Kimberly Stevenson v. Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The determination of the plaintiff's summary judgment motion is controlled by the Appellate Court's decision in Fields v. Housing Authority of Stamford, 63 Conn.App. 617, 777 A.2d 752 (2001).   The following facts are relevant to the court's decision and are undisputed.   The plaintiff was injured on January 1, 2010 as a result of a fall on property owned by the defendant.   On January 8, 2010, the plaintiff notified the “building manager” about her incident and thereafter the defendant's standard “Liability Reporting Form” was prepared.   The plaintiff states in her affidavit that she “subsequently ․ determined that the apartment building was known as Trumbull Gardens, but [she] did not know that the [defendant] was responsible for the maintenance of the apartment building.”   The defendant received written notice on July 8, 2010 from the plaintiff's attorney of the intention to commence an action.

The defendant moves for summary judgment on its second special defense alleging that “[t]he plaintiff failed to provide notice to the defendant as required by ․ General Statutes § 8–67.¹  The plaintiff contends that the statute is directory and not mandatory, and that the notices that she gave are sufficient to satisfy the statute.   Additionally, the plaintiff asserts that the notices that she provided distinguish the present case from the Fields decision.

The court disagrees with the plaintiff's counterassertions for the reasons that they have been addressed and rejected by the Court in Fields v. Housing Authority of Stamford, supra, and its progeny.   See, e.g., Allston v. Housing Authority of New Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5012207 (July 24, 2008, Corradino, J.) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 879, 880) (evidence of actual notice was oral report given to housing authority employee that resulted in written record of time and place of fall, her injuries, and that litigation was contemplated);  Lett v. Torrington, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 03 0089569 (March 29, 2004, Brunetti, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 769, 770) (evidence of actual notice was “plaintiff's employer's workers' compensation carrier sent a letter to the building manager of the housing authority complex where the plaintiff allegedly fell”).

In view of the foregoing, the court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the plaintiff's noncompliance with § 8–67 and, therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment (112.00) is granted.

TYMA, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. That statute provides as follows:  “Any person injured in person or property within boundaries of property owned or controlled by an authority, for which injury such authority is or may be liable, may bring an action within two years after the cause of action therefor arose to recover damages from such authority, provided written notice of the intention to commence such action and of the time when and the place where the damages were incurred or sustained has been filed with the chairman or the secretary of the authority within six months after the cause of action therefor arose.”.  FN1. That statute provides as follows:  “Any person injured in person or property within boundaries of property owned or controlled by an authority, for which injury such authority is or may be liable, may bring an action within two years after the cause of action therefor arose to recover damages from such authority, provided written notice of the intention to commence such action and of the time when and the place where the damages were incurred or sustained has been filed with the chairman or the secretary of the authority within six months after the cause of action therefor arose.”

Tyma, Theodore R., J.