Carabetta Management Co. v. Taisha Sealy (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES

The defendant, Taisha Sealy, brings this motion for attorneys fees pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb and Connecticut Practice Book § 11–21, following the plaintiff's December 31, 2012 withdrawal of this action.   On January 12, 2012, the defendant filed her motion for attorneys fees.   On January 31, 2012 and March 27, 2012, this court took evidence on the defendant's motion for attorneys fees, including the plaintiff's responses to a request for admissions served during discovery.

Findings of Fact

The parties had been in the process of litigating a summary process matter between the same parties for the same premises, Docket No. HDSP–160135.   On June 30, 2011 the plaintiff had the defendant served with a notice to quit possession of the same premises:  1630 Main Street, Apt. 1002, Hartford, Connecticut, asserting nonpayment of rent.   On July 18, 2011, counsel for the plaintiff withdrew the summary process action Docket No. HDSP160135 and delivered a letter to counsel for the plaintiff reinstating the written yearly tenancy.   On July 29, 2011, the plaintiff had the defendant served with a writ, summons and complaint.   On July 29, 2011, the plaintiff filed a summary process complaint seeking possession of the aforementioned premises occupied by the defendant.   The complaint alleged nonpayment of her portion of rent for certain months pursuant to a written lease agreement.   On August 15, 2011, Attorney Cecil Thomas of Greater Hartford Legal Aid filed an appearance on behalf of the defendant.   Attorney Thomas also served the plaintiff with Requests for Admission pursuant to Practice Book § 13–22(b).  The parties further engaged in the discovery process pursuant to the Rules of Court.

On October 21, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss this action based on several challenges to the court's subject matter jurisdiction related to the timing of the service of the June 30, 2011 notice to quit, withdrawal of the prior action and reinstatement of the defendant's tenancy.   The plaintiff filed no objection to the motion to dismiss.   Instead, on December 31, 2011, the plaintiff withdrew this summary process action.   On January 11, 2012, the defendant filed the instant motion.   The plaintiff filed no written objection to the motion for attorneys fees.   On January 31, 2012, Attorney David Pels, also of Greater Hartford Legal Aid, filed an appearance in this matter and directed the examination of Attorney Thomas in support of the instant motion.   Attorney Thomas was the sole witness to testify in this matter.

Attachment No. 6 to the rental agreement between the parties specifically allows for the plaintiff to recover “all costs, including marshal fees and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the Landlord in any legal proceeding as the result of a default under the terms of this Agreement as may be determined and rendered as a judgment by the Court.”

Attorney Thomas testified to his training and experience related to the defense of summary process actions.   The defendant seeks an award based on an hourly rate of two hundred ($200.00) dollars per hour.   He also testified to the number of hours (10.1) dedicated by his office to the defense, ultimately successful, of this action.

The Defendant's Argument

The defendant asserts that she is entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb, which provides for the award of attorneys fees as a matter of law to the consumer who successfully prosecutes or defends an action or a counterclaim based upon a contract or lease that provides for attorneys fees.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–150bb.

The defendant further asserts that the instant motion, brought pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book § 11–21, is the proper mechanism by which a successful “consumer,” in this instance a residential tenant, brings a postjudgment claim for attorneys fees pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–150bb.

The defendant essentially relies, as to the applicability of this statutory scheme for the postjudgment recovery of attorneys fees in the landlord-tenant context, on Figueroa v. FAH Redstone Ltd. Partnership, as well as recent cases from this Court, including the first incarnation of this summary process matter, which also resulted in an award of attorneys fees after the defendant's successful defense.

In Figueroa, the plaintiffs/tenants brought a separate civil action for attorneys fees pursuant to C.G.S. § 42–150bb after the defendant/landlord withdrew a summary process action initiated against them.   Figueroa v. FAH Redstone Ltd. Partnership, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. CVN–0702–2096 (November 29, 2007, Peck, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 639].   In ruling on the cross motions for summary judgment, the court made several findings, some of which are unique to the summary process context, the most important of which specifically finds that C.G.S. § 42–150bb applies to tenants who successfully defend summary process actions involving a written lease agreement with an attorneys fees provision.   Id. at 3. The Figueroa court's application of the aforementioned statute is based on the presence of the term “lease” in the statute.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–150bb.

The Plaintiff's Argument

The plaintiff argued orally that Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb does not create a statutory cause of action allowing for an award of attorneys fees to a tenant who successfully defends a summary process action involving a lease with an attorneys fees provision.   In the landlord-tenant context, the most recent case on point is Plainville Housing Authority v. Galka, although not specifically cited by the plaintiff, this court considers that decision herein.

In Galka, the defendant brought a postjudgment motion, pursuant to Practice Book § 11–21, seeking an award of attorneys fees after the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.   The complaint was dismissed on the defendant's motion challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction based on the validity of the notice to quit.   Plainville Housing Authority v. Robert Galka, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP–053968 (December 17, 2010, Gilligan, J.) [51 Conn. L. Rptr. 839].

The court in Galka focused on the varying definitions and contextual applications of the word “lease” as it appears in C.G.S. § 42–150bb.   The court concluded that Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb does not allow for an award of attorneys fees in the landlord-tenant context as the term “contract or lease” as used in that statute is not meant to include rental agreements (leases) in summary process actions.

Discussion

“A lease is simply a type of contract and ordinary rules of contract interpretation and general rules of contract law apply to leases.”  Warner Associates v. Logan, 50 Conn.App. 90, 94–95 (1998) (action to recover damages for the alleged breach of a commercial lease).   Additionally, the Connecticut General Statutes state that an agreement in which the consumer leases any residential dwelling falls within the ambit of a “consumer contract.”  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–151(b)(2)(c).

This court finds no ambiguity in the words of Connecticut General Statutes § 42–150bb as it relates to summary process actions.   This court finds, as it did in Malcolm v. Diaz, that based on the plain language of the statute, it does indeed apply to appropriate summary process actions involving written leases with attorneys fees provisions.   Malcolm v. Diaz, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP–156276 (March 3, 2011, Oliver, J.) [51 Conn. L. Rptr. 528].

In Malcolm v. Diaz, this Court, in awarding a prevailing tenant attorneys fees, discussed the reciprocal application of these provisions through C.G.S. § 42–150bb and how this application should encourage thoughtful, well prepared pleading on the part of landlords, which would be less susceptible to successful legal challenges.   Also, such an application would likely encourage good-faith discussions between the parties and timely pre-trial settlements by putting landlords and their counsel on notice that failure to adequately and timely assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of their cases might have additional financial consequences.

Withdrawals of actions would not be discouraged as the context within which the withdrawal is made would determine whether or not the action was “successfully” defended or whether, for example, a defendant/tenant vacated the premises and turned over the keys, limiting the court's ability to grant practical relief.   An oral or written statement or stipulation as to the reason for the withdrawal would likely address the majority of landlord concerns regarding being “punished” for certain withdrawals.   Further, the basis for the withdrawal would be relevant as to what sum of attorneys fees are a “reasonable” award, under the totality of the circumstances.

The plaintiff also appeared to assert that an interconnection between the two summary process actions and negotiations between the parties related thereto were the bases for the withdrawal, as opposed to jurisdictional defects.   In an abundance of caution, this court held a second hearing to allow the plaintiff to explore and expand on this assertion.   After the second hearing and a review of the entire record, this Court has not been persuaded to adopt the plaintiff's reasoning.

Finally, the plaintiff argues that awarding tenants attorneys fees where appropriate will open a “Pandora's Box” that will threaten the well-settled and efficient summary process framework as it exists in this state.   This argument was first made approximately eight months ago by this same plaintiff and the predicted results have yet to come to pass.   Regardless, such an argument cannot serve as a basis to have this Court interpret and apply the law in a different fashion.

ORDER

This court finds the defendant has established all of the prerequisites for recovery of attorneys fees pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42–150bb.   In this matter, the withdrawal of the action constitutes a successful defense of the summary process action.   Further, the attachment to the written lease agreement provides for the plaintiff's recovery of attorneys fees.

Additionally, based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the court finds 10.1 hours of Attorney Thomas' time at a rate of $200.00 per hour to be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case.

Accordingly, the court awards the defendant reasonable attorneys fees of $2,020.00 for the successful defense of this summary process action.

Vernon D. Oliver

Oliver, Vernon D., J.