Deborah Michaud v. Daniel Michaud (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This dissolution of marriage matter came to court with a return date of July 21, 2009.   The plaintiff, Deborah Michaud, and the defendant, Daniel Michaud, tried a fully contested custody case before the Regional Family Trial Docket as a result of their inability to settle their custodial differences at the local court level.   Both parties are seeking primary physical custody of the parties' minor children.   The plaintiff seeks an order of joint custody in regard to decision-making.   Her other claims for relief seek a certain division of holidays and vacation time with the children.   The plaintiff seeks alimony, child support, 60 percent of the proceeds of sale of the marital home, 50 percent of the husband's pension, and the other attendant orders.   The defendant seeks sole custody;  however, he asks for joint custody if the plaintiff meets certain treatment goals, primary residence of the children with a specific schedule of parenting time, including holidays and vacation, an offer of alimony to the plaintiff, child support, a division of the home sale escrow, and certain other orders.   The children's interests were protected by a guardian ad litem.   The guardian ad litem testified at trial.   A full custody study was performed by Dr. Stephen Humphrey, a licensed clinical psychologist.   Fact witnesses were called by both parties as witnesses at trial.

The court has carefully considered the statutory criteria and case law regarding the dissolution of the marriage, custody, parental access and visitation, child support, alimony, health insurance, life insurance, attorneys fees, assignment of property interests, and other attendant matters.   The court has heard all of the testimony, observed the demeanor of the parties and witnesses, and reviewed all of the exhibits.   Based upon the credible evidence the court makes the following findings.

The court has jurisdiction over the marriage.   One party has resided in the state of Connecticut continuously for more than one year prior to the bringing of this action.   The plaintiff, Deborah Michaud, whose birth name is Deborah Poczbout, married the defendant, Daniel Michaud, on June 24, 2000, in Bristol, Connecticut.   There have been two minor children born since the date of the marriage:  Julia, born March 21, 2001 and Camden, born September 15, 2005.   The court finds both children are issue of the marriage.   No other minor children have been born to the wife since the date of the marriage.   There are no other minor children issue of the marriage.   The parties have not been recipients of public assistance.   The court finds that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and that there is no reasonable hope of its reconciliation.

I

The plaintiff is forty-four years old.   She has completed her high school education and has college credits in radiation therapy.   Her work experience is in two primary areas:  retail and medical billing.   While she has significant experience in medical billing, the technology in that field is so advanced since her last employment that she will need to update her skills to return to work.   Her retail experience includes working at Sports Authority.   The plaintiff has experienced generally good physical health, except that she has injured her right knee repeatedly, which required surgery.   The condition of the knee currently presents no obstacle to her employment in the areas of medical billing or retail work.

The plaintiff's emotional health has been more problematic for her.   Dating back to at least 2004, the plaintiff has struggled first with depression, and later with anxiety.   She is treated by her internist for these conditions.   She has been taking medication to control her emotional state for years.   She commenced treatment with a clinical psychologist as well.   Both her clinical psychologist and her internists have recommended that she treat with a psychiatrist.   She refuses to do so, claiming that she would not want that relationship interfered with by this court action.   The court finds this disingenuous inasmuch as the internist's recommendation of psychiatric treatment dates back to long before this dissolution of marriage action commenced.   The court has had the opportunity to observe the plaintiff in the courtroom and considered the credible evidence regarding her conduct outside of the courtroom.   From this, the court concludes that the plaintiff's current care regimen is insufficient to enable her to focus or keep her temper in check.   The plaintiff could not stay on topic in answering questions.   Her answers meandered and strayed.   Her temper was barely restrained when she felt pressed;  she displayed it repeatedly.   Certain topics or certain people speaking with her rendered the plaintiff unable to focus on the matter at hand and communicate on an even keel.   The court is unable to conclude whether this unfortunate circumstance for the plaintiff will interfere with her ability to work inasmuch as there was not evidence that she has sought employment since this behavior has become prominent.¹  It certainly has had significant negative implications for her ability to safely and effectively care for her children, as discussed below.

Daniel Michaud is forty-five years old.   He is in good physical health except that he has a condition known as hemochromatosis.   Hemochromatosis is a build up of iron in the body which he must have removed from time to time.   It has not caused any interference with Mr. Michaud's ability to be employed full time.   He has never been treated for any emotional difficulties.   He has a college degree and is a certified public accountant.   Mr. Michaud is employed at Village Cabinets.   It is stable employment.   While he is a salaried employee, he is also required to take numerous furlough days.   Mr. Michaud works during the day, Monday through Friday.   He presently resides with his family of origin in Bristol, Connecticut.

By nature, Mr. Michaud is a rather quiet individual who appears reserved and of few words.   Throughout the marriage he has had two major avocations:  ice hockey and fishing.   Ms. Michaud was not happy with his engagement in these activities on the weekend or after work.   When Mr. Michaud played hockey during the week it was well after the children went to bed.   He has played hockey most of his life;  Ms. Michaud knew that he played it when she dated him.   She knew that this was an active interest of his.   Mr. Michaud did take up fishing during the marriage.   Normally he fished from around five in the morning until arriving back home around ten in the morning.   The exception to this was when he had a tournament.   On those occasions, Ms. Michaud and the children would occasionally attend the tournament, making it a family activity.   The plaintiff resented Mr. Michaud's fishing.   At her request, he quit men's league fishing in the evenings.

Ms. Michaud believes that her husband's hockey and fishing led to the lack of intimacy in their marriage.   He denied that this was the cause of their marital problems.   Mr. Michaud felt his wife's behaviors are what stressed the marriage:  he found her lazy and argumentative.   He did not, however, seek a dissolution of marriage because he was concerned about Ms. Michaud's care of the children and so he wanted to be in the home for them.   The parties had attended marital counseling before the plaintiff filed for divorce.   Nowhere in the counseling did the plaintiff claim that the defendant was physically abusive or aggressive.

The plaintiff consulted with a divorce attorney one month before filing for divorce and read materials on the topic from the library.   She asked the defendant to leave for a while.   He refused.   She visited the Interval House in Danbury to learn about domestic abuse and what her rights were.   The court finds that violence has played no part in the dissolution of the parties' marriage.   Nor does the court ascribe fault to one party or the other for the dissolution of the marriage.   However, the court does find that the plaintiff used process to her maximum advantage to remove the defendant from the home when she had no real fear of him.

Her first restraining order application was denied.   The parties had an argument in which the defendant punched a door.   She alternately claimed that he did this because he was angry with her daughter and that she and he were having an argument.   The plaintiff filed for divorce because her husband did not converse with her or express his feelings to her.   She felt he was not paying adequate attention to her.

The parties had an argument immediately prior to the plaintiff's filing for divorce.   The defendant pushed her away and she bounced off the bed to the floor.   She filed an application for a restraining order in which she failed to explain her conduct in it.   The plaintiff asked that the restraining order be granted without any visitation rights to the defendant.   The plaintiff in a shifting explanation stated the judge told her to do that;  when pressed she said she met the judge.   When pressed she could not state where that happened in the court house.   The restraining order was granted ex parte.   The defendant was ordered to leave the home.   After hearing, that restraining order was dismissed.   The defendant moved back home.

On October 23, 2009, another incident occurred in which the plaintiff again claimed the defendant harmed her.   The plaintiff had the children in her car.   It was stopped in front of the defendant's truck.   The plaintiff was at the back of the truck, ostensibly to retrieve a car seat.   She took the defendant's divorce papers out of the back of the truck and he grabbed them back from her.   She says he pushed her to the ground.   He denies it.   The police were called.   They came and arrested him.   A full protective order was issued.   The court cannot conclude exactly what occurred that date.   The plaintiff's conduct after that date, however, is more illuminating.

After the protective order was issued, she went to the defendant's place of business and asked his boss to give him his college ring.   In January 2010, she went to the hockey rink that the defendant skates in.   She sent him emails inviting him to children's events that she would be attending.   When confronted with the fact that she had a full protective order at the time, the plaintiff testified that she never intended to call the police.   This is not the conduct of a fearful person.   She wrote a note in support of dropping the charges when the defendant agreed to an exclusive possession order in family court on March 3, 2010.   The charges against him were nolled on April 15, 2010.

II

In describing the things that concern the father about the mother's care of the children, he stated that she often yells at them, sometimes swearing.   Several of her friends testified.   From her allies, there was agreement that she yells a lot at the children.   While she acknowledges that she yells at the children, she denies she ever swears at them, only at their father in front of them.

Mr. Michaud also complained that the children's mother regularly spent hours on the telephone when she should be caring for the children.   This was confirmed at least in part by her witnesses.   The court finds both to be true.   Finally, he is concerned that her lack of attention has extended to matters that affect safety.   These matters are detailed below.

Ms. Michaud wants the children to live primarily with her because she believes that she is more involved with the children and that the defendant is more interested in his hobbies than participating in the children's activities.   While she asserts that the children need both a male and female role model, she acknowledges that the children may have overheard her telling others that their father is not good for them.   Her actions in denigrating the defendant in front of the children and allying her daughter with her have been harmful to the children's relationship with their father.

Dr. Stephen Humphrey, a licensed clinical psychologist, performed a forensic custody evaluation of this family.   His report was admitted into evidence.   He testified as well.   Mr. Michaud's presentation to Dr. Humphrey is as an individual who may be rigid at times and unable to show flexibility.   He is not comfortable with changes in routine and has difficulty dealing with situations that are emotionally volatile.   This essentially has been a recipe for disaster in his marriage, given Ms. Michaud's constant seeking of emotional affirmance from him.   Dr. Humphrey noted, and the court accepts as true the following:  “his detached, aloof interpersonal style is optimal in some ways for dealing with Ms. Michaud, but it has the paradoxical effect, in my opinion, of making her work harder to engage him emotionally.”   One result of this is that the parties do not communicate well, and generally do not compare well.   The restraining orders and protective orders that Ms. Michaud gained during the pendency of this action only heightened this situation.   After listening to all of the evidence regarding the incidents surrounding these matters, the court does not find that Mr. Michaud presented any physical danger to his wife.   There is no evidence of credible fear of him.   Instead, she is angry, resentful and bitter towards him.

This bitterness has come out, unfortunately, in many ways.   She speaks badly of Mr. Michaud to the children.   Mr. Michaud conversely, after one major error has no longer engaged in this kind of alienating behavior.   On the day that he was served with a restraining order, he wrote a note to his children that told them that their mother made up lies and she was the reason he was leaving home.   Certainly he could have left a note full of love and reassurance for the children, without this invective.   The court notes, however, that he has never repeated this type of misconduct again.  (That said, it is also incumbent upon Mr. Michaud to advise his nuclear family of the harm that can come to these children, by them speaking poorly to them of their mother.)

Mr. Michaud has been a hands-on parent since the birth of the each of the children.   While the parties lived together, when he arrived home from work, Mr. Michaud was just as involved as his wife in all of the basic parenting responsibilities involved with rearing young children and infants.   The court finds that Ms. Michaud regularly treated him as the ‘on duty’ parent from the moment that he got home from work.   She finds parenting to be exhausting, and, at times, emotionally and physically challenging.   Mr. Michaud also substantially contributed to household chores.   Mr. Michaud is very capable of meeting the day-to-day needs of the children.   He has not, however, been proactive in scheduling organized activities for the children.   This is a strong skill of Ms. Michaud's.   The defendant shows affection for the children and is an appropriate custodian.   There is some concern raised by the psychologist that he unconsciously pays more attention to his son than his daughter.   This view is held by Julia;  it has been fed, at least in part, by her mother.   Knowing that a court order prohibited Mr. Michaud from attending his daughter's dance recital (because pursuant to a court order the parents are not to attend the same events), the mother made statements to the child that made the child upset with her father for not coming to the recital.   This conduct of the mother undermines the child's relationship with her father.   The children's exposure to the conflict between these parents is not good for either child.   Julia has picked sides:  her mother.   Camden is showing some signs of aggression during the evaluation that concerns the evaluator, Dr. Humphrey.   Dr. Humphrey also testified the conflict between these parents has contributed to the children's emotional problems.   The court accepts this testimony of the evaluator.   The mother is unable to speak in a balanced and appropriately supportive manner of the father to the children on a regular and sustained basis.

In considering what custodial arrangement is best for these two children, the court must consider the numerous statutory factors as they play out under the facts of this case.²  Julia is ten years old and Camden is five and a half years old.   Camden will be going to school full-day in the first-grade starting this September.   He has been engaged by his mother in activities appropriate for his age.   Julia is a very active girl who goes to school and has many extracurricular activities.   Indeed, it is the energy and commitment of her mother which has helped bring about this healthy life for Julia.   Ms. Michaud is an excellent parent in this respect:  she is able to engage her children's creative energies and extracurricular interests in socially appropriate ways.   The mother, Ms. Michaud, is an appropriate custodian when she is neither distracted from her parenting responsibilities nor upset and angry.   Both emotional phenomena result in her failing to provide them the necessary care.   Further, a combination or one of them alone, under a variety of scenarios can create situations of risk for the children.   When they are ignored during a long phone call, barraged by negative comments about their father, or subjected to physical risk because of distraction or upset of their mother, they are at risk.   These are not abstract possibilities for the court to consider, in light of the behavior of Ms. Michaud and as observed by the court during the trial.

Ms. Michaud has had a variety of accidents, only a few of which have occurred while the children are in her care.   The cumulative effect however is troubling.   Ms. Michaud has demonstrated that she is easily distracted.   She suffers anxiety that prevents her from focusing calmly.   Perhaps the most troubling incident occurred during a spat at an exchange of the children.   Ms. Michaud drove her car off, not only without buckling Camden in, but with one of the motor vehicle doors open.   Her testimony in regard to this was very disconcerting.   Instead of explaining that this would never happen again, Ms. Michaud seemed to justify it by explaining why she was so upset, and, that she did not drive very far down the road (passed homes) before she decided to pull over and remedy the situation.   At no time during the argument was she or any of the children at risk of any physical harm.   No reasonable person would have subjected their child to such physical risk because she is upset.   Instead, this incident is evocative of Ms. Michaud's troubling inability to control herself and focus first on the needs of her children when she is faced with something that upsets her.   This is a basic safety issue.   In considering the best interest of the children, the court must in the first instance consider whether the children are physically safe in the care of a parent.   If not, the court must consider whether orders may be entered that can ensure that safety.

Ms. Michaud's propensity for distraction and lack of focus is at the core of other incidents.   A kitchen fire occurred while Camden was in Ms. Michaud's care.   She was cooking spring rolls in a frying pan.   She was not deep frying them;  there was a little oil in the pan.   Camden called for her.   Ms. Michaud went to help him.   When she returned, she saw flames licking up into the air at the upper cabinet level.   She appropriately retrieved her child and got him out of the house.   Substantial fire damage occurred.   Ms. Michaud testified that she was only a minute or two with Camden.   It is hard to know how that could be so or why she did not turn the flame down.   Unfortunately, this kind of incident might occur any time anywhere through simple negligence of a party.   However, where a parent has so many other incidents of inability to focus, this becomes one of several events that provide the court with significant concern about the well-being of these children in the care of their mother when she is distracted.

Ms. Michaud had motor vehicle mishaps in the last five years.   One was a rear-end accident in which she was hit.   On another occasion someone took a right-hand turn into her passenger door at a busy intersection.   Notwithstanding horn honking before the collision, she did not see the driver coming at her.   In the fall of 2009, while driving alone, Ms. Michaud caused an accident by taking a left-hand turn into another driver's car.   On yet another occasion, she backed into the snow blower.   Lastly, she also had a mishap at Mr. Michaud's house while she was dropping the children off.   The car was a standard transmission vehicle which she asserts was in park and she had failed to set the emergency brake in the car.   The car rolled backward into something very solid.   No one was hurt.   These many incidents are emblematic of her behavior in the courtroom when she lost focus in her answers to questions.

During the forensic psychological evaluation and at doctor's appointments, she similarly had trouble focusing and would wander.   Both reflected this in their reports and treatment notes (as applies to each).   It is not likely that Ms. Michaud can control her emotional responses to situations that provide difficulty to her.

The parties' inability to function well together is fueled by each of their personalities, as adeptly described by Dr. Humphrey.   A poignant example of how Ms. Michaud's issues and Mr. Michaud's inability to deal with them intersected to the detriment of the children.   Shortly before the parties' separation, she could not get the two children to settle down to go to sleep.   She was totally frustrated and asked Mr. Michaud for help.   He commented to her that it is a one parent job.   One cannot help but wonder that if it is a one parent job and he understood the difficulties his wife was having, why he did not just take over and be the one parent to settle the children down for their benefit, so they could get some sleep.   Instead, this is a window on the interaction of these parents over a matter such as this.   Mr. Michaud baited his wife and did not act in the children's interests.   Meanwhile, Ms. Michaud struggles in her day-to-day care for the children, even when they present to her simple age appropriate, mundane challenges to her authority.

The guardian ad litem in this matter testified at length about the difficult issues surrounding the party's inability to communicate.   She points to the problems that the parents have had during transition times with the children.   Indeed, the evidence is replete with examples of tension surrounding the mere transitioning of the children.   Her concerns about the behaviors of Ms. Michaud have led her to recommend that the court order another person to be present during Ms. Michaud's parenting time, if there are large blocks of time involved.

She pointed to Ms. Michaud's skills as a parent in involving the children in activities and sharing information with Mr. Michaud about these activities.   Her largest concern about the parenting of Mr. Michaud is the flip side of that coin:  that he is passive in regard to these issues;  and needs to show more interest in dealing with the scheduling of activities.   Other than that, however, the guardian had no concerns about Ms. Michaud as a parent for the children when she is not distracted.

The guardian ad litem would like the court to appoint a parenting coordinator, whose duties would not be therapeutic in nature, but instead, would provide the parties tangible guidance in joint decision-making.   She recommends a parenting coordinator who has significant experience dealing with high conflict families.   The guardian recommends that if the coordinator's recommendations are not followed and one party challenges them in court, that a sanction be ordered if the court concurs with the recommendations.   In recognition of the fact that parenting coordinators are costly, the guardian ad litem generously offered that $5,000 of her fees be put aside to fund parenting coordination fees.

The guardian ad litem recommends that the court create a consistent schedule that provides the father with more access time than he currently has and that the mother's parenting time during the day be conditioned upon her having a friend or relative in the home to function as a second set of eyes to ensure the safety of the children.   She recommends this provision stay in place until the mother is under the treatment of a psychiatrist.   The guardian seeks this person be present on weekends, during the day and other times that the children do not have structured activities.

The guardian ad litem testified that the father is a fine parent and able to make appropriate decisions.   Regarding his willingness to work with the plaintiff on custodial issues, he has been flexible regarding schedule changes, when provided a reasonable basis.   He has been able to communicate civilly with the plaintiff through e-mails.   Conversely, when he had a week long furlough from work, the plaintiff refused to allow him any additional time with the children over this period.   This lack of flexibility, coupled with her alienating comments to the children, does not bode well for her making sure the children have a healthy relationship with their father as they grow up.

Dr. Humphrey recommends that the children spend more time with her father, both because it is beneficial to them and because it will provide a relief to the mother from the stresses of parenting.   Dr. Humphrey also expressed concern about whether in the future, the plaintiff's emotional problems would interfere with her parenting of the children in a substantial way.   This is the genesis of his recommendation that the father have more parenting time with the children.

The court finds it is in the best interest of Julia that she be engaged in counseling to help her deal with the stressors that have been put upon her between her parents as described earlier in this decision.

The court is constrained to prove a decision-maker on custody issues when these warring parents are at an impasse.   Mr. Michaud has demonstrated an ability to consider the opinions of Ms. Michaud in decision-making.   Conversely, her anger and bitterness at him has interfered with her ability to consistently include him in decision-making, often taking unilateral action.   This action is not consistent with the prior framework that the parents operated under before their separation.   Instead it is presently fueled by her negative reactions to him.   Mr. Michaud has shown flexibility in parenting time scheduling to accommodate the mother, she has not shown similar flexibility to accommodate him.   In regard to physical parenting, the children are safe with the father on a consistent basis.   His care has both historically and presently been appropriate for the children.   Unfortunately, this is not the case for Ms. Michaud as found above.   The court in determining a custody order that is in the best interest of the children must consider their needs and the parents' respective ability to presently provide for those needs.  “At the same time, however, the focus of the court's inquiry must be designed to meet the primary objective which is to determine the present parenting ability of the parties.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  O'Neill v. O'Neill, 13 Conn.App. 300, 304, 536 A.2d 978, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 806, 540 A.2d 374 (1988).”  Feinberg v. Feinberg, 114 Conn. 589, 596, 970 A.2d 776, cert. granted, 293 Conn. 901, 975 A.2d 1277 (2009).

III

The parties' marital home was sold pendente lite.   From the proceeds the guardian ad litem was paid a retainer of $6,000.   Each party also received $6,000.   The balance of the proceeds, $55,176.81 is before the court for distribution.

The defendant has interest in the Belmont profit sharing plan.   His interest value as of December 31, 2010 is $20,391.75.   No more current information as to its value is available.

The evidence before the court shows that, as of that time, the rate of return on the account was .8 percent a quarter.   Therefore, the court accepts the value of $20,500 for purposes of this dissolution.

During the pendency of the action, the plaintiff settled a personal injury case without disclosing it.   She received funds that she spent during the pendency of this action.   She testified the funds were less than $5,000.   The court attributes this asset to her in the division of the marital estate.

The husband has a boat worth $8,000.   It is ‘under water’ with a debt of $10,500 on the same.   The wife drives a 2000 Nissan Maxima;  she values it at $3,600 and her husband values it at $5,230.   The court accepts the wife's value.   The husband drives a 2000 Chevrolet Blazer that he values at $2,000 with a debt of $4,000 on it.   The court accepts these values.   The wife currently has possession of the household contents from the marital home at the Wethersfield rental she lives in.   The court has no evidence from which to conclude the value of those furnishings.   The court notes that the husband has bank accounts with nominal value of about $125.   He also discloses an insurance reimbursement check of $433.

Debts, in addition to the vehicular loans noted above, are as follows:  Mr. Michaud owes his mother $11,160, his attorney approximately $28,000 as shown on his financial affidavit and approximately $2,200 in other accumulated small debts.   The wife owes her father $1,438, her attorney $78,000 as shown on her financial affidavit, and she has approximately $1,500 in other accumulated debt.

The court finds the guardian ad litem fees of $15,132 to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case.   Notwithstanding her offer to donate a portion of it to parenting coordinator fees, the court declines to so order the same.   Therefore, the entire sum is due from the parties as detailed below.

The plaintiff continues to live in the Wethersfield rental that she has been in since the sale of the marital home.   Her rental costs are detailed on her financial affidavit.   The defendant lives with his family in Bristol, Connecticut.   As a result he has not had the overhead expenses of a separate rental, though he would like to move out of his family home when he feels he can afford the move and rental costs.

The plaintiff earns only nominal income of $46 per week from lawn mowing.   She receives Food Stamps.   Her ability to return to work in the medical billing field is dependent on updated skill attainment.   She has not attained the sufficient number of college credits for training as a radiologist, as she had sought during the marriage.   Since Middlesex Community College has told her she is no longer welcome because of her behavior there, she has not pursued this education elsewhere and is not likely to, the court finds.   Her sales experience is her most likely skill that is marketable for her to gain employment outside of the home.   Her ability to do so, as a result of her emotional challenges detailed above on a sustained basis has not been proven to the court.   In 2010, she earned only $201.   Accordingly, the court assumes that her best opportunity for sustained employment is likely as a minimum wage earner.   The defendant argues that the court should find an earning capacity for the plaintiff.

The defendant's employment as a CPA who is the comptroller of Village Cabinets has been detailed above.   The furlough system at Village Cabinets is implemented to cause a direct deduction of the equivalent of one day's pay (for each furlough day) from his paycheck.   As a result of furlough requirements, his gross income in 2010 was $63,539.   His weekly pay is $1,238.00 gross.   His net pay for child support and alimony purposes is $828.60 per week.   The court finds that no child support is presently due from the plaintiff to the defendant inasmuch as it is difficult to determine her present earning capacity.   The court notes she imputes twenty hours per week to herself.   The court cannot determine whether her present emotional state which interferes so completely with her concentration when under stress will also extend to employment.   The court must consider, therefore, alimony needs of the plaintiff.   In the past year she worked as a school crossing guard earning only nominal income.   Presently the defendant is the sole parent responsible for the financial support of the children, which diminishes his funds available for spousal support.   The plaintiff has been able to support herself in the past.   If she pursues the mental health care with a psychiatrist that has been recommended to her, she may well recover herself to that position.   Her confidence in her ability to work full time will contribute to the possibility of this, of course.   Her need for alimony recognizes the imperative that she work on both her emotional health as well as job retraining.   Eight years should allow for both.   The defendant's ability to pay is tempered by the imperative that he support their children.

The court orders:

1. Dissolution of the marriage.

2. Joint legal custody of the minor children;  if the parties are unable to reach an agreement on an issue, the father shall be the final decision maker.   The parties shall utilize Our Family Wizard for communication.   The father shall pay the subscription fees for both parents.

3. The children shall live primarily with their father and shall have parenting time with their mother on the following rotating schedule;

a.  Week One:

i. the children shall be with their mother from after school on Monday to school Wednesday morning when school is in session;  when school is not in session the children shall be with their mother from 5 pm on Monday to 5 pm on Wednesday;

ii. the children shall be with their mother from Friday after school (or 5 pm if school is not in session) to Sunday at 5 pm.

b. Week Two:

i. the children shall be with their mother from after school on Monday to school Tuesday morning when school is in session;  when school is in not session the children shall be with their mother from 5 pm on Monday to 5 pm on Tuesday;

ii. the children shall be with their mother from after school on Thursday to school Friday morning when school is in session;  when school is not in session the children shall be with their mother from 5 pm on Thursday to 5 pm on Friday;

c. Holidays and Vacations–Vacations weeks are defined as seven days including the parent's regular weekend.   Vacations trump the regular schedule.   Holidays trump the regular schedule and vacations.

i. Each parent shall be entitled to have the children with them for holidays on the following basis, from 9 am to 7 pm (except as noted):

1. the mother shall always have the children with her for Mother's Day and the father shall always have the children with him for Father's Day.

2. the mother shall have the children with her on the following holidays in even-numbered years:  Easter, Christmas Eve (2 pm on December 24 to 9 am on December 25), Memorial Day and Thanksgiving.   The father shall have the children with him on those holidays in odd-numbered years.

3. the father shall have the children with him on the following holidays in even-numbered years:  Fourth of July, Halloween (5 pm to 8 pm), Christmas Day (9 am on December 25 to 7 pm on December 29) and Labor Day. The mother shall have the children with her on those holidays in odd-numbered years.

4. all other holidays shall follow the regular schedule.

4. The father shall be responsible for all transportation for parental access transitions unless the children are taking the school bus, which shall be deemed to satisfy this requirement.

5. As a condition of the mother's contact with the children remaining unsupervised, she shall have her internist and treating psychologist (or psychiatrist if she were to engage such service) quarterly (January 15, April 15, July 15, and October 15th) send a report to the guardian ad litem which details the non-compliance of the mother with her mental health treatment regimen, both clinical and pharmaceutical, and whether, based upon the treatment, the provider believes the mother poses a risk to the children if her time with them remains unsupervised.   This requirement shall continue until further order of the court or the thirteenth birthday of the younger child.   The guardian ad litem is not released from her responsibilities as long as this requirement exists, and, shall bill the parties regarding this service on an equal basis.   She may return to court for enforcement of payment of her fees as may be necessary.

6. The father shall arrange for Julia to have counseling until the earlier of the counselor stating it is no longer necessary or further order of this court.

7. The mother shall not pay any child support until she is working for at least twenty hours per week or working for any number of hours and earning at least $10 per hour.   She shall report any employment to the father through Our Family Wizard within forty-eight hours of gaining the employment.

8. The father shall maintain health insurance as it is available through his employment at a reasonable cost (as defined by law) for the benefit of the minor children.   If it is not so available but is available on the same terms by the mother she shall carry it.   In the absence of either, the father shall procure HUSKY Health Insurance for the benefit of the minor children.   The defendant shall pay all of the health expenditures of the minor children not covered by health insurance until such time as a child support order is issued to the plaintiff.   At that time this order shall be re-allocated by the court.

9. The court retains jurisdiction over the issue of an educational support order for both children.

10. The court issues no orders for life insurance as security for any of the support orders herein.

11. The defendant shall pay periodic alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $175 per week for a period of eight years, the death of either party, the remarriage of the plaintiff or her cohabitation under statutory law.   Said alimony is non-modifiable as to term.

12. The guardian ad litem's fees of $15,132 shall be paid in full from the parties' escrow funds within thirty days.   Any remaining fees due to Dr. Stephen Humphrey shall be paid on the same basis.   The balance of the escrow shall be divided as follows:  the first $5,000 of the remaining funds to the defendant and then 50 percent to each party.

13. The plaintiff shall be the sole owner of the contents of her rental home and the 2000 Nissan Maxima free and clear of any claim of the defendant.

14. The defendant shall be entitled to claim both children as dependency exemptions on his state and federal tax returns.

15. The defendant shall be the sole owner of the boat and 2000 Chevrolet Blazer and the debts thereon.   He shall indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless in regard thereto.

16. Each party shall be the sole owner of bank accounts in their respective names.   The defendant shall be the sole owner of the insurance check proceeds of $433.

17. The defendant shall convey to the plaintiff one-half of his Belmont deferred compensation account valued as of the date of dissolution by Qualified Domestic Relations Order.   The parties shall each pay one-half of the cost of said order, the creation of which is the responsibility of the plaintiff.   The court retains jurisdiction over the QDRO for effectuation of this order in accordance with its tenor.

18. Each party shall be solely responsible for the debts on their respective financial affidavits.   They shall indemnify and hold the other harmless with regard thereto.

19. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorney fees.

20. These orders are effective immediately.

LYNDA MUNRO, JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. It was inferred that her behavior caused her to be removed from Middlesex Community College, though it was never explicitly stated..  FN1. It was inferred that her behavior caused her to be removed from Middlesex Community College, though it was never explicitly stated.

FN2. (c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:  (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child;  (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;  (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;  (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody;  (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child;  (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;  (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute;  (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;  (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments;  (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household;  (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both;  (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;  (13) the child's cultural background;  (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;  (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b–120;  and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b–69b.   The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers..  FN2. (c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:  (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child;  (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;  (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;  (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody;  (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child;  (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;  (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute;  (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;  (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments;  (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household;  (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both;  (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;  (13) the child's cultural background;  (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;  (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b–120;  and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b–69b.   The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.

Munro, Lynda B., J.