Sheila Schlosser v. Jeffrey Schlosser (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This action seeks the dissolution of the parties' near to four-year marriage.   The action was commenced by a complaint dated March 30, 2010 which was returnable to the court on December 27, 2011.   Without objection, an amendment to the complaint was made in court on May 3, 2012.

Both parties appeared at trial on May 3, 2012.   The defendant was represented by counsel and the plaintiff was a self-represented litigant.   The court considered the testimony and financial affidavits of the parties and the applicable provisions of common and statutory law.

As financial matters were in dispute in the contested dissolution trial, the court ordered the unsealing of the financial affidavits pursuant to Practice Book § 25–59A.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court makes the following findings of fact.   All factual findings made herein have been made by a fair preponderance of the evidence unless otherwise set forth herein.

The parties were married in Manchester, Connecticut on May 27, 2008.   They have one child, Ian, who was born in 2007.   The plaintiff had two children prior to the marriage;  only one of them remains in the care of the plaintiff.   The defendant also had a child prior to the marriage.

Ian currently resides with the plaintiff as the defendant has been held, in lieu of bail, on pending charges that he is contesting in the appropriate criminal court.

The plaintiff acknowledges the defendant has been a good father to Ian. She is seeking sole custody while the defendant is incarcerated.   She agrees that the defendant should enjoy joint custody of Ian upon his release.

The plaintiff works as a store manager for a pizza restaurant and also works part-time for a coffee shop chain.   According to her financial affidavit, her weekly gross wages from her employment is $710 and the net is $630.

The defendant currently has no income.   He previously worked at Town Fair Tire and is handy with cars.

The defendant took a hardship loan from his 401(k) in November 2011 in the amount of $2,700 to pay back rent on the apartment occupied by the plaintiff and Ian. He provided the funds to the plaintiff to satisfy the back rent, but she testified that she gave the money to her father to repay loans her father allegedly made to the defendant.

The plaintiff acquired a 1994 Toyota Celica on New Year's Eve 2011.   She values the car at $1,200.   She denies acquiring it with any portion of the $2,700 she obtained from the defendant.   The court does not find such denial credible.

The plaintiff remains responsible for outstanding utility bills, which are in her name, incurred while the parties leased an apartment.   There was no evidence of the amount of such bills nor did she list any such indebtedness on her financial affidavit.

The defendant previously held title to three motor vehicles which he values as follows:  (i) a 1986 Oldsmobile 442 at $6,000;  (ii) a 1992 Buick LaSabre at $1,000 and (iii) a 1994 Pontiac Grand Am at $1,000.

All of those vehicles have been sold from under him.   The plaintiff had custody or control of the vehicles prior to their transfers to others.   She claims the cars are not worth what the defendant claims as they became damaged or inoperable.   The court finds the vehicles when last in the possession of the defendant were operable and not damaged as claimed by plaintiff—the damage occurred when the vehicles were with the plaintiff or her friends and family.

The plaintiff gave her cousin the Oldsmobile for, she claims, the removal of the stereo system therefrom.   The plaintiff claims the cousin located the vehicle's title in the car, forged the defendant's name and transferred the vehicle to a third party.   After the defendant reported the vehicle stolen, it was seized and now sits in an impound lot.   A warrant for the plaintiff's cousin has been issued.

The plaintiff, without the consent of the defendant, sold the other two vehicles owned by the defendant.   He has also reported those vehicles as having been stolen.   She claims she received no compensation for the transfer of the Buick LaSabre to a then paramour—which transfer occurred after the initiation of these proceedings and in violation of the automatic orders.   The court does not find the claim of the plaintiff that she received no compensation for the transfer to be credible.   Although she admitted to selling the Pontiac, there was no evidence of the amount, if any, that she received.   As each vehicle when transferred was operable, the court finds the defendant's estimation of value and condition to be the more credible and finds the value of the vehicles to be as set forth by the defendant.

The only other assets of the parties consist of the furnishings that were in an apartment that was vacated by the plaintiff just before an eviction was to be concluded for failure to pay rent (since she did not use the money from the defendant to pay the arrearage).   The parties agree that there is a television set worth approximately $3,000, a trundle bed worth approximately $2,000 and a refrigerator worth approximately $1,700.   The items are in storage and the plaintiff is paying storage fees of approximately $158 a month.

The plaintiff's financial affidavit reflects that she is paying $400 a week in rent, but that is an error.   Her rent, which she allegedly pays to her father, is $100 a week.   Accordingly, her total weekly expenses, assuming the $100 a week rent and storage fees of $37 a week (based on the $158 a month), are $218 a week and her net income is $630 a week.

Based on the parties' financial affidavits and the Worksheet for the Connecticut Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (the guidelines) which was prepared on the basis of the plaintiff's actual income and an earning capacity of the defendant of $330 a week, the presumptive child support payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for the minor child is found to be $55 a week.

The court finds the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate due to the special circumstances of the defendant's loss of income due to this incarceration and deviates from the guideline amount as set forth below.¹

The minor child and the plaintiff are insured via the HUSKY program.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND ORDERS

The court makes the additional findings and enters the following orders:

1. Dissolution

The court has jurisdiction in this matter which has been pending for more than ninety days.   The plaintiff has lived in the State of Connecticut for more than one year prior to the institution of the action.

The marriage has broken down irretrievably.

The court finds the allegations of the complaint have been proven and are true.

The State of Connecticut has contributed to the support of the parties.

The marriage of the parties is hereby dissolved, and they are each hereby declared to be single and unmarried.

2. Custody and Parenting

The plaintiff shall have sole legal custody of the child.   At such time as the pending charges against the defendant are resolved and he is released from incarceration, the plaintiff and the defendant shall enjoy joint legal custody of the minor child and then, to the extent feasible, the plaintiff shall consult with the defendant on major developmental issues affecting the health, welfare, education, religious and moral upbringing of their child, however, the plaintiff shall have the sole ability to make all of the decisions with respect to the child.²

Subject to the terms of applicable protective and restraining orders, the defendant shall have visitation with the minor child at the discretion of the plaintiff until such time as he is released from custody.   At such time as there is joint custody, the defendant shall have parenting time as agreed upon by the parties, subject to the terms of any applicable protective and restraining orders.

Neither party is to permanently remove the child from the State of Connecticut.   The court finds the foregoing orders to be in the best interest of the minor child.

3. Post–Majority Education

Pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 46b–56c, the court reserves jurisdiction to determine educational support and each party reserves their respective right to file a future motion or petition for an educational support order.

4. Child Support and Reimbursements

Until the defendant is released from incarceration (as such has been clarified and spelled out in footnote 2) the court deviates from the guidelines and orders that no child support be paid by the defendant.   From and after his release, child support shall be payable by the defendant in the amount determined in accordance with the guidelines.

The plaintiff shall pay 78% and the defendant shall pay 22% of the unreimbursed medical and work-related child care expenses until further order of the court.

5. Tax Exemption

Until such time as the defendant earns at least $25,000 yearly, the plaintiff shall claim the minor child as an exemption on her federal and state income tax returns.   At such time as the defendant earns at least $25,000 a year and so long as he is current with his child support, the parties shall alternate the exemption, with the plaintiff claiming the child for odd numbered tax years and the defendant claiming the child for even numbered tax years.

6. Healthcare for the Minor Child

To the extent available at a reasonable cost, through their employer or otherwise, each party is ordered to provide medical and dental insurance for the minor child.   Reasonable cost is defined to mean an amount not to exceed 5% of the respective net income of the plaintiff and of the defendant.   If medical and dental insurance is not available at a reasonable cost, the plaintiff shall apply for and maintain the child on HUSKY or equivalent insurance and the plaintiff and defendant shall share equally the cost of any HUSKY or equivalent insurance premiums.

7. Alimony

Based upon the statutory factors, including without limitation, the age, education, earnings, vocational skills and work experience of the plaintiff and of the defendant, the court orders that no alimony shall be awarded to the plaintiff and no alimony shall be awarded to the defendant.

8. Other orders

The plaintiff shall retain the 1994 Toyota Celica free and clear of any claims by the defendant.

The defendant took a hardship loan against his 401(k) to pay the back rent on the apartment leased by the parties and the money was diverted by the plaintiff.   The plaintiff shall reimburse the defendant the sum of $2,700 within one year from the date of this judgment.

The plaintiff directly or indirectly converted the automobiles that were in the name of the defendant which, collectively, had a value of $8,000.

The defendant, however, is unable to pay child support for the minor child for the foreseeable future.

The plaintiff may retain the personal property of the parties which is presently in storage.

The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of $2,000 as his marital share in the property (including the automobiles converted by the plaintiff).   Said sum shall be paid within one year from the date of the judgment.

Each party shall retain a full interest in any life insurance policy they may own.   Each will name the child as an irrevocable beneficiary on any life insurance now or hereafter obtained by them, either individually or through their respective employer, until such time as the child reaches the age of twenty-three.

The parties shall retain any bank account they may hold free and clear of any claim by the other party.

Each party shall be entitled to his/her personal property free and clear of any claim by the other party.

Each of the parties shall keep the assets listed on his/her respective financial affidavit and be responsible for the debts listed on the same.   Each party shall indemnify and hold the other harmless with respect to any debt, or portion thereof, ordered to be paid by such party.

9. Miscellaneous

The court restores the former name of the plaintiff to Sheila Ann Lopez.

Each party shall be responsible for their respective attorney's fees, if any, and the costs incurred in connection with this action.

Each party is ordered to sign whatever documents are necessary, and as presented to them by the other party, to effectuate these orders within ten days of presentment.

Unless otherwise specifically set forth herein, these orders are effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT,

Olear, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The incarceration is not as a result of an alleged offense perpetrated on the plaintiff or the minor child.  General Statutes § 46b–215e..  FN1. The incarceration is not as a result of an alleged offense perpetrated on the plaintiff or the minor child.  General Statutes § 46b–215e.

FN2. To be clear, it is not the intention nor the order of the court that the custody revert to joint legal custody in the event the defendant is able to make bail and is then released from jail, but that the change occur only at such time as the charges are disposed of by verdict or dismissal, and in the event of a conviction, he has served the time required under any sentence imposed..  FN2. To be clear, it is not the intention nor the order of the court that the custody revert to joint legal custody in the event the defendant is able to make bail and is then released from jail, but that the change occur only at such time as the charges are disposed of by verdict or dismissal, and in the event of a conviction, he has served the time required under any sentence imposed.

Olear, Leslie I., J.