JP v. J. Curtis Roberts et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On February 7, 2012, the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, Joan and Curtis Roberts, in which it alleges the following facts.   On March 26, 2003, by a deed of the same date, the defendants mortgaged the premises known as 714 Tolland Stage Road, Tolland, Connecticut, to Guaranty Federal Financial Corporation to secure a promissory note in the amount of $290,000.   The mortgage was recorded on the Tolland land records on April 10, 2003.   Guaranty Federal Financial Corporation assigned said mortgage to Washington Mutual Bank, FA by an assignment dated March 26, 2003, which was also recorded on April 10, 2003.   The plaintiff is a successor by merger to Washington Mutual Bank, formerly known as Washington Mutual Bank, FA. The mortgage correctly identifies the secured premises as 714 Tolland Stage Road, Tolland, Connecticut, and references an Exhibit A, as providing a complete legal description of the secured premises.   Said mortgage, however, was recorded without an Exhibit A. Reformation of the mortgage to provide a detailed legal description, identified as Exhibit A, would not prejudice any subsequent encumbrances because the mortgage correctly references the street address of the mortgaged premises.

The defendants have filed a motion to strike the reformation count on the ground that it is insufficient as a matter of law and fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.  “The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 (2003).  Practice Book § 10–39(a) provides in pertinent part:  “Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ․ that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.”  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116–17 (2011).  “[P]leadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 253 (2010).   This court takes “the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and ․ construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 747 (2012).  “Moreover [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, supra, 295 Conn. 252.

The defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite elements of a cause of action for reformation of the mortgage, because count one is devoid of any allegations concerning mutual mistake, fraud, or inequitable conduct.   The defendants further argue that the plaintiff has omitted an essential allegation, viz. that the written instrument fails to express the real agreement or transaction.   The plaintiff counters that it has sufficiently alleged a cause of action sounding in reformation by claiming that the mortgage refers to Exhibit A, and that no such exhibit was ever attached.   The plaintiff argues that this absence results in the failure of the mortgage to express the real agreement or transaction.

“Reformation is appropriate in cases of mutual mistake—that is where, in reducing to writing an agreement made or transaction entered into as intended by the parties thereto, through mistake, common to both parties, the written instrument fails to express the real agreement or transaction ․ [R]eformation is also available in equity when the instrument does not express the true intent of the parties owing to mistake of one party coupled with fraud, actual or constructive, or inequitable conduct on the part of the other.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Harlach v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins. Co., 221 Conn. 185, 190–91 (1991).  “In short, the mistake, being common to both parties, effects a result which neither intended.”  Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 532 (1981).   The reformation doctrine has also been held by Connecticut courts to apply “to actions for reformation of a deed ․ the function of which is merely to pass title to land, pursuant to the agreement of the parties.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)”  Id.

In Derby Savings Bank v. Oliwa, 49 Conn.App. 602 (1998), our Appellate Court was faced with facts similar to the present case.   There, the defendant executed a mortgage deed and note to the plaintiff, but due to a mistake by the attorney who prepared the mortgage documents, the mortgage deed contained a description of the wrong property.   Both the commitment letter and the mortgage note, however, contained references to the correct property.   The trial court found mutual mistake and granted reformation of the mortgage in order to correct the deed so that it described the intended property, and thereafter granted strict foreclosure.   In affirming the judgment of the trial court, our Appellate Court agreed with the trial court's finding that “both parties intended the mortgage to cover property other than that described in the mortgage deed, and that the error resulted from a mistake by the attorney who prepared the mortgage documents.”  Id. 603.

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the mortgage correctly identifies the secured premises as 714 Tolland Stage Road, but that the complete legal description referred to in the mortgage as an exhibit was never recorded with the mortgage.   The plaintiff seeks a reformation of the mortgage in order to include Exhibit A. In reviewing the complaint in the light most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, it is necessarily implied that the plaintiff has alleged that Exhibit A was omitted as the result of a mistake.   As a result, the motion to strike must be denied.

Sferrazza, S.J.

Sferrazza, Samuel J., S.J.