IN RE: Nayya M.1 (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On March 15, 2011, the petitioner, Joette Katz, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, filed petitions pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112 to terminate the parental rights of respondent Amy F., a/k/a/ Amy M., the mother of Nayya M., born October 22, 1999, Hashim M., born June 13, 2001 and Adam M., born March 30, 2005.   The petitions filed also seek to terminate the parental rights of Brian E., the respondent father of Nayya and Hashim M., and Oscar R., the respondent father of Adam M. All three respondent parents were properly served notice of the petitions for termination of parental rights.   Mother and Brian E. appeared to defend the petitions, entering pro forma denials on April 14, 2011, and were appointed counsel after being determined indigent.   Oscar R. did not appear and was defaulted for failure to appear on December 1, 2012.²  The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of these children.   None of the parents has claimed any Native American tribal affiliation.   This court has jurisdiction.

On December 1, 2011, the mother and her attorney appeared and presented to the court properly executed forms consenting to the termination of her parental rights in all three children.   The court, (Wollenberg, J.), canvassed the mother on her consents and found by clear and convincing evidence that they had been knowingly and voluntarily entered by mother with a full understanding of the legal consequences of her actions.   Her consents were accepted.   See General Statutes § 17a–112(i).   Subsequently, the petitioner orally moved to amend each of the petitions to withdraw the non-consensual ground alleged against mother and allege the ground of consent.   The oral motion to amend the petitions was granted by the court on December 1, 2011.

Trial was held on May 2, 2012.   Brian E. appeared, represented by counsel, to contest the petitions for Nayya and Adam. Oscar R., previously defaulted for failure to appear, did not attend the trial.   Mother, having consented, was excused from attending the trial.   The court has considered the credible evidence, including the exhibits and the testimony presented, and the arguments of counsel.   For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and terminates the parental rights of the mother and the fathers in Nayya, Hashim and Adam M.

I

LEGAL STANDARDA. Termination of Parental Rights

Each of the three petitions, as amended, alleges consent on the part of the mother, two identical statutory grounds for termination of the parental rights of each of the fathers, Brian E. and Oscar R., and a third ground as to Oscar R.

The first is the ground of abandonment.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) provides for termination if “the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern and responsibility as to the welfare of the child.”

The second non-consensual ground is the failure to rehabilitate, which provides, in pertinent part, for termination if “(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and [the parent] has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.”  General Statutes § 17a–112(B)(i).

A third non-consensual ground, no ongoing parent-child relationship, is alleged against Oscar R. in the petition for Adam M. This ground is contained in § 17a–112(j)(3)(D), which states:  “there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.”

Termination of parental rights proceeds in two stages:  adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment.   See In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010);  In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769, 858 A.2d 887 (2004);  In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1991);  Practice Book §§ 32a–3(b), 35a–7.   However, where the ground alleged involves failure to rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B), “[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d. 770 (2003);  In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527, 939 A.2d 16 (2008);  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000).  “What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis.”  In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231;  In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000).  “Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than ‘any’ rehabilitation ․ Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.”  (Citations omitted.)  In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 500.  “[E]ven if a parent has made successful strides in [his] ability to manage [his] life and may have achieved a level of stability within [his] limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, [he] could assume a responsible position in the life of [his] children.”  (Citation omitted.)   In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450 (2005).   The issue is not whether the parent has improved his ability to manage his own life, but whether he has gained an ability to care for the specific needs of the child at issue.   See In re Summer S., 124 Conn.App. 540, 545, 5 A.3d 972 (2010);  In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.App. 619, 627, 5 A.3d 575 (2010);  In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 104 (2001).

With respect to the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship under § 17a–112(j)(3)(D), it is axiomatic that the court also must rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to look to the future and determine whether to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.   See In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (permissible for the court, in determining whether to allow further time for reestablishment of parent-child relationship, to consider psychological evaluation performed after adjudicatory date and the child's relationship with the foster parents with whom he was placed when termination petition already pending.);  In re Amber B., 56 Conn.App. 776, 785, 746 A.2d 222 (2000);  see also Practice Book § 35a–7(a).

If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, including consent by a parent, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest.   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756, 936 A.2d 638 (2007).  “In the dispositional phase ․ the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.   In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a–112(k) ].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 529, 939 A.2d 16 (2008).   Procedurally, it is permissible to hear evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases in a single, non-bifurcated proceeding.   See In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 15 A.3d 194 (2011);  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–AB), 192 Conn. 254, 257, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984);  State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172–73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979);  Practice Book § 35a–7(b).

II

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 8, 2010, the department invoked a 96–hour hold, and on February 11, 2010, filed ex parte motions for temporary custody of Nayya, Hashim and Adam, as well as neglect petitions on their behalf, which alleged that the three children were being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being.   At the preliminary hearing on the temporary custody orders on February 19, 2010, mother agreed that the temporary custody orders to the department should be sustained.   Brian E. objected to the sustaining of the temporary custody orders with respect to Nayya and Hashim, and a contested hearing was scheduled at the Middletown Child Protection Session for February 26, 2010.   Oscar R. failed to appear.   At the preliminary hearing, the court sustained the temporary custody order on Adam M., sustained the temporary custody orders on Nayya and Hashim pending the outcome of the hearing on February 26, 2010, and ordered preliminary specific steps for mother and the absent Oscar R.

On February 26, 2010, Brian E. withdrew his objection to the temporary custody orders.   The court sustained those orders on Nayya and Hashim, and reviewed and approved preliminary specific steps for Brian E., which he signed, indicating that he would cooperate with the conditions approved and ordered by the court.   He further acknowledged that he understood that if he did not follow the steps, it would increase the chance that petitions may be filed to terminate his parental rights permanently so that his children may be placed in adoption.

Trial on the neglect petitions was scheduled for July 15, 2010.   On that date, all three children were adjudicated neglected on the ground of being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being and were committed to the care and custody of the department.   Mother was present in court at the time of the adjudication and commitment;  her nolo contendere plea was accepted by the court.   Oscar R. had been previously defaulted for failure to appear at the neglect plea hearing on March 22, 2010.   Brian E. was defaulted for failure to attend the trial in person.³  Evidence was heard and judgments were rendered.   The court ordered final specific steps for mother and the preliminary steps issued to Brian E. on February 26, 2010 were ordered as final steps for him.

On March 15, 2011, the department filed the petitions for termination of parental rights.   On August 4, 2011, the department filed a motion to cease visits with the children by mother and Brian E. On August 18, 2011, the court ordered the hearing on the visitation motion consolidated with the trial on the termination of parental rights petitions.   On November 15, 2011, the court approved permanency plans for termination of parental rights and adoption for all three children.   None of the parents filed a written objection to the permanency plans.⁴  On December 1, 2011, a consolidated trial was held on the visitation motion and the termination petitions.   Mother appeared and consented to the termination of her parental rights.   Oscar R. was defaulted for failure to appear.   Brain E. appeared, with counsel, and contested the termination of his parental rights.   The court heard evidence and concluded the trial.   However, subsequently, on February 9, 2012, a mistrial had to be declared due to the trial judge's unanticipated medical leave and consequent inability to render a decision.   Counsel for all parties were notified of the unfortunate turn of events and posed no object to a mistrial.   A new trial on the non-consensual grounds alleged as to both fathers relative to the adjudicatory phase, the dispositional phase of the termination petitions, and the petitioner's motion to cease visitation was ordered and scheduled for May 2, 2012.   The acceptance of the mother's consents and findings related to them by the prior trial judge were allowed to stand.

III

FACTUAL FINDINGS

At trial on May 2, 2012, the petitioner introduced 20 exhibits and the testimony of one witness, Maria Cameron, the department social worker assigned to the children's cases.   Mother and her attorney, previously excused, did not attend the trial.   Oscar R., previously defaulted, also did not attend.   Brian E. attended the trial, represented by counsel.   He introduced one exhibit and one witness, himself.   The children's attorney introduced no exhibits or testimony.

The court granted the department's motion for judicial notice and indicated it would take judicial notice of all items requested therein.   In addition, the court indicated it would take judicial notice of the pleadings, filing dates, specific steps, court memoranda and court orders in the files.   See In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 402, 852 A.2d 643 (2004);  In re Mark C., 28 Conn.App. 247, 254, 610 A.2d 181, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 922, 614 A.2d 823 (1992).

At the commencement of the May 2 trial, the court granted the petitioner's oral motion to amend the petitions to correct an oversight and check the box containing the allegation that it had made reasonable efforts to locate the respondents.   See General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).

The credible and relevant evidence introduced at trial, and a review of the judicially noticed court items, supports the finding of the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:

Nayya and Hashim were the subject of neglect petitions filed by the department in June of 2004.   On September 27, 2004, they were adjudicated neglected.   Neither mother nor father, Brian E., attended that hearing.   The disposition ordered was protective supervision for a period of six months.   Specific steps were issued for both mother and Brian E. That protective supervision was extended repeatedly, beginning on March 2, 2005, until it finally concluded on June 6, 2007.   On May 5, 2005, a neglect petition was filed on behalf of Adam M. On October 5, 2005, Adam M. was adjudicated neglected and placed under an order of protective supervision until January 5, 2006.   The protective supervision of Adam's care also was extended repeatedly, in tandem with orders of extension for Nayya and Hashim.   However, on May 11, 2006, an ex parte order of temporary custody in the interest of Adam was issued for reasons not in evidence.   Nayya and Hashim remained under protective supervision.   On July 6, 2006, a motion to vacate Adam's temporary custody order was granted and protective supervision with respondent mother of all three children again was extended.   Brian E. was found not be Adam's biological father on July 6, 2006.   On October 4, 2006, genetic testing concluded that Oscar R. was Adam's father.   Ultimately, protective supervision of all three children remained in effect until June 6, 2007.   On more than one occasion during this three-year period, mother and Brian E. were provided with specific steps in an effort to improve their ability to parent.⁵

Whatever three years of protective supervision accomplished, any improvement achieved did not endure.   On July 27, 2009, mother reported to the department that she was no longer able to care for her three children.   She said she was in nursing school and working part time, and her children were not faring well due to the stress she had been experiencing.   The stress had, at some point, resulted in her hospitalization for depression, but she had not sought ongoing mental health treatment after her discharge.   She admitted to attempting suicide by cutting her wrists while the children were visiting friends.   Mother indicated she had no family or friends who could be trustworthy resources or considered as a temporary placement for her children.   She also had eliminated Brian E., Oscar R. and her latest boyfriend, Quince F. as potential caretakers.   Mother was adamant she could not care for the children, but the department only began efforts, a few months later, to preserve the family unit.

On September 21, 2009, two months after mother's call, the department assigned the case to social worker Cameron.   She met with mother twice and set up a referral for intensive family preservation (IFP), but by November 2009, mother was no longer engaging with the department despite Cameron's numerous attempts.   When Cameron made home visits, she only had contact with boyfriend, Quince F., or the children.   On October 29, 2009, Cameron received a phone call from Lakiesha Ruth of IFP, who reported that mother had not responded to her phone calls or acknowledged letters sent by IFP to her home.   IFP was going to close its case due to lack of compliance.   On five occasions, from November 2009 to February 2009, department workers conducted home visits and found one or more of the children alone with no adult supervision.   The eldest, Nayya, was nine years old.   Incredibly, this was not sufficient cause for alarm for the department to seek custody of the children because they indicated they had been left alone only a short time.

On November 2009, the department received a report from a Hartford police officer stating that there was a fight between mother, Quince F., and her previous boyfriend, Oscar R. The fight took place outside Oscar R.'s place of employment.   Mother reported that the fight occurred due to Nayya's disclosure that Oscar R. had touched her chest inappropriately three times from September 2007 to December 2008.   Mother, Quince F. and Oscar R. were all arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.   On December 4, 2009, Nayya was interviewed regarding the alleged molestation by Oscar R. After the interview, mother was informed that Nayya and Hashim needed therapy, but mother never pursued it.   On February 8, 2010, mother reported that she was involved in a domestic violence incident with Quince F., who was on probation and subsequently incarcerated.   She claimed the children were not at home at the time of the incident.   Mother stated she was in her second week of a new job and asked if the department could drive her children to school and watch them after school until she got home from work.   Mother was informed that the department was not able to assist her with getting her children to and from school daily.   Mother indicated she had no other plan for the care of her children, and she could not afford to lose her job.   Mother tried to justify leaving the children home alone if there was a neighbor they could go to in the event of an emergency.   When mother was advised this was not an acceptable plan, mother indicated she would feel more comfortable if the children were placed in the department's care until she could safely provide for them.   A ninety-six-hour hold was invoked on February 8, 2010.   On February 11, 2010, ex parte temporary custody orders were issued by the court for Nayya, Hashim and Adam.

After the children were removed, Brian E. was contacted and refused to give any current information to Cameron.   Brian E. reported he had married his second wife, Tangela E., who had five children of her own.   He reported to Cameron that he and Tangela had a wonderful, happy relationship.

Respondent Father, Oscar R.

For the duration of the neglect and termination petitions, the department has consistently been able to locate Oscar R. at his Bridgeport address.   He has been duly served with both the neglect and termination petitions for Adam at that address.

Due to his failure to appear in court, and his lack of cooperation with the department, little is known about Oscar R. He was born on September 9, 1977 and is 34 years old.   He is a convicted felon and has a criminal history dating back to 1993, including convictions for several burglaries, breach of the peace, larceny, and risk of injury.   His last conviction was for larceny in March 2010.   Oscar also has had prior involvement with the department, including three prior substantiations for abuse or neglect in 2001, 2003, and 2009.   The first two substantiations involved another woman's children;  the last one involved the inappropriate touching of Nayya.

Oscar's son, Adam, was the subject of an earlier neglect petition filed in 2006.   In May 2006, baby Adam was placed in foster care, but eventually returned to mother under protective supervision that lasted until June 2007.   Oscar did cooperate with a genetic test to determine he was Adam's biological father in 2006.   The court has been provided with no other information as to his participation during the last year of the protective supervision that ended in 2007.   The reported altercation between mother, Quince F. and Oscar R. as a result of Nayya's disclosure is some indication that Oscar R. may have had some contact with mother and Adam from 2007 and 2008, but the extent of that contact is unknown, and Adam was still quite young.   Mother reported Oscar last saw Adam in 2009.

Since the filing of the second neglect petition on Adam, in February 2010, Oscar R. has had no contact with the department or his son.   He has never attended court, requested services or visits, or complied with any of the recommendations contained in specific steps issued for him in February 2010.   Oscar R. has not called the department to inquire about Adam or sent the child any cards, gifts or letters, even on special occasions.   Mother told Cameron that Oscar has never contributed to Adam's support.

Upon Adam's removal from the home of his mother and Quince F. in 2010, Adam, then four years old, expressed love and feelings of concern and loss regarding his mother and Quince, but not Oscar R., whom he has not seen since the age of three.   Adam, now seven, has resided with the same foster family since October 28, 2010.   Because of his younger age, he has proven the most resilient of the three children, responding very well to the affection and attention of his foster parents, whom he often calls “Mom” and “Dad.” When asked about his father, Adam states he believes his father is in jail.   He never initiates discussion or asks questions about his father.

There is no doubt that Oscar R. is unaware of the extent of his son's past trauma or his specialized needs.   He has deliberately chosen to ignore court proceedings initiated as a result of the neglect of his son.

Father, Brian E.

Brian E. is 43 years old.   He was born on October 10, 1968 in Stamford, Connecticut, the second youngest of six children.   His parents were married and he reports that he had a “great childhood,” and was not exposed to domestic violence, substance abuse or physical abuse in the home.   He has two brothers and three sisters, all of whom reside in Connecticut.   Brian attended Stamford public school in regular education classes ad obtained a high school diploma.   During high school he worked at a mall.   After graduating, he worked at a gas station and many seasonal jobs such as driving school buses.   Later, he attended truck driving school and received a commercial driver's license.   He has reportedly earned up to $1,000 monthly.   He receives no government benefits.

He was briefly married to a woman in 1992, but the couple divorced in 1995.   There were no children issue of that marriage.   He had a brief relationship with a Stephanie J., and the pair had two children, Aniysa and Jalaal J., who are now adults.   Aniysa resides in West Haven with her mother.   Brian E. claims he has regular contact with these two children.

Mother began a relationship with Brian E. at a very young age, in 1997, when she was sixteen years old.   Brian was 26 that year.   This relationship endured for seven years.   From 1997 until 1999, the couple shared an apartment in Bridgeport.   Nayya was born in 1999 and Hashim was born in 2001.   According to mother, this relationship included physical scuffles and verbal disputes, often over jealousy issues.   Brian admits he and mother would argue, but insists he never put his hands on her because he does not believe in hitting women.   However, Amy M. reported domestic violence did take place, and she fled to shelters during their relationship due to Brian's abuse.   Hashim reported witnessing violence between his mother and Brian E. Brian E. states this was part of mother's scheming with her new boyfriend so she could find a way out of their relationship.   In 2004, mother had a sexual relationship with Oscar R. and Adam was conceived.   By 2006, mother and the three children had moved in with the maternal grandmother and eventually relocated to Hartford, where she was living with boyfriend Quince F. at the time the children were removed from her care.   Mother married Quince F. in December 2010.

Brian E. claims to have resided in Bridgeport since 1989.   He married Tangela E., a woman with five children, after his relationship with mother ended.

Brian E. has a criminal history dating back to 1991 and has been convicted of two counts of threatening, two counts of assault in the third degree, three counts of criminal trespass, risk of injury, reckless endangerment, three counts of breach of the peace, possession of drug paraphernalia, and interfering with a peace officer.   His most recent convictions, on January 7, 2011, for interfering with a peace officer, breach of the peace second degree and threatening netted him six months in jail and three years of probation.

Nayya and Hashim were removed in February 2010 because mother told the department that she had no one whom she could trust to help her care for the children.   Her position obviously reflected a lack of reliance on Brian E. Mother had, a few years earlier, allowed the children to spend time at the home of Tangela and Brian E., but this resulted in the physical abuse and neglect of both Nayya and Hashim.   Mother reported that while Tangela cared for the children, they missed school frequently.   In one incident, Drano was thrown into Nayya's face.⁶  Subsequently, mother testified that Tangela would come to her home in Hartford, as late as the summer of 2009, and threaten to fight her or hurt her children if there was any contact with Brian.   Tangela wanted Brian to have no contact with his children, and it appears he complied.   Mother reported to the department that as of the date of the removal in February 2010, Brian E. had not seen either of his two children for almost a year and a half.   This is buttressed by the concern the two children expressed for Quince F.'s well-being at the time of removal.   Hashim described Quince F. as being like a “real” father to him.   There is no indication they asked for or about Brian E. upon their removal.   Mother informed the department that the tables had turned on Brian E. Rather than being the abuser, he was now abused by Tangela and had the burns and scars to prove it.   Mother indicated in February 2010 that if Brian E. were to be given custody, based on her past experiences, someone other than he would be caring for his two children, as he had continued to abuse substances for the past five or six years.   In 2010, Tangela also reported to the department that Brian E. was abusing substances.

When the children were removed, Brian E. was contacted by Cameron and indicated he was unaware of the trouble mother had been having caring for the children.   This supports mother's representation that he hadn't seen the children for about a year and a half prior to their removal from mother's care.   Brian appeared at the preliminary temporary custody hearing and demanded a contested hearing, which was scheduled at the Middletown Child Protection Session within a week.   He was provided with an attorney at state expense.   Brian testified that mother was the one who chose to leave him for another, and then gave up the kids into state care.   He indicated that at the time of the children's removal, he was still married to Tangela, but things were not going well.   Brian testified that the predicament of Nayya and Hashim was thrust upon him and “all this chaos” was “thrown in his lap” while he had to deal with Tangela and her five children.

For a brief period of time, Brian E. appeared resolute about assuming care of his children.   Although he agreed to sustain temporary custody in the department on February 26, 2010, waiving his right to contest custody within ten days, he agreed to specific steps which he now purports to have not understood, although he was represented by counsel when he signed them and they were reviewed with him.   He claims he was told by the department that all he had to do was submit to one urine screen for drugs, and if it was negative, the children would be handed over to him.   Cameron testified that it was made clear to him at that February 26 hearing that he would have to submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow any recommendations, submit to a hair test, and participate in a “fast track” parenting program.   Her recollection is supported by the fact that the preliminary specific steps contemplated all of those requirements.

After the preliminary steps were issued, Brian was referred for a hair test and a substance abuse assessment at Southwest Community Center in the Bridgeport area.   On March 22, 2010, a clinician at the center contacted Cameron and confirmed that father attended the appointment;  however, they were unable to do a hair test.   Brian showed up with a noticeably more shaven head than he had at the prior court hearing, according to Cameron.   He was so bald that a hair test could not be performed, so a urine screen was done, which was negative.   Despite that, the assessment still recommended a relapse prevention program due to Brian E.'s reported history of substance abuse and his lack of any supports to maintain sobriety, such as a sponsor.   On March 29, 2010, the Southwest Community Center clinician reported that he had been unable to get in contact with Brain E. despite leaving several messages.   The department contacted Brian on April 3 and April 5 of 2010 and informed him that he needed to follow up with the relapse group.   Brian indicated he was not going to do the group because his one urine screen has been negative.   Subsequent efforts to engage him on the part of the Southwest Community Center were unsuccessful.   On May 13, 2010, Brian E. was scheduled for a court ordered psychological and interactional evaluation with Dr. Derek Franklin.   He failed to attend.   His relationship with Tangela, whom he had married in June 2009, broke up in 2010, right around the time of the children's removal and he admitted this drove him to drink, ultimately leading to his arrest and incarceration.   He admits he was not willing to follow through with the programs he agreed to participate in, explaining, “I was going through a lot.”

Brian E. was referred to an intensive family reunification program in early 2010 at the Bridgeport Child Guidance Clinic.   He was supposed to attend sessions for 8 to 12 weeks, but stopped attending after only two weeks, and failed to maintain contact with the service provider.   Brian was offered weekly visits with his children after their removal.   He did not have transportation, so the children were brought to locations he chose, at times he deemed convenient.   He began supervised visits on February 19, 2010 and was consistent for the most part until June 2010.   He had no visits with his children from June 8, 2010 until October 7, 2010.   His last visit with his children was on October 22, 2010, when they celebrated Nayya's birthday.   It was noted during supervised visits that Brian E. required better parenting skills, as he would often appear unsure of how to interact with the children or what to say.   He also never had a visit alone with his children—there was always his wife or some other family member there who would guide him on what to say.   The children enjoyed these visits, but appeared distant at times.

Brian E. was arrested on August 26, 2010 for interfering with an officer, breach of peace second degree and threatening second degree and may have been briefly incarcerated at that time because his mother advised Cameron he was in jail in August 2010.   After his conviction of these offenses, Brian E. was incarcerated from January 7 to July 11, 2011, Although he was supposed to keep his whereabouts known to the department, his attorney, and the children's attorney, he made no effort to inform anyone that he was in jail.   He admitted at trial that he really didn't want his children to see him in jail.   He now attempts to blame the department for his lack of visits, but he was equally, if not more responsible for initiating contact with the department, and he missed many visits in 2010, before he was incarcerated.   In addition, when the department finally learned he was in prison in March 2010, the children told the worker they did not want to visit him in jail.   Hashim's response was, “He's in jail again?”   Nayya stated, “He's the one losing out on his children.”

Until recently, Brian E. maintained no verified housing of his own.   He told the department to send his mail to his parents' address, but at times he was living in other places he refused to disclose to the department.   At trial, he testified he obtained his own apartment about six months ago in Bridgeport.   He resides there with a fourteen-year-old nephew but gave no explanation as to why he would take in someone else's child when his ability to provide for his own is being questioned.   The evidence is insufficient to conclude that this apartment, which he noted has “beds,” is even appropriate for Brian E. and three children, because he did not inform the department of this address or the fact that he was living with a teenage nephew so the department might investigate the suitability of the situation.

Brian E. is now on parole and works two jobs, so he is not home very often.   He proposes that his 23–year–old working daughter, Aniysa, who lives in West Haven, several towns removed from Bridgeport along Interstate 95, care for the children at night, but hasn't given too much thought on how he will ensure the children continue with therapy.   Brian seemed unconvinced that the children need therapy.   He also talked about all of the children attending a school right around the corner, but Nayya may be awarded a scholarship to attend private school in Fairfield, about which she is very excited.   He admits he hasn't thought everything through.   He claims that Aniysa has been “with” him all along in his struggle, but two years ago she failed to complete the process for foster care licensing for Nayya and Hashim.   Brian was proud that his current income allowed him to purchase a car and wear Prada designer glasses, which he proudly displayed to the court.   He feels Nayya, Hashim, and even Adam, who is not his child, can be returned to his care immediately, without any preliminary preparation on his part or therapeutic interventions, including parenting instruction, which his awkwardness with the children when he did visit suggests he needs.   Brian's self-proclaimed, but untested sobriety has existed for the past six months or longer—he gave conflicting testimony on this subject.   He attended a few sessions of a relapse prevention group required by his parole officer, but he described no ongoing support system to maintain sobriety.   Given his long history of substance abuse, six months is a woefully inadequate period of time, especially absent evidence of testing, to convince the court he has achieved full recovery, and in 2010 he was dishonest in denying any current or past substance abuse to Cameron.

Brian acknowledges that what the foster family has done for his children has been “all well and dandy,” but they will be better off with him, because their pain will go away once reunited with him.   He is convinced that attending bible school to forget all earthly things, as he has claims to done recently, despite the Prada wear, is the key to their future happiness.   Although he has considered the effect the past years have had on his children, he indicated he is more concerned with the effect of their living with a foster parent and “me not being there when I want to be there.”   He still has not divorced Tangela.

Brian E. has a tendency to paint an overly rosy picture in an effort to present himself favorably.   For example, in being interviewed for the termination social study, he denied any past or current substance abuse, but testified that he started drinking and this led to his incarceration in early 2011.   He claimed that his children are his life, yet he went for extensive periods of time, even when the children were not in foster care, without seeing Nayya or Hashim.   During the time they resided with their grandmother in Bridgeport and thereafter, in Hartford with their mother, Nayya and Hashim were exposed to domestic violence, missed days of school, medical and dental neglect, and physical and sexual abuse.   Where was Brian?

Brian testified that he raised Jaleel and Aniysa well, but his seven-year relationship with mother and subsequent marriage to Tangela suggest otherwise.   In addition, when the home of his older children's mother, Stephanie J., was investigated in 2010 as a possible placement, there were questions of substance abuse in that home.   He could not recall his son's current occupation without prompting.   Brian E. denies violent activities and domestic violence with mother, but his arrest record and mother's reports undermine that representation.   As noted above, the length of time he claims to have been sober varies, in the course of his brief testimony, from a claim of two years, to a year and five months, to six months.

The evidence firmly establishes that Brian E. never took affirmative steps to resume his visits with his two children after he stopped attending them regularly in June 2010.   See In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 426–27, 787 A.2d 608 (2011) (appropriate to expect incarcerated parent to make affirmative attempt to develop relationship with child from whom he is separated.)   He has not made much effort to have contact with his children since his release from incarceration in July 2011.   He did not demand therapeutic interventions with the children and has never participated in a parenting program.

Nayya M.

Nayya M. is now 12 years old.   She was born in Bridgeport, Connecticut on October 22, 1999.   Prior to Nayya coming into foster care in February 2010, she was not medically up to date and was overdue for a dental appointment.   She had not had a physical since 2004.   My People Clinical Services provided a therapist, Johnnette McGhee, for Nayya and her brothers when they were first removed from mother's home on February 8, 2010.   Nayya was unaware that her mother had requested her removal from the home due to her inability to balance parenting, work and school.   Mother had told Nayya and Hashim that they only would be with a foster family for a couple of days and then they would return home.   Nayya reported that her mother was a good mother, although she was unhappy and cried a lot.   McGhee noted that “․ Nayya seems to be keeping her feelings to herself.   It is almost as if Nayya is in denial of her situation.   This prompts me to believe that something is going on that she is unable to express at this and/or she is protecting mother.   Although she tried to present with a cheerful and ‘matter of fact’ facade, it is also obvious that she is moderately distressed by the removal from her mother's care and she is guarded especially of mother.”   Nayya's primary concern upon removal was that she not be separated from her brothers.   Nayya endured two prior placements before being placed in her present, special study foster home.   The foster parents are friends of one of the children's paternal aunt, and were recommended to the department by Brian E. Other relatives suggested by mother or Brian E. as placements failed to followed through with the process or they were deemed inappropriate.

Shortly after Nayya was placed with her current foster family in October 2010, Nayya was interviewed by her ongoing therapist, Katherine Muse–McGee of Sound Mind II. In this session, Muse–McGee noted that Nayya was the “care giver,” and somewhat guarded in her response as to why she had ended up in foster care.   Nayya seemed unable to process mother's role in creating the situation and blamed Adam for crying so loud a “nosey” neighbor called the department.   Nayya appeared able to rationalize her mother's behavior no matter what the cost.   It appeared to Muse–McGee that Nayya had been exposed to a level of trauma, evidenced by her heightened level of guarded responses and the time she spent redirecting her two brothers.   She noted that Nayya is a parentified child, who felt responsible for her mother and possessed a desire to fix mother's problems.   Nayya reported that in mother's home, if one person did something wrong everyone was punished.   She reported that she remembered an incident when her mother made her and Hashim strip down, and mother then beat them until they were bruised and bleeding.   Nayya reported that she was very scared and has never felt that level of fear in her life.

Nayya also has reported being inappropriately touched by Oscar R., Adam's putative father.   Mother also reported that prior to 2009, Brian E. left Nayya in the care of Tangela and Drano was poured on Nayya, causing her face and inside of her mouth to peel.   Nayya was seen at Bridgeport Hospital as a result of this injury.   Nayya implicated Tangela's daughter as the perpetrator in this incident.   She indicated that Tangela's two daughters were always mean to her.   On March 24, 2010, mother reported to the department that Nayya had not seen Brian E. for almost a year and a half.

Although she was 11 years of age at the end of 2010, Nayya was functioning cognitively on the level of an eight or nine-year old.   She was easily discouraged and would make self-defeating statements.   She was struggling in school, especially in math, because someone several years before had called her stupid in math.   Her vocabulary suffered from an excessive use of slang.   However, by February 2011, Nayya was viewed as putting forth her best effort, although she continued to view herself as inadequate and at times would sit on her bed and talk to a picture of her mother.

More recently, Muse–McGee notes that Nayya continues to “thrive and work hard in all areas in her life.”   She has a very strong desire to acclimate into the foster family as well as in the community, participating in sport activities—basketball and soccer—and the arts.   Nayya has been happy in this home and states she has nothing to go back to in Hartford.   She states she will go nowhere else and wishes to be adopted by the foster parents.   She occasionally affectionately refers to her foster parents as “Mom” and “Dad,” or aunt and uncle.   She asks about her mother, but not Brian E.

Initially, Nayya was academically behind when she entered the sixth grade in Fairfield, but she was provided a tutor which greatly improved her grades.   She is in regular education classes and the school reports no behavioral concerns.   Nayya now plans to go to college.   Nayya has her own bedroom and bath, and most importantly, friends.   She has made the honor roll several times, applied for admission to a local private school and was accepted, which Nayya views as a defining moment as an “official” Mack child.⁷

Nayya still requires therapy to learn to make her own decisions, and not be persuaded by external influences.   Without continued therapy, Nayya could be very affected by poor performance or other set-backs due to her lack of emotional and cognitive maturity.   Nayya still needs a bit more time to catch up with childhood;  for too long, she felt responsible for her mother and her brothers.

Hashim M.

Hashim, born on June 13, 2001, is almost eleven years old.   From the age of five, he has been the subject of department involvement.   On December 12, 2006, a report was investigated by a department social worker, Jill Kochman, that Hashim reported to the school nurse that a mark on his face was a result of being hit with a yellow stick by his maternal grandmother.   Mother and the three children were then under an order of protective supervision, but were living with maternal grandmother, despite the maternal grandmother's prior involvement with the department due to allegations of sexual abuse and neglect regarding one of her own children.   Mother indicated she was not home when the injury occurred.   Hashim presented to the school nurse with an inch long red mark on his left cheek bone just below his eye.   Hashim reported that maternal grandmother was told by his maternal aunt that Hashim tried to kiss one-year-old Adam, but Hashim stated he only brought his face close to the baby's face.   Hashim said his grandmother grabbed him by the arm, removed his pants and hit him four or five times with a yellow stick on his legs and face.   The investigator later determined that the stick was actually a king size Slim Jim beef snack measuring about 18 inches in length.   Hashim reported being physically beat “all the time” by his grandmother.   Nayya reported that mother was well aware of the physical discipline inflicted on Hashim by the maternal grandmother.   Grandmother admitted to hitting Hashim, and stated that while the children lived in her home, she was in charge.   She felt it was sexually inappropriate for a boy to kiss another boy on the face, cheek or lips.   After this incident, physical abuse of Hashim was substantiated and mother and the three children had to move to a local hotel until a shelter placement was secured.

When the children were removed in February 2010, mother was emphatic that the children not be placed with her mother, who always treated Hashim differently and was very mean to him.   She felt grandmother would not be able to manage the children on their own.   The grandmother was not approved as a relative placement.

On March 24, 2010, in an interview, mother reported to the department an incident that occurred while the children were at the home of Tangela and Brian E. She said Tangela cut Hashim with a piece of glass on the right side of his leg and left a permanent scar.   Nayya reported that both she and Hashim were often spanked by Tangela.   In addition, her sons would beat up Hashim constantly.   Nayya, too, reported Hashim being made to “strip down” in order to be physically beaten by his mother.

Upon entering care in February 2010, Hashim also was evaluated by Johnnette McGhee of My People Clinical Services in a therapeutic debriefing session.   Hashim was then eight years old and in the third grade.   He presented as polite, articulate, open and easily engaged.   His affect was sad, fearful and very anxious.   He asserted he did not know why he and his siblings were removed from his mother's home except that mom was having difficulty getting them to school.   He thought he was only going to be away from mother for a few days and expressed great affection for his mother.   Unlike the markedly guarded Nayya, who indicated she had never witnessed any violence in the home, Hashim gave vivid accounts of various fights he had witnessed between his mother and his father, Brian E., his brother's father, Oscar R., and his mother's boyfriend at the time, Quince F. He voiced being concerned and worried that Quince was going to die because mother always used weapons such as knives and hammers during their fights.   He stated that he had witnessed a fight recently in which his mother had a knife and cut Quince on his chest and shoulder.   He stated he really liked Quince because he was like a real father to him.   McGhee concluded that Hashim was acutely distressed about removal from his mother's home and traumatized due to repeated exposure to family violence.

The middle child, Hashim is described by the department worker as the most confused and challenging of the three children.   He also is considered the “pleaser,” an effort on his part to avoid rejection.   After two placements, when Hashim moved in with his current foster family, one of the foster parents was concerned about some of Hashim's initial behaviors:  lying, lack of self-esteem, failure to do homework and not following rules.

Hashim also has been in therapy with Muse–McGee since being placed with this family.   This therapy started out at the foster home, but the three children now see McGee in her office or they engage in activities with her in the community.   Like Nayya, when first examined by Muse–McGee in October 2010, Hashim blamed Adam's making noise for their removal and evinced an overwhelming desire to help mother and fix the problem.   Right off the bat, however, he was willing to make the third placement work, although he engaged in difficult behaviors at school, some of them attention-seeking.   When playing basketball, he would become easily frustrated and disengage from the game.   Muse–McGee reported that his “desire to be acknowledged for all his achievements may be rooted in the having to take the brunt of his siblings' behaviors in the past.”   By February 2011, Muse–McGee reported that Hashim was working hard to adjust to his new role in the foster family.   He was learning to understand that it was all right to be compliant and that would not be a betrayal of loyalty to his mother.   His efforts to sabotage his standing with the foster family had decreased and he was quite proud of his academic achievements.   By the end of 2011, although at times behaving in emotionally immature behavior, such as throwing crayons and giggling at inappropriate times, Hashim continued to show positive growth evidenced by his sportsmanship, social interactions with his peers, an invitation to participate in honors orchestra and his continued efforts to work on behaviors that yield negative results.   He is in regular education classes and there are few behavioral concerns.   Hashim needs constant validation of self-worth and still suffers from his sense of guilt over not being able to save his mother, an indication that as the older son, he assumed the role of the man of the family.   He desperately needed the positive male role model that his foster father is now providing him.   He also spends quality time with one particular foster brother.

Hashim is still struggling with loyalty to his biological family, but he continues to grow.   He performed in a town-wide orchestra in which he played alongside high school students and in the honors orchestra concert.   His baseball skills have earned him the opportunity to play for a more advanced team, boosting his self-esteem.   He is doing well in school and has made many good friends.   Involvement in sports and music has allowed Hashim to be a part of a team and express himself creatively.   The uncertainty of his status seems to have the most effect on Hashim, who stills harbors hopes of returning to his mother's care.   Muse–McGee notes, “I continue to believe that because the parental custody issue has not been settled Hasihm's belief of reuniting with a parent keeps him guarded.   Continuing to lay a foundation for Hashim building trust, with structure and continuity of care will allow a more even flow of therapeutic intervention once the custody issue has been completely resolved.”   In Muse–McGee's professional opinion, Hashim should not have any contact with Brian E. due to his “unrealistic, ideological view” of his father, which hinders him from exploring a complete relationship with his foster father.   Hashim at times responds with resistance to the foster father's directions.   In his mind, he already has a father and does not need another.

Prior to the unauthorized contact with Brian E. this past Christmas, Hashim had no contact with either mother or father for over a year.   He has expressed his frustration with his mother for not showing up.   In 2011, when made aware that this father was in jail, Hashim did not want to visit him there.   His response, when informed, was “He's in jail again?”

Adam M.

Adam was five years old when he was removed from his mother's home.   According to Johnnette McGhee, during the debriefing session she conducted in February 2010, Adam presented as friendly, happy, cooperative and easily engaged.   He maintained good eye contact and was not easily distracted.   However, he also presented with a level of speech impairment making it difficult to understand him.   Like Hashim, Adam indicated he had witnessed violence between his mother and Quince F. He believed they were both dead because he saw them on the floor fighting and they had blood on them.   Adam conveyed to McGhee that he loved and missed his mother and Quince F. and wanted to go home with his siblings.

Adam also exhibited challenging behaviors such as lying, hitting his siblings, defiance, wandering off, tantruming and always wanting his way when he entered his third placement with the current foster family.   Both Adam and Hashim have had psychiatric evaluations, but the issue of whether or not they require medication has yet to be decided.⁸

When Adam was placed with the current foster family, Muse–McGee recommended that Adam continue with behavior modification treatment, including academic enrichments and speech therapy.   Because he was still so young and does not seem to have suffered from the abuse perpetrated on his older siblings, Adam was able to benefit from therapy quickly and avoid anti-social behaviors such as throwing temper tantrums.   He learned to use words when displeased with a situation.   He suffers the least from the disconnect with his mother, simply responding he “doesn't know” when asked why he doesn't see his mother.   He knows little about his father, not having seen him in three years.   He never brings up Oscar R. or his mother unless it becomes the subject of a discussion initiated by one of his older siblings.   When asked about his father, he says he thinks Oscar is in jail.

Adam is now in first grade and doing well.   He is eager to learn and be a part of the foster family.   He adjusted to his current home so quickly he didn't want to leave during his preplacement visits to the home.   He refers occasionally to his foster parents as “Mom” and “Dad.” He has an ability to acclimate with few distractions and resolve conflict in different situations.   He is reading and has improved his speech considerably.   Adam is willing to put more thought and effort into understanding behaviors and consequences.   He has grown socially and enjoys playing with his peers.   He appears to be the most resilient of the three children, particularly because he has responded most to the attention and affection of the present foster family.   He just started to play baseball and is looking forward to playing other sports.

Mother has some contact with the foster parents, who are willing to permit contact with her in the future if deemed appropriate.   The foster family's dedication and advocacy for these children, their working relationship with Muse–McGee to provide therapeutically-informed care, and their effort to provide the children with an appropriate and enriching childhood, including sports, music instruction and family-centered activities, is impressive.

IV

ADJUDICATION

Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes § 17a–112(j) is an independent ground for termination.  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 618 A.2d 1 (1992).   The petitioner is required to prove at least one ground alleged as to each parent in its petition by clear and convincing evidence.  In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 46, 907 A.2d 126 (2006).

A. Reasonable Efforts Finding—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).

In order to terminate parental rights, the department must show, by clear and convincing evidence, as a prerequisite, that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.” ⁹  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1);  In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552, 979 A.2d 469 (2009);  In re Brendan C., 89 Conn.App. 511, 524, 874 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 910, 882 A.2d 669 (2005);  In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 640, 809 A.2d 119, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003).  “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 347, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002);  In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001);  In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).

From the time of the initiation of the neglect petitions in 2010, the department made reasonable efforts to locate Brian E. and Oscar R. Their addresses were known to the department, and they were duly served notice of the temporary custody orders and the neglect and termination petitions in accordance with the law.   Each of the father's specific steps required that he keep the department, his attorney and the attorney for his children notified of his whereabouts.   There was a brief period of time in January and February of 2011 where the department worker was unaware Brian E. had been incarcerated, but this was after the issuance of the specific steps putting the burden on Brian to keep his whereabouts known ․ Cameron also was advised that Brian E. was incarcerated in August 2011 by his mother, but she was not able to confirm that when she checked corrections records.   Brian E. reviewed and signed his specific steps, so he was on notice that he had an affirmative obligation to keep the department aware of his whereabouts.   Brian E. suggests that the department has a continuing obligation to find him when he relocates, as if the parties are playing a game of hide and seek.   Brian E. also admitted that while he was in jail, he did not want his children to come to prison to see him, so he may have deliberately chosen not to inform the department of his incarceration.   He also admitted to losing contact with his attorney, another abdication of responsibility.   However, by March 2011, Brian E. was aware of the filing of the termination petition and spoke to the department worker, Cameron while he was still in jail.   It is not clear whether Cameron or Brian E. initiated this conversation.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to locate both fathers.

Prior to the adjudicatory date, the department made reasonable and appropriate efforts, to the extent possible, given Brian E.'s lack of compliance with his specific steps and unwillingness to engage in services, to promote reunification with Brian E., and these efforts occurred despite a prior involvement with his children that led to three years of ultimately unsuccessful preservation efforts pursuant to an order of protective supervision that was extended nine times.

The court ordered two substantially similar sets of specific steps for Brian E. and the department, a preliminary set in February 26, 2010, which was affirmed as a set of final steps on July 15, 2010.   Brian E. was present in court on February 26, 2010, and he signed these steps, indicating he understood them and would comply with them.   Brian E. was expected to cooperate with the department, keep his whereabouts known to the department, his attorney and the children's attorney, participate in a substance abuse assessment and follow treatment recommendations, engage in an intensive parenting program, sign releases to monitor his progress in programs, secure adequate housing and legal income, not engage in substance abuse and not have further involvement with the criminal justice system.   Brian E. was informed he was expected to submit to a hair test to check for use of illegal substances.   He was expected to visit the children as often as the department permitted.

In addition to the services offered to Brian E., the department provided Nayya, Hashim and Adam with services, including extensive therapy, special tutoring to address their educational deficiencies when they entered the Fairfield school system, medical check-ups, since all three of the children had not seen a pediatrician for years when they entered care, dental treatments, and several foster home placements.   The department facilitated visits by Brian E., offering supervision and transportation, at his request, to locations that were convenient for him.

Oscar R. has ignored all court proceedings regarding Adam since February 2010.   He has failed to maintain contact with the department or to respond to Cameron's letters in an effort to engage him.   Cameron testified that the letters she sent to Oscar's Bridgeport address which were never returned by the post office.   He never responded.   Cameron has never met him.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify both Brian E. and Oscar R. with their children to the extent possible, given both men's lack of communication and cooperation, lack of compliance with specific steps and continued criminal behavior.   The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that both Brian E. and Oscar R. were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services.

B. Abandonment— § 17a–112(j)(3)(A)

This first ground for termination of parental rights, alleged as to both Brian E. and Oscar R., is established when a child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.

Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of “interest, concern or responsibility.”  In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986).  “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.”  (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 732, 994 A.2d 233 (2010);  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998);  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993).   Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility includes “attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support.”  In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997).   “Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare.”  In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46–47, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008).   While incarceration alone is insufficient to prove abandonment, while a parent is in prison, he should “take advantage of programs that would have permitted him to maintain contact with the child[ren]” In re Jaime S., supra, 120 Conn.App. 733.

It is indisputable that both fathers have fallen far short of the above minimal standards for attentive parenting and have exhibited little interest, concern or responsibility.   Before the children's removal, Brian E. had not seen his children for a year and a half.   Mother, for years, had difficulty caring for the three children and Brian was aware of her shortcomings.   He had been a participant in their cases during the three years of protective supervision.   Once mother moved to Hartford, he left his two children to sink or swim, found another partner, and focused on her children, not his own.   There is no evidence he ever contributed anything toward the children's support after he stopped residing with mother in 2004.

During the earlier period of protective supervision, Brian E. never accepted substance abuse treatment.   When the children were removed in 2010, both mother and Tangela reported that Brian E. had continued to abuse substances.

Brian places all the blame for his children's placement into foster care in 2010 on mother.   He has not had a visit permitted by the department with his children since October 2010.¹⁰  His consistent visits stopped even earlier, in June 2010, and he chose not to notify the department or his attorney of his incarceration or request visits or attempt any contact with his children while in prison.

Brian E. acknowledged his responsibility in the promotion of reunification when he was presented with preliminary specific steps over two years ago.   Prior to the adjudicatory date, he completely failed to participate in any of the services ordered by the court.   He failed to attend a number of court dates, including the neglect trial date.   Although Brian E. is acquainted with the foster parents, there is no evidence he contacted them regularly to inquire as to the welfare of Nayya and Hashim.   He refused to fully participate in or complete substance abuse or parenting programs to which he was referred by the department in 2010, services he would have had to attend consistently before return of the children could ever be contemplated.   Between October 2010 and the adjudicatory date, March 15, 2011, Brian E. “did not visit the [children], did not display love or affection for the [children] or send cards, letters, notes or gifts to the [children] ․ [T]he respondent [Brian E.] failed to approach employees of the department to initiate visits with the child[ren] ․ or to inquire about [their] welfare.”  In re Nicholas B., 52 Conn.Sup. 347, citing In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 518–19, 959 A.2d 1063 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 911, 964 A.2d 545 (2009).   There is no evidence of any cards, letters or gifts to the children from Brian before or after the date of their removal.

Oscar R. has not seen Adam M. since 2009.   Oscar R. has never contacted the department, although he had notice of both the neglect petition and the termination petition regarding Adam. The only evidence of any interest, concern or responsibility on his part was his cooperation with a paternity test back in 2006.   Oscar R. has never called the department social worker consistently to ask how his son is doing.   He has not sent Adam any cards or gifts, not even for special occasions, and has never paid any child support.   Oscar R. never bothered to appear and defend the neglect or termination petitions.   His extreme disinterest is appalling and certainly indicative of a total lack of affection and concern toward his son.

Statutory abandonment on the part of both fathers has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.   As of the adjudicatory date, they had not manifested any continuing, reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to their children's welfare.  In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 112, 121–23, 614 A.2d 832 (1991);  In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 37–38, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).   In the case of In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 314–15, 771 A.2d 160 (2001), the ground of abandonment, as then set forth in § 45a–717(f), was discussed by the court.  “Section 45a–717(f) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern ․” Brian's attempts at fathering Nayya and Hashim have certainly been sporadic;  Oscar's attempts are non-existent.

C. Failure to Rehabilitate—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).

This is the second ground for termination alleged against both fathers in the petition.   If the parent of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding fails to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, he could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, this ground for termination exists.

The evidence is undisputed that Nayya, Hashim and Adam were adjudicated neglected twice, once on September 27, 2004, and again on July 15, 2010, when they were committed to the custody of the petitioner.   Brian E. and Oscar R. did not attend the neglect trial.   The court ordered specific steps for both fathers.

“Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of the parent to a constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [Section 17a–112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jazmine B., 121 Conn.App. 376, 383–84, 996 A.2d 286, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 924, 998 A.2d 168 (2010);  In re Jeisean M., supra, 270 Conn. 398;  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706;  741 A.2d 873 (1999).   Whether the age and needs of the child do not support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989).   Also, in determining whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient and allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation further, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.   See In re Jennfer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 485;  In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230;  In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).

“An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires ․ a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities.”  In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999);  In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 499.

The evidence in this case is clear and convincing that both Brian E. and Oscar R., as of the date of the filing of the termination petitions on March 15, 2011, the adjudicatory date, had not achieved a reasonable degree of rehabilitation.   Further, there is no evidence of conduct prior or subsequent to the date of the filing of the petitions which would encourage the belief that within a reason able period of time, considering the age and needs of their children, either father could assume a responsible position as a parent.

A parent's compliance with specific steps set during the pendency of the neglect case is a relevant and important consideration in reaching a rehabilitation finding.  In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 167–68;  In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 179, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).   The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parenting, and has corrected any of the factors that led to the initial neglect adjudication.   See In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 126.   To terminate parental rights for the failure to achieve rehabilitation, both prongs of the test incorporated in § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) must be met:  (1) that the parent has failed to achieve rehabilitation;  and (2) there is no reason to believe that the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child.  In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 843, 724 A.2d 546 (1999).

The specific steps essentially map out a guide to the efforts and requirements both the department and the parent must meet in order to achieve family reunification.

The specific steps set for Oscar R. were issued by the court on February 19, 2010, during the preliminary 10–day temporary custody hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–129(c).  Oscar R. was required to cooperate with the department and with visits to his home by the department and the child's attorney, announced and unannounced, and to keep the department and the child's attorney apprised of his whereabouts.   He never appeared to apply for counsel, and never contacted the department.   He failed to respond to letters from the department worker that were never returned by the post office.   He never participated in a recommended substance abuse evaluation.   He never provided the department with releases.   His securing of adequate housing and legal income to support Adam has never been verified.   He did not avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system, as he was convicted of larceny and incarcerated in March 2010.   Oscar R. failed to advise the department of the composition of his household.   Oscar R. failed to visit Adam, whom he has not seen since 2009.

Despite his declaration to the contrary, there is no doubt that Brian E. had a very clear picture of what he was expected to do if he seriously desired to raise his children, and the consequences of non-compliance with his specific steps.

On February 26, 2010, Brian agreed to and signed specific steps when he agreed to sustain the temporary custody orders on Nayya and Hashim.   In the beginning, he was showing a degree of interest and asserting his parenting abilities.   Despite prior failed efforts after the lapse of three years of protective supervision, the fact that mother indicated Brian had been having only sporadic contact with his children since marrying Tangela, and the children's reports of abuse when Brian left them supervised by his wife, the department, astonishingly, was very willing to work with him and place the children in his home with Tangela.   The goal was to integrate the children into father's home with Tangela, and develop a healthy, nurturing relationship with his children.   However, Brian first was required to complete an intensive parenting program and a substance abuse assessment, and was expected to follow through on any treatment recommendation with respect to the latter.   There is no doubt, except in Brian's mind, that he needed to acquire better parenting skills.   He had never cared for any of his four children on his own.

Further investigation conducted within a month of the orders of temporary custody being issued revealed that Brian and Tangela had a history with the department individually and together.   There were four substantiated reports against Brian, who was listed as the perpetrator regarding neglect dating from May 27, 1998 to January 15, 2008.   Tangela had 14 child protective services reports, four of which were substantiated against her.   There were current concerns with Tangela's children's speech and mental health and two new referrals regarding Tangela and her children.   Her two oldest children were residing with their grandmother, not with Brian E. and Tangela.   One referral, dated March 5, 2010, was called in by Tangela alleging sexual abuse of her teenage daughter.   The second referral was called in by a service provider alleging neglect by Tangela regarding her son's mental health issues.   In addition, as noted earlier in this decision, Nayya and Hashim reported being abused when left in the care of Tangela.   Mother also reported menacing behavior on the part of a jealous Tangela.   On March 26, 2010, Brian E. left a message with the department indicating he was no longer residing with Tangela and provided an address and phone number.   This new address was his parents' home.   He demanded that visits be held at this address.

Subsequent to February 26, 2010, Brian E.'s compliance with his specific steps was well below an acceptable level.   He refused to follow through with the recommended intensive parenting program at the Child Guidance Clinic or the relapse prevention program at Southwest Community Center, both of which were in Bridgeport, where he resided.   He missed four court hearings in 2010 and failed to attend a court-ordered psychological evaluation that was scheduled for May 13, 2010.   Cooperating with any court-ordered evaluation was one of his specific steps.   He also failed to attend two scheduled administrative case reviews on March 26, 2010 and September 9, 2010.   Brian E. did not always keep his whereabouts known to the department or his attorney.   All he ever gave the department was his parents' address even when he did not reside there.   The worker would attempt to get in touch with him by phone and would only be able to leave a message with his relatives.   Brian E. did not maintain consistent contact with the department throughout the case from June 19, 2010 to the adjudicatory date and thereafter.   During his first few months of incarceration, he did not contact the department and forgot how to contact his attorney.   His subsequent criminal behavior, which he testified was due to his drinking, also violated his steps not to abuse alcohol or have any further involvement with the criminal justice system.   He was not candid with the department about his drinking in 2010, when he was adamantly denying any substance abuse problem, disingenuously pointing to one negative urine screen, far less revealing than the hair test the department preferred.   The time and method of any testing was up to the department, per the specific steps.   He has never kept the department apprised of the composition of his household.   He never cooperated with the children's therapy because his lack of consistent visits and failure to follow through on substance abuse treatment or the referred parenting program prevented him from reaching a point where family therapy or intensive reunification services could have been effective.

In March 2010, after leaving the residence he shared with Tangela, Brian E. admitted he couldn't care for the children and began offering relatives as placement.   When none of them were approved, he suggested his sister's friends, the current foster parents.

The department has never been able to ascertain whether Brian obtained suitable housing or adequate income.   He has not verified any of his self-reports.   Brian claims to work two jobs, but one job is “under the table,” more illegal behavior on his part.   He has not confirmed any of his current income with the department.   Only at the May 2 trial did he reveal he obtained his own apartment.   The reasons for the presence of his 14–year old nephew would need to be investigated, and his assumption of such a responsibility when he has never even cared for his own children is concerning.   If Nayya and Hashim were to be returned to his care, their care should be his only concern.   After his extended absence in their lives, the insertion of another, possibly equally needy child, might make it difficult for them to reestablish a bond with Brian.

Brian E. was offered two-hour weekly visits with his children after their removal and agreed to visit with his children as often as the department permitted.   He began supervised visits on February 19, 2010 and was consistent for the most part until June 2010.   He had no visits with his children between June 8, 2010 and October 7, 2010.   His last visit with the children, apart from an unauthorized one last Christmas, was on October 22, 2010.

Brian E. agreed to visit the children as often as he could.   Since the department filed a motion to cease visitation, he has done little to pave the way for the resumption of visits.   He has not requested any parenting program or therapeutic interventions.   At trial, he presented a certificate purporting to indicate he had finished eight sessions of relapse prevention, but that short program, perhaps a condition of his parole, absent random tests, is insufficient to draw the conclusion he is in full recovery or needs no further relapse prevention supports.

The evidence is clear and convincing that as of the adjudicatory date, March 15, 2011, neither father had achieved a status where either one was more able to capably parent than at the time of the neglect adjudications on July 15, 2010.   Furthermore, there is no evidence to conclude that rehabilitation into the role of a constructive parent for Nayya, Hashim or Adam could be achieved by either of them within a reasonable period of time.

Since the adjudicatory date, Oscar R. has remained totally uninvolved.   Although Brian E. has been released from incarceration, and has apparently found work and an apartment in Bridgeport, his angry, rather confrontational demeanor during the trial and his testimony, which was long on blaming others and short on any self-reflective understanding of his contribution to his children's predicament, convinces the court that he still needs a great deal more intervention in order to become an effective parent.   His plan includes his past practice of relying on others to care for Nayya and Hashim.   He brought his daughter, Aniysa, to the trial, purportedly to show the court how well he had “raised” her, a boast the court does not find credible, and to suggest that she could care for the children during the long part of the day he is away, even though she, works as a nurse's assistance and lives in West Haven, more than a few miles away from Bridgeport, where he resides.   More “passing off” of responsibility to another by Brian E. is not what the children need right now;  that is merely what they have come to expect of him.   Given the abuse, neglect and trauma they have endured for years due to his tumultuous relationship with Amy F. and his lack of involvement, they deserve much better.   This is not a situation where Brian E. has undergone a dramatic transformation and displays a credible, newfound commitment to rehabilitation.   See In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 644.   This is a disappointing case of a man who will not acknowledge his own deficiencies and remains resistant to suggestion.   He is woefully unprepared to do what is necessary to reunify with Nayya and Hashim;  he has not even a limited understanding of their physical and emotional needs.   Moreover, he seems to have no recognition that a sudden and drastic move out of their current, enriching environment could affect his children adversely.   It is all about Brian.   He believes everything will be perfect if he just takes them into his home right away.   He can't even acknowledge that they have a home to which they have acclimated for nearly two years, not to mention the friends, activities and attachments which they might not be too eager to immediately leave.   It is unlikely, even if he were to rehabilitate, given his prior substantiations of neglect, that the department ever would license him as a placement for Adam.

Further delay in this case in an attempt to renew efforts to rehabilitate either father into the role of a suitable parent would be injurious to the children, who are still working to overcome the psychological damage of years of neglect and abuse, and doing so will require a sober, reliable and competent caretaker who is willing to invest in their need for stability, affection, therapy and services.   Oscar R. is not the least bit interested in Adam. There is no justification for allowing the absent Oscar R. any additional rehabilitation period.

Brian E. is simplistic and uninformed in his planned approach to parenting his two very emotionally traumatized children, stressing religious instruction as their most significant need.   His acknowledgment of their need for therapy was prompted, and, at best, tepid, since he hasn't a clue as to what their emotional needs require and what it will take to address them.

All three children have fortunately adjusted well and are thriving in the care of foster parents who are devoted to them and capable of not only addressing, but advocating for their special needs.   After over 27 months in foster care, the children must see a resolution to the permanency issue to assure they meet their full potential.   It is clear it would take a great deal of time with little possibility of success, given Brian's attitude and past performance, to persuade him to cooperate, engage in supervised visits and services and permit thorough monitoring of his progress.   Even if his own issues, including his anger, past domestic violence and substance abuse were adequately addressed, an additional prolonged period of time would be necessary to aid him in improving his parenting skills and his relationship with his two children, who have had little contact with him in over a year.

Prolonging these children's status in the limbo of foster care to assist two fathers who have such a distressing history of noncooperation with the department, services and court orders would be futile and potentially harmful to the children, who are now firmly secure in a loving, attentive home that wishes to adopt them.

The ground of failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i), alleged for termination of both fathers' parental rights, has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

D. No Ongoing Parent–Child Relationship—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D).

This is the third ground alleged against Oscar R. To prove this ground, the department must show the absence of “the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and [that] to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.”  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D);  In re Devaun J., 109 Conn.App. 832, 837, 953 A.2d 913 (2008);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 815, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).   This ground encompasses a situation in which “regardless of fault, a child either has never known his ․ parent, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitely lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced.”  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (Citation omitted.)   The decisive question is whether the child has present memories or feelings of a positive nature for the natural parent.  In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 602, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999).

The evidence in this case establishes clearly and convincingly that Oscar R. exhibits no positive feelings toward Adam. Even the knowledge that his child entered foster care a second time elicited no participation or response from Oscar R. After Adam's birth, the child developed more of a relationship with mother's other male partners than he ever did with Oscar.   If a relationship between Oscar and Adam ever did develop, it has been displaced.   When Adam was taken into department custody, he expressed affection for mother's boyfriend, not his biological father.   Adam is now firmly attached to his foster parents, whom he calls “Mom” and “Dad.” Adam only knows his real father is in jail;  he does not ask for him or speak about him unless prompted to do so.   Adam expresses no positive feelings about Oscar R. Given Oscar R.'s total disinterest and his lack of contact with Adam since 2009, to permit any further time to allow a father-son relationship to be reestablished would be a futile exercise.   The court concludes that the petitioner has proven the ground set forth in § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) by clear and convincing evidence as to Oscar R.

V

DISPOSITIONA. Section 17a–112(k) Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that all the statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of parental rights of Oscar R. and Brian E. have been proven.

Before making a decision whether or not to terminate parental rights, “the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a–112(k) ].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Devon W., 124 Conn.App. 631, 648, 6 A.3d 100 (2010);  In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 72, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 403 (2005);  In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26–26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004).   These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

(1) “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

All three children have been provided with therapy and tutoring to address their emotional problems and academic deficiencies.   The department made considerable effort to find them a placement in which they have flourished.   They also have been referred for long overdue medical and dental treatments.

The department offered timely and appropriate services to Brian E., to the extent possible, to facilitate reunification.   Not only was he offered services once the children were removed in February 2010, but he had been offered rehabilitative services in prior neglect proceedings affecting Nayya and Hashim.   He was offered a substance abuse evaluation and the recommended relapse prevention treatment, an intensive parenting program, which Cameron claimed would have put him on a “fast track” to reunification, and supervised visitation, which occurred at his choice of time and designation.   The nature and extent of the department's efforts to rehabilitate Brian E. has been more fully discussed in Part IV of this decision.   Brian refused to accept substance abuse treatment, then admittedly relapsed into substance abuse which contributed to his incarceration for six months in early 2011.   Since his release from prison, he has not made a serious effort to engage in the required services.

As noted in Part IV, Oscar R. has never contacted the department to request visitation or services to promote reunification between him and Adam.

Both Brian E. and Oscar R. were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   Neither father took acceptable advantage of the offered services to facilitate reunification within the foreseeable future.

(2) “Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

As noted above and in Part IV of this decision, the department has made reasonable efforts to the extent possible, given the lack of cooperation on the part of both fathers, to reunite both fathers with their children.

(3) “The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations.”

Oscar R. never appeared at court to defend either the neglect petition or the termination petition regarding Adam. Specific steps were issued for him on February 19, 2010.   The department attempted to engage Oscar R., but letters went unanswered.   Oscar R. has never contacted the department.

Brian E. was issued preliminary steps, which he signed on February 26, 2010, and those steps were made final steps at the time of the time of the children's commitment on July 15, 2010.

In Part IV of this decision, there is more extensive discussion of the department's reasonable, but failed efforts to ensure compliance by both fathers with the steps, and the lack of cooperation or effort on the part of both fathers.   Neither father adequately fulfilled the specific steps requirements.

(4) “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

Adam is now seven years old and is thriving in his current foster home, where he has lived with his two siblings since late 2010.   He refers to the foster parents as his “Mom” and “Dad.” When he was first removed, he expressed affection toward Quince F., mother's husband.   Adam expresses no positive feelings about his biological father, whom he has not seen since he was three years old.

Nayya and Hashim know and express affection toward Brian E., but Nayya was a parentified child, having assumed responsibility for her younger brothers.   She is thriving in the foster home, understands she cannot return home to her mother and has expressed a willingness to be adopted.   She and Hashim may have been hoping to return to mother in the past.   Nayya considers her father unreliable.   Hashim has exhibited some divided loyalty, but is also improving and thriving in the care of the foster parents.   Nayya and Hashim refer to their foster parents at times as “Mom” and “Dad” or “aunt” and “uncle” The children's therapist recommends against any further contact between the children and Brian E. The very real potential for further disappointment would not be in their best interests.

(5) “The age of the child.”

Nayya, born on October 22, 1999, is 12 years old.   Hashim, born on June 13, 2001, is almost 11 years old.   Adam, born on March 30, 2005, is seven years old.

(6) “The effort the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communications with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

The full extent of both fathers' lack of effort and contribution, and their unjustified failure to maintain contact with the department, the foster home and their children are thoroughly reviewed in Part IV of this decision.

Oscar R. has made no effort to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of Adam to return to him in the foreseeable future.   He has had no contact with Adam since 2009 and has refused to respond to communications from the department.   He has not attended a single court hearing since 2010.

Brian E. had a chance of gaining custody of Nayya and Hashim at the time the orders of temporary custody were issued, but he relapsed into substance abuse, or more likely, continued with his longstanding substance abuse.   His visits with the children dwindled to none, he never participated in recommended services and was convicted of three crimes and sentenced to prison in early 2011.   He failed to notify the department of his incarceration, but his visits had already become sporadic by the time he was imprisoned.   By his own volition, he has not maintained consistent contact with the department or the children, and there is no evidence he has had regular communication with the foster parents, although he is acquainted with the them.   Although Brian E. vociferously protests the loss of his rights, his efforts to accept and take responsibility were too little, too late.

(7) “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable acts or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

There is no evidence that the department or any other person interfered with the respondent fathers' ability to maintain a relationship with their children by unreasonable acts or conduct.

There is no evidence that economic circumstances have constituted a significant factor in either father's failure to maintain a meaningful relationship with their children.   Services, and supervised visitation, including transportation, were available.   Visits for Brian were arranged at his requested time and location.   Brian E. had legal representation throughout the pendency of these cases at no expense to him.   The children's medical, educational and therapeutic needs were addressed and payment was arranged by the department.   Unfortunately, the fathers' receptiveness to assistance and services offered to them was inadequate;  in fact, non-existent in the case of Oscar R. Oscar R. never visited Adam;  Brian E. stopped regular visits by his own choice before the end of 2010.   When he asked to resume visits in August 2011, the department's decision to move to cease any visitation between Brian E. and his children was well supported by their therapists' recommendation and Brian's past performance.

B. Best Interests of the Children

The court must now address the issue of whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.   This is the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding.  “If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In this phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 258, 881 A.2d 450 (2005);  In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469–70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003);  see also In re Devon W., supra, 124 Conn.App. 648.   The trial court “must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents'] parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.”  In re Vanna A., supra, 83 Conn.App. 17, 26–27.

The Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq., as amended, and General Statutes § 46b–129(k)(1) mandate that after 12 months in foster care, a child must have a plan for a permanent home.   See In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 479, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd., 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999).   Our supreme court has noted consistently the important of permanency in children's lives.   See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), supra, 181 Conn. 646, n.4. (removing child from foster home or further delaying permanency would be inconsistent with child's best interest.)  “Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Juvenile Appeal (83–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 285, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   Foster care should be a strictly limited episode in the life of a child.   With a statutorily mandated twelve-month limit prior to the institution of a permanency plan, a transition from foster care of over two years duration to the achievement of a permanent home for Nayya, Hashim and Adam falls outside the acceptable timelines.   In addition, the time period that has elapsed since the 2010 filing of the childrens' neglect petitions does not include the three years the department spent during the pendency of their prior neglect cases attempting to rehabilitate mother and the fathers to constructive parenting roles without success.

When mother ended her relationships with Brian E. and Oscar R., neither father paid support or more than sporadic attention to their children.   Mother knew she could not call on either of them for help;  hence, when she found caring for the three children without any reliable assistance was beyond her capabilities, she relinquished their care to the department.   Surrendering custody to Brian E. at that time was out of the question—mother reported Brian was still abusing substances and described several incidents of abuse of her children when Brian's E.'s wife, Tangela, cared for them.   Tangela had threatened mother about contact with Brian.   She was justifiably fearful that Brian E. would not protect her children.   According to mother, Brian E.'s declaration that he would take care of his children translated into his finding someone else to take care of them.   Oscar R., according to Nayya, had sexually molested her, so he was not a viable option.

Waiting any longer for either father to demonstrate a sustained period of rehabilitation is an unjustifiable risk, since they both rejected offers of assistance and failed to even visit their children regularly.   Their brief periods of incarceration were no excuse to justify not seeking visits or making other efforts to improve their skills or contact their children.   In addition, both have had prior opportunities to rehabilitate and resume the care of the children, but they chose to leave all responsibility to the mother, whose parenting problems must have been obvious to them.

Any further delay of permanency to allow for parental rehabilitation in the case of these three children will only exacerbate the emotional damage years of neglect, abuse and removal from their mother, the parent they loved and relied upon the most, already has caused them.   All of them require a patient, sober, reliable and informed caretaker in order to fully achieve their potential.   There is no satisfactory evidence that their mother or fathers could meet the sophisticated level of parenting and attentiveness that their emotional and educational needs require.   Brian E. presented as inappropriately smug and self-satisfied, with no recognition of his own major contribution to the past neglect and abuse of his two children.   Uncooperative, reluctant and resistant to department interventions, he is an angry man who continues to blame mother and the department for what has happened.

Oscar R. is completely disinterested in Adam, and has been for at least three years.

The children's attorney advocates termination of parental rights and adoption as being in their best interests.   As he argued, the children need a caretaker “who can sacrifice, see their needs independent of [his] own, [and] whose ego does not get involved in their parenting.”   The children are beginning to blossom and thrive in their current placement, and it is in their best interests that they be given a chance to remain there permanently.   Adam, Hashim and Nayya have grown immensely since their initial placement in their current foster home on October 28, 2010.   The foster parents are strong advocates for the children getting a good education.   Nayya has been accepted to a private school next year, and Hashim is now encouraged to try to attend.   The children are very involved in school and community activities, playing instruments and participating in sports.   Adam requires special education.   All three continue to require therapy biweekly.   Most important, they are all together, in an identified, potential adoptive home which may foster, if appropriate, some continued connection to their biological relatives, as the foster mother is good friends with one of the maternal aunt.   From the beginning of these cases, the children emphasized their desire to stay together, and adoptions will assure that.

Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered the exhibits, testimony and arguments of counsel, the court concludes that the evidence is clear and convincing that the best interests of Nayya, Hashim and Adam are served by the termination of their mother's and fathers' parental rights so they may be free for adoption.

Motion to Cease Visitation

As the court has determined to terminate the parental rights of mother and Brian E., the motion to cease their visitation is arguably moot.   However, to avoid any further litigation on this issue, the court grants the motion, finding that continued contact with mother or Brian E. would not be in the best interests of Nayya, Hashim or Adam. Any future contact between the children and any of the respondent parents shall be left to the department's or subsequent adoptive parents' informed discretion.

CONCLUSION

Termination of Parental Rights

The petitions for termination of parental rights are granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of Amy F. and Brian E. in Nayya M. and Hashim M., and the parental rights of Amy F. and Oscar R. in Adam M.

Pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 17a–112(m), it is ordered that the commissioner of the department of children and families be appointed statutory parent for the children so that they may be placed for adoption.   In securing adoptions, the court urges the department to give first preference to the current foster parents.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o), the statutory parent will file a written report on the case plan for the children with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before July 5, 2012 at 9:00 A.M. As previously ordered, a motion to review permanency plans, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(k), is to be filed on or before August 14, 2012, and a hearing to review any such plans will be held on September 25, 2012 at 9:45 A.M.

Additional reports and/or motions to review permanency plan for the children will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as the children's adoption is finalized.

The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when any adoption is finalized.

Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that may exercise jurisdiction over any subsequent adoptions of these children is ordered to notify in writing the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoptions are finalized.¹¹

KELLER, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. A parent who fails to appear at the plea hearing on a termination of parental rights petition and prove eligibility for appointed counsel is not entitled to representation during the termination proceeding.   See Practice Book § 3–9(e)..  FN2. A parent who fails to appear at the plea hearing on a termination of parental rights petition and prove eligibility for appointed counsel is not entitled to representation during the termination proceeding.   See Practice Book § 3–9(e).

FN3. See Practice Book § 35a–8(a)..  FN3. See Practice Book § 35a–8(a).

FN4. See Practice Book § 35a–14(c)..  FN4. See Practice Book § 35a–14(c).

FN5. Protective supervision is usually extended when there continue to be concerns about the care of the children or a parent's compliance with services.   In the court's 12 years of experience presiding over juvenile matters, a series of extensions totaling up to a three-year period is extraordinary..  FN5. Protective supervision is usually extended when there continue to be concerns about the care of the children or a parent's compliance with services.   In the court's 12 years of experience presiding over juvenile matters, a series of extensions totaling up to a three-year period is extraordinary.

FN6. The history of this incident is inconsistent.   Mother claimed Tangela threw the Drano at Nayya;  Nayya says it was one of Tangela's daughters..  FN6. The history of this incident is inconsistent.   Mother claimed Tangela threw the Drano at Nayya;  Nayya says it was one of Tangela's daughters.

FN7. The foster parents have four older, biological children who are exceptionally accomplished academically, and the M. children look to them as role models..  FN7. The foster parents have four older, biological children who are exceptionally accomplished academically, and the M. children look to them as role models.

FN8. Cameron is working to resolve an apparent disagreement between the evaluating psychiatrists, who have recommended medication for the boys, and their current therapist, Muse–McGee, who believes their behaviors are the by-product of neglect, abuse and lack of pro-social behaviors.   These issues, she believes, do not respond to medication and are best treated with behavior modification, consistency, positive reinforcement and time, implemented in close collaboration with the foster home to enforce healthy, pro-social behaviors, redefine healthy, age appropriate roles, address trust issues, and treat inappropriate behavior as a learning experience.   The children's measurable and distinct improvement over the past several years may have proven her correct..  FN8. Cameron is working to resolve an apparent disagreement between the evaluating psychiatrists, who have recommended medication for the boys, and their current therapist, Muse–McGee, who believes their behaviors are the by-product of neglect, abuse and lack of pro-social behaviors.   These issues, she believes, do not respond to medication and are best treated with behavior modification, consistency, positive reinforcement and time, implemented in close collaboration with the foster home to enforce healthy, pro-social behaviors, redefine healthy, age appropriate roles, address trust issues, and treat inappropriate behavior as a learning experience.   The children's measurable and distinct improvement over the past several years may have proven her correct.

FN9. These findings are not required as to any parent who consents to the termination of parental rights.   See General Statutes § 17a–112(i)..  FN9. These findings are not required as to any parent who consents to the termination of parental rights.   See General Statutes § 17a–112(i).

FN10. Subsequent to the adjudicatory date, he did have one unauthorized visit in 2011 at Christmas time, when the children were at the home of their maternal aunt..  FN10. Subsequent to the adjudicatory date, he did have one unauthorized visit in 2011 at Christmas time, when the children were at the home of their maternal aunt.

FN11. The state legislature recently enacted P.A. 12–82, which, if signed into law by the Governor, will, after October 1, 2012, allow this court to hear adoption petitions connected to cases in which it has entered judgments terminating parental rights..  FN11. The state legislature recently enacted P.A. 12–82, which, if signed into law by the Governor, will, after October 1, 2012, allow this court to hear adoption petitions connected to cases in which it has entered judgments terminating parental rights.

Keller, Christine E., J.