Citibank, N.A. v. Alman A. Beckford (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (# 101)

FACTS

The plaintiff, Citibank, N.A., commenced this action via summons and complaint to collect a debt owed to it by the defendant, Alman Beckford, on October 14, 2011.   The plaintiff alleges that it is a national banking association and that the defendant was extended credit under a credit installment agreement.   Furthermore, the defendant failed to make payments and now owes $9,645.06.   Moreover, it is alleged that the plaintiff provided the defendant with monthly account statements of the indebtedness as a result of the credit extended.

The defendant appeared on October 20, 2011.   No answer or cross-complaint was filed.   Also, on October 20, 2011, the defendant moved to dismiss this action.   On November 2, 2011, the plaintiff filed its objection to the motion to dismiss along with a memorandum of law in support.   On November 9, 2011, the defendant filed its reply along with a memorandum in support.   On December 19, 2011, this matter was heard at short calendar

DISCUSSION

“The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss] are:  (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;  (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person;  (3) improper venue;  (4) insufficiency of process;  and (5) insufficiency of service of process.”  Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book § 143, which is now § 10–31.  “[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213–14, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).  “It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., at 214.

Broadly and generously construed, the defendant argues that this action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for two main reasons.   First, it is argued that Citibank, N.A., is not the proper party and cannot show that it was aggrieved, thereby preventing the plaintiff from having standing to bring suit.   Specifically, the defendant argues that Citibank (S.Dakota) N.A., has a separate pending action against the defendant, Docket # HHD–CV–11–6017714, for an alleged debt and, now, a “different entity,” the plaintiff, Citibank, N.A., commenced the present action for “the very same amount due.”   Second, it is argued that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the possession of a valid certificate of authority to bring suit in violation of General Statutes § 33–921.   In response, the plaintiff argues that it has standing to bring this action because of evidence it has attached demonstrating that Citibank (S.Dakota) N.A. merged into Citibank, N.A. Additionally, the plaintiff responds that it is not actually “doing business” in Connecticut such that it need be licensed as a foreign corporation authorized to do business before maintaining the present legal action pursuant to § 33–921.

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion.   One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action.”  Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 207, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).   The burden of demonstrating that a party has standing to bring an action is on the plaintiff.   See Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 274 Conn. 92, 104, 874 A.2d 742, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1016, 126 S.Ct. 659, 163 L.Ed.2d 526 (2005).  “Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court nor is it a test of substantive rights.   Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate non-justiciable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 802, 970 A.2d 640 (2009).

In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged that it extended a line of credit to the defendant and that the defendant has defaulted thereon.   “Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury;  a [party] ordinarily establishes standing by allegations of injury [that he or she has suffered or is likely to suffer].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., supra, 294 Conn. at 214.   The plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to establish that it was aggrieved and that it thus has standing to bring the present debt collection action.   See Citibank South Dakota, N.A. v. Beckford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 11 6017714 (March 1, 2011, Wagner, J.T.R.) (allegations that the defendant failed to make required payments on credit card sufficient to confer standing);  see also Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Breen, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 11 6017487 (May 5, 2011, Wilson, J.);   and Discover Bank v. Breen, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 11 6017970 (July 18, 2011, Woods, J.).

Next, the defendant's belief that the plaintiff in the present action is not the proper party for purposes of collecting the amount owed is without merit.   As an initial matter, the court notes that in the other referenced action, Docket # HHD–CV–11–6017714, the alleged debt was in the amount of $4,428.18.   However, in this action, the alleged debt is in the amount of $9,645.06.   Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that these are not the very same debts as the defendant claims.   Nevertheless, the plaintiff has also submitted evidence of the merger between Citibank (S.Dakota) N.A. and Citibank, N.A. “When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ․ other types of undisputed evidence ․ and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken ․ the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651–52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).  “When issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court's jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.”  Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).   However, if a party submits evidence in support of their jurisdictional claim, it is incumbent on the opposing party to dispute the facts therein, otherwise such facts are deemed undisputed and no hearing has to be held.  Weihing v. Dodsworth, 100 Conn.App. 29, 39, 917 A.2d 53 (2007).   In the present case, the evidence of the merger between Citibank (S.Dakota) N.A. and Citibank, N.A. is undisputed.   As a result, any debt owed to Citibank (S.Dakota) N.A., that has not already been collected, would now be owed to Citibank, N.A. For that reason, Citibank, N.A. is the proper party to the present action.

Additionally, the defendant challenges whether the court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff due to its lacking a certificate of authority and its failure to transact business within the state.   This argument raises issues properly pleaded as special defenses and/or counterclaims.  “Section 160 of the 1978 Practice Book [now § 10–46], provides that if a defendant intends to controvert the right of a plaintiff to sue as a corporation he must specially raise that issue in his answer.   Section 164 [now § 10–50] further provides that any claimed illegality not apparent on the face of the pleadings must be specially pleaded.   It is thus clear that an attack on the corporate capacity of a plaintiff to sue must be raised by way of special defense.”  U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. DiGhello, 179 Conn. 246, 249, 425 A.2d 1287 (1979).   This procedure has been confirmed by recent Superior Court cases.  “[I]t is well established in our case law that a challenge to the plaintiff's right to sue without a certificate of authority to transact business in Connecticut does not go to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court, but is a matter of defense that is waived by the defendant unless it is pleaded as a special defense and proved at trial.”   Mapei Corp. v. Bestflor Distributors, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5010569 (June 29, 2009, Sheldon, J.);   see also Bank of New York v. Veglio, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 07 5009817 (August 22, 2011, Hartmere, J.);   HSBC Bank USA v. Fequiere, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 09 5024230 (August 10, 2010, Hartmere, J.);   Access International Advisors Ltd. v. Argent Management Co., LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 09 5012939 (June 1, 2010, Tierney, J.T.R.);   Sales Team Staffing, Inc. v. GHP Media, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV 09 6001329 (May 28, 2010, Bellis, J.) (50 Conn. L. Rptr. 18).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby denied.

Woods, J.

Woods, Glenn A., J.