Nancy Mirto v. John Villano (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 142)

The defendant moves to strike count five on the ground that the plaintiff cannot support a legally sufficient claim for unjust enrichment according to the facts of the present case.   The defendant moves to strike count eleven on the ground that the interpleader claim is unnecessary due to the Probate Court's order regarding the funds in dispute in the present case.

FACTS

In the present case, the plaintiff, Nancy Mirto, as the executrix of the estate of Roberta Pascale (the decedent) filed a complaint on August 30, 2010.   On May 17, 2011, the plaintiff filed an eleven-count revised complaint in which she named John Villano, Western Surety Co., the West Haven Community House, Easter Seals Goodwill IRC, Inc. (Easter Seals) and New England Home Construction, Inc. as defendants.   In her revised complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   Villano was the trustee of the Anthony Pascale testamentary trust (the trust) and the conservator of Anthony Pascale's estate, and the decedent was the sole beneficiary of the trust during her lifetime.   In 1998, the corpus of the trust consisted of $48,649.76 as well as real property located in West Haven, Connecticut, where the decedent previously resided.   Between 1998 and 2004, Villano expended all of the personal property of the trust without distributing any of the trust's assets to provide for the decedent's care.   After the personal property assets of the trust were exhausted, Villano began using the funds from the decedent's conservator estate to pay the costs of operating the trust.   In December 2007, the decedent was terminated from her employment and developed a medical condition.   From December 2007 until the plaintiff's death in November 2008, the decedent repeatedly informed Villano that her condition required medical care, and Villano failed to distribute any trust assets to cover the decedent's expenses.   Upon the decedent's death, the trust's assets were to pass to Easter Seals and the West Haven Community House, the remaindermen beneficiaries of the trust.

Counts one, three and nine are against Villano and sound in breach of fiduciary duty as to his role as trustee and conservator of the decedent's estate.   Counts six and seven are also against Villano and sound in conversion and breach of contract, respectively.   Counts two, four and ten are against Western Surety Co. and sound in violations of General Statutes § 45a–144.   Count eight is against New England Home Construction, Inc. and sounds in a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. Counts five and eleven are against the West Haven Community House and Easter Seals and sound in unjust enrichment and interpleader, respectively.   Because the present matter solely concerns Easter Seals, the court will hereinafter refer to Easter Seals as “the defendant.”

In count five, the plaintiff further alleges that the defendant and the West Haven Community House were unjustly enriched because the assets due to the defendant and the West Haven Community House were improperly maintained by the assets of the decedent's conservator estate and should have been distributed to the decedent during her lifetime.

In count eleven, the plaintiff alleges that in December 2010, Villano appeared in the Probate Court for the judicial district of West Haven and reported that he sold the trust's real property for approximately $43,061.07.   On February 3, 2011, the Probate Court ordered that the assets of the trust should not be distributed to the defendant and the West Haven Community House but instead should be kept in an escrow account until the resolution of the present case.   The plaintiff alleges that her claim to the funds of the trust are in conflict with the claims of the defendant and the West Haven Community House and that the plaintiff is therefore entitled to interpleader relief pursuant to General Statutes § 52–484.

On February 1, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts five and eleven of the plaintiff's revised complaint and a memorandum of law in support.   The defendant moves to strike count five on the ground that the plaintiff cannot support a legally sufficient claim for unjust enrichment based upon the facts of the present case.   The defendant moves to strike count eleven on the ground that the interpleader claim is unnecessary due to the Probate Court's order regarding the funds in dispute in the present case.   On April 9, 2012, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike and a memorandum of law in support.   The present matter was heard at the short calendar on April 30, 2012.

ANALYSIS

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).  “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 303 Conn. 205, 213, 32 A.3d 296 (2011).

The defendant moves to strike count five on the ground that the plaintiff has not pleaded a legally sufficient cause of action for unjust enrichment.   Specifically, the defendant argues that because it did not enter into a contractual relationship with the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot establish the elements of an unjust enrichment claim.   In addition, the defendant argues that it has not received a benefit and that the plaintiff has not conferred a benefit upon the defendant.   The plaintiff counters that under Connecticut case law, a party with an interest in an estate may recover under a theory of unjust enrichment from another party that has received a share of the estate due to a mistake or neglect on the part of the fiduciary of the estate.

“Unjust enrichment applies wherever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract ․ A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another ․ With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary in any case where the benefit of the doctrine is claimed, to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard ․ Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment.”  Kelley v. Five S Group, LLC, 136 Conn.App. 57, 63–64, (2012).

The plaintiff relies upon Adams v. Williamson, 150 Conn. 105, 186 A.2d 157 (1962), and Kiauliene v. Kukenis, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 0120343 (July 13, 1994, Sullivan, J.) (9 C.S.C.R. 804) [12 Conn. L. Rptr. 129], for the proposition that a party with an interest in an estate may recover from another who unjustly receives a greater share of the estate due to the mistake or neglect of the estate's fiduciary.   Both cases are distinguishable, however, from the present case.   Unlike the defendant in the present case, who is a passive beneficiary, the parties in Adams and Kiauliene allegedly engaged in affirmative conduct in order to receive a greater share than that to which they were legally entitled.

In Adams v. Williamson, supra, 150 Conn. 105, the executrix of her deceased husband's will filed incorrect accountings with the Probate Court that erroneously included overpayments to herself.  Id., 108.   After the Probate Court ordered the executrix to restore the overpayments to the estate, the executrix argued that the previously entered orders of the Probate Court rendered the matter res judicata.  Id., 109.   The Supreme Court upheld the Probate Court's order and reasoned:  “We have held that an order of distribution, if erroneous, does not protect persons receiving distribution under it from liability to others who were erroneously omitted in that order.”  Id., 111.   Adams is distinguishable from the present case, however, because while the defendant in the present case was merely a passive beneficiary, the executrix in Adams represented to the Probate Court that she was entitled to receive money that she was not lawfully due to receive.

Likewise, in Kiauliene v. Kukenis, supra, 9 C.S.C.R. 804, the defendant engaged in affirmative conduct to produce the alleged unjust enrichment.   The defendant, as administrator of the decedent's estate, distributed the entirety of the estate to herself due to her mistaken belief that she was the decedent's sole heir.  Id. The plaintiffs, who claimed that they were also the decedent's heirs, brought an action against the defendant sounding in unjust enrichment.  Id. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because the plaintiff did not file an appeal with the Probate Court.  Id. The court, relying upon Adams v. Williamson, supra, 150 Conn. 111, recognized the unjust enrichment claim and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.  Id. The court reasoned:  “[A] party erroneously omitted from receiving a distribution of an estate can bring an action against the distributees based on the theory of unjust enrichment.”  Id. In the present case, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendant engaged in any wrongful or improper conduct.  Id. Thus, Kiauliene is inapposite to the present case because the defendant in Kiauliene allegedly improperly distributed the entirety of the decedent's estate to herself.   Thus, while any enrichment that the defendant in Kiauliene received could be characterized as “unjust,” the defendant's alleged enrichment in the present case cannot be similarly characterized.

While the plaintiff is correct that “a contractual relationship is not a prerequisite to recovery based on unjust enrichment”;  Schirmer v. Souza, 126 Conn.App. 759, 767, 12 A.3d 1048 (2011);  as set forth above, the alleged enrichment must be unjust in some manner.   In reviewing the allegations in the complaint, the benefit allegedly conferred upon the defendant in the present case cannot be properly classified as “unjust,” “inequitable” or “unconscionable.”   Thus, the plaintiff has failed to allege a legally sufficient unjust enrichment claim.¹  Therefore defendant's motion to strike count five of the plaintiff's revised complaint is granted.

The defendant also moves to strike count eleven of the plaintiff's revised complaint, which sounds in interpleader, on the ground that interpleader is unnecessary due to the Probate Court's order that the trust assets be held in an escrow account pending the resolution of the present case.   The plaintiff counters that an interpleader claim is proper pursuant to § 52–484 because the Probate Court has not yet conclusively determined the rights of the parties in relation to the trust assets.

Section 52–484 provides in relevant part:  “Whenever any person has, or is alleged to have, any money or other property in his possession which is claimed by two or more persons, either he, or any of the persons claiming the same, may bring a complaint in equity, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, to any court which by law has equitable jurisdiction of the parties and amount in controversy, making all persons parties who claim to be entitled to or interested in such money or other property.”   In her revised complaint, the plaintiff acknowledges that “[o]n or about February 3, 2011, the Probate Court for the District of West Haven entered an order directing that the assets of the Trust should not be distributed to the Defendants ․ but that the assets of the Trust should be held in an interest bearing escrow account pending the outcome of the present action.”   The court recognizes that § 52–484 is a “broad statutory bill in the nature of interpleader.”  Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, 297 Conn. 489, 495, 1 A.3d 1026 (2010).   Nonetheless, interpleader statutes are “not to be construed as permitting the substitution of the procedure for any existing legal remedy equally efficacious.”  McLay v. Montowese Brick Co., 94 Conn. 193, 195, 108 A. 664 (1919).   See Cooley v. Piggot, 84 Conn. 323, 325–26, 80 A. 92 (1911) (interpleader action improper where compliance with an order of the Probate Court adequately protected the plaintiff's rights).   In addition, to sustain the plaintiff's claim in the nature of interpleader, which requires a separate two-step process,² when the Probate Court has ordered that the trust assets be held in escrow pending the outcome of the present case would not serve the policy of preserving judicial resources.   See Bruno v. Geller, 136 Conn.App. 707, 723, (2012) ( “[t]he conservation of judicial resources is of paramount importance as our trial dockets are deluged with new cases daily”).   The plaintiff has failed to state a claim entitling her to relief in the nature of interpleader.   Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike count eleven of the plaintiff's revised complaint is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike counts five and eleven of the plaintiff's revised complaint is granted.

Brian T. Fischer, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff also argues that the court should impose a constructive trust in equity pursuant to the doctrine of unjust enrichment in the present case.  “The imposition of a constructive trust by equity is a remedial device designed to prevent unjust enrichment ․ Thus, a constructive trust arises where a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 210 n.22, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).   As set forth above, the plaintiff has not alleged a legally cognizable claim for unjust enrichment.   Accordingly, the plaintiff's argument that the court should impose a constructive trust in the present case is without merit..  FN1. The plaintiff also argues that the court should impose a constructive trust in equity pursuant to the doctrine of unjust enrichment in the present case.  “The imposition of a constructive trust by equity is a remedial device designed to prevent unjust enrichment ․ Thus, a constructive trust arises where a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 210 n.22, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).   As set forth above, the plaintiff has not alleged a legally cognizable claim for unjust enrichment.   Accordingly, the plaintiff's argument that the court should impose a constructive trust in the present case is without merit.

FN2. Actions pursuant to 52–484 involve two distinct parts, the first of which is an interlocutory judgment of interpleader ․ An interlocutory judgment of interpleader, which determines whether interpleader lies, traditionally precedes adjudication of the claims.  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra, 297 Conn. 497..  FN2. Actions pursuant to 52–484 involve two distinct parts, the first of which is an interlocutory judgment of interpleader ․ An interlocutory judgment of interpleader, which determines whether interpleader lies, traditionally precedes adjudication of the claims.  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra, 297 Conn. 497.

Fischer, Brian T., J.