LLC v. Alberto Soto et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is a summary process action for possession of residential premises at 452 Tunxis Avenue, Bloomfield, Connecticut.   On June 5, 2012, the parties appeared before the court for trial on the three-count complaint.   The plaintiff alleges that an oral month-to-month lease has terminated due to lapse of time, that the defendants' original right or privilege to occupy the premises has terminated and nonpayment of rent due in April 2012.   The defendants, in their answer, disagree with the plaintiff's claims.

SUMMARY PROCESS–GENERALLY

The courts of this state have consistently held that “[s]ummary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, 284 Conn. 1, 5 (2007).  “Summary process statutes provide a prompt hearing and final determination ․” Id., at 5–6.   Summary process is intended to ․ provide an expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession.”  HUD/Barbour–Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650, 658 (1995).   The ultimate issue in a summary process action is the right to possession.   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Tinaco Plaza, LLC. v. Freebob's, Inc., 74 Conn.App. 760, 766–67 (2003).

“Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy ․ It enables landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms ․ Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and a final determination ․ Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  St. Paul's Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn.App. 728, 733 (2010).

EQUITY

“Equity does not necessarily mean full compensation to the plaintiffs.   Equity is [j]ustice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated rules of common law ․ the term ‘equity’ denotes the spirit and habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men ․ [e]quity takes into consideration fairness to both the plaintiff and the defendant.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Krasowski v. Fantarella, 51 Conn.App. 186, 199 (1998), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 961 (1999).  “It is fundamental that anyone going into equity and asking its aid submits to the imposition of such terms as well-established equitable principles require ․” (Internal citations omitted.)   Village II Glen Lochen v. Burnham, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CV 07–4034048, (June 4, 2010, Peck, J.) [50 Conn. L. Rptr. 85].  “As he is seeking equity he must do equity.”  Caramini v. Telegulias, 121 Conn. 548, 553 (1936).

BURDEN OF PROOF

“While the plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that may be legitimately drawn from the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the plaintiff must still sustain the burden of proof on the contested issues in the complaint and the defendant need not present any evidence to contradict it.”  Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 211 (1981).   The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential elements of their cause of action by a fair preponderance of the evidence.  Gulycz v. Stop & Shop, 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923 (1982).   Failure to do so results in judgment for the defendant.  Id. “ ․ [W]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged.”  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 308 (1998).

STANDARD OF PROOF

The standard of proof in summary process actions, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is “properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394 (1981).

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM

To prevail on a claim for lapse of time, the plaintiff must establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the following essential elements:  1. The existence of an oral or written weekly, monthly or yearly rental agreement;  2. The Plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the subject premises;  3. The address of subject premises;  4. The date of the rental agreement that has terminated;  6. Notice to quit:  service date and termination date;  and 7. That the defendant is still in possession.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 47a–23(a)(1)(A) et seq.

“Termination of lease [by lapse of time] signifies that the lease—whether express or implied or whether oral or written—will lapse at the end of the current period and will not be renewed.”   Yale University v. Valinho, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. SPN 9407–20487 (October 13, 1994, DiPentima, J.) (Hartford # 1033) [12 Conn. L. Rptr. 668].

In a summary process action based on the plaintiff's claim that the defendants originally had the right or privilege to occupy the premises but any such right or privilege has terminated, the plaintiff must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, all the elements of the case.   The essential elements are:  (1) the plaintiff is the owner of the property;  (2) the defendants originally had a right or privilege to occupy the premises but such right or privilege has terminated;  (3) the plaintiff caused a proper notice to quit possession to be served on the defendant to vacate the premises on or before a certain date;  and (4) although the time given the defendant to vacate in the notice to quit possession has passed, the defendant remains in possession of the premises.   Conn. Gen.Stat. § 47a–23(a)(3).

To prevail on a claim for nonpayment of rent, the plaintiff must establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the following essential elements:  (1) a rental agreement;  (2) that the plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the premises;  (3) the address of the subject premises;  (4) the amount of rent due to the plaintiff from the defendant;  (5) when the rent was due to the plaintiff;  (6) the date of nonpayment;  (7) The service of the notice to quit, as well as its service date and termination date;  and (8) that the defendant is still in possession.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 47a–15a et seq.

Leases as Contracts–Generally

“A lease is simply a type of contract and ordinary rules of contract interpretation and general rules of contract law apply to leases.”  Warner Associates v. Logan, 50 Conn.App. 90, 94–95 (1998).  “ ․ [W]hen a landlord specifies the terms for the future occupancy of the dwelling unit and the tenant continues in possession without objecting to those terms, it may be construed that the tenant has accepted those terms and a contract will be implied from the conduct of the parties.”  Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 607 (1950).  “[A]cceptance may be shown by acts or conduct indicating assent to an offer or under appropriate circumstances, acceptance may be implied by the offeree's silence and inaction ․ moreover, regardless of actual intent, if the offeree's conduct leads the offeror reasonably to conclude that the offer is being accepted, acceptance has taken place as a matter of law.”   Greenfield v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 560884 (August 26, 2002).

“The rules governing contract formation are well settled.   To form a valid and binding agreement contract in Connecticut, there must be a mutual understanding of the terms that are definite and certain between the parties ․ to constitute an offer and acceptance sufficient to create an enforceable contract, each must be found to be based on an identical understanding by the parties.”  Duplissie v. Devino, 96 Conn.App. 673, 688, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 916 (2006).   Mutual assent presents a question of fact.  M.J. Daly & Sons, Inc. v. West Haven, 66 Conn.App. 41, 48, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 944 (2001).   Mutual assent is based on the parties written or spoken words or by other acts.  Precision Mechanical Services, Inc v. Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc., 97 Conn.App. 258, 263, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 928 (2006).

“It is [well] established ․ that parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree.   This freedom includes the right to contract for the assumption of known or unknown hazards and risks that may arise as a consequence of the execution of the contract.”  (Internal quotation marks, omitted.)  Scoville v. Shop–Rite Supermarkets, Inc., 86 Conn.App. 426, 431, 863 A.2d 211 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 921, 867 A.2d 838 (2005).  “If there was a meeting of the minds of the parties, without fraud or unfair conduct on either side, the contract must stand, although subsequent events may show that either party made a bad bargain ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ross v. Koenig, 129 Conn. 403, 406–07, 28 A.2d 875 (1942).

THE PLEADINGS

“The admission of the truth of an allegation [in a] pleading is a judicial admission conclusive on the pleader.”  Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, 161 Conn. 191, 199 (1971).  “Factual allegations contained in pleadings upon which the case is tried are considered judicial admissions and hence irrefutable as long as they remain in the case ․ An admission in pleading dispenses with proof, and is equivalent to proof.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 345, 766 A.2d 400 (2001).   It is the full equivalent of uncontradicted proof of these facts by credible witnesses ․ and is conclusive on the pleader.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Days Inn of America, Inc. v. 161 Hotel Group, Inc., 55 Conn.App. 118, 126, 739 A.2d 280 (1999);  see Connecticut Hospital for the Insane v. Brookfield, 69 Conn. 1, 4, 36 A. 1017 (1897).   An admission by answer carries all reasonable implications of fact and legal conclusions arising from it.  Guiel v. Barnes, 100 Conn. 737, 743, 125 A. 91 (1924).

SPECIAL DEFENSES

“[A] special defense is not an independent action;  rather, it is an attempt to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint to demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Valentine v. LaBow, 95 Conn.App. 436, 447 n.10 (2005), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 933 (2006).   The defendants have the burden of proving the allegations in their special defenses by a fair preponderance of the evidence.   Lodovico v. Mihalcik, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CV–07–50130991 (August 17, 2010, Rittenband, J.T.R.).

THE PROCEEDINGS

“The fact-finding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of the circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cavoli v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906 (2005).  “It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony ․ it is the quintessential function of the factfinder to reject or accept certain evidence ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540 (2000).  “The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact].”  Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123 (1981).   “[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to the testimony.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530 (1977).

“[T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible ․ it is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses ․ the trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness ․ the trier can, as well, decide what—all, none, or some—of the witnesses testimony to accept or reject.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Osborne, 41 Conn.App. 287, 291 (1996).   The trial court's function as the finder is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.”  In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808 (1986).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court has weighed all the evidence and assessed the testimony and credibility of the witnesses and reaches the conclusions set forth herein by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

1. On and after July 1, 2011, the plaintiff and the defendant, Alberto Soto, entered into a series of oral and written agreements related to the defendant's work for the plaintiff in assisting in the operation of a small farm on the premises.   Part of the defendant's compensation for his labor included his right to occupy, with his family, the subject premises (Exhibits 1–3;  A, B);

2.  The subject premises are:  452 Tunxis Avenue, Bloomfield, Connecticut;

3.  The terms of the employment/occupancy agreement changed several times over the course of the defendants' occupancy and employment, based on requested revisions by both parties, resulting in a monthly tenancy (Exhibits 1–3;  A, B);

4.  A specific rental amount was never agreed upon by the parties;

5.  In April 2012, the parties were unable to reach a mutually acceptable agreement for Alberto Soto's continued employment and occupancy;

6.  The defendants' original right or privilege to occupy the subject premises, by virtue of the monthly agreement between the parties, terminated on or about April 1, 2012, when the parties failed to reach a new agreement;

7.  On April 12, 2012, the plaintiff had the defendants served with a notice to quit possession of the premises;

8.  The time given in the notice to quit possession for the defendant to vacate the premises, May 1, 2012, has passed, yet the defendants have not vacated the premises and remain in possession.

Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

The court finds that the plaintiff has established all the essential elements of its case by a fair preponderance of the evidence, as to the Second Count of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, The Court enters judgment for immediate possession of the subject premises in favor of the plaintiff.   The Court orders an equitable stay of execution through July 31, 2012.

BY THE COURT,

Hon. Vernon D. Oliver

Oliver, Vernon D., J.