Scott Palmenta v. Leo Arnone et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION to DISMISS

This Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, in which the plaintiff/prison inmate alleges that he has been denied nutritionally adequate prison meals and denied a meal as a disciplinary measure, is before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss (# 102), in which they assert that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion (# 106).   Oral argument was not requested.

I

Background

In his complaint, dated October 1, 2011, the plaintiff, Scott Palmenta, a Connecticut prison inmate, alleges that he has been denied nutritionally adequate prison meals and was denied a meal as a disciplinary measure in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.   He also states that he alleges the same causes of action under State law, but does not specify the basis thereof.   The defendants are Leo Arnone, who, as discussed below, is the Commissioner of Corrections, and Correction Officer Croteau.

The plaintiff alleges that he has eaten prison meals since November 2007 and experienced headaches and constipation without knowing the source.   See complaint, ¶¶ 7–8.   He alleges also that prison meals provide excessive sodium and an insufficient amount of dietary fiber.   See complaint, ¶ 10.   He alleges that prisoners must be provided with nutritionally adequate meals, which do not present an immediate danger to their health and well being.   See complaint, ¶ 13.

In addition, the plaintiff alleges that, on September 24, 2011, defendant Croteau denied him lunch, leaving him hungry.   See complaint, ¶¶ 15–16.   He also claims that a disciplinary ticket was illegally raised from Class B to Class A. See complaint, ¶ 18(A).

The plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against each defendant in his individual capacity and removal of the Class A disciplinary ticket from his record.   He also requests the court to declare that the acts and/or omissions by the defendants were unconstitutional.   See complaint, ¶ 3.

Additional references to the factual allegations are set forth below.

II

Standard of Review

“Whenever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause;  as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 245, 558 A.2d 986 (1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.E.2d 416 (1992).   The Supreme Court has termed this “fundamental principle” the “ ‘jurisdiction first’ rule.   Once the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented ․ The court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  St. Paul Travelers Companies, Inc. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 816, 12 A.3d 852 (2011).

“[T]rial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ․ may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case ․ [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances:  (1) the complaint alone;  (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record;  or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts ․ Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed.   When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ․ [W]here a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 347–48, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).

Here, concerning the issues which are dispositive, as explained below, there are no disputed facts.   No evidentiary hearing was requested or required.   “[T]he motion to dismiss ․ admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 201, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).   No evidentiary hearing need be held on a motion to dismiss where there is no genuine issue as to a material fact.   See Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).

III

Discussion

The defendants challenge the plaintiff's standing to bring this suit.  “The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss ․ [I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute ․ It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Association Resources, Inc. v. Wall, 298 Conn. 145, 164, 2 A.3d 873 (2010).

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion.   One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action.”  Gold v. Rowland, supra, 296 Conn. 207.

“Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court;  nor is it a test of substantive rights.   Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 802, 970 A.2d 640 (2009).

A

Nutritionally Adequate Diet

“The plaintiff has brought a[n] ․ action pursuant to § 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.¹ See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (‘[e]very person who, under color of [law] ․ custom, or usage, of any [s]tate ․ subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ․ to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [c]onstitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law’);  ․ (‘[t]he purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails').”  (Citation omitted.)   Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 126, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010).

“The [Eighth] Amendment [of the United States Constitution] ․ requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is reasonable safety ․ It is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions.”  (Citation omitted.)  Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993).   An inmate may state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment that a defendant has, “with deliberate indifference,” exposed him to conditions “that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.”  Id., 35.

“Although [t]he Constitution does not require that sentenced prisoners [receive] every amenity which one might find desirable ․ the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does require that prisoners be served nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well being of the inmates who consume it.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1983) (per curiam).

Concerning the nutritional adequacy of food, the defendants argue that the plaintiff claims to have suffered headaches and constipation, but he did not know the source thereof.   See complaint, ¶ 8.   They assert that the complaint should be dismissed since the plaintiff has failed to allege any injury that rises to the level of a constitutional violation and that they are immune from suit for damages.

In his opposition to the defendants' motion (# 106), page 6, the plaintiff states that the only relief he seeks concerning the prison menu is declaratory and/or injunctive relief, “not monetary damages.”   Rather, he states that he is seeking a gluten-free diet with adequate fiber.   Any damages claims concerning the prison diet are expressly waived.   See Suffield Bank v. Berman, 228 Conn. 766, 768 n.2, 639 A.2d 1033 (1994).   Accordingly, the court need not consider the defendants' arguments concerning immunity from suit for damages as to such claims.

“°'[N]either absolute nor qualified immunity is a defense to a claim for injunctive relief.'  Hall v. Marshall, 479 F.Sup.2d 304, 318 (E.D.N.Y.2007);  see Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 239 (2d Cir.2005) (‘An official's entitlement to absolute immunity from a claim for damages, ‘however,’ does not bar the granting of injunctive relief, Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir.1987);  see, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536–37 (1984), Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir.1998);  Heimbach v. Village of Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir.1979), or of other equitable relief');  Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir.1999) (‘Qualified immunity shields the defendants only from claims for monetary damages and does not bar actions for declaratory or injunctive relief’).”   Brisco v. Rice, United States District Court, E.D.N.Y., Docket No. 11–CV–578 (JFB)(ETB) (January 27, 2012).

“Injunctive relief may be obtained in a § 1983 action for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, even absent an official's personal involvement, if the complaint alleges that the official had responsibility to ensure that prisoners' basic needs were met, and the complaint adequately alleged deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.”  White v. Mitchell, 2001 WL 64756, *3 (E.D.N.Y. January 18, 2001) ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Torrence v. Pelkey, United States District Court, D.Conn., Civ. No. 3:96 CV 299(HBF) (August 8, 2001).

Here, the plaintiff's allegations as to defendant Croteau, who is alleged to be a correction officer, and defendant Arnone, who is the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections,² contain neither allegations as to their responsibilities concerning the prison diet nor allegations concerning deliberate indifference.   Similarly, the complaint lacks allegations concerning immediate danger to health.

“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Oliphant v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 563, 569 n.5, 877 A.2d 761 (2005).   Since it appears that the plaintiff may be able to amend his allegations to support a claim as to the inadequacy of the prison diet, as to this aspect of the plaintiff's complaint, “this court will treat the motion to dismiss as a motion to strike ․” Norberg v. Hurlburt, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield at Litchfield, Docket No. CV 11 5007329 (October 25, 2011, Pickard, J.).

“ ‘The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  ‘The role of the trial court [in ruling on a motion to strike] [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.’  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).   When ‘the issues concern the granting of a motion to strike, [the court is] limited to and must accept as true the facts alleged in the ․ complaint.’  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 315 n.4, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003).  ‘[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.’  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 229, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006).”  Norberg v. Hurlburt, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 11 5007329.

Since, as to the adequacy of the prison diet, the plaintiff's complaint is legally insufficient to state claims for injunctive relief against the defendants, it is stricken as to those claims.

B

Denial Of Meal

Denial of a single meal presents a different issue.   In the context of a § 1983 action concerning conditions of confinement, the Appellate Court stated,” [a]s the United States Supreme Court has explained, ‘[t]he power to declare the rights of individuals and to measure the authority of governments ․ is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy.’  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).   As a result, ‘[t]he exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants who can show [an injury] resulting from the action which they seek to have the court adjudicate.’  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 473.   The standing requirement further evinces a proper regard for the judicial branch's relationship with coequal branches of government under our constitutional structure.   Thus, ‘[i]t is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm;  it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.’   Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).   An allegation of injury is both fundamental and essential to a demonstration of standing.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Johnson v. Rell, 119 Conn.App. 730, 736–37, 990 A.2d 354 (2010).

“Federal standing jurisprudence requires an ‘injury in fact’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical ․’ (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).   Our Supreme Court has stated that ‘[t]here is little material difference between what we have required and what the United States Supreme Court in Lujan demanded of the plaintiff to establish standing.’   Gay & Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees, 236 Conn. 453, 466 n.10, 673 A.2d 484 (1996).”  Johnson v. Rell, supra, 119 Conn.App. 737 n.7.

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, he was denied a single lunch meal as a disciplinary measure, leaving him hungry.   The defendants assert that such a claim does not rise to the level of a Constitutional violation.   In his opposition to the motion, the plaintiff argues that he suffered hunger pains, stress, and emotional distress as a result.

Recent federal decisions have found that a denial of a single meal to an inmate does not rise to the level of a constitutional injury.  “Courts have consistently found that missing a single meal does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation ․ Courts have reached the same conclusion in the context of claims for retaliation under the First Amendment.”  (Citations omitted.)   Marr v. Case, United States District Court, Western District of Michigan, No. 1:07–cv–823 (January 18, 2008), 2008 WL 191326 *3 (collecting cases).   See Liffiton v. Kiszewski, United States District Court, Western District of New York, No. 09–CV–994A(F) (July 1, 2010, Foschio, U.S.M.J.), 2010 WL 2869570 *3–*4, adopted (July 20, 2010, Arcara, U. S.D.J.), 2010 WL 2869565 (denial of one meal insufficient to raise constitutional challenge to conditions of confinement).

Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims against the defendants as to the denial of a single meal are dismissed.

C

Disciplinary Ticket

In his complaint, the plaintiff also seeks removal of a Class A ticket, which allegedly was changed from a Class B ticket, from his record.   The defendants argue that the plaintiff has no standing to appeal a disciplinary ticket.   In opposition, the plaintiff claims that the severity of the disciplinary report was arbitrarily raised from B to A to provide authority to place him in segregation.

“Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a particular classification.”  Martinez v. Commissioner of Correction, 105 Conn.App. 65, 76, 936 A.2d 665 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 917, 943 A.2d 475 (2008).   “Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of a sentence imposed by a court ․ In order to state a claim of a violation of due process, an inmate must show a protected liberty interest and a deprivation of that interest without being afforded due process of law.   A prisoner's liberty interest to be free from disciplinary segregation is not inherent in the due process clause of the federal constitution.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quoation marks omitted.)  Id., 77.   Similarly, “[a] prisoner has no property or liberty interest in prison employment, increased recreation or educational courses.”  Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, 39 Conn.App. 674, 680, 667 A.2d 304 (1995).   The plaintiff has not cited a statute, regulation or policy statement which presents a due process issue.   See Harris v. Meulemans, 389 F.Sup.2d 438, 441 (D.Conn.2005).³

In addition, to the extent that the plaintiff seeks to appeal the disciplinary ticket, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, since disciplinary hearings are not contested cases for the purposes of administrative appeals.   See Burgos Vega v. Sieminski, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. HHB CV 07 4013227 (April 19, 2007, Owens, J.T.R.) (43 Conn. L. Rptr. 690).

Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims as to raising the disciplinary ticket to Class A are dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted concerning the plaintiff's claims against the defendants (1) as to the denial of a single meal;  and (2) as to raising the disciplinary ticket to Class A. The plaintiff's claims as to the nutritional adequacy of the prison diet are stricken.   It is so ordered.

BY THE COURT

ROBERT B. SHAPIRO

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ․ subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”.  FN1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ․ subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

FN2. See Commissioner of Correction v. Coleman, 303 Conn. 800, 803 n.2, 38 A.3d 84 (2012)..  FN2. See Commissioner of Correction v. Coleman, 303 Conn. 800, 803 n.2, 38 A.3d 84 (2012).

FN3. In his opposition to the motion, pages 3, 5–6, the plaintiff asserts that he was a “whistle blower” who was retaliated against for exercising a constitutionally protected activity, filing a grievance.   Since these allegations are not contained in the complaint, the court need not consider them..  FN3. In his opposition to the motion, pages 3, 5–6, the plaintiff asserts that he was a “whistle blower” who was retaliated against for exercising a constitutionally protected activity, filing a grievance.   Since these allegations are not contained in the complaint, the court need not consider them.

Shapiro, Robert B., J.