Shawna Tasto v. Meghan E. McKeand et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 133)

In the present case, the defendants, Mary Delaney and Donald Delaney, have filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact and they may not be held liable for negligence.   The plaintiff has not filed an opposition, and has left the defendants to meet their burden.

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ․ The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Grimm v. Fox, 303 Conn. 322, 329 (2012).

“Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner ․ In the context of multi-car accidents [however] judges of the superior court have consistently granted summary judgment where it is undisputed that the middle vehicle was stopped at the time of the accident and the plaintiff fails to submit any evidence that the driver of the middle vehicle operated his car negligently.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Corsi v. Pascal, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 04 4004535 (June 12, 2007, Holden, J.).

Here, it is undisputed that the defendant, Mary Delaney, was operating a vehicle owned by the defendant, Donald Delaney, and that the vehicle was involved in a chain reaction motor vehicle collision in which the plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries.   The defendants argue that the Delaney vehicle was a middle-vehicle in this collision and, thus, they may not be held liable.   The defendants have presented evidence, in the form of an affidavit by Mary Delaney, stating that the vehicle she operated was completely stopped at a red traffic light before the collision.   There is no dispute that, while the Delaney vehicle was completely stopped, a vehicle driven by a co-defendant struck the Delaney vehicle from the rear, propelling the Delaney vehicle into the rear of the vehicle in front of it, and the vehicle struck by the Delaney vehicle, in turn, struck the plaintiff's vehicle.   The plaintiff has presented no contrary evidence and, in fact, alleges in the complaint that, at the time of the collision, the vehicle driven by Mary Delaney, was stopped at a red traffic signal behind the vehicle of one co-defendant and in front of the vehicle of another co-defendant.

As a result, there are no remaining genuine issues of material fact as to any allegations of negligence against these defendants, and the motion for summary judgment is granted as to the defendants, Mary Delaney and Donald Delaney.

Woods, J.

Woods, Glenn A., J.