Kimberly Pavelko v. Margaritas Management Group, Inc. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

This is an action claiming reckless service of alcohol by the defendant to its patron who subsequently was involved in a motor vehicle accident with the plaintiff.   The service of alcohol occurred on May 2 and/or 3, 2009.   The accident occurred on May 3, 2009.   The complaint was served on the defendant on June 24, 2011 and returned to court on June 28, 2011.   The defendant has moved for summary judgment on the basis of the tolling of the applicable statute of limitation, General Statutes § 52–584,¹ as more than two years had passed before the commencement of the action.

The plaintiff has filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment, claiming that the action is timely for the reason that the liability of the defendant could not be determined until the completion of the police investigation on July 22, 2009.   The plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations began to run on that date, which is when the plaintiff could have reasonably discovered her injury was caused by the defendant's alleged recklessness.

The parties were heard by the court on April 16, 2012.   Neither party presented any legal authority in support of their respective positions, other than referencing the applicable statute of limitations.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment “ ․ shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Practice Book § 17–49.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment a trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Hertz Corp. v. Federal Insurance Company, 245 Conn. 374, 381 (1998).  “The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under the applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ․ and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact ․ A material fact ․ [is] a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hurley v. Heart Physicians P.C., 278 Conn. 305, 314, 898 A.2d 777 (2006).

“A motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried.”  Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).   In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any issues exist.  Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988).

Summary judgment “is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way.”  Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 751, 660 A.2d 810 (1995).  “[A] summary disposition ․ should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id., 752.  “[A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed.”  Id.

“A genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact ․ and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 378, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).  “[T]he ‘genuine issue’ aspect of summary judgment procedure requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 378–79.  “Issue of fact encompasses not only evidentiary facts in issue but also questions as to how the trier would characterize such evidentiary facts and what inferences and conclusions it would draw from them.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

ANALYSIS

The issue before the court is whether, as a matter of law, the court can determine when the statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52–584, began to run.  “[T]he term ‘injury’ is synonymous with ‘legal injury’ or ‘actionable harm.’  ‘Actionable harm’ occurs when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the essential elements of a cause of action.  Catz v. Rubenstein, 201 Conn. 39, 44, 513 A.2d 98 (1986).”  Tarnowsky v. Socci, 271 Conn. 284, 288, 856 A.2d 408 (2004).

“[A] plaintiff who has incurred an actionable injury and knows the identity of one or more of the tortfeasors, but has no reason to suspect the existence of additional responsible parties, clearly cannot bring an action against the unknown parties until he discovers their existence.   In such cases, the blameless failure to discover the existence of the unknown tortfeasors is tantamount to a blameless failure to discover a causal connection between the tortfeasor's breach of duty and the injury, a failure that clearly tolls the statute of limitations.”  Id., 292.

“We conclude that the two year statute of limitations set forth in § 52–584 does not begin to run until a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should have known, the identity of the tortfeasor.   We emphasize that a plaintiff's ignorance of the identity of a tortfeasor will not excuse the plaintiff's failure to bring a negligence action within three years of the date of the act or omission complained of.”  Id., 297.

“[T]he determination of when a plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered ‘actionable harm’ is ordinarily a question reserved for the trier of fact.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted).  Id., 288.

When the plaintiff reasonably discovered facts from which to ascertain that the defendant caused her injury is an issue for the trier of fact.   Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate.

ORDER

The defendant's motion for summary judgment (105.00) is denied.   The plaintiff's objection to the motion (106.00) is sustained.

Robert E. Young, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 52–584 states “No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.”.  FN1. General Statutes § 52–584 states “No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.”

Young, Robert E., J.