State of Connecticut v. Ronald T. Dolphin (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

The defendant, Ronald Dolphin, is charged with patronizing a prostitute in violation of General Statutes § 53a–83.¹  Before the court is the pro se defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   The thrust of the defendant's argument is that the present case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a federal forum.²  The defendant filed this motion to dismiss and a brief memorandum in support on May 7, 2012.

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010).  “In general, a motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise a claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action.”  Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).  “Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 802, 970 A.2d 640 (2009).

It is well settled that the Superior Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over causes of action for crimes or offenses against the state.   “[T]he Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction ․ Article fifth, § 1 of the Connecticut constitution proclaims that [t]he powers and jurisdiction of the courts shall be defined by law, and General Statutes § 51–164s provides that [t]he Superior Court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 695, 12 A.3d 783 (2011).  “The Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear criminal matters from its authority as a constitutional court of unlimited jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   State v. Pompei, 52 Conn.App. 303, 307, 726 A.2d 644 (1999).

The defendant's contention that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this criminal charge is simply not supported by Connecticut law.   See, e.g., State v. Pompei, supra, 52 Conn.App. 307 (holding that the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction where the defendant was charged with larceny in the first degree);  State v. Guillory, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CR 00 0011284 (June 27, 2003, dos Santos, J.) [35 Conn. L. Rptr. 2] (holding that the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction where the defendant was charged with three counts of engaging in the business of new home construction or holding himself out as a new home contractor without a current certificate of registration);  State v. Borysewicz, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket Nos. CI 99 7513866, CI 00 0483535 (December 18, 2000, Gaffney, J.) (holding that the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction where the defendant was charged with three counts of creating a nuisance).

The motion to dismiss is denied.

The Court

By Ronan, J.T.R.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 53a–83 provides in relevant part:  “A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute when:  (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he pays a fee to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in sexual conduct with him;  or (2) he pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will engage in sexual conduct with him;  or (3) he solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual conduct with him in return for a fee.”.  FN1. General Statutes § 53a–83 provides in relevant part:  “A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute when:  (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he pays a fee to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in sexual conduct with him;  or (2) he pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will engage in sexual conduct with him;  or (3) he solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual conduct with him in return for a fee.”

FN2. Specifically, the defendant, a self-represented party, contends that absent a “delegation of authority order” from the federal government, the present case must be dismissed.   The defendant further argues that “without proof of jurisdiction, the court cannot proceed ․”.  FN2. Specifically, the defendant, a self-represented party, contends that absent a “delegation of authority order” from the federal government, the present case must be dismissed.   The defendant further argues that “without proof of jurisdiction, the court cannot proceed ․”

Ronan, John J., J.T.R.