The Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT

This contract action was commenced against the named defendants by complaint filed May 9, 2008.   The matter arises out of a claim that the plaintiff suffered economic losses due to a breach of a certain contract dated March 3, 2008 and entered into by the parties for political consulting services from the plaintiff for the U.S. senatorial nomination and campaign of 2008 in Alaska.   The matter was tried a jury commencing on January 4, 2012 and returning with a verdict rendered on January 6, 2012.   The defendant has moved to set aside the jury's verdict and an order for a new trial.   The plaintiff has filed objections to the defendants' motions.

The setting aside of jury verdicts is based on the general premise that jury verdicts should be left untouched unless there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial court or an injustice has been done which is manifestly apparent.  Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 303, 852 A.2d 703 (2004);  LaCroix v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 107 Conn.App. 332, 334, 945 A.2d 489 (2008).   The defendant did take exceptions to the Court's charge to the jury.   The plaintiff took no exceptions, and no further instructions were given by the Court beyond those given in the original charge.

The defendant's burden is to establish that the failure to include a charge contrary to the defendant's position must not only be improper, but that it must have been harmful and, in effect, misled or misguided the jury in reaching the verdict that it did.

“As long as [jury instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury ․ the instructions [are not] improper ․ Instructions are adequate if they give the jury a clear understanding of the issues and proper guidance in determining those issues ․ The court should submit to the jury all issues as outlined by the pleadings and as reasonably supported by the evidence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sutcliffe v. FleetBoston Financial Corp., 108 Conn.App. 799, 809, 950 A.2d 544 (2008).  “When reviewing [a] challenged jury instruction ․ the well settled rule [is] that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ancheff v. Hartford Hospital, 260 Conn. 785, 811, 799 A.2d 1067 (2002).

The Appellate court has set down certain guidelines concerning the setting aside of any jury verdict that may be rendered.   Those cases basically hold that the court should not interfere with that deliberative process which may result in a verdict that the trial court may not have arrived at, but nevertheless is within the bounds of reason.

“The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier.  [N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testimony ․ The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Smith Brook Farms, Inc. v. Wall, 52 Conn.App. 34, 37, 725 A.2d 987 (1999).   “It [is] the jury's function to consider the evidence and testimony, giving weight to that which it deemed credible and persuasive and discarding that which it deemed implausible and weak.”   Wilson v. Kent Realty, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 99 0081115 (June 26, 2002, Cremins, J.).  “We note that [i]t is not the function of this court to sit as the seventh juror when we review the sufficiency of the evidence ․ rather, we must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury's verdict ․ In making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict of which it is reasonably capable.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bosco v. Regan, 102 Conn.App. 686, 696, 927 A.2d 325 (2006), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 914, 931 A.2d 931 (2007).  “The most favorable reasonable construction must be given to the circumstantial as well as to the direct evidence of what actually transpired.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Elliott v. Larson, 81 Conn.App. 468, 475, 840 A.2d 59 (2004).

The fact finder in this case could find that there were on-going contacts between the parties over how the subject contract was to be implemented.   These contacts by phone, e-mails, and in person did not alter the terms or any particular conditions of the respective contractual obligations that could be found in the said contract signed on March 1 and 5, 2008, respectively.   The contract had a unilateral term in the sense that the plaintiff with proper notice could “terminate” the contract if timely payments were not made by the defendants under the terms of that contract.   In other words, the remaining two $10,000 payments due on April 1 and May 1, 2008, were unequivocal conditions.   The jury could find that the defendants breached the contract by not making such payments.   The fact that the defendant Cuddy was not comfortable or pleased with the services being rendered by the plaintiff did not constitute a material breach by the plaintiff and therefore, the defendants' contractual obligation for payments continued.

The defendants attempted to raise by way of argument, that “impossibility” as a defense would allow a rescission of the contract in favor of the defendants.   The impossibility of performance by either party was not supported by the probative evidence that was submitted to the jury and, therefore, it was not considered to be a legally sufficient ground that would be charged to the jury or the basis for any kind of a directed verdict in favor of the defendants.   See Sutcliffe v. Fleet Boston Financial Corp., supra, 108 Conn.App. 809.   Dills v. Enfield, 210 Conn. 705, 717–721 (1989);  14 Corbin on Contracts, Impossibility (Ed.2001) Sect. 74.5 et seq., p. 27.

The defendants reliance on Practice Book § 15–8 is misplaced because that provision relates only to court, non-jury matters in which a plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case and, therefore, the action is subject to dismissal.   The Court did take under review the defendants' Motion For Directed Verdict at the end of the plaintiff's and defendants' cases and, in effect, that motion was denied and the matter was submitted to the jury for its determination.

Whatever machinations may have occurred between the parties and their representatives were something that the Court does not place any probative value on.   It does illustrate the fluid nature of the relationship between the parties and may allow a fact finder to come to different conclusions within the context of the subject contract.   The jury could find that there was an on-going obligation for payment by the defendants to the plaintiff for political consulting services that were being rendered in a substantive and meaningful way, although perhaps not to the liking of the defendant Cuddy.   The dissatisfaction by one party to a contract does not necessarily relieve that party of the obligations under the contract.   See generally 13 S. Williston, Contracts (4th Ed.2000) § 39:1, et seq., p. 508.   Therefore, the defendants' various positions were not accepted by the fact finder and a verdict was rendered in favor of recovery for the plaintiff.   Based on the totality of the evidence submitted to the jury, the Court comes to the conclusion there is no legal or factual basis for setting aside the jury's verdict and therefore the defendants' Motion To Set Aside is denied.

BY THE COURT,

Roche, J.

Roche, Vincent E., J.