Gayle Secondo v. Housing Authority of the City of Hartford et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 113)

FACTS

On April 20, 2011, the plaintiff, Gayle Secondo, filed a three-count complaint against the Housing Authority of the City of Hartford and Reliastar Life Insurance Company.   Count two is the one at issue in the motion to strike before the court.   The plaintiff alleges the following facts.   The plaintiff's husband, Frank A. Secondo (Secondo), was an employee of the Housing Authority of the City of Hartford (Housing Authority).   While an active employee, Secondo was enrolled in the Housing Authority's life insurance policy with Northwestern National Life Insurance Co.¹ The plaintiff was the sole beneficiary of Secondo's life insurance policy.   Secondo left his employment with the Housing Authority as the result of a work-related disability.   Following Secondo's death, the plaintiff received $10,000 from the Housing Authority as representative of Secondo's life insurance policy.   The plaintiff alleges she was entitled to a total of $54,000 in insurance benefits, which she did not receive.

In count two of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the Housing Authority violated the provisions of General Statutes § 38a–456 by failing to provide Secondo with written notice before discontinuing his life insurance coverage.²  As a result, the Housing Authority failed to continue Secondo's life insurance policy and the plaintiff was not given the full benefits she was entitled to as his beneficiary.   Pursuant to § 38a–456, the Housing Authority is obligated to pay the plaintiff the full benefits she was entitled to before it wrongfully terminated Secondo's life insurance policy.

On November 17, 2011, the Housing Authority filed a motion to strike the second count of the complaint on the ground that § 38a–456 does not apply to public governmental entities like the Housing Authority.   The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law.   The plaintiff filed an objection to the Housing Authority's motion to strike on January 4, 2012.   On January 6, 2012, the Housing Authority filed a reply memorandum.   The matter was heard at short calendar on January 9, 2012.

DISCUSSION

“Whenever any party wishes to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ․ that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.”  Practice Book § 10–39(a).  “The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 130, 2 A.3d 859 (2010).  “The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 117, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).  “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

The Housing Authority argues that the second count of the complaint is legally insufficient to state a claim for a violation of § 38a–456 because that provision is not applicable to a public governmental entity such as the Housing Authority, the provision applies only to an employer's cancellation of a group life insurance plan as to all eligible employees, and count two fails to allege the cancellation or discontinuation of a life insurance policy.   The plaintiff counters that the Housing Authority is a corporation, albeit a public corporation, that can be held liable under § 38a–456, the provision applies to any cancellation of life insurance and is not limited to the cancellation or discontinuance of the entire group life insurance plans as to all eligible employees, and the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under § 38a–456.

In response to the plaintiff's objection, the Housing Authority states that the plaintiff failed to allege in the complaint that the Housing Authority is a corporation or any other type of legal entity specified in § 38a–456.   Further, the Housing Authority argues that even if municipal housing authorities have been referred to as public corporations, both statutory and common-law authorities have distinguished public sector corporations and municipal and governmental entities from traditional private sector corporations.   The Housing Authority argues that if it is found to be a “corporation,” within the meaning of § 38a–456, then the plaintiff's claim is preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.   Lastly, the Housing Authority argues that it is not well pleaded nor necessarily implied from the complaint that the Housing Authority cancelled or discontinued its entire group life insurance plan as is required by the statutory provision, but only that Secondo's policy was discontinued.

GENERAL STATUTES § 38a–456

Section 38a–456(a) provides, in relevant part:  “Any individual, partnership, corporation or unincorporated association providing group life insurance coverage for its employees shall furnish each insured employee, upon cancellation or discontinuation of such life insurance, notice of the cancellation or discontinuation of such insurance.”  (Emphasis added.)   The Housing Authority argues that § 38a–456 does not apply to public governmental entities such as the Housing Authority.   There is no existing case law in which Connecticut state courts have interpreted § 38a–456.³  As such, the issue of whether § 38a–456 applies to municipal housing authorities requires this court to engage in statutory interpretation.   Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 298 Conn. 191, 197, 3 A.3d 56 (2010).

General Statutes § 1–2z provides, in relevant part:  “The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.”  Section 38a–456 does not define the term “corporation,” nor does it state whether the term “corporation” encompasses both private and public corporations.   Likewise, the term “corporation” is not defined elsewhere in Title 38a.⁴  “If a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, supra, 298 Conn. 200–01.⁵  The word “corporation” is defined with substantial similarity in a number of dictionaries.   For example, the Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed.1999) defines “corporation” as “the municipal authorities of a town or city ․ a body formed and authorized by law to act as a single person although constituted by one or more persons and legally endowed with various rights and duties including the capacity of succession.”   See also American Heritage Dictionary (2d Ed.1982) ( “A body of persons granted a charter legally recognizing them as a separate entity having its own rights, privileges, and liabilities distinct from those of its members ․ [s]uch a body created for purposes of government.”);   Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2005) (“Corporation” means “[a]n entity ․ having authority under the law to act as a single person distinct from the shareholders who own it and having rights to issue stock and exist indefinitely ․ a group or succession of persons established in accordance with legal rules into a legal or juristic person that has a legal personality distinct from the natural persons who make it up, exists indefinitely apart from them, and had the legal powers that its constitution gives it.”).   Neither the text of § 38a–456 nor the dictionary definitions provide definitive guidance as to whether the legislature intended the term “corporation” to include public corporations such as the Housing Authority.⁶

Nevertheless, the court finds that the term “corporation,” as used in § 38a–456(a), includes both public and private corporations.   In different contexts, other judges of the Superior Court have found a public corporation to be incorporated within the meaning of the statutory term “corporation.”   In A–Right Plumbing, Sewer & Water Main Co., LLC v. Aquarion Operating Services Co., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X06 CV 05 4004864 (December 16, 2005, Alander, J.) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 485, 487) the court found that as a public corporation and political subdivision of the state, the defendant was subject to the provisions of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42–110a et seq.   The court found that the defendant, as a public corporation, fell within the statutory definition of “person” as set forth in General Statutes § 42–110a(3).⁷  Id., 486.   The defendant argued that if the legislature intended to include public corporations/political subdivisions within the statute, it would have explicitly included such entities within the statutory definition of “person.”  Id. In response, the court determined, “[t]he converse ․ is also true.   The legislature knows how to expressly exclude political subdivisions from the applicability of a statute when it intends to do so.”   Id. The court found that the express language and remedial purpose of CUTPA should be construed so as not to exempt public corporations from the purview of CUTPA.  Id., 487.   See also Jackson v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, Superior Court, judicial district of Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 06 5004320 (August 8, 2007, Matasavage, J.) (43 Conn. L. Rptr. 865, 866) (finding defendant, Bridgeport housing authority, to be included within term “corporation” as used in General Statutes § 13a–149).

Likewise, the legislature in the present case did not explicitly exclude public corporations or municipal housing authorities from the statutory notice requirements set forth in § 38a–456, as it could have done had it so intended.  “[T]he intention of the legislature is found not in what it meant to say, but in the meaning of what it did say.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Achillion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Law, 291 Conn. 525, 536, 970 A.2d 57 (2009).   For that reason, the term “corporation” is interpreted to include both public and private corporations.

Section 1–2z also requires the court to consider § 38a–456 in relation to other statutes in the same statutory scheme.  Jim's Auto Body v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 285 Conn. 794, 808–09, 942 A.2d 305 (2008).   Two other provisions in Title 38a share statutory language with § 38a–456.   Both §§ 38a–325 ⁸ and 38a–537 ⁹ require notification prior to the termination of specified insurance policies.   Neither provision defines the term “corporation,” and there is no case law interpreting the applicability and scope of the term.

One judge of the Superior Court did, however, examine the general purpose of the notice requirement set forth in § 38a–537.   In Benway v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 95 0050910 (April 12, 1996, Sferrazza, J.) (18 Conn. L. Rptr. 634, 635), the court considered whether § 38a–537(b) ¹⁰ conferred upon an employee a private cause of action against the employer for failure to furnish the required notice of discontinuation of health insurance.   In examining the legislative history surrounding the passage of Public Act 82–159,¹¹ the court determined, “the purpose of § 38a–537(b) is to protect individual employees from financial harm flowing from the loss of health insurance without notice.”  Id. Since §§ 38a–456 and 38a–537 share language relating to notice requirements, it can be inferred that the purpose of § 38a–456 is equally to protect employees from harm resulting from loss of life insurance without the required notice.¹²

Courts have broadly construed other statutes determined to have a remedial purpose.   See, e.g., Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 492, 656 A.2d 1009 (1995) (“[CUTPA] is remedial in character ․ and must be liberally construed in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted));  Okee Industries, Inc. v. National Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 225 Conn. 367, 373—74, 623 A.2d 483 (1993) (“[Section] 49–42 is a remedial statute enacted to provide security for workers and materials suppliers unable to avail themselves of the protection of a mechanic's lien ․ Because [t]he statutory requirement of a bond is designed to protect and benefit those who furnish materials and labor to the contractor on public work ․ such statutory provisions are to be liberally construed.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.));  Funaioli v. New London, 52 Conn.App. 194, 197–98, 726 A.2d 626 (1999) (“The legislature designed the Workers' Compensation Act to further a remedial purpose ․ The act's provisions, therefore, should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).   Provisions intended to serve as a protection for employees should be construed broadly to protect them from all employers issuing group life insurance policies to their employees, including both public and private corporations.

“If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ․ The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lopa v. Brinker International, Inc., 296 Conn. 426, 430, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010).  “When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, [the court also looks] for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, supra, 298 Conn. 197.   With respect to extratextual sources, the legislative history of § 38a–456 does not provide any guidance as to the intended scope of the term “corporation,” or whether it includes public corporations such as the Housing Authority.   Nevertheless, based on the express language of the provision and the general remedial purpose behind the notification of termination provisions in the insurance statute, as evidenced by the legislative history surrounding § 38a–537, the term “corporation” encompasses both public and private corporations, and as a result includes the Housing Authority.

ERISA PREEMPTION

The Housing Authority argues that if the court finds it to be included within the term “corporation,” as used in § 38a–456(a), the plaintiff's claim is preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and, therefore, the court must strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint.

As a procedural matter, several judges of the Superior Court have found that preemption by ERISA can be raised on a motion to strike.   See Kosswig v. Timken Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 05 4004072 (March 3, 2006, Domnarski, J.) (41 Conn. L. Rptr. 19, 21) (granting defendant's motion to strike upon finding plaintiffs' claims to be preempted by ERISA);  Kinsey v. Guinness Import Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. CV 99 0174374 (August 30, 2002, D'Andrea, J.T.R.) (“A motion to strike can raise the issue of ERISA preemption.”).

“ERISA is a comprehensive regulation of employee welfare and pension benefit plans [that] extends to those that provide medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits for plan participants or their beneficiaries through the purchase of insurance or otherwise ․ The federal statute does not go about protecting plan participants and their beneficiaries by requiring employers to provide any given set of minimum benefits, but instead controls the administration of benefit plans ․ as by imposing reporting and disclosure mandates ․ participation and vesting requirements ․ funding standards ․ and fiduciary responsibilities for plan administrators ․ It envisions administrative oversight, imposes criminal sanctions, and establishes a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme ․ It also preempts some state law.  [Section 514 of ERISA], 29 U.S.C. § 1144.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Napoletano v. Cigna Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 233, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Batte–Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 914 A.2d 996 (2007).

“The preemption provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994), preempts any state law that ‘may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ․’ “ (Emphasis in original.)  Id. 233.   The Connecticut state courts have not yet considered the issue of whether ERISA preempts § 38a–456.   The court does, however, find persuasive the federal court's preemption analysis set forth in Iwans v. Aetna Life Ins. Corp., 855 F.Sup. 579, 586–87 (D.Conn.1994).¹³  In Iwans v. Aetna Life Ins. Corp., the federal district court determined that ERISA preempted 38a–456 because “the Connecticut law would place additional and potentially substantial burdens on the administration of the employee benefit plan.   Moreover ․ the Connecticut statute would require an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer's obligation.”  Id., 587.   In addition, several judges of the Superior Court have found § 38a–537(a), a provision similarly-worded to § 38a–456(a), to be preempted by ERISA.   See Thompson v. Bridgeport Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 98 352686 (June 18, 2001, Moran, J.);   Duncan v. Junior Achievement, Superior Court, judicial district of Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 96 0335878 (June 26, 1997, Skolnick, J.) (19 Conn. L. Rptr. 669, 671).¹⁴  For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that § 38a–456 is preempted by ERISA.

Nevertheless, ERISA does not apply to government sponsored benefit plans.   Poole v. Waterbury, 266 Conn. 68, 83, 831 A.2d 211 (2003).   Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1), ERISA provides an exemption for any employee benefit plan that is a “governmental plan,” as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32).¹⁵  Therefore, it is incumbent upon the court to determine:  (1) whether the Housing Authority is a political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the state, and (2) whether Secondo's life insurance policy was a plan established or maintained by the Housing Authority for its employees.

The general test for determining whether an employer is exempt because it is a governmental subdivision, agency or instrumentality is set forth in Rose v. Long Island Railroad Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 915–17 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936, 108 S.Ct. 1112, 99 L.Ed.2d 273 (1988).¹⁶  “[T]he exemption for political subdivisions [is limited] to entities that are either (1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 916.¹⁷

In the present case, the Housing Authority falls within the definition of a political subdivision of the state government.   It was created pursuant to General Statutes § 8–40.   In addition, “ ‘[a] municipal authority created under a municipal authorities statute has been regarded as a corporate agency of the state and not a creature, agent or representative of the municipality organizing it.’   1 E. McQuillin, [Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) ], § 2.29a.” Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 186, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988).

The question remaining is whether the life insurance policy offered by the Housing Authority constitutes a plan that is established or maintained by the Housing Authority, as a political subdivision, for its employees.  “The use of the conjunction ‘or’ in section 1002(32) indicates that a plan is a governmental plan if it is either established or maintained by a government body for its employees ․ This literal interpretation has been employed by courts which, without any consideration of the issue of maintenance, have found plans to be exempt from ERISA merely because they were established by governmental entities.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Roy v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 878 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir.1989).   See also Gualandi v. Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that exclusive governmental funding is sufficient to constitute governmental establishment of a plan).

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that Secondo was enrolled in the Housing Authority's life insurance policy with Northwestern National Life Insurance Company, subsequently ReliaStar, while he was still an active employee of the Housing Authority.   The plaintiff also alleges that pursuant to the terms of the Housing Authority's agreement with ReliaStar, the Housing Authority was required to provide Secondo with 15 days written notice prior to discontinuing his life insurance coverage.  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ․ Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).   This court takes “the facts to be those alleged in the complaint ․ and ․ construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ Moreover [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 252.   Based on the plaintiff's allegations, construed broadly, it can be implied that the life insurance policy Secondo enrolled in while an active employee of the Housing Authority was provided for and established by the Housing Authority.   As such, the court finds that the life insurance policy was a “governmental plan” within the ERISA exemption defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32), and, therefore, is not preempted by ERISA.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion to strike.

Woods, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Northwestern National Life Insurance Company subsequently changed its name to ReliaStar Life Insurance Company..  FN1. Northwestern National Life Insurance Company subsequently changed its name to ReliaStar Life Insurance Company.

FN2. General Statutes § 38a–456 provides:  “(a) Any individual, partnership, corporation or unincorporated association providing group life insurance coverage for its employees shall furnish each insured employee, upon cancellation or discontinuation of such life insurance, notice of the cancellation or discontinuation of such insurance.   The notice shall be mailed or delivered to the insured employee not less than fifteen days next preceding the effective date of cancellation or discontinuation.   Any individual or any such entity that fails to provide timely notice shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars for each violation.   The Labor Commissioner shall have the authority to assess all such fines.   This section shall apply to any such individual, partnership, corporation or unincorporated association that substitutes one policy providing such group life insurance coverage for another such policy with no interruption in coverage.“(b) If any individual or any such entity fails to furnish notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the individual or entity shall be liable for benefits to the same extent as the insurer would have been liable if coverage had not been cancelled or discontinued.”.  FN2. General Statutes § 38a–456 provides:  “(a) Any individual, partnership, corporation or unincorporated association providing group life insurance coverage for its employees shall furnish each insured employee, upon cancellation or discontinuation of such life insurance, notice of the cancellation or discontinuation of such insurance.   The notice shall be mailed or delivered to the insured employee not less than fifteen days next preceding the effective date of cancellation or discontinuation.   Any individual or any such entity that fails to provide timely notice shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars for each violation.   The Labor Commissioner shall have the authority to assess all such fines.   This section shall apply to any such individual, partnership, corporation or unincorporated association that substitutes one policy providing such group life insurance coverage for another such policy with no interruption in coverage.“(b) If any individual or any such entity fails to furnish notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the individual or entity shall be liable for benefits to the same extent as the insurer would have been liable if coverage had not been cancelled or discontinued.”

FN3. Section 38a–456 is discussed in two federal district court cases.   See Iwans v. Aetna Life Ins. Corp., 855 F.Sup. 579, 586 (D.Conn.1994) (finding § 38a–456 to be preempted by ERISA);  Goodman v. Farmington Board of Education, No. 3:01CV1609(CFD), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33734, at *3 (D.Conn. Dec. 6, 2005) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims, including violation of § 38a–456, because court granted summary judgment as to plaintiffs' federal law claims).   These opinions do not, however, address the specific issue of whether the provision includes both public and private corporations within the term “corporation.”.  FN3. Section 38a–456 is discussed in two federal district court cases.   See Iwans v. Aetna Life Ins. Corp., 855 F.Sup. 579, 586 (D.Conn.1994) (finding § 38a–456 to be preempted by ERISA);  Goodman v. Farmington Board of Education, No. 3:01CV1609(CFD), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33734, at *3 (D.Conn. Dec. 6, 2005) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims, including violation of § 38a–456, because court granted summary judgment as to plaintiffs' federal law claims).   These opinions do not, however, address the specific issue of whether the provision includes both public and private corporations within the term “corporation.”

FN4. General Statutes § 38a–1, the definitions section for all of Title 38a, does not provide a definition for any of the four entities referred to in § 38a–456(a)..  FN4. General Statutes § 38a–1, the definitions section for all of Title 38a, does not provide a definition for any of the four entities referred to in § 38a–456(a).

FN5. “In the absence of a statutory definition, we turn to General Statutes § 1–1(a), which provides in relevant part:  ‘In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language ․’ To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, we look to the dictionary definition of the term.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stone–Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 677–78, 911 A.2d 300 (2006)..  FN5. “In the absence of a statutory definition, we turn to General Statutes § 1–1(a), which provides in relevant part:  ‘In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language ․’ To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, we look to the dictionary definition of the term.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stone–Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 677–78, 911 A.2d 300 (2006).

FN6. The court finds the Housing Authority to be a public corporation.   This is supported by both statutory authority and judicial interpretations of a municipal housing authority's legal status.  “A housing authority is a public corporation created by the municipality to exercise certain delegated sovereign powers pursuant to [§§ ]8–40 [through] 8–81 of the General Statutes.”  Housing Authority v. Dorsey, 164 Conn. 247, 251, 320 A.2d 820 (1973).  “In each municipality of the state there is created a public body corporate and politic to be known as the ‘housing authority’ of the municipality ․” General Statutes § 8–40.  “The housing authority is a distinct corporate entity ․ It is not an agency of the city ․” (Citation omitted.)  Austin v. Housing Authority, 143 Conn. 338, 349, 122 A.2d 399 (1956)..  FN6. The court finds the Housing Authority to be a public corporation.   This is supported by both statutory authority and judicial interpretations of a municipal housing authority's legal status.  “A housing authority is a public corporation created by the municipality to exercise certain delegated sovereign powers pursuant to [§§ ]8–40 [through] 8–81 of the General Statutes.”  Housing Authority v. Dorsey, 164 Conn. 247, 251, 320 A.2d 820 (1973).  “In each municipality of the state there is created a public body corporate and politic to be known as the ‘housing authority’ of the municipality ․” General Statutes § 8–40.  “The housing authority is a distinct corporate entity ․ It is not an agency of the city ․” (Citation omitted.)  Austin v. Housing Authority, 143 Conn. 338, 349, 122 A.2d 399 (1956).

FN7. CUTPA provides that:  “No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.”  (Emphasis added.)  General Statutes § 42–110b(a).   General Statutes § 42–110a(3) defines “person” in CUTPA as “a natural person, corporation, limited liability company, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, and any other legal entity.”   (Emphasis added.).  FN7. CUTPA provides that:  “No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.”  (Emphasis added.)  General Statutes § 42–110b(a).   General Statutes § 42–110a(3) defines “person” in CUTPA as “a natural person, corporation, limited liability company, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, and any other legal entity.”   (Emphasis added.)

FN8. General Statutes § 38a–325(a) provides in relevant part:  “Any individual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated association providing professional liability insurance coverage for its employees shall furnish each insured employee, upon cancellation or discontinuation of such professional liability insurance, notice of the cancellation or discontinuation of such insurance.   Such notice shall be mailed or delivered to the insured employee not less than forty-five days next preceding the effective date of cancellation or discontinuation.”.  FN8. General Statutes § 38a–325(a) provides in relevant part:  “Any individual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated association providing professional liability insurance coverage for its employees shall furnish each insured employee, upon cancellation or discontinuation of such professional liability insurance, notice of the cancellation or discontinuation of such insurance.   Such notice shall be mailed or delivered to the insured employee not less than forty-five days next preceding the effective date of cancellation or discontinuation.”

FN9. General Statutes § 38a–537(a) provides in relevant part:  “Any individual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated association providing group health insurance coverage for its employees shall furnish each insured employee, upon cancellation or discontinuation of such health insurance, notice of the cancellation or discontinuation of such insurance.”.  FN9. General Statutes § 38a–537(a) provides in relevant part:  “Any individual, partnership, corporation, or unincorporated association providing group health insurance coverage for its employees shall furnish each insured employee, upon cancellation or discontinuation of such health insurance, notice of the cancellation or discontinuation of such insurance.”

FN10. General Statutes § 38a–537(b) provides in relevant part:  “If any individual or any such entity fails to furnish notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the individual or entity shall be liable for benefits to the same extent as the insurer, hospital or medical service corporation or health care center would have been liable if coverage had not been cancelled or discontinued.”  Section 38a–456(b) shares the same language..  FN10. General Statutes § 38a–537(b) provides in relevant part:  “If any individual or any such entity fails to furnish notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the individual or entity shall be liable for benefits to the same extent as the insurer, hospital or medical service corporation or health care center would have been liable if coverage had not been cancelled or discontinued.”  Section 38a–456(b) shares the same language.

FN11. Section 38a–537(b), formerly § 38–262c(b), was first enacted in 1982, as part of P.A. 82–159..  FN11. Section 38a–537(b), formerly § 38–262c(b), was first enacted in 1982, as part of P.A. 82–159.

FN12. It should also be noted that § 38a–537 was enacted prior to § 38a–456.  “[T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law ․ Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute ․ we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction ․ [T]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have upon any one of them.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stone–Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, supra, 280 Conn. 678..  FN12. It should also be noted that § 38a–537 was enacted prior to § 38a–456.  “[T]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law ․ Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a statute ․ we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction ․ [T]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have upon any one of them.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stone–Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, supra, 280 Conn. 678.

FN13. See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Segarra, Superior Court, judicial district of Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 08 5018505 (November 16, 2011, Hartmere, J.) (53 Conn. L. Rptr. 53, 54) (“As there is no controlling Connecticut case law on point, the court looks to federal law as persuasive authority.”)..  FN13. See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Segarra, Superior Court, judicial district of Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 08 5018505 (November 16, 2011, Hartmere, J.) (53 Conn. L. Rptr. 53, 54) (“As there is no controlling Connecticut case law on point, the court looks to federal law as persuasive authority.”).

FN14. Both judges cite to an advisory opinion issued by the Department of Labor in which it concluded that “subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 38a–537 are preempted by ERISA insofar as they are applied, directly or indirectly, to employee benefit plans covered by Title I of ERISA.”   U.S. Dept. of Labor Adv. Op. to Ms. Sherry Dominick (February 22, 1996)..  FN14. Both judges cite to an advisory opinion issued by the Department of Labor in which it concluded that “subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 38a–537 are preempted by ERISA insofar as they are applied, directly or indirectly, to employee benefit plans covered by Title I of ERISA.”   U.S. Dept. of Labor Adv. Op. to Ms. Sherry Dominick (February 22, 1996).

FN15. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) provides in relevant part:  “The term ‘governmental plan’ means, a plan established or maintained for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.”.  FN15. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) provides in relevant part:  “The term ‘governmental plan’ means, a plan established or maintained for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.”

FN16. “In general, we look to the federal courts for guidance in resolving issues of federal law ․ [T]he decisions of the federal circuit in which a state court is located are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of a federal statute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Joyner v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 111 Conn.App. 93, 99 n.3, 957 A.2d 882 (2008)..  FN16. “In general, we look to the federal courts for guidance in resolving issues of federal law ․ [T]he decisions of the federal circuit in which a state court is located are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of a federal statute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Joyner v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 111 Conn.App. 93, 99 n.3, 957 A.2d 882 (2008).

FN17. In Rose v. Long Island Railroad Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 915–16 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936, 108 S.Ct. 1112, 99 L.Ed.2d 273 (1988), the Court adopted the criteria used by the National Labor Review Board (NLRB) when determining whether an entity fell within the political subdivision exception to jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)..  FN17. In Rose v. Long Island Railroad Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 915–16 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936, 108 S.Ct. 1112, 99 L.Ed.2d 273 (1988), the Court adopted the criteria used by the National Labor Review Board (NLRB) when determining whether an entity fell within the political subdivision exception to jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).

Woods, Glenn A., J.