that are not clinical in nature.   Samantha C. did not present with an Axis I or Axis II diagnosis, but Dr. Mantell observed that certain of her responses indicated that she was describing herself with narcissistic and schizoid personality features.   Her answers also indicated that she might have a tendency for impulsive and unanticipated outbursts.

The MMPI2 is similar to the MCMI3.   Dr. Mantell described the instrument as more evidence based, in that it was developed from studying patients with certain disorders and identifying characteristic behaviors of those patients.   The test was designed to see whether a person possessing those characteristic behaviors would endorse them when asked in a questionnaire, thus self-diagnosing a disorder.   Dr. Mantell said that Samantha C.'s MMPI2 profile was marginally valid because it was defensive.   It did not provide interpretive results.

Dr. Mantell recommended mental health counseling for Samantha C. due to her life situation and the need to manage it effectively.   He also thought it would benefit her because she had implicated herself as a likely person who might have injured Maggie;  her test results indicated she might have a problem with impulsive and unanticipated outbursts, and that type of situation often surrounds injuries to a baby like those Maggie suffered.   He noted Samantha C.'s temper outburst while caring for Maggie during the evaluation.

Dr. Mantell concluded that Samantha C.'s parenting results were significant in two respects:  Samantha C. had an anger outburst during the parent-child interaction, and she had an elevated score on the Parent Stress Inventory that indicated that she found her child less rewarding than most parents do.   He said that injuries to children from being shaken, handled roughly or hit occur when the child frustrates the parent.   One sign of that frustration is that the parent gets angry with the child—which he observed directly.   Another sign is that the parent says the child is not as rewarding as the parent would like.   Dr. Mantell also indicated that a third concern is in the parent's willingness to acknowledge an area of weakness, if it exists, and to ask for assistance with it.   He noted that Samantha C. had made inconsistent statements about whether she ever became frustrated with Maggie, but she did not think that she had a problem as a parent and a caretaker or that she needed help.   She said that she did not see a need for counseling for herself, but she was amenable to engaging in counseling in order to get Maggie back.

Dr. Mantell concluded that Samantha C.'s ability to meet Maggie's needs on an ongoing basis was in doubt.   He reached that conclusion because the cause of Maggie's injuries was unresolved.   Samantha C.'s presentation and her history raised concerns about whether she was responsible for those injuries.   In addition, he thought that her life situation was not very rewarding.   She was living in Luis A.'s home.   He was about to go to jail, perhaps for up to three years.   She was not working full-time, and she did not have enough money to live on her own.   Her child had been removed.   She told Dr. Mantell that she was estranged from members of her own family because they did not approve of Luis A. That Samantha C. did not see a need to engage in mental health counseling contributed to Dr. Mantell's concern about returning Maggie to her care.   He believed that the child would be at risk for continued abuse or neglect if Samantha C. did not engage in therapy.

Dr. Mantell described Luis A. as pleasant, polite, and cooperative.   Like Samantha C., Luis A. presented with a complete sense of innocence regarding Maggie's injuries.   He did not appear to appreciate the gravity of the medical findings.

Dr. Mantell said that the most useful information concerning Luis A. came from his description of himself.   Luis A. told Dr. Mantell about his criminal history, that he had been in court several times, that he had been in jail and expected to be incarcerated again.   Luis A. said that he regretted leaving school early, and that he was not able to earn any appreciable money because work was slow in the roofing business.   He disclosed that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was on medication.

Dr. Mantell found it significant that during the interview and testing Luis A. said he was tired and wanted to go home.   Dr. Mantell thought this showed poor judgment.   The evaluation was a very important event, yet Luis A. wanted to leave before it was completed.   Dr. Mantell asked him to stay until it was done, and Luis A. cooperated.

Dr. Mantell recommended that Luis A. engage in mental health counseling because he had significant issues in his life.   According to Dr. Mantell, Luis A. did not believe that counseling would benefit him.   He said that he had no history of suicidal or homicidal thoughts, depression or anxiety.   He reported having hallucinations a few years earlier, when he was not on his medication.   He said that he heard someone talking to him in a conversational voice, which he believed was all in his head.   Luis A. described a long history of counseling efforts that he found unhelpful and that left him with a poor opinion of counselors as a group.

Dr. Mantell used the same six diagnostic tools to evaluate Luis A. Luis A.'s score on the Child Abuse Potential Inventory was in the mid-range on the scale, which meant that the score itself did not identify him as a person who is at risk for abusing a child.   His score on the defensiveness scale was high.   On the Parent Stress Inventory, Luis A. reported a much calmer, easier child than Samantha C. did, and satisfactory confidence in his ability to take care of Maggie.   He did not indicate that he found Maggie unrewarding to him.

When Dr. Mantell observed Maggie with Luis, she cried and whimpered with him as she had with Samantha C., but Luis A. did not have a frustrated reaction to her.   Dr. Mantell described him as abundantly affectionate with Maggie, repeatedly kissing, hugging and cooing over her.   Dr. Mantell found Luis A. to be strongly interactive with the child, with a much more intense and assertive style.   Maggie did not appear to recognize Luis A.

Luis A. scored unusually high on the defensiveness scale for the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory.   This questionnaire is used to assess whether a person has a substance abuse problem.   He also had a high score on the Supplemental Addiction Measure.   Dr. Mantell concluded that Luis A. might have a substance abuse problem, although he denied that he was using anything on a regular basis.

Dr. Mantell noted that both Samantha C. and Luis A. said that they felt that Maggie recognized them.   In his report, Dr. Mantell said that he was not able to see anything that supported their view.   He thought that the child was as interested in him as she was in them.   He said that “(b)ased only on [his] one exposure, [he] would wonder if the child would notice an absence of contact with her parents.” ⁴

Dr. Mantell listed seventeen factors associated with increased risk for child abuse and neglect that he had identified in the evaluations of Samantha C. and Luis A.:

Teenage mother.

Out-of-wedlock child.

Unplanned pregnancy.

Parents with less than a high school diploma.

Parents with family histories of child protection issues.

Juvenile history of delinquency and/or behavioral problems.

Childhood exposure to domestic violence and abuse.

Childhood exposure to parental substance abuse.

Parental criminal involvement.

Question of adequacy of bonding in childhood.

Two or more fractures in various stages of healing.

Unexplained physical injuries.

Medical opinion that the injuries are non-accidental.

Medical opinion that the injuries could not be self-inflicted because of the child's developmental capacities and/or the nature of the injury.

Delayed in seeking care for fractures.

Discrepant history.

History of physiological over-reactivity.

Dr. Mantell also noted four protective factors:

Parents report a stable relationship.

Parents report no domestic violence.

Parents report no substance abuse.

Father reports a supportive family of origin.5

Dr. Mantell concluded that “[t]he parent's reported history indicates multiple psychosocial characteristics that are associated with a heightened risk for child abuse and neglect for persons with their psychosocial characteristics.   Then there are the medical findings that indicate multiple injuries to the child that are unexplained, non-accidental and not possibly self-inflicted and, therefore, considered by medical opinion to be abusively inflicted.   Risk factors greatly outweighed protective factors in the histories of the parents” ⁶ In Dr. Mantell's view, “[g]iven the number and nature of the medical injuries reported, the combined results raise strong questions about the ability of the parents to keep their child safe.   A further concern is the fact that neither parent is reporting a need for counseling or for rehabilitative efforts for any real problem they acknowledge having.   No one is taking responsibility for the injuries to the child.   Under these circumstances, it is not clear how participation in treatment programs can reduce the risk factors for repeated abuse.” ⁷

Respondent Parents' Supervised Visitation With the Minor Child

When Maggie first came into the department's care, Samantha C. and Luis A. had supervised visits with her at the department's offices twice a week for an hour and a half.   They visited together, and they were often accompanied by relatives.   Because so many family members came with them, the department's social worker Claudio or the case aide supervising the visits normally gave them extra time.

Claudio testified that Samantha C. appeared to be uncomfortable with Maggie initially.   She sat and watched everyone else interact with the child, but she did not really interact with Maggie at all.   Luis A. would encourage her to take Maggie from him, and she would do so reluctantly.   There was a sense of awkwardness about her interaction with Maggie.   It was not until September 2011, when Luis A. was incarcerated, that Samantha C. became more engaged in interacting with the child.

According to Claudio, Luis A.'s interaction with Maggie was completely different.   He was much more animated and more eager to hold her.   Luis A. was engaged with Maggie from the beginning of the supervised visitation.

Claudio reported that Maggie has shied away from Luis A. on quite a few occasions.   In response, Luis A would pick her up and hold her, and she would fuss and then warm up to him.   Maggie behaved differently with Samantha C. She would approach Samantha C. and go to her.   Samantha C. would pick her up or take her hand.   Maggie is affectionate with Samantha C., but she is equally affectionate with the department's staff.

Claudio observed that Maggie has an attachment to Luis A. and Samantha C., but it is not an attachment to the level that she has stranger anxiety when she leaves Samantha C. and Luis A. She does not cry or resist when the visit ends and she leaves with someone else.

After their relationship ended in May 2012, Samantha C. and Luis A. continued to visit together for another month.   The visits were still twice each week for two hours.   At Claudio's recommendation, the time of the supervised visitation was changed to an hour later to accommodate Samantha C.'s work hours.   She had a second job, from 5:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m., and she had been very tired when she came to visit Maggie.

Claudio testified that one day in summer of 2012, one parent arrived alone for the visit and announced that they had agreed to divide the time between them.   Luis A. visited with Maggie for the first hour, and Samantha C. visited for the second hour.

Samantha C. and Luis A. were consistent in their visits until the fall of 2012.   In November 2012, Luis A. began to miss visits.   Claudio reported that Luis A. missed “about four” visits in November 2012, three of which were consecutive.   Luis A. also missed two visits in December 2012 and three visits in January 2013, including the visit scheduled for the day before the last day of the termination of parental rights trial.   Magdalena M., Luis A.'s mother, came to three of the visits that Luis A. missed.   She indicated that she only came because he had asked her to do so.

The department staff asked Luis A. to call in advance if he was not going to attend a visit because it was not fair to Maggie to have her sitting at the DCF offices until Samantha C. arrived.   Although he agreed that he would do so, he did not comply.   If Luis A. missed a visit, Claudio would try to call Samantha C. to see if she wanted a longer visit, as well as to confirm that Samantha C. would be attending during her scheduled time.

Samantha C. missed two visits in December 2012 and three visits in January 2013, including the visit on the day before the last day of the trial.⁸  Both Samantha C. and Luis A. had confirmed to Claudio that they would be there, but neither of them came to see Maggie.   Maggie had been brought to the department's office for the visit.   While Luis A. called to say that he was sick, Samantha C. did not contact the department at all.

With the permission of the department, Luis A. and his family organized a birthday party for Maggie's 2nd birthday at Chuck E. Cheese.   The party occurred on December 27, 2012, which was one of Maggie's scheduled visiting days.   The party lasted for three hours.   Luis A., Maggie's extended family on Luis A.'s side, and one of Samantha C.'s cousins attended the party.   Samantha C. was informed of the party but she did not come, and Luis A. was not able to reach her on her cell phone.⁹

Claudio explained that the department becomes concerned when a child's parents do not attend visits, because it appears that the parents are putting themselves ahead of the child.   It becomes a bigger concern when the department brings this to the parents' attention and they still fail to appear for a visit, or they show up without a snack and a drink for the child, or they forget her diaper bag, as Samantha C. and Luis A. tended to do.

Respondent Mother's Compliance With Specific Steps

On January 20, 2011, and again on June 1, 2011 the court (Sommer, J.) ordered specific steps for Samantha C. to follow in order to facilitate her reunification with Maggie.   As of August 1, 2012, the adjudicatory date, Samantha C. had not complied fully with some of the specific steps ordered by the court.

Keep all appointments set by or with the Department of Children and Families Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem:  Samantha C. complied with this step.   She attended scheduled court hearings and administrative case reviews with the department.

Let DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child know where you and the child are at all times:  Samantha C. complied with this step.   She always made a reasonable effort to keep the department informed of her whereabouts.

Take part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals (parenting and individual):  Samantha C. did not fully comply with this step.   The following treatment goals were expressly identified in her specific steps:  “Learn about developmental needs of child;  demonstrate positive coping skills.”   In March 2011, the department identified Catholic Family Services, CCBH and CHC as resources where Samantha C. could obtain mental health counseling.   Nearly five months later, Samantha C. completed an intake assessment at CHC. She attended only two individual sessions at CHC. Although she was scheduled to meet with her counselor once every two weeks, her last session was on October 11, 2011.   She was discharged from CHC on November 28, 2011 due to her lack of attendance.

Samantha C. completed the fifteen required hours for the “ParentNet, Parenting People Program” in December 2011.

Cooperate with court ordered testing and evaluation:  Samantha C. complied with this step.   She cooperated with the court-ordered psychological evaluation and interactional evaluation conducted by Dr. Mantell.

Sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with service providers to check on your attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings with this court.   Sign the release within 30 days:  Samantha C. complied with this step.

Get and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income:  Samantha C. did not fully comply with this step.   Samantha C. was employed at the Dollar Tree until the summer of 2012.   She was unemployed when the termination of parental rights petition was filed.

Samantha C. did not secure adequate housing for herself and Maggie, and she remained dependent on others for a place to live.   She and Luis A. resided with his family until September 2011, when he was incarcerated and she moved to her cousin's home.   Luis A. joined her after his release, and they lived together until their relationship ended in May 2012.   Samantha C. then moved to her aunt's home.

Have no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system.   Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole:  Samantha C. did not comply with this step.   Samantha C. has pending criminal charges in connection with Maggie's injuries.   In addition, Samantha C. was arrested on June 20, 2012 and charged with disorderly conduct, General Statutes § 53a–182, and threatening in the 2nd degree, General Statutes § 53a–62.

Visit with the child as often as DCF permits:  Samantha C. complied with this step.   She was consistently attending visits with Maggie as of the adjudicatory date.

Within thirty days of this order, and at any time after that tell DCF in writing the name, address, family relationship and birth date of any person(s) who you would like the department to investigate and consider as a placement resource for the child:  Samantha C. complied with this step.   She gave the department the names of resources for the child.

Tell DCF the names and addresses of the grandparents of the child:  Samantha C. complied with this step.

Respondent Father's Compliance With Specific Steps

On January 20, 2011, June 1, 2011 and December 9, 2011, the court (Sommer, J.) ordered specific steps for Luis A. to follow in order to facilitate his reunification with Maggie.   As of August 1, 2012, the adjudicatory date, Luis A. had not complied fully with some of the specific steps ordered by the court.

Keep all appointments set by or with the Department of Children and Families.   Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem:  Luis A. complied with this step.   He attended scheduled court hearings and administrative case reviews with the department, except for one administrative case review that occurred while he was incarcerated.

Let DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child know where you and the child are at all times:  Luis A. was not consistently compliant with this step.   After his relationship with Samantha C. ended in May 2012, Luis A. was transient for a period of time.   He stayed with various friends, and he was homeless at one point.   Claudio offered him assistance in locating a shelter, but Luis A. rejected the help.

Take part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals (parenting, individual, and family):  Luis A. did not comply with this step.   The treatment goals expressly identified in the addendum to Luis A.'s June 1, 2011 and December 9, 2011 specific steps were:  (1) continue to address behavioral health history and present effect on functioning, demonstrating stable mood and affect;  (2) acknowledge responsibility for Maggie's injuries and an understanding of the severity of such;  (3) demonstrate the ability to recognize risk and protect Maggie from harm;  and (4) demonstrate the ability to recognize Maggie's needs and place those above his personal needs.   Luis A failed to achieve the treatment goals.   Despite repeated referrals, he did not attend an intake assessment at CCBH until March 2012, and he attended only one individual counseling session.

With respect to parenting programs, Luis A. failed to complete the ParentNet program and the Families Network—Nurturing Fathers Program, and he did not participate in the Travisano Network parenting class.

Submit to substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment, including inpatient treatment If necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention:  Luis A. did not comply with this step.   The department referred him to MCCA, but he failed to attend three scheduled substance abuse evaluations in April 2011.

Following his incarceration in late 2011, Luis A. was supposed to attend individual and group substance abuse treatment sessions through the Travisano Network as a condition of his release.   Luis A. did not attend any individual substance abuse counseling sessions, and he missed three group sessions in January 2012.   As a result of his poor attendance, he was not able to participate in the program.   All of his urine tests in January 2012 were positive for marijuana.

In April 2012, Luis A. attended an evaluation and screening at MCCA. He tested positive for THC and cocaine at that time.   He was referred to the men's intensive outpatient program (IOP), a program that included three-hour group sessions three times per week.   Luis A. attended one group session.   He cancelled three individual sessions, and he was discharged from MCCA at the end of May 2012 for failing to attend the program.

Luis A. had another evaluation at MCCA in June 2012.   He was encouraged to re-engage in the IOP, but he failed to do so.   He was discharged for non-attendance in July 2012.

Submit to random drug testing;  the time and method of the testing will be up to DCF to decide:  Luis A. did not fully comply with this step, which was included in the specific steps ordered by the court on December 9, 2011.   Although he attended some of his scheduled substance abuse evaluations, he failed to attend many of them.

Not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine:  Luis A. did not comply with this step.   He admitted to the department's social worker that he regularly used marijuana.   Every one of his urine tests was positive for marijuana.   He also tested positive for cocaine on April 17, 2012.

Cooperate with service providers recommended for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment:  Luis A. did not comply with this step.   The service providers recommended in the specific steps were CCBH, Danbury Regional Child Advocacy Center—Parent Net Program, and Birth to Three parent services.   The department also referred Luis A. to Catholic Family Services, CHC, and MCCA. As discussed above, Luis A. failed to cooperate fully with the service providers recommended to him.

Cooperate with court ordered testing and evaluation:  Luis A. complied with this step.   He cooperated with the court-ordered psychological evaluation arid interactional evaluation conducted by Dr. Mantell.

Sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with service providers to check on your attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings with this court.   Sign the release within 30 days:  Luis A. complied with this step.

Get and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income:  Luis A. did not comply with this step.   He had an inconsistent employment history.

Luis A. did not obtain adequate housing for himself and Maggie.   He was dependent upon his and Samantha C.'s relatives for housing.   He and Samantha resided with his mother Magdalena M. until September 2011.   After his release from incarceration in December 2011, he joined Samantha C at her cousin's house.   When their relationship ended in May 2012, he stayed with friends and he was homeless for a while.

Have no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system.   Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole:  Luis A. complied with this step.

Visit with the child as often as DCF permits:  Luis A. complied with this step.   Except for when he was incarcerated, he was consistently attending visits with Maggie as of the adjudicatory date.

Within thirty days of this order, and at any time after that, tell DCF in writing the name, address, family relationship and birth date of any person(s) who you would like the department to investigate and consider as a placement resource for the child:  Luis A. complied with this step.   He gave the department the names of resources for the child.

Tell DCF the names and addresses of the grandparents of the child:  Luis A. complied with this step.

Reunification Efforts by the Department

In addition to providing case management and monitoring services, assessing risk on an ongoing basis, and monitoring the viability of reunification, the department referred both Samantha C. and Luis A. for mental health services through Catholic Family Services, CCBH, and CHC, and for parenting programs at ParentNet, to facilitate their reunification with Maggie.   The department also referred Luis A. to Families Network's Nurturing Fathers Program.   The department recommended that Luis A. engage in substance abuse counseling through MCCA on several occasions.   The department requested psychological evaluations of Samantha C. and Luis A. and interactional evaluations of each parent with Maggie to assist in case planning.   The department referred Maggie to Birth to Three to assess and support her developmental needs.   The department arranged and supervised weekly visitation for Maggie with Samantha C., Luis A. and other relatives.

LEGAL STANDARD

A proceeding for termination of parental rights is governed by General Statutes § 17a–112.  “In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under § 17a–112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:  (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1);  (2) termination is in the best interest of the child;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(2);  and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a–112(j)(3).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009).

A hearing on a termination of parental rights petition proceeds in two phases—adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that one of the statutory grounds for termination existed as of the date the petition was filed or last amended.  Practice Book § 32a–3(b);  Practice Book § 35a–7(a);  In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010).   When a termination of parental rights is sought under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B) on the ground of failure to rehabilitate, however, the court may consider events subsequent to the filing date when deciding whether the parent's rehabilitation “is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003).   The court need find that only one statutory ground for termination has been established to grant the petition.  In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 473, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).

If the court finds that the department has proven at least one statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, the court then proceeds to the dispositional phase.  “In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child[ren].”  “In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child[ren].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah O., 128 Conn.App. 323, 340, 16 A.3d 1250, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 928, 22 A.3d 1275 (2011).  “In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a–112(k) ] ․” In re Jason B., 137 Conn.App. 408, 422–23, 48 A.3d 676 (2012).

Evidence as to adjudication and disposition may be heard in the same proceeding, but disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded.  In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 15 A.3d 194 (2011);  Practice Book § 35a–7(b).

IV

ADJUDICATIONA. Reasonable Efforts Finding

A reasonable efforts finding is a predicate for granting a petition for termination of parental rights.   The court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the department “made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).  “[Section 17a–112] imposes on the department the duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or children with the parents.   The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.   Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our Legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 767–68, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff'd, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).  “Thus, the department must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts.   Section 17a–112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances.   Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191, 16 A.3d 1244 (2011).

The department alleges that, as of the adjudicatory date, the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify Maggie with Samantha C. and Luis A. by providing case management and monitoring services, supervising weekly visitation, referring Maggie to Birth to Three to assess and support her developmental needs, referring Samantha C. to providers for parenting and mental health services, and referring Luis A. to providers for substance abuse, parenting, and mental health services.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify Maggie with Samantha C. and Luis A.

The department also alleges that reasonable efforts to reunify Maggie with Samantha C. are no longer appropriate because Samantha C. is awaiting trial on criminal charges arising from Maggie's injuries.   On March 11, 2011, the criminal court entered a protective order barring Samantha C. from residing with Maggie;  that order was in effect at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing.   The department represents that Samantha C. has not acknowledged any responsibility for Maggie's injuries and has failed to access the mental health services recommended to her.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify Maggie with Samantha C. are no longer appropriate.

With respect to Luis A., the department alleges that reasonable efforts to reunify him with Maggie are no longer appropriate because Luis A. has failed to use the rehabilitative services available to him and continues to struggle with addiction.   Luis A. has not ensured that he has a mental health provider for counseling and medication management in view of his history of bipolar disorder, and he is not able to provide the level of consistency and stability that Maggie requires.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to reunify Maggie with Luis A. are no longer appropriate.

The department also alleges that Samantha C. and Luis A. are unwilling or unable to benefit from the department's efforts to reunite them with Maggie, as demonstrated by their individual circumstances.   The department specifically cites Samantha C.'s failure to comply with certain of her court-ordered specific steps, despite the referrals and assistance offered to her, and Luis A.'s failure to comply with some of his court-ordered specific steps, despite the referrals and assistance offered to him.   The department maintains that neither parent demonstrates an understanding of the severity of Maggie's injuries or accepts responsibility for the child's injuries on any level.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Samantha C. and Luis A. are unable or unwilling to benefit from the department's efforts to reunite them with Maggie.

B. Statutory Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights

The department alleges two statutory grounds for termination of the parental rights of Samantha C. with respect to Maggie:  failure to rehabilitate after adjudication, General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) (Ground B–1), and acts of omission or commission, General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C) (Ground C).  The department alleges the same statutory grounds for terminating the parental rights of Luis A. with respect to Maggie.

The Respondent Mother's Failure to Rehabilitate After adjudication (Ground B–1)

The first statutory ground alleged for termination of the parental rights of Samantha C. is that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i)—failure to rehabilitate after adjudication.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) provides:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3) ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and the parent of such child ․ has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).

“Personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ In conducting this inquiry, the trial court must analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child ․ The trial court must also determine whether the prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child ․” In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 646, 39 A.3d 727, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012).  “The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when she will be able to assume a responsible position in her child's life.   Nor does it require her to prove that she will be able to assume full responsibility for her child, unaided by available support systems.   It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.”  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–3), 1 Conn.App. 463, 477, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984).  “Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabilitation ․ Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Destiny K., supra, 134 Conn.App. at 646–47.

On June 1, 2011, Maggie was adjudicated neglected and committed to the department until further order of the court.   At the time of the adjudication on the neglect petition, the presenting problems were that Samantha C. had been arrested and was facing felony charges for the injuries to Maggie;  Samantha C. was barred by a protective order from residing with Maggie;  and Samantha C. had not completed parenting classes or followed through with mental health counseling.   Since that time, Samantha C. has failed to demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation to meet Maggie's needs now or within a reasonable period of time.

“[A] finding of rehabilitation is not based on a mechanistic tabulation of whether a parent has undertaken specific steps ordered.   The ultimate issue the court must evaluate is whether the parent has gained the insight and ability to care for his or her child given the age and needs of the child within a reasonable time.”  (Citation omitted.)  In re Destiny R., supra, 134 Conn.App. at 627.   As of August 1, 2012, the date the termination of parental rights petition was filed, Samantha C.'s felony charges relating to Maggie's injuries were unresolved.   In addition, Samantha C. had been arrested on misdemeanor charges in June 2012.   All of the charges were pending as of the last day of the termination of parental rights trial.   Samantha C. had failed to engage in mental health counseling, despite many referrals and frequent encouragement from the department's social worker.   She attended only two therapy sessions after her initial intake assessment, and she had been discharged after many missed appointments.   Samantha C. had not obtained stable housing, and she was prohibited by a protective order from residing with Maggie.   By the time of the termination of parental rights trial, Samantha C. has missed several of her regularly-scheduled visits with Maggie.   Her eleventh-hour intake appointment with Catholic Charities, which was scheduled to occur during the last week of the trial, does not demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation to meet Maggie's needs.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Samantha C. has failed to achieve a level of rehabilitation that would support a belief that she will assume a responsible position in Maggie's life at some point in the future.

The Respondent Mother's Acts of Omission or Commission (Ground C)

The department also seeks to terminate the parental rights of Samantha C. with respect to Maggie on the grounds set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C).  Section 17a–112(j)(3)(C) provides for termination of parental rights when “the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being, except that non-accidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C).

“The General Assembly chose not to define the term ‘serious physical injury’ as it is used in our child welfare statutes.   It further declined to import the criminal definition provided by General Statutes § 53a–3(4), despite having done so in other statutes ․ [W]hen a statute does not supply a definition or a term, its ‘commonly approved usage’ governs ․ To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition of the term ․ The word ‘serious' is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as ‘such as to cause considerable distress, anxiety, or inconvenience.’  “ (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re Rachel J., 97 Conn.App. 748, 759–60, 905 A.2d 1271, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 941, 912 A.2d 476 (2006).   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Maggie sustained serious physical injuries in the form of six unexplained fractures to her ribs, left clavicle, left and right tibias, and right fibula, during her first five and a half weeks of life, when Samantha C. and Luis A. were her primary caretakers.   See In re Rachel J., supra, 97 Conn.App. at 760 (severe fracture to child's elbow was a serious physical injury);  In re Clark K., 70 Conn.App. 665, 676, 799 A.2d 1099, cart. denied, 261 Conn. 925, 806 A.2d 1059 (2000) (three fractures of child's skull were serious physical injuries);  In re Cheyenne A., 59 Conn.App. 151, 158–59, 756 A.2d 303, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 759 (2000) (child's seventeen rib fractures were serious physical injuries).

Through the last day of the termination of parental rights hearing, neither Samantha C. nor Luis A. had adequately explained Maggie's serious physical injuries.   Although both parents speculated in their January 19, 2011 interviews with Stanco, the department's investigator, that Samantha C. was responsible for Maggie's injuries, Samantha C. later denied having said so and accused Stanco of misquoting her.   The court credits the testimony of the department's investigator.   Both Samantha C. and Luis A. told Dr. Mantell that they had no idea how the injuries occurred, and they appeared not to appreciate their severity.   Luis A. acknowledged during his testimony at trial that the thought that Samantha C. had caused Maggie's injuries had crossed his mind, but he said that he did not know what had happened.   As provided in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C), Maggie's non-accidental and inadequately explained serious physical injuries constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental omission or commission.

“The phrase prima facie evidence means evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Cheyenne A., 59 Conn.App. 151, 158–59, 756 A.2d 303, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 759 (2000).   The petitioner may rely on circumstantial evidence to meet the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the child was “denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission including, but not limited to, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C).

While it is true that evidence of the respondent's acts of omission was largely circumstantial, that evidence was sufficient.   The law does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence as far as probative force is concerned ․ The standard of clear and convincing proof used in this case denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the issuable fact in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution ․ In a criminal case, the jury may draw reasonable, logical inferences from the facts proven as long as they do not resort to speculation and conjecture ․ In a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence, the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts, and not any one fact, may establish guilt ․ Insofar as circumstantial evidence can be and is routinely used to meet the higher standard of proof in a criminal prosecution, so can it be used in a case such as this where the applicable standard is that of clear and convincing proof.

(Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Juvenile Appeal (85–2), 3 Conn.App. 184, 192–93, 485 A.2d 1362 (1985).

Samantha C. was arrested in March 2011 on charges of assault and risk of injury relating to Maggie's injuries.   These charges were still pending at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing.   Samantha C. admitted to the department's investigator that she might have caused Maggie's injuries.   Both Dr. Arguello and Dr. Leventhal said that Maggie's injuries could not have occurred accidentally, and such injuries were considered diagnostic of child abuse.   The department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Samantha C.'s acts of parental commission or omission denied Maggie the care necessary for her physical well-being.¹⁰

The Respondent Father's Failure to Rehabilitate After Adjudication (Ground B–1)

The first statutory ground alleged for termination of the parental rights of Luis A. is also failure to rehabilitate after adjudication, as set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).   As of June 1, 2011, the date of the adjudication on the neglect petition, the presenting problems were the significant injuries to Maggie and Luis A.'s failure to comply with recommended services for substance abuse, mental health, and parenting skills.   Since that time, Luis A. has failed to demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation to meet Maggie's needs now or within a reasonable period of time.

Luis A. was referred to MCCA for substance abuse treatment several times between March 2011 and October 2012.   Even when he attended an initial evaluation and screening, as he did on three separate occasions, he did not complete more than one or two sessions.   Luis A. was referred to CCBH for mental health services, but he did not continue with treatment after an intake appointment and one counseling session.   Luis A. also did not complete a parenting program.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Luis A. has failed to achieve a level of rehabilitation that would support a belief that he will assume a responsible position in Maggie's life at some point in the future.

The Respondent Father's Acts of Omission or Commission (Ground C)

The department also seeks to terminate the parental rights of Luis A. with respect to Maggie under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C), on the grounds of acts of parental omission or commission.   As discussed above in connection with the termination of Samantha C.'s parental rights on this ground, Maggie suffered serious unexplained physical injuries while her parents were her primary caretakers.   While the evidence indicates that Samantha C. was the parent directly responsible for Maggie's six fractures, it also shows that Luis A. was the parent who failed to protect Maggie from being injured.   A parent may commit an act of omission or commission by failing to protect his child from serious physical injury, even if the parent was not the person who actually inflicted the serious physical injury.  In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 543, 744 A.2d 915 (2000);  In re Felicia D., 35 Conn.App. 490, 501–02, 646 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 931, 649 A.2d 253 (1994).   The department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Luis A.'s acts of parental commission or omission denied Maggie the care necessary for her physical well-being.

V

DISPOSITION

Having found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds exist to terminate the parental rights of Samantha C. and Luis A. with respect to Maggie, the court must next determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child, “The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).   In determining whether the department has established by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the respondents' parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the court must consider the seven factors set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(k) and make written findings concerning those factors.  “The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jason B., 137 Conn.App. 408, 422–23, 48 A.3d 676 (2012).   The court makes the following written findings with respect to each of the seven factors.

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent:  Samantha C. and Luis A. have been offered services since the case began.   The department offered case management services, transportation, and visitation with Maggie.

Maggie has been offered case management services, foster care services, transportation, Birth to Three services, and visitation with Samantha C. and Luis A.

2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended:  The department made reasonable efforts to reunite Maggie and Samantha C. and Luis A. pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, by offering and funding case management, Birth to Three services, supervised visitation, and foster care services.

3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent o which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order:  The court ordered preliminary specific steps for Samantha C. and Luis A. on January 26, 2011, when it sustained the order of temporary custody.   It issued final specific steps on June 1, 2011, when Maggie was adjudicated neglected and committed to the department until further order of the court.   The court also ordered specific steps for Luis A. on December 9, 2011, when it approved a permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption, with a concurrent plan of reunification of Maggie with Luis A. The terms of the specific steps ordered by the court and the respondent parents' compliance with the specific steps are more fully described in part II of this decision Samantha C. and Luis A. did not comply with all of their obligations under the specific steps.   The department fulfilled its obligations under the specific steps and other court orders.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to such child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties:  Maggie does not appear to have any emotional ties with Samantha C. or Luis A. Maggie has resided in the same foster home since January 20, 2011, and she appears to be bonded with her foster parents.

5. The age of the child:  Maggie was born on December 10, 2010.   She is now 2 years and 4 months old.

6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child:  Samantha C. and Luis A. did not make the effort required to adjust their respective circumstances so that it would be in Maggie's best interest to return to their care.   But for an intake assessment and two sessions in the second half of 2011, Samantha C. avoided any mental health counseling until the last week of the termination of parental rights trial, when she scheduled an intake appointment with Catholic Charities.   Despite several referrals to MCCA for substance abuse treatment between March 2011 and October 2012, Luis A. failed to complete more than one or two sessions, including the initial evaluation and screening, each time.   Luis A. also failed to complete recommended mental health counseling and parenting education.   In addition, both Samantha C. and Luis A. failed to maintain contact with the child and with the department by missing a number of visits with Maggie during the months before the termination of parental rights trial.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent:  Samantha C. and Luis A. have not prevented each other from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Maggie.   They have not been prevented by any other person, or by their economic circumstances, from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child.

The court has considered Maggie's best interests, including her health, safety and need for permanency.  “It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents.   There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty ․” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982).   Maggie is bonded to her foster parents, with whom she has lived since January 20, 2011, the day she was released from Danbury Hospital.   They are the only parents she has known, they are providing her with a stable and nurturing environment, and they are willing to adopt her.   Based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of Samantha C. and Luis A. is in the best interests of Maggie.¹¹

VI

CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ordered as follows:

The objections by Samantha C. and Luis A. to the permanency plan are overruled;

The parental rights of Samantha C. and Luis A. are hereby terminated with respect to Maggie;  and

The commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Maggie so that Maggie may be placed for adoption.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o), the statutory parent shall report to the court within thirty days of this judgment on a case plan for the child, and shall timely present such further reports to the court as required by law.

The department shall file a petition for adoption of Maggie with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Danbury pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–129b, or the clerk of the Probate Court which has jurisdiction over an adoption of Maggie shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Danbury when and if any such adoption is finalized.

Judgment shall enter accordingly.

BY THE COURT

HELLER, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In accordance with General Statutes § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties are not disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest in the matter and only upon order of the court..  FN1. In accordance with General Statutes § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties are not disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest in the matter and only upon order of the court.

FN2. Maggie had previously been seen in the Danbury Hospital emergency room on December 29, 2010, less than three weeks after her birth.   On that date, Samantha C. and Luis A. brought her to the emergency room because she had vomited blood.   Maggie was diagnosed with reflux, and her formula was switched to one that was soy-based.   Dr. Arguello reviewed Maggie's hospital records from December 29, 2010, and he thought that the diagnosis was not correct.   He explained that many of the children who have reflux do not have blood in their vomit, and, therefore, a diagnosis of blunt trauma to the abdomen should have been considered..  FN2. Maggie had previously been seen in the Danbury Hospital emergency room on December 29, 2010, less than three weeks after her birth.   On that date, Samantha C. and Luis A. brought her to the emergency room because she had vomited blood.   Maggie was diagnosed with reflux, and her formula was switched to one that was soy-based.   Dr. Arguello reviewed Maggie's hospital records from December 29, 2010, and he thought that the diagnosis was not correct.   He explained that many of the children who have reflux do not have blood in their vomit, and, therefore, a diagnosis of blunt trauma to the abdomen should have been considered.

FN3. Samantha C. and Luis A. both reported that they did not leave Maggie with anyone else, except that Luis A.'s brother and his girlfriend took care of her for about an hour the previous Friday or Saturday afternoon..  FN3. Samantha C. and Luis A. both reported that they did not leave Maggie with anyone else, except that Luis A.'s brother and his girlfriend took care of her for about an hour the previous Friday or Saturday afternoon.

FN4. State's Exhibit 10 (Report by David Mantell, Ph.D. on psychological evaluations and interactional evaluations dated March 29, 2011) at 16..  FN4. State's Exhibit 10 (Report by David Mantell, Ph.D. on psychological evaluations and interactional evaluations dated March 29, 2011) at 16.

FN5. Id. at 11–12..  FN5. Id. at 11–12.

FN6. Id. at 16..  FN6. Id. at 16.

FN7. Id. at 17..  FN7. Id. at 17.

FN8. Samantha C. reportedly had some medical and dental appointments, but she called less than half the time to advise that she would not be attending the visit with Maggie..  FN8. Samantha C. reportedly had some medical and dental appointments, but she called less than half the time to advise that she would not be attending the visit with Maggie.

FN9. Luis A. told Claudio that he had sneakers to give Maggie for her 2nd birthday, but he has not yet given them to her.   Samantha C. and Luis A. brought Maggie gifts when they were together.   After their relationship ended, only Samantha C. arrived with gifts for the child..  FN9. Luis A. told Claudio that he had sneakers to give Maggie for her 2nd birthday, but he has not yet given them to her.   Samantha C. and Luis A. brought Maggie gifts when they were together.   After their relationship ended, only Samantha C. arrived with gifts for the child.

FN10. Samantha C. exercised her right to remain silent and did not testify at the termination of parental rights trial.   The department asked the court to draw an adverse inference from Samantha C.'s failure to testify.   Pursuant to Practice Book § 35a–7A, the court advised Samantha C. that she had the right to remain silent, but that if she did not testify, the court could—but was not required to—draw an adverse inference.   Samantha C. was fully canvassed, and she confirmed that she understood that the court could draw an adverse inference if she did not testify.   Notwithstanding the advisement to Samantha C., the court has concluded that it will not draw an adverse inference from Samantha C.'s decision not to testify..  FN10. Samantha C. exercised her right to remain silent and did not testify at the termination of parental rights trial.   The department asked the court to draw an adverse inference from Samantha C.'s failure to testify.   Pursuant to Practice Book § 35a–7A, the court advised Samantha C. that she had the right to remain silent, but that if she did not testify, the court could—but was not required to—draw an adverse inference.   Samantha C. was fully canvassed, and she confirmed that she understood that the court could draw an adverse inference if she did not testify.   Notwithstanding the advisement to Samantha C., the court has concluded that it will not draw an adverse inference from Samantha C.'s decision not to testify.

FN11. In determining the issue of the best interests of the child, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and the court has concluded by clear and convincing evidence that there is no permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Maggie that is less restrictive than termination of the parental rights at issue.   See In re Azareon Y., 139 Conn.App. 457, 60 A.3d 742 (2012), cert. granted in part, 307 Conn. 950, 60 A.3d 739, and cert. granted in part, 308 Conn. 928, (2013);  In re Julianna B., 141 Conn.App. 163, 61 A.3d 606 (2013)..  FN11. In determining the issue of the best interests of the child, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and the court has concluded by clear and convincing evidence that there is no permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Maggie that is less restrictive than termination of the parental rights at issue.   See In re Azareon Y., 139 Conn.App. 457, 60 A.3d 742 (2012), cert. granted in part, 307 Conn. 950, 60 A.3d 739, and cert. granted in part, 308 Conn. 928, (2013);  In re Julianna B., 141 Conn.App. 163, 61 A.3d 606 (2013).

Heller, Donna Nelson, J.