Jacob Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT # 320

On February 10, 2012, the plaintiff, Jacob Doe, prevailed against the defendant, the Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, at trial.   The plaintiff was sexually abused by Ivan Ferguson from 1981 to 1983, while he was a minor.   He alleged inter alia, that the defendant was negligent and reckless in allowing Ferguson to have unsupervised access to children as a priest in its diocese at all times relevant to the present action, even though it knew or should have known of Ferguson's past history and then-present likelihood of sexually abusing minors.   The jury determined that the plaintiff is entitled to recover $1,000,000 in damages from the defendant.

The defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict on February 8, 2012.   The court reserved decision on the motion.   The defendant then filed the present motion on February 17, 2012.   The plaintiff filed his objection to the motion on March 6, 2012.   The defendant subsequently filed a reply memorandum on March 15, 2012.   The plaintiff in turn filed a supplemental memorandum on March 19, 2012.   The court heard oral argument on the matter on March 26, 2012.

“A trial court may set aside a verdict on a finding that the verdict is manifestly unjust because, given the evidence presented, the jury mistakenly applied a legal principle or because there is no evidence to which the legal principles of the case could be applied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Card v. State, 57 Conn.App. 134, 138, 747 A.2d 32 (2000).   A trial court “should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably reach [its] conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in its application of legal principles.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Greci v. Parks, 117 Conn.App. 658, 667, 980 A.2d 948 (2009).

“It is not the function of [the] court to sit as the seventh juror when we review the sufficiency of the evidence ․ rather, we must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury's verdict.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ormsby v. Frankel, 255 Conn. 670, 692, 768 A.2d 441 (2001).  “In making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable ․ In other words, [i]f the jury could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the verdict must stand, even if the court disagrees with it.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The defendant argues that the court should set aside the jury's verdict for the following reasons:  1) the plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving that the defendant was negligent and reckless thirty years ago;  2) the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that the defendant was reckless;  3) the jury was required to engage in conjecture and speculation in reaching its verdict on both counts;  4) the court erred in refusing to allow certain expert witness testimony on how society approached and understood child sexual abuse in the 1970s and 1980s;  5) the court erroneously admitted and excluded certain evidence about whether the defendant had contacted the police and whether the defendant had been told that Ferguson had been treated for sexual disorders at St. Luke's;  and 6) the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that certain off premises incidents could not be considered in calculating damages.

“A trial court [also] has the inherent power to set aside a verdict where it finds it has made, in its instructions, rulings on evidence, or otherwise in the course of the trial, a palpable error which was harmful to the proper disposition of the case and probably brought about a different result in the verdict.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hamernick v. Bach, 64 Conn.App. 160, 163, 779 A.2d 806 (2001).   The grounds on which the defendant moves to set aside the verdict involve not only “whether the verdict as it stands is against the evidence presented before the jury” but also “whether the jury should have had the benefit of certain evidence that was excluded, and should not have had the benefit of other evidence admitted.”   Diener v. Tiago, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 97 0348578 (July 9, 2002, Ballen, J.T.R.).  “Even if a court has acted improperly in connection with the introduction of evidence, reversal of a judgment is not necessarily mandated because there must not only be an evidentiary [impropriety], there also must be harm ․ The harmless [impropriety] standard in a civil case is whether the improper ruling would likely affect the result.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dow–Westbrook, Inc. v. Candlewood Equine Practice, LLC, 119 Conn.App. 703, 722, 989 A.2d 1075 (2010).   There must be a showing that the improper ruling would have affected the final result.  Id. “The overriding question is whether the trial court's improper ruling affected the jury's perception of the remaining evidence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 723.

“To prove a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence each of the elements:  duty, breach, proximate cause and damages.”  Carano v. Moomey, 51 Conn.App. 382, 389, 721 A.2d 1250 (1998).   For recklessness, the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant engaged in “a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater ․ than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 832, 836 A.2d 394 (2003).

The court concludes, after viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, that the jury could have legally and reasonably—not speculatively—found that the defendant was negligent and reckless in the manner alleged by the plaintiff.   The evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine, inter alia, the applicable standard of care and whether the defendant acted with conscious disregard, such that its verdict is neither against the law nor contrary to the evidence.   To the extent that the defendant challenges the correctness of the jury's evidentiary interpretations, the court reminds the defendant that “ ‘[t]he sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact] ․ The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party.’  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Smith Brook Farms, Inc. v. Wall, 52 Conn.App. 34, 37, 725 A.2d 987 (1999).  ‘It [is] the jury's function to consider the evidence and testimony, giving weight to that which it deem[s] credible and persuasive and discarding that which it deem[s] implausible and weak.’   Wilson v. Kent Realty, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 99 0081115 (June 25, 2002, Cremins, J.).”   Jasonis v. Patel, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 09 5005502 (January 10, 2012, Roche, J.).

The court also concludes that the defendant has not shown that certain rulings regarding the evidence and jury instructions affected the jury's perception of the evidence and therefore the verdict.   In moving to set aside the verdict, the defendant focuses upon the purported legal impropriety of the subject rulings.   The court is unpersuaded by the defendant's arguments that it improperly admitted and excluded the evidence and jury instructions presently at issue.   Furthermore, even if such arguments were persuasive, the defendant addresses the issue of whether the subject rulings “were consequential enough to have had a substantial effect on the verdict”;  Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 555–56, 102 A.2d 352 (1954);  only in passing, if at all.   Such a showing does not warrant setting aside the jury's verdict, especially when considered in conjunction with the court's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have legally and reasonably reached its verdict.

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict.

By the Court,

Dubay, J.

Dubay, Kevin G., J.