IN RE: Alexander R.1 (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On March 1, 2012, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) brought this petition to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Awilda R. and Yarles J. B.-D. to their minor child Alexander, who was born on May 1, 2011.   Upon filing of the petition, the court caused a summons to be issued to the respondent parents, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(a),² requiring them to appear on March 29, 2012, at 2:00 p.m., at which time the respondent father appeared, was advised of his rights, appointed counsel, and entered a plea contesting the petition.   This court confirmed service on the absent respondent mother, but, in the absence of a military affidavit, continued the matter until April 17, 2012, at which time, a military affidavit having been filed and reviewed by the court, Cofield, J., a default was entered against mother for failing to appear and enter a plea, pursuant to Practice Book Section § 35a–8(b).³

The case was scheduled for a trial on May 29, 2012, at which time DCF's counsel and social worker, the child's attorney and guardian ad litem, the father and his attorney, and the mother's attorney appeared, but the mother was not present.   The father submitted his written consent to termination of his parental rights on a form promulgated by the chief court administrator.   The court accepted the consent after conducting a thorough canvas of him and finding by clear and convincing evidence that he had knowingly and voluntarily consented to termination of his parental rights, with full understanding of the consequences of doing so and after having been adequately and effectively advised by his attorney, and that his attorney had reviewed the consent with him and had been present for the court's canvas of the respondent.   The father, his attorney, the mother's attorney were all excused, and trial proceeded in their absence.   DCF presented testimony from social worker Sasha Gilbert and introduced as an exhibit the TPR social study, both of which are found to be credible and proven to be true.   Pursuant to the Connecticut Code of Evidence §§ 2.1 and 2.2,⁴ the court also stated its intention, without objection from the parties, to take judicial notice of the court file and the affidavit submitted in support of the order of temporary custody (OTC).   In summation, counsel for DCF and the minor child urged that the petition be granted.

The court finds that the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters has jurisdiction over the pending matter.   No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of this child.   The court has carefully considered the petition, all of the evidence, including the social study and testimony presented, according to the standards required by law.   Neither parent claims Native American affiliation and the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq., are not applicable.   The matter is now ready for decision, and the facts found herein were established by clear and convincing evidence.

I

ADJUDICATORY PHASE

Trial of a petition to terminate parental rights has two phases, adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, the court must make separate determinations as to reasonable efforts and the statutory grounds for termination.

A

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

The TPR petition originally alleged failure to rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) and failure to rehabilitate by a parent who (i) has a neglected child under the age of seven when and (ii) has previously lost previous parental rights to another child under § 17a–112(j)(E) as TPR grounds against both parents, and an additional count against the respondent mother of abandonment under § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).⁵  After accepting the father's written consent, the court granted the department's oral motion to add a count of consent pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(i) ⁶ as the ground for terminating his parental rights, and the department is no longer pursuing the earlier grounds against him.   To prevail in a non-consensual termination of parental rights case, DCF must prove at least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.   See In re Michael B., 49 Conn.App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 919, 722 A.2d 807 (1998).

Under Practice Book § 35a–7(a), in the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, “the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.”   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 757, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).   In the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to the adjudicatory date with regard to all the adjudicatory grounds alleged against the mother.   On the two failure to rehabilitate grounds under §§ 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) and (E), the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of evidence on May 29, 2012, on the issue of whether the respondent mother had achieved the degree of rehabilitation that is sufficient to foresee that she may assume a responsible position in Alexander's life then or within a reasonable time.

B

EFFECT OF MOTHER'S DEFAULT

Since the respondent mother has been defaulted for not appearing, the adjudicatory bases for terminating her parental rights are deemed and found to have been proven by the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence.   Practice Book § 32a–2(a) establishes that child protection proceedings, including these petitions for termination of parental rights, are civil matters.⁷  See also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 634, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004);  In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 253, 822 A.2d 1009 (2003).   As in other civil matters, the entries of a default establish admission of the material facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, and conclusively determine that the petitioner has prevailed on each of the elements at issue in the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding.  Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732–33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings “is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition”);  see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000).   In an abundance of caution, appropriate to the gravity of the TPR issues at hand, however, the court has further considered the petitioner's evidence that addresses the specific adjudicatory grounds alleged.

C

REASONABLE EFFORTS

A termination of parental rights under § 17a–112(j) on non-consensual grounds, as has been pleaded here for the respondent mother, requires the court to find whether:

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the mother and reunify the child with her unless

The court finds that the mother is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.8

The evidence proved clearly and convincingly that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Ms. R. She lives at an address known to DCF and at which it had contact with her during these proceedings and where she was served with the TPR petition.   It was also proven by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Alexander with his mother, but that she has been unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   Ms. R. has a long history of cocaine abuse, beginning at age 15, mental illness, and domestic violence and of not complying with services for drug treatment, parenting classes, anger management, and mental health treatment.   The courts of New York state have terminated her parental rights to six of her children, and there was a TPR case pending in New York for another of her children when this case was filed.   Of her fourteen children, she has already lost seven to TPRs here or in New York, has two TPR cases pending, and her three other minor children live with relatives or a godparent.   Both she and the child Alexander tested positive for cocaine when Alexander was born, just as several of her other children had tested positively for drugs at birth.

After Alexander's birth, DCF referred Ms. R. for substance abuse treatment, and in June 2011 she attended a substance abuse evaluation at the Institute for Hispanic Families, which then recommended that she attend an intensive outpatient substance abuse program four times a week, but she was discharged from treatment because she did not attend any sessions after the evaluation.   Because of her prior mental health diagnoses of depression, schizophrenia, panic attacks, and suicidal ideation, DCF also referred her for mental health services, and she again attended an intake but then refused to attend any more appointments.   Alexander was removed from her custody at birth on an order of temporary custody, and although DCF also offered her regular visitation with the child, she stopped visiting with him in July 2011 and has not seen or had contact with him since then.   On October 13, 2011, she told DCF that she would no longer participate in any services for reunification.

D

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION1. Father's Consent— § 17a–112(i)

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent father knowingly and voluntarily consented to the termination of his parental rights.

2. Mother

a. Abandonment— § 17a–112(j)(3)(A)

The first ground alleged in the TPR petition for terminating the mother's parental rights to Alexander, is that, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A), she abandoned this child.  “In adjudicating a petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of abandonment, the court's focus is on the parent's conduct.”  In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 994 A.2d 233 (2010).

A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment ․ General Statutes [Rev, to 1995] § 17a–112(b)(1) [now § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) ] defines abandonment as the [failure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․

In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).   The statute requires DCF to show by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.  “Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern,” “not ․ a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.”  Id., 18.   “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The evidence meets this standard by clear and convincing proof.   As of the adjudicatory date when the TPR petition was filed on March 1, 2012, Ms. R. had not seen or had contact with Alexander since July 2011, when he was only two months old.   Since then, she has shown no love or affection for Alexander and no interest in or concern whatsoever about her son or her son's welfare.   In October 2011, she told DCF that she was not interested in services to reunite her with her son.   This ground for terminating her parental rights was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

b. Failure to rehabilitate— § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i)

General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) authorizes terminating parental rights to a child previously found to have been neglected if a parent fails to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a reasonable position in the life of that child.

Until lately there appeared to be no decisive appellate authority on whether a TPR under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) required specific steps, but the Appellate Court apparently put that issue to rest in the recent case of In re Zowie, officially released May 3, 2012, available at http:// www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP135/135AP362.pdf. In Zowie, a parent claimed that the specific steps did not adequately inform him of conduct necessary for reunification.   In rejecting that claim, the court wrote that

§ 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) ․ provides for the termination of a child where the child “(i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ (ii) and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․

The language that specific steps are an element of a TPR under 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) does not appear to be obiter dictum, but instead essential to the outcome of that case, and hence, despite the lack of any substantive analysis, is probably binding on this court.   Since the respondent mother in this case was issued specific steps for reunification with Alexander on three occasions (upon issuance of the ex parte OTC, sustaining of the OTC, and commitment), this court need not address the substantive legal issue.

“Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a–112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999).

“[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384, 784 A.2d 457 (2001).  “Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate;  it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying [the child] a safe permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the] biological [father] ․ continues to be incapable of providing such a home for [the child].”  In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999).  In re Joseph W., 121 Conn.App. 605, 997 A.2d 512 (2010).  “What is a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis,” depending on the age and needs of the particular child.  In re Shannon S., 41 Conn.Sup. 145, 154, 562 A.2d 79, aff'd, 19 Conn.App. 20, 560 A.2d 993 (1989).

In conducting the inquiry as to whether the department has proven a respondent's failure to rehabilitate by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must consider:

the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child;  and

whether the prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child.

“The statute requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's level of rehabilitation is less than that which would encourage a belief that he or she can assume a responsible position in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 173, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).  “Thus, the trial court's inquiry requires the determination of both the present and past status of the child, and obtaining a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting.”  Id. The crux of the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate is whether a parent has sufficiently addressed the problems and deficiencies in parenting that led to state intervention in the family so that the parent can, considering the age and needs of the child, assume a responsible position in the child's life, or will be able to do so in the reasonably foreseeable future.

This ground was proven by clear and convincing evidence.   Alexander was adjudicated to be neglected and committed to DCF on January 11, 2012.   Three times prior filing of the TPR petition, the mother was advised by orders of specific steps of the actions she needed to take to rehabilitate herself and reunify with her son.   The evidence in this case proves clearly and convincingly that the respondent mother had not sufficiently rehabilitated herself on the adjudicatory date when the TPR petition was filed or at the time of trial that she could assume a responsible position in Alexander's life, in view of his age and needs, on either of those dates or in the reasonable future.   She has a long-term substance abuse problem that she has never been willing or able to address and serious mental health issues that she has also not been willing or able to address.   This child is still young and completely dependent on his adult caretaker.   He has a physical condition that requires medical attention.   Ms. R. has never shown the willingness or ability to care for any of her children or to address the reasons that child welfare authorities have needed to remove children from her custody.   In view of her failure and unwillingness to address these issues, she will not be ready to assume a responsible position in Alexander's life within a reasonable period of time.

c. Failure to rehabilitate by a parent of a neglected child under the age of seven and who has previously lost parental rights— § 17a–112(j)(3)(E)

General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(E) authorizes terminating parental rights to a neglected child under the age of seven if the parent has previously lost parental rights pursuant to a TPR petition filed by DCF and has failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a reasonable position in the life of that child.   Like a TPR under § 17a–112(j)(3)(B), this statutory ground looks at the parent's rehabilitative status on the adjudicatory date, at the time of trial, and in the future.   To prevail on this ground, DCF must prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the facts alleged for a failure to rehabilitate under § 17a–212(j)(3)(B) and the additional facts that the child is under the age of seven and that parent's rights to an older child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families.   This ground and each of its statutory elements was proven here by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) The child is under the age of seven years.   Clear and convincing evidence established that Alexander, at one year of age, is less than seven years old.

(2) The child was adjudicated to be neglected, uncared for, or abused.   The evidence established clearly and convincingly that Alexander was adjudicated neglected on January 11, 2012.

(3) It was proven by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. R. has failed, and is unable or is unwilling, to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering Alexander's age and needs, she could assume a responsible position in this child's life.   As discussed previously, it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that she had not achieved sufficient rehabilitation to assume a responsible position in Alexander's life, in view of his age and needs, on the adjudicatory date, at the time of trial, or in the reasonable future.

(4) Ms. R.'s parental rights to another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families.   It was proven by clear and convincing evidence that the mother's parental rights to her previous child, Yarles, were terminated in January 2012 pursuant to a TPR petition filed by the commissioner of DCF.

II

DISPOSITION

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).   Unlike the adjudicatory phase, on disposition the court may consider information through the close of the evidentiary hearing.   In the dispositional phase of this case the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including May 29, 2012, the date of trial in this matter.

A

REQUIRED STATUTORY FINDINGS

In making the dispositional decision in a non-consensual case, “the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors” specified in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).  See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).  “[T]hose ‘seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’  “ In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 46–47 (2009).   As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings with regard to the department's petition to terminate Ms. R.'s parental rights, and the court has considered these findings in determining whether it is Alexander's best interest to terminate the parental rights of his mother.  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent— § 17a–112(k)(1).

As discussed above, DCF offered timely and appropriate services to Ms. R to facilitate reunion with Alexander.

2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended— § 17a–112(k)(2).

As discussed above, DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite Alexander with his mother pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, but Ms. R. was unwilling or unable to benefit from those services.

3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order— § 17a–112(k)(3).

When the order of temporary custody was sustained on May 13, 2011, and when Alexander was committed to DCF on January 11, 2012, the following specific steps were ordered for Ms R. to regain custody of Alexander:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)'s court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.   Ms. R. refused to keep appointments with DCF.

Keep whereabouts known to DCF and your attorney.   Mother complied.   DCF learned of her address when the child was born, and she confirmed that address and continued to reside at that location throughout these proceedings.

Visit child(ren) as often as DCF permits and demonstrate appropriate parent/child interaction during visits.   Mother refused to comply, rejecting weekly visits after visiting with Alexander during the first two months of his life.   Her last visit was in July 2011.

Do not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol, submit to random drug testing;  submit to substance abuse evaluation and follow treatment recommendations.   There was no evidence offered as to whether Ms. R. continued to use illegal drugs during this case, but she refused any drug testing after June 6, 2011.   She accepted a referral for substance abuse evaluation at the Institute for Hispanic Families but then refused to comply with the Institute's treatment recommendation.

Participate in parenting at My People's Clinical Services, individual mental health counseling at Hartford Behavioral Health, substance abuse evaluation and treatment at the Institute for Hispanic Families and make progress toward the identified treatment goals of no substance abuse, obtaining legal and stable housing, developing appropriate parenting skills, and addressing her mental health issues.   DCF referred mother for mental health services at Hartford Behavioral Health, she attended the intake, but she then refused to attend subsequent appointments.   There was no evidence as to whether DCF referred her for parenting counseling at My People's.   She has refused to participate in any services since October 2011.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF and make progress toward treatment goals.   Not applicable.

Cooperate with service providers recommended by DCF for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services, and/or substance abuse treatment and sign appropriate releases.   She attended intakes for substance abuse and mental health services, but refused to attend follow-up appointments.   She did sign appropriate releases.

Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.   Mother has no income other than food stamps.   She lives with the father of some of her other children in an apartment in a transitional facility that does not allow children and would not be appropriate for a child.

Identify changes in household composition.   No evidence was offered as to whether Ms. R. complied.

No further involvement in the criminal justice system.   Mother was arrested in August 2011 on charges of larceny in the sixth degree and conspiracy to commit that offense.   She was incarcerated for a month and then pled guilty to larceny six.

Cooperate with probation.   There was no evidence that mother was on probation.

Obtain protective order and develop appropriate safety plan to avoid more domestic violence.   No restraining order is in effect.

Identify grandparents and potential relative placement resources.   No evidence was offered.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties— § 17a–112(k)(4).

As Alexander has not seen his mother since he was two months old, he could not possibly have any emotional ties with her.   He is closely bonded to the foster family with whom he has been placed since his birth.

5. The age of the child— § 17a–112(k)(5).

Born on May 1, 2011, Alexander just turned one year old.

6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return her to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child— § 17a–112(k)(6).

The respondent mother made no effort to adjust her conduct or circumstances to make it in the best interest of Alexander to be united with her.   She has refused visitation since June 2011 and reunification services since October 2011.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent— § 17a–112(k)(7).

Neither parent nor anyone else interfered with or prevented reunification of the other parent with this child.   The economic circumstances of either parent have not prevented reunification or a meaningful relationship with his or her child.

B

BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD— § 17a–112(j)(2)

The final element of the termination of the parental rights statute, § 17a–112(j), requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․” The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare.   In determining whether terminating the respondent parents' parental rights would be in Alexander's best interest, the court has considered various factors, including his interest “in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of [his] environment”;  Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985);  his age and needs, the length and nature of his stay in foster care;  the lack of contact or relationship with his birth parents;  the potential benefit or detriment of his retaining a connection with his biological mother and father;  his genetic bond to each birth parent;  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999);  and the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon.   The court has also balanced this child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with his biological parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Alexander has lived virtually his entire, short life with the foster family where he now resides.   He has received excellent care from the two foster parents, and is especially bonded with his foster mother, who stays at home with him.   He calls her “mommy” and looks to her for comfort and protection.   He has thrived in this home, the foster parents would like to adopt him, and DCF has identified them as prospective adoptive parents.   He has an unusual physical condition that does not threaten his health but will probably require medical monitoring, treatment and counseling.   In addition to the need shared by all children for stability, continuity and permanency, this child needs parents who will pay attention to him, monitor this condition, and assess how best to respond to it.

Neither one of Alexander's parents offer any possibility of providing suitable care for him.   His father has consented to the TPR and is incarcerated.   His mother has a long history of untreated substance abuse and mental health problems that have left her unable to care properly for her child.   Under these conditions and all the other proven evidence, it is this child's best interest to terminate their parental rights.

III

ORDERS OF TERMINATION

The court having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of each respondent's parental rights and having determined, upon all of the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in the child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of each respondent parent, it is therefore HEREBY ORDERED:  The parental rights of Awilda R. and Yarles J. B.-D. to Alexander R. are terminated.

Pursuant to General Statutes Section 17a–112(m), the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent for this child so that he may be placed for adoption.   In securing either objective, the court urges the department to give first preference to the current foster parents.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o) and Practice Book Section 35a–14(g), the statutory parent shall file a written report on the case plan for Alexander, the permanency plan, and the status of the child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before July 6, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. and every three months thereafter.

A motion for review of permanency plan must be filed on or before March 7, 2013, and a hearing on such plan shall be held on April 18, 2013, at noon.

Additional reports and/or motions for review of the plan will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as an adoption of the child is finalized.

The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when any adoption is finalized.

Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoptions of this child is ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing of the date when said adoption is finalized.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN2. General Statutes Section 46b–129 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) ․ Upon the filing of such a petition, except as otherwise provided in subsection (k) of section 17a–112, the court shall cause a summons to be issued requiring the parent or parents or the guardian of the child or youth to appear in court at the time and place named, which summons shall be served not less than fourteen days before the date of the hearing in the manner prescribed by section 46b–128, ․”.  FN2. General Statutes Section 46b–129 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) ․ Upon the filing of such a petition, except as otherwise provided in subsection (k) of section 17a–112, the court shall cause a summons to be issued requiring the parent or parents or the guardian of the child or youth to appear in court at the time and place named, which summons shall be served not less than fourteen days before the date of the hearing in the manner prescribed by section 46b–128, ․”

FN3. Practice Book Section 35a–8(b) provides as follows:  “If a parent fails to appear at the initial hearing and no military affidavit has been filed, the judicial authority shall continue the proceedings prior to entering a default for failure to appear until such time as the military affidavit is filed, provided if the identity of the parent, after reasonable search, cannot be determined, then default may enter and no military affidavit is required.”.  FN3. Practice Book Section 35a–8(b) provides as follows:  “If a parent fails to appear at the initial hearing and no military affidavit has been filed, the judicial authority shall continue the proceedings prior to entering a default for failure to appear until such time as the military affidavit is filed, provided if the identity of the parent, after reasonable search, cannot be determined, then default may enter and no military affidavit is required.”

FN4. Section 2–1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, captioned.   “Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts,” provides as follows:(a) Scope of section.   This section governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.(b) Taking of judicial notice.   A court may, but is not required to, take notice of matters of fact, in accordance with subsection (c).(c) Kinds of facts.   A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) within the knowledge of people generally in the ordinary course of human experience, or (2) generally accepted as true and capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration.(d) Time of taking judicial notice.   Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.Section 2–2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, captioned “Notice and Opportunity To Be Heard,” provides as follows:(a) Request of party.   A party requesting the court to take judicial notice of a fact shall give timely notice of the request to all other parties.   Before the court determines whether to take the requested judicial notice, any party shall have an opportunity to be heard.(b) Court's initiative.   The court may take judicial notice without a request of a party to do so.   Parties are entitled to receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard for matters susceptible of explanation or contradiction, but not for matters of established fact, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned..  FN4. Section 2–1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, captioned.   “Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts,” provides as follows:(a) Scope of section.   This section governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.(b) Taking of judicial notice.   A court may, but is not required to, take notice of matters of fact, in accordance with subsection (c).(c) Kinds of facts.   A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) within the knowledge of people generally in the ordinary course of human experience, or (2) generally accepted as true and capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration.(d) Time of taking judicial notice.   Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding.Section 2–2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, captioned “Notice and Opportunity To Be Heard,” provides as follows:(a) Request of party.   A party requesting the court to take judicial notice of a fact shall give timely notice of the request to all other parties.   Before the court determines whether to take the requested judicial notice, any party shall have an opportunity to be heard.(b) Court's initiative.   The court may take judicial notice without a request of a party to do so.   Parties are entitled to receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard for matters susceptible of explanation or contradiction, but not for matters of established fact, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned.

FN5. General Statutes Section 17a–112 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;  (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․ [or] (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families;  ․”.  FN5. General Statutes Section 17a–112 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;  (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․ [or] (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families;  ․”

FN6. General Statutes Section 17a–112(i) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court upon hearing and notice, as provided in sections 45a–716 and 45a–717, may grant a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of the parent's parental rights with respect to such child.”.  FN6. General Statutes Section 17a–112(i) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court upon hearing and notice, as provided in sections 45a–716 and 45a–717, may grant a petition for termination of parental rights based on consent filed pursuant to this section if it finds that (1) upon clear and convincing evidence, the termination is in the best interest of the child, and (2) such parent has voluntarily and knowingly consented to termination of the parent's parental rights with respect to such child.”

FN7. Practice Book Section 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”.  FN7. Practice Book Section 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”

FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”.  FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”

Frazzini, Stephen F., J.