State of Connecticut v. Francis Gaffney (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE OR SENTENCE IMPOSED IN AN ILLEGAL MANNER

The defendant, Francis Gaffney, moves to correct his sixty (60) year sentence for felony murder (General Statutes § 53a–54c) asserting that felony murder is an unclassified felony under Connecticut law that does not permit a sixty year sentence.   In connection with his motion, the defendant sought appointment of counsel.   After conducting the inquiry prescribed by State v. Casiano, 282 Conn. 614 (2007), the Office of the Public Defender declined to appear.   The defendant is therefore self-represented.   The state objects to the motion asserting the felony murder is properly treated as murder under Connecticut law.   For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

On March 28, 1989, the defendant pleaded guilty, under the Alford doctrine, to felony murder in violation of § 53a–54c and kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–92(a)(2)(b).  The court (Damiani, J.) imposed an agreed sentence of sixty years on felony murder and twenty-five years concurrent on the kidnapping first degree count for a total effective sentence of sixty years.

DISCUSSION

The defendant's claim derives from the action of our legislature in the 1973 and 1974 sessions.   Prior to the adoption of the penal code, murder and felony murder were codified in the same statutory section that was punishable as a class A felony.   In 1973, the legislature repealed the murder statute and enacted intentional murder as a class A felony under a new section, 53a–54a.   In this process, felony murder was omitted entirely.

In 1974, the legislature reinstituted felony murder under a new statutory section.   This new section (§ 53a–54c) did not expressly state the punishment for felony murder nor its classification.   Based on this, the defendant in the present motion asserts that felony murder cannot be classified the same as intentional murder but must, instead, be deemed an unclassified felony.

The defendant's position is unpersuasive for two reasons.   First, the text of both § 53a–54a (intentional murder) and § 53a–54c (felony murder) begin with the following phrase:  “A person is guilty of murder when ․” Thus, the plain meaning of the statutes indicate that intentional murder and felony murder are two methods of committing the same crime—murder.   Moreover, General Statues § 53a–45(a) states that “murder” is punishable as a class A felony and General Statutes § 53a–35a(2) fixes the penalty for “murder” at not less than twenty-five years and not more than life.   Accordingly, our statutory scheme can fairly be interpreted to have classified felony murder as a class A felony for which a sentence of sixty years can be imposed.

Second, our Supreme Court has ruled that, through the statutory enactments described above, the legislature did not create a new crime but rather specified another manner in which the crime of murder could be committed.   State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 696 (1989);  State v. Greco, 216 Conn. 282, 297 (1990);  State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 718–9 (1990).   In addition, our Appellate Court in the context of a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence has stated that felony murder is simply one form of the crime of murder.  State v. Cross, 127 Conn.App. 718, 721, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 918 (2011).

For the reasons set forth above, the motion is denied.

So Ordered at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 4th day of April 2012.

ROBERT J. DEVLIN, JR., JUDGE

Devlin, Robert J., J.