Jeffrey Nelson v. LLC (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE (# 157) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT/MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT

This case involves the claim by the plaintiff, Jeffrey Nelson, for damages and losses he allegedly claimed to have sustained from his loss of prospective employment as a result of the defamatory and malicious conduct of his former employer, Tradewind Aviation, LLC.

The case was tried to a jury and upon deliberation the jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him $207,332.94 in economic damages and $100,000.00 in non-economic damages.

The defendant has now moved the court for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the jury's verdict or, in the alternative it seeks to have the court set aside the verdict.

“While ․ a motion [to open or set aside] should not be readily granted nor without strong reasons, it ought to be when there appears cause for which the court acting reasonably would feel bound in duty so to do.”  Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 710–11, 461 A.2d 1037 (1983);  Baris v. Southbend, Inc., 68 Conn.App. 546 (2002).  “Practice Book [§ 17–4] vests discretion in the trial court to determine whether there is a good and compelling reason for its modification or vacation.”  Hirtle v. Hirtle, 217 Conn. 394, 398 (1991).

Our Appellate Court, in the case of Sepe v. Deemy, went into great detail in discussing the ramifications involved in a trial court's decision whether to set aside a jury verdict:  “There are serious constitutional issues posed by setting aside a jury verdict.   This is so because ‘[litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by the jury.’  Bambus v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 148 Conn. 167, 169 (1961).  ‘The right to a jury trial is fundamental in our judicial system, and ․ the right is one obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict, since the constitutional right of a trial by jury includes the right to have issues of fact as to which there is room for reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men passed upon by the jury and not by the court.’   “ Camp v. Booth, 160 Conn. 10, 13 (1970);  Jacobs v. Goodspeed, 180 Conn. 415 (1980);  Gosselin v. Perry, 166 Conn. 152, 168 (1974).  Barbieri v. Taylor, 37 Conn.Sup. 1, 2 (1980).   Accordingly, a court should move cautiously in deciding to set aside a jury's verdict.

The movant has cited five specific reasons why it believes the jury verdict is contrary to law and must be set aside:

(1) because the plaintiff misrepresented the reason that he left employment with Tradewind.   There was contradictory evidence presented by each side as to the actual representations made by the plaintiff to Republic Airlines, the company with whom he was seeking employment.   The plaintiff offered testimony that he told Republic that he was let go by Tradewind for lack of work.   That statement was consistently made by the plaintiff throughout the trial.   He offered Plaintiff's Ex. 9—a Connecticut Department of Labor unemployment notice form to substantiate that claim.   In the box captioned “reason for unemployment” the box “lack of work” is the only one checked off.   The form is signed by someone who purports to be “President” of Tradewind Aviation.   LLC and it is dated 9/10/07.   While there was conflicting testimony as to who actually placed the check mark on the form, the jury was aware of the respective claims of the parties and had sufficient evidence to form a basis upon which to find that the plaintiff had been consistent in his claim that he was laid off.   The jury also had a sufficient basis to find that he did not misrepresent to Republic the reason he was let go by Tradewind and that it was due to Tradewind's subsequent statements to Republic that the plaintiff's job offer was rescinded.   By the verdict, it is obvious that the jury did find that the defendant's actions not only did the plaintiff harm, but did him substantial harm.

(2) the plaintiff's job offer would have been rescinded “once Republic Airways discovered that the plaintiff had misrepresented that he had never been in an accident or incident in an airplane ․”

Again, the jury heard two conflicting arguments about what the plaintiff represented to Republic Airlines.   Sufficient evidence was offered by the plaintiff to permit the jury to find that the plaintiff did not make a false representation to Republic in response to its inquiry about past accidents or incidents in airplanes.   His version of the facts was that although he was a participant in an incident involving damage to a plane during his student training, he was not at the controls at the time of the incident and, therefore, he did not have to account for that incident.   That was his version of the facts and, apparently, the jury accepted it and did not consider that to be a reason why Republic withdrew its offer to him.

(3) the court improperly admitted hearsay statements of pilots in command that allegedly commended the plaintiff's work as a second in command pilot.

The court, after argument by both sides, ruled that the pilots whose statements were allowed into evidence were pilots in command who had a duty to critique the plaintiff's performance just as did the several pilots whose evaluations of the plaintiff were critical of him.   The pilots whose out of court statements were allowed into evidence were employees of Tradewind Aviation and had as part of their responsibilities, a duty to observe the plaintiff's performance and to report their observations to Tradewind Aviation.   They were found to be agents of the defendant and were authorized to make such statements in the course of their employment.   Those statements are properly imputed to Tradewind and are admissible testimony.

(4) the plaintiff's claim that he was terminated in order to avoid being laid off by Tradewind was based on speculation and conjecture.

There was sufficient evidence and testimony offered concerning comments made to the plaintiff by Tradewind supervisors, both at staff meetings and privately, concerning the seasonal slowdown in business to permit the jury to find that the plaintiff was truthful when he testified that he believed the reason he was let go was due to a lack of work and that Tradewind subsequently misrepresented that fact when it advised Republic that the plaintiff had been let go for performance reasons.

(5) the plaintiff admitted that he advised the Connecticut Department of Labor that he had been discharged by Tradewind.

Again the jury heard conflicting evidence and testimony concerning the plaintiff's application for unemployment benefits.   The defendant puts great reliance upon the fact that the plaintiff told an agent of the Department of Labor that he was “discharged” by Tradewind.   The plaintiff testified that he never used the word “discharged” in his one and only conversation with that agent which took place over the telephone.   He further testified that he did not write, edit or even read the written report which contained that word (Deft.Ex. V).  While he is alleged to have told the agent that he was reprimanded on one occasion for what amounted to ministerial reasons involving keeping the interior of the plane clean, he added that that reprimand took place many weeks prior.   The jury was free to decide which facts to believe and, apparently, accepted the plaintiff's version.   There was sufficient evidence and testimony to permit that finding.

“The jury's verdict is set aside and judgment entered only if the jury could not have reasonably and legally reached their conclusion” (emphasis added) Ham v. Green, 248 Conn. 508, 519 (1999).

Having considered the argument of the defendant in its motion, the court finds that the jury heard sufficient evidence and testimony to permit it to render the verdict which was returned in this case.   For that reason, the court will not disturb the jury's verdict.   The motion of the defendant Tradewind Airways, LLC for judgment not withstanding the verdict and/or to set aside the verdict is hereby denied.

BY THE COURT,

JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, JUDGE

Doherty, Joseph W., J.