Thomas Ford et al. v. Michael Michaud et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (# 101)

On February 16, 2012, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss this action as to Thomas C. Ford on the ground that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because Thomas C. Ford does not have standing to bring an action for partition.   The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law but no evidence is submitted therewith.   On March 2, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the defendants' motion.   Thereafter, the defendants filed a memorandum of law.   The matter was heard at short calendar on March 5, 2012.

Facts

This action concerns a petition for partition of property located at 12 Fernwood Lane in Cheshire.   The plaintiffs, Thomas E. Ford and Thomas C. Ford, allege that they and the defendants, Michael Michaud and Jill Michaud,¹ are the equitable and/or record owners of the property and are currently in possession thereof.   With respect to such interests, the plaintiffs allege the following series of transactions.

On June 16, 1987, Thomas E. Ford acquired title to the property by warranty deed.   On April 30, 1990, Thomas E. Ford conveyed a one-third interest to each of Thomas C. Ford and Jill Michaud by quitclaim deed.   On March 31, 2003, Thomas C. Ford and Jill Michaud transferred their interests to Thomas E. Ford by quitclaim deed so that he could pursue a reverse mortgage.   On October 14, 2005, Thomas C. Ford paid $60,000 for the reduction of the reverse mortgage in order to ensure that his name would be on the deed after new financing was obtained.   On May 30, 2006, Thomas E. Ford transferred his interest to the defendants by quitclaim deed.   On that same date, the defendants conveyed their interests to Thomas E. Ford and themselves by quitclaim deed as joint tenants.   It is alleged that the defendants were supposed to obtain refinancing of the mortgage and, thereafter, convey the property to Thomas E. Ford, Thomas C. Ford and themselves.   The defendants, without the plaintiffs' knowledge, consent or approval, obtained three separate open-ended mortgages on the property in the amounts of $200,000, $223,000 and $60,000, respectively.

Discussion

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ․ A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 627, 941 A.2d 266 (2008).  “The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Association Resources, Inc. v. Wall, 298 Conn. 145, 164, 2 A.3d 873 (2010).  “The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 701, 945 A.2d 927 (2008).  “[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).   Nevertheless, “[i]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 443, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).   In particular, “[w]hen a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

The defendants argue that Thomas C. Ford does not have standing to bring an action for partition because he is not an owner of the property nor does he have an interest in the property.   The plaintiffs counter that Thomas C. Ford has standing because he acquired an equitable interest when he paid $60,000 in order to have his name placed on the deed.   The plaintiffs argue that since the defendants failed to place Thomas C. Ford's name on the deed, as agreed upon, he has been classically aggrieved and has standing to bring this action.

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 411, 35 A.3d 188 (2012).   Therefore, standing “presents a threshold issue ․” New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 511, 518, 970 A.2d 583 (2009).  “One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ․ When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue ․ Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury;  a [party] ordinarily establishes ․ standing by allegations of injury.   Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, supra, 411.

The right to partition is set forth under General Statutes § 52–495, et seq.  Section 52–495 provides in relevant part:  “Courts having jurisdiction of actions for equitable relief may, upon the complaint of any person interested, order partition of any real property held in joint tenancy, tenancy in common, coparcenary or by tenants in tail ․” General Statutes § 52–500(a) provides in relevant part:  “Any court of equitable jurisdiction may, upon the complaint of any person interested, order the sale of any property, real or personal, owned by two or more persons, when, in the opinion of the court, a sale will better promote the interests of the owners ․” Common to both of these sections is the requirement that property may be partitioned or sold “upon the complaint of any person interested.”   The definition of “person interested” is not set forth under the terms of the statute.

While Connecticut courts have also not defined the term “persons interested” our Appellate Court considered an appeal in a partition action where the plaintiff claimed equitable interest in the property on the basis of his having resided on the property and having assumed mortgage payments claiming an express, verbal and implied understanding that the ownership of various assets was to be shared.   While the Appellate Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the trial court, which denied such an equitable interest, the court also noted “that a failure to transfer title is not dispositive in determining the rights and interests of the parties with respect to the subject property.”   See Herring v. Daniels, 70 Conn.App. 649, 805 A.2d 718 (2002), at 659.

Also, where “despite not yet having a legal interest in the property, the plaintiff's allegation of equitable ownership is sufficient to overcome the defendants' motion to strike ․” See Custom Modular Industries, Inc. v. Mount, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 02 0346531 (March 17, 2003, White, J.);   see also Samos, LLC v. Vouros, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 08 5005876 (December 28, 2010, Pavia, J.).

In reviewing the pleadings in this case the plaintiffs allege that they and the defendants are the equitable and/or record owners of the property.   The plaintiffs further allege that, on October 14, 2005, Thomas C. Ford paid $60,000 for the reduction of the reverse mortgage in order to ensure his name would be on the deed.   Moreover, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants had agreed to convey the property to Thomas E. Ford and Thomas C. Ford although they ultimately failed to do so.   The defendants have not offered any evidence to refute the allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint.   Taking the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, and construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader;  Conboy v. State, supra, 292 Conn. 651;  there are sufficient facts alleged to show that Thomas C. Ford has an interest in the subject property sufficient to provide him with standing in this partition action.

While “[o]nly the owner of real or personal property may proceed under § 52–500 ․ to have that property partitioned or sold”;  Narowski v. Kichar, supra, 181 Conn. 253;  “issues of title may be determined in the partition action.”   59A Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 74.   Furthermore, an ownership interest may be equitable in nature.   See Herring v. Daniels, supra, 70 Conn.App. 659 (“[A] failure to transfer title is not dispositive in determining the rights and interests of the parties with respect to the subject property.”).   Therefore, the defendants' failure to include Thomas C. Ford's name on the quitclaim deed is not dispositive in determining the rights and interests of Thomas C. Ford with respect to the property in the present case.   While these cases did not consider the issue of standing directly, it is intuitive that standing must have been present because standing “presents a threshold issue ․” New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, supra, 291 Conn. 518.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

BY THE COURT

Denise D. Markle,Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Jill Michaud has also been referred to as Jill Ann Ford. For the purpose of simplicity, she will be referred to as Jill Michaud..  FN1. Jill Michaud has also been referred to as Jill Ann Ford. For the purpose of simplicity, she will be referred to as Jill Michaud.

Markle, Denise D., J.