Paul Wright v. Colonial Motors, Inc. et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE (# 105) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE

The plaintiffs, Paul Wright, Brenton Fisher and Vincent “Ricky” McLennon have brought this action in which each alleges discriminatory termination of employment in violation of § 46a–60 C.G.S. and hostile work environment in violation of § 46a–60(a)(1) C.G.S. against the defendant Colonial Motors, Inc.

In the fifth prayer for relief (subsection e) they seek punitive damages under § 46a–60 and § 31–290a, C.G.S.

The defendant has moved the court to strike the fifth prayer for relief arguing that a violation of § 46a–60 only does not warrant an award of punitive damages.

The parties appeared and were heard as to their claims and the court reserved decision.

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ․ A motion to strike ․ requires no factual findings by the trial court.”  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 (2003).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a [party's] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 260 (2001).[I]f facts provable in the [pleading] would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”   Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 321 (2003).  “If the pleading fails to establish a valid cause of action, a court shall grant a motion to strike the offending claims.”  Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395, 401–02 (2011).

In support of its motion, the defendant has cited Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV06 4008944 (October 28, 2010, Cosgrove, J.) [51 Conn. L. Rptr. 28], wherein the trial court examined the legislative history of § 46a–104 and determined that punitive damages were not authorized by that statute.   The Tomick case is currently pending before our Appellate Court.

The plaintiffs concede that the decision in Tomick is contrary to their claims in the instant case and have asked the court to defer any ruling on the matter before it until the Appellate Court has ruled.   This court is not receptive to doing that.

The plaintiffs further argue that in other cases, specifically Cantoni v. Xerox, 1999 WL 7391 (Conn.Super.1999) [24 Conn. L. Rptr. 38], and Collier v. State, 1999 WL 300643 (Conn.Super.) [24 Conn. L. Rptr. 433], the trial court awarded punitive damages because the language of § 46a–104, C.G.S. contains no language expressly prohibiting an award of punitive damages.   As noted, the defendant has cited a number of cases, most specifically Tomick which holds otherwise.

This court's review of § 46a–60 permits the court to find that punitive damages are not expressly provided for in that statute.  “As we have stated many times, [w]here a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject ․ is significant to show that a different intention existed ․ That tenant of statutory construction is well grounded because [t]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have upon any one of them.”   Asylum Hill v. King, 227 Conn. 238, 256–57 (2006).

For the foregoing reason, the court finds that punitive damages are not available to the plaintiffs under § 46a–60, C.G.S. and for that reason the defendant's motion to strike the fifth prayer for relief is hereby granted.

BY THE COURT,

JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, JUDGE

Doherty, Joseph W., J.