Edgar Ortiz v. Ronald J. Maillet et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

One of the defendants, R.E. Michel Company, Inc. (Company), moves to strike the fifth and sixth counts of the complaint filed by the plaintiff, Edgar Ortiz.   Those counts purport to impute liability on the Company as the owner of a motor vehicle driven recklessly by its employee, Ronald J. Maillet, by virtue of the evidentiary presumption of agency afforded by General Statutes § 52–183.

A motion to strike “admits all the facts well pleaded;  it does not admit conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”   Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108 (1985).

The Company bases this motion to strike on two grounds.   First, that the allegations of reckless operation by its employee are factually deficient, and second, that liability for reckless operation by an employee cannot be imposed on the employer-owner of a vehicle vicariously.   Because the court agrees with the second ground, this decision only addresses that issue.

At common law no punitive or exemplary damages were assessable against owners for the acts of their agents if the owner's liability was purely vicarious, Maisenbacher v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 379 (1899).   With respect to vehicles, however, vicarious responsibility for such damages was, at one time, specifically imposed by statute where the driver failed to pay the damages, Levik v. Norton, 51 Conn. 461, 469 (1883).   This statute eventually evolved into § 14–295 and § 14–154a, among others, Gionfriddo v. Rent A Car Systems, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 287, fn.3 (1984).   As noted, during the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries, owners of vehicles were expressly liable for enhanced damages for the egregious operation of their vehicle by their agents if the agents were unable to pay those damages, Id. In 1925, however, this imputed responsibility was eliminated except for owners who lease d vehicles, Id.

Also a cause of action derived from statute cannot be judicially expanded to apply to situations for which the legislature has declined to provide relief, Cook v. Collins Chevrolet, Inc., 199 Conn. 245, 251 and 252 (1986).   The language of General Statutes § 14–295 speaks only of multiplied damages against those who drive recklessly.   That text contrasts starkly with the former language of § 14–154a which created “statutory suretyship” by stating that the owner-lessor of a car is “liable ․ to the same extent as the operator ․” Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc., 247 Conn. 342, 346 (1998).   If the legislature wished to impute to owners multiplied damages in all contexts, it knew how to do so, having done it in related areas in the past.

Given the absence of language specifying responsibility for punitive or exemplary damages for nonoperator owners in § 14–295 and the evolution of § 14–154a which formerly imposed such responsibility on all owners and later restricted its effect to rental situations, the court concludes, as a matter of law, the multiplied damages provisions of § 14–295 are inapplicable to nonoperator owners whose liability stems solely from the presumption of agency afforded by General Statutes § 52–183.

Therefore, the Company sustains no imputed liability under the common law or under § 14–295 for the reckless operation of its motor vehicle by an employee, and the motion to strike is granted as to the fifth and sixth counts.

Sferrazza, J.

Sferrazza, Samuel J., S.J.