IN RE: Grace S. dob 9–14–11 1 (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The present matter involves trial on coterminous petitions alleging neglect of the minor child known as Grace S., who was born on September 14, 2011, and seeking to terminate parental rights (TPR) of Petra C. and Jessie S. to this child.   The respondent father appeared on the initial hearing date, was advised of his rights, and appointed counsel.   He informed the court that day that the mother was in the hospital, and her initial appearance was continued until December 1, 2011, at which time she appeared but notified the court that she refused to waive any defects in service.   The matter was continued until January 19, 2012, at which time she did not appear, but service was confirmed by the court, Cofield, J. The matter was continued again until March 1, for her to appear, be advised, and enter a plea;  but when she did not appear that day, she was defaulted, as was respondent father.   The matter was scheduled for trial on April 24, 2012, at which time neither parent appeared.   A DCF social worker, assistant attorney general representing DCF, and counsel for the child appeared for trial.   At trial, DCF presented evidence in the form of the TPR social study and testimony from DCF social worker Zaira Reyes.   Upon notice to the parties at trial and without objection, the court also took judicial notice of the court file and all prior proceedings in this matter.

The court is not aware of proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child, and this court has jurisdiction.   Neither parent claims Native American affiliation and the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq., are not applicable.   The matter is now ready for decision.   The court has carefully considered the petition, all of the facts judicially noticed and the evidence presented, including the social study, according to the standards required by law.   The social study and testimony of the social worker are found credible, and their contents proven.   Upon such consideration, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, as well as additional facts included in later sections of this decision or as separately set forth in the mandatory written findings, which are incorporated by reference herein.

I

EFFECT OF DEFAULTS

The two respondent parents have been defaulted.  Practice Book § 32a–2(a) establishes that child protection proceedings, including these petitions for termination of parental rights, are civil matters.²  See also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 634, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004);  In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 253, 822 A.2d 1009 (2003).   As in other civil matters, the entries of a default establish admission of the material facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, and conclusively determine that the petitioner has prevailed on each of the elements at issue in the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding.  Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732–33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings “is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition”);  see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000).   In an abundance of caution, appropriate to the gravity of the TPR issues at hand, however, the court has further considered the petitioner's evidence that addresses the specific adjudicatory grounds alleged.

II

NEGLECT ADJUDICATION

Under General Statutes § 17a–112(l),³ a petition for termination of parental rights may be filed at the same time as a neglect petition.   In a coterminous proceeding, the trial court must first, pursuant to Practice Book § 35a–3,⁴ determine, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, whether the child is neglected, uncared for or abused.   The grounds of neglect alleged here are that the child is being denied proper care and attention and permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his/her well-being, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–120(6).⁵

Grace was born needing detoxification from methadone and with fetal alcohol syndrome, and she remained in the hospital for several weeks.   An order of temporary custody was entered shortly after her birth.   When interviewed by a DCF social worker, the mother claimed not to have been using any alcohol, illegal drugs or methadone since December 2009, but the child's condition at birth belies her claims.   The mother has a long history of alcohol and substance abuse, which is today exacerbated by lung cancer that has spread to her back;  and she had a relapse shortly after the baby was born.   She has nine other children, none of whom are in her care because of her long history of substance abuse.   The mother and father each visited Grace in the hospital only a couple of times.   The father told DCF right away that he wanted to consent to termination of his parental rights.   Upon the child's release from the hospital, DCF offered weekly visitation, but neither parent came to see the child.   The parents are married, but the father has chosen to stay with the mother and not attend to the child.   When both of their parental rights were terminated to their older child Jessie, the father told DCF that he would be “unable to provide for his son Jessie S., as he was very much concerned about Ms. [C.] and found it difficult to concentrate on raising Jessie S. without her.   After Grace was born, Mr. [S.] was asked of his willingness to parent his child without Ms. [C.]'s assistance and presence.”   TPR social study, at 12.   He never provided a response.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the minor child is neglected as alleged in the petition on the basis of predictive neglect, and enters an adjudication of neglect on both those grounds.   Similarly, In Re Curnijah H., 121 Conn.App. 292, 994 A.2d 710 (2010), a finding of predictive neglect was upheld based on a respondent mother's lack of success in addressing her drug abuse and mental health issues that left her unable to care properly for any of her children.   As the court noted in In Re Francisco R., 111 Conn.App. 529, 959 A.2d 1079 (2008), the doctrine of predictive neglect is grounded in the state's responsibility to avoid harm to the well-being of a child, not to repair it after a tragedy has occurred.

III

TPR ADJUDICATORY PHASE

Trial of a petition to terminate parental rights has two phases, adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, the court must make separate determinations as to reasonable efforts and the statutory grounds for termination.   The TPR grounds alleged here, as to both parents, are failure to rehabilitate by a parent (i) of a neglected child under the age of seven and (ii) whose parental rights to another child have previously been terminated, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(E).⁶

A

Reasonable Efforts

A termination of parental rights under § 17a–112(j) on non-consensual grounds, as has been pleaded for the respondent parents here, requires the court to find whether

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate each parent;  and

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with each parent, unless the court finds that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.7

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate both parents, who were both served and appeared in this proceeding.   It was also proven by clear and convincing evidence that neither parent is willing to benefit from reunification efforts.   DCF offered each parent visitation with the child, and neither one visited.   DCF sent them letters asking them to contact DCF if they wanted to visit or have reunification services, but neither one responded.

B

Statutory Grounds for Termination

The TPR petition was filed on September 21, 2011.   Under Practice Book § 35a–7(a), in the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, “the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.”   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 757, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).

Termination of parental rights under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(E) requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the child that is the subject of the petition is under seven years old, that the child was adjudicated as neglected or uncared for, that the parental rights of the respondent to another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the commissioner for children and families, and that the parent has failed, or is unwilling or unable to achieve, such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.   As to each of these elements, there was clear and convincing proof.

(1) The child is under the age of seven years.   Clear and convincing evidence established that Grace, at almost nine months of age, is less than seven years old.

(2) The child is neglected, uncared for, or abused.   As discussed above, this element was proven by clear and convincing evidence, and the child has been adjudicated to be neglected.

(3) Such parent's parental rights to another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families.   This fact was also proven by clear and convincing evidence as to both parents.

(4) The parent has failed, or is unable or is unwilling, to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.   This fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

The respondent mother has had her parental rights to four other children terminated pursuant to petitions filed by DCF. She has been offered substance abuse treatment many times, entered numerous programs, but never been willing or able to achieve rehabilitation of her substance abuse problem.   She conceals her drinking from her husband, by hiding alcohol in water bottles or purchasing her alcohol and drinking it quickly before he gets home.   She admitted using alcohol during her pregnancy, and the extent of her drinking was shown by the fact that the child now suffers from fetal alcohol syndrome.   She entered a detoxification program in November 2011 but did not comply with the follow-up recommendation that she undergo inpatient treatment.   By not visiting the child since mid-September 2011, when Grace was still in the hospital, the mother has shown a complete and utter lack of interest or willingness to assume a responsible position in Grace's life.   Until she is willing to address her substance abuse problem, she will never be ready to assume a responsible position in any child's life.   As noted by the department in its social study, “Grace is a newborn infant.   She is completely dependent on a competent caregiver for her safety, well-being and care.   She is not readily visible in the community and cannot summon for assistance should the need arise.   She should not be required to wait for her mother to achieve what mother has been unable to achieve in 19 years.”  Id., at 12.   As of the adjudicatory date and at the time of trial, the mother had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that she could then or within a reasonable period of time, considering Grace's age and needs, assume a responsible position in this child's life.

The respondent father is employed doing odd jobs and landscaping at several properties owned by the parties' landlord and has a history of employment.   He has an old history of criminal arrests and convictions and substance abuse, but for many years he has been sober, drug-free, and not been arrested.   He works and has stable housing.   He has been married to the mother since 2007, and has repeatedly chosen to support her rather than to meet the needs of the children they have had.   Since they have been together, he has a history of enabling and condoning her substance abuse despite saying that he wants to help her toward recovery.   The specific steps ordered him to attend a substance abuse evaluation and receive treatment so that he would learn how to stop enabling his wife's alcoholism, but after attending the evaluation he declined to comply with the treatment recommendations.   His parental rights to the parties' son Jessie were previously terminated in a TPR petition filed by DCF. He is not willing or able to raise a child on his own or to leave the mother, and he told Grace's DCF social worker that he wanted to consent to the termination of his parental rights.   When he has spoken with DCF social workers, he has shown no understanding of his wife's substance abuse problems or their effects.   As of the adjudicatory date and at the time of trial, he had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that he could then or within a reasonable period of time, considering Grace's age and needs, assume a responsible position in this child's life.

Since October 2011 Grace has been placed in a pre-adoptive foster home with her older brother Jessie, who has already been adopted by the foster mother.   Grace's foster mother is meeting all her needs and is eager to adopt this child.

IV

TPR DISPOSITION

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).   Unlike the adjudicatory phase, on disposition the court may consider information through the close of the evidentiary hearing.   In the dispositional phase of this case the court has considered the evidence and testimony relating to facts and circumstances through April 24, 2012, the date upon which the evidence was taken in this matter.

A

Required Statutory Findings

In making the dispositional decision in a non-consensual case, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors specified in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).  See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).  “[T]hose ‘seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’  “ In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 46–47 (2009).   As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings with regard to the department's petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father, and the court has considered these findings in determining that it is Grace's best interest to terminate the parental rights of her parents.  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent— § 17a–112(k)(1).

The department offered timely and appropriate services to the respondent parents to facilitate reunion with the child.   It offered visitation parenting counseling to both of them, drug treatment for the mother, and substance abuse evaluation for the father.

2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended— § 17a–112 (k)(2).

DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the parents with their child as required under the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

3. The terms of any court orders entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations— § 17a–112(k)(3).

The following specific steps were ordered when this court entered an order of temporary custody on September 21, 2011, and reaffirmed by the court, Cofield, J., at the ten-day hearing on the OTC:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)'s court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

Neither parent accepted visits with Grace offered by DCF after she left the hospital or attended the administrative case review for the child.

Keep whereabouts known to DCF and your attorney.

Parents complied.

Visit child(ren) as often as DCF permits and demonstrate appropriate parent/child interaction during visits.

Neither parent complied, as both stopped visiting the child.

Mother:  Participate in substance abuse and individual counseling at Wheeler Clinic, and make progress toward the identified treatment goals of addressing substance abuse and mental health issues.

Ms. C. entered a detoxification program but refused to follow its recommendation for inpatient treatment.

Father:  Participate in individual substance abuse treatment at Wheeler Clinic, and make progress toward the identified treatment goals of addressing substance abuse, co-dependency and enabling behaviors.

Mr. S. attended a substance abuse evaluation but refused to comply with the treatment recommendations.

Attend parenting counseling at the Village or Klingberg Family Centers and make progress toward identified goal of demonstrating appropriate parenting.

DCF sent the parents a letter offering reunification services, which would have included the parenting counseling, but they refused to respond.

Cooperate with recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services, and/or substance abuse treatment and sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with the providers.

Neither parent complied with all treatment recommendations but both did sign all the necessary releases.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF and make progress toward treatment goals.

Not applicable.

Do not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol, submit to random drug testing;  submit to substance abuse evaluation and follow treatment recommendations.

There was no evidence offered as to current substance abuse.   Both parents refused to comply with the substance abuse treatment recommendations, mother by not going inpatient after the detoxification program and father by not entering the treatment recommended after his substance abuse evaluation.

Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations.

Not applicable.

Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.

Both parties complied.   They live in an apartment for $75 per month in exchange for the father providing handyman services for the landlord.

Identify changes in household composition.

No evidence of noncompliance.

Inform DCF of changes in household composition.

No evidence of noncompliance

Keep child inside the state of Connecticut unless given advance permission from DCF or the court to take the child out of state.

Not applicable, as all visitation was supervised.

Supply names and addresses of grandparents and of persons the parent would like DCF to consider as a placement resource.

No evidence of noncompliance.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties— § 17a–112(k)(4).

Grace could not possibly know her parents, in light of her young age and their limited contact with her.   For most of her life the only caretaker she has known is the potential adoptive foster parent.

5. The age of the child— § 17a–112(k)(5).

Born on September 14, 2011, Grace is eight months old, and she will turn nine months of age in a few days.

6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child— § 17a–112(k)(6).

Neither parent has done anything to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in Grace's best interest to be returned to them.   They did not visit the child after she left the hospital.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent— § 17a–112(k)(7).

Neither parent has been prevented from having or maintaining a meaningful relationship with daughter by any act or conduct on the part of DCF. There was no evidence that the economic circumstances of either parent affected their ability to have a meaningful relationship with their child.

B

Best Interest of the Child

The final element of the termination of the parental rights statute, § 17a–112(j), requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․” The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare.   In determining whether terminating the parental rights of the respondent parents would be in Grace's best interest, the court has considered various factors, including the child's interest “in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of [her] environment”;  Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985);  her age and needs;  the length and nature of her stay in foster care;  the contact maintained with her birth parents and the potential benefit or detriment to Grace of retaining a connection with her biological parents;  her genetic bond to each parent;  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999);  and the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon.   The court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with her biological parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Clear and convincing evidence establishes that it is Grace's best interest to terminate the parental rights of both respondents.   The mother's drinking problem prevents her from being able to take care of any child, in particular an infant such as Grace, who must rely completely on competent adults for her welfare and protection.   The respondent father has many positive attributes.   He has overcome an earlier history of drug abuse and criminal behavior, has been employed steadily, and has found meaning and stability in his religious observance and practices.   He has good ties with his biological family and has maintained stable housing and employment.   He also has chosen, however, to preserve his marriage with the respondent mother, which in many circumstances might be regarded as a positive attribute;  but for Grace and her older brother Jessie, his desire to stay with his wife and overlook her alcohol abuse has meant that he has been and continues to be unready, unwilling, and unable to take care of the two children he has fathered with his wife.   He has repeatedly told DCF that he sees her as the one responsible for taking care of any children in their care, thereby ignoring the fact that her alcoholism leaves her unable to provide adequate care for a child of Grace's young age.   Grace is in a loving home with a foster mother who has already adopted Grace's older brother and is eager to adopt her.   With neither parent willing or able to assume adequate responsibility for her, clear and convincing evidence proves that it is in this child's best interest to terminate their parental rights and free this child for permanence and stability elsewhere.

V

ORDERS

The court having found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory grounds exist to terminate the parental rights of each respondent parent that terminating their parental rights is in the child's best interest, it is therefore HEREBY ORDERED:  The parental rights of Petra C. and Jessie S. to Grace S. are terminated.

Pursuant to General Statutes Section 17a–112(m), it is ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed statutory parent for Grace so that she may be placed for adoption.   In securing the adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present foster parent.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o) and Practice Book Section 35a–14(g), the statutory parent shall file a written report on the case plan for this child, the permanency plan, and the status of the child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before June 15, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. A written status report on implementation of the plan will be due by September 14, 2012.

A motion for review of permanency plan for the child shall be filed, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(k), by February 15, 2013, and a hearing on the plan shall be held on March 28, 2013, at 9:30 a.m.

Additional reports and/or motions to review the plan shall be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as the child's adoption is finalized.

The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when the adoption is finalized.

Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of this child is ordered to notify in writing the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford when said adoption is finalized.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN2. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”.  FN2. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”

FN3. General Statutes Section 17a–112(l) provides as follows:  “Any petition brought by the Commissioner of Children and Families to the Superior Court, pursuant to subsection (a) of section 46b–129, may be accompanied by or, upon motion by the petitioner, consolidated with a petition for termination of parental rights filed in accordance with this section with respect to such child.   Notice of the hearing on such petitions shall be given in accordance with sections 45a–716 and 45a–717.   The Superior Court, after hearing, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (i) or (j) of this section, may, in lieu of granting the petition filed pursuant to section 46b–129, grant the petition for termination of parental rights as provided in section 45a–717.”.  FN3. General Statutes Section 17a–112(l) provides as follows:  “Any petition brought by the Commissioner of Children and Families to the Superior Court, pursuant to subsection (a) of section 46b–129, may be accompanied by or, upon motion by the petitioner, consolidated with a petition for termination of parental rights filed in accordance with this section with respect to such child.   Notice of the hearing on such petitions shall be given in accordance with sections 45a–716 and 45a–717.   The Superior Court, after hearing, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (i) or (j) of this section, may, in lieu of granting the petition filed pursuant to section 46b–129, grant the petition for termination of parental rights as provided in section 45a–717.”

FN4. Practice Book Section 35a–3, captioned “Coterminous Petitions,” provides as follows:  “When coterminous petitions are filed, the judicial authority first determines by a fair preponderance of the evidence whether the child or youth is neglected, uncared for or dependent;  if so, then the judicial authority determines whether statutory grounds exist to terminate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence;  if so, then the judicial authority determines whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child or youth by clear and convincing evidence.   If the judicial authority determines that termination grounds do not exist or termination of parental rights is not in the best interests of the child or youth, then the judicial authority may consider by a fair preponderance of the evidence any of the dispositional alternatives available under the neglect, uncared for or dependent petition.”.  FN4. Practice Book Section 35a–3, captioned “Coterminous Petitions,” provides as follows:  “When coterminous petitions are filed, the judicial authority first determines by a fair preponderance of the evidence whether the child or youth is neglected, uncared for or dependent;  if so, then the judicial authority determines whether statutory grounds exist to terminate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence;  if so, then the judicial authority determines whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child or youth by clear and convincing evidence.   If the judicial authority determines that termination grounds do not exist or termination of parental rights is not in the best interests of the child or youth, then the judicial authority may consider by a fair preponderance of the evidence any of the dispositional alternatives available under the neglect, uncared for or dependent petition.”

FN5. General Statutes 46b–120 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(6) A child or youth may be found ‘neglected’ who ․ (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, or (C) is being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to the well-being of the child or youth, ․”.  FN5. General Statutes 46b–120 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(6) A child or youth may be found ‘neglected’ who ․ (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, or (C) is being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to the well-being of the child or youth, ․”

FN6. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court, ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3) ․ (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families;  ․”.  FN6. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides as follows:  “The Superior Court, ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3) ․ (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families;  ․”

FN7. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”.  FN7. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”

Frazzini, Stephen F., J.