Ralph Rivera v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON APPEAL

This case involves a statutory appeal concerning unemployment compensation, see § 31–249 of the General Statutes.

The administrator ruled that Mr. Rivera was ineligible for unemployment compensation because of willful misconduct in that he walked off the job.   A timely appeal was filed with an Appeal Referee who upheld the administrator.   A timely appeal was filed with the Board of Review which affirmed the referee's decision adopting the referee's finding of facts.   The decision of the Board was mailed to the claimant on October 25, 2010 which contained a notice in bold, capitalized type that to appeal the decision, the appeal must be filed by November 24, 2010.

Section 31–249a of the general statutes provides in subsection (a):

Any decision of the board, in the absence of a timely filed appeal from a party aggrieved there by or a timely filed motion to reopen, vacate, set aside or modify such decision by a party aggrieved thereby shall become final on the thirty first calendar day after the date on which a copy of the decision is mailed to the party, provided (1) any such appeal or motion which is filed after such thirty-day period may be considered to be timely filed if the filing party shows good cause as defined in the regulations adopted pursuant to Section 31–249h for the late filing ․

Section 31–249b in turn sets the ambit of the aggrieved claimant's right to appeal to the superior court.   It states that:  “at any time before the board's decision has become final any party, including the administrator, may appeal such decision, including any claim that the decision violates statutory or constitutional provisions, to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford or for the judicial district wherein the appellant resides.”

There is no dispute here that the appeal which Mr. Rivera entitled “Appeal to Superior Court” was filed on February 14, 2011, well after the thirty-day period at which point the appeal became final, see also Regs, Conn State Agencies, § 31–237g–49(a).

In accordance with § 31–249a(1) the same regulation also provides that “any appeal or motion filed after the thirty-day period has expired may be considered timely if the filing party shows good cause for the late filing.”

Section 31–249h authorizes the Board of Review in these cases to adopt such regulations defining good cause for the timeliness of filing motions or appeals pursuant to Section 31–249a.

As noted by Fuller in Volume 9A of his Connecticut Land Use and Practice at § 25:1 “administrative appeals did not exist at common law or even in 1818 when the state constitution was adopted so courts have no jurisdiction over them except as provided by statute,” see generally Walkenshaw v. O'Brien, 130 Conn. 122, 138 (1943).

The statutory scheme is interesting here in that an appeal will lie to the superior court only before it becomes final (§ 31–249b) and a decision becomes final thirty days after a decision by the board, (§ 31–249a).   The latter statute, however, also says any appeal after the thirty-day period may be considered to be timely filed (and thus not “final”) for appeal purposes if the filing party shows “good cause” for what would otherwise be a late filing.   But the legislature permits the agency whose decision is being appealed from to set forth in its regulations the “good cause” standard.   Two regulations deal with this matter.   Reg § 31–237g–49b provides “any appeal or motion filed after the thirty-day period has expired may be considered timely if the filing party shows good cause for the late filing.”   Reg § 31–237g–49(c) says “a party has good cause for failing to file a motion to re-open within (30) calendar days of the issuance of the Board's decision if a reasonably prudent individual under the same or similar circumstances would have been prevented from filing a motion to reopen.

Here the legislature in effect invited the agency to enact regulations referencing the good cause standard thus in effect allowing agency interpretation of the “good cause” statutory language to be determinative.   In State Medical Society v. Board of Examiner in Podiatry, 208 Conn. 709 (1988) the court said:  “we have accorded deference to such a time tested agency interpretation of a statute, but only when the agency has consistently followed its construction over a long period of time, the statutory language is ambiguous, and the agency interpretation is reasonable,” Id., p. 719.   In his “Appeal to Superior Court,” as a reason for the late filing, Mr. Rivera said “I delayed in filing because I was depressed.”   He also filed a letter from a doctor which describes his physical condition and mobility and apparently muscular problems with reference also to a carpal tunnel syndrome.   In effect it recommends work restrictions.

A “proposed decision” of the Board, in this case, in effect sets forth how the “good cause” standard is applied citing previous cases.   The Board states a claimant's illness can excuse late filing if the claimant establishes the illness's severity prevented timely filing.   The Board notes it has required medical documentation from a treating physician “which specifically establishes a nexus between the claimant's medical condition and his or her failure to file a timely appeal.”

The Board's practice in this regard seems reasonable given its responsibility to define a broad term like “good cause” in such a way so as to provide an equitable standard applicable to all late filing claimants.

The Board's proposed decision seems to recognize both physical and mental medical conditions can be the basis of a good cause finding.   The court can only agree with the Board's observations that the doctor's letter submitted has nothing to do with the reason Mr. Rivera offered for filing a late appeal.   It also does not set forth a physical condition which would have prevented the filing of a timely appeal.

An appeal was therefore not taken to the superior court before it became final and there was no “good cause” reason for filing the untimely appeal.

The appeal is therefore dismissed, the court having no jurisdiction to hear it on the merits.

Corradino, J.T.R.

Corradino, Thomas J., J.T.R.