Christopher Aubin v. 10284 (2012)

RULING ON DEFENDANT RIOUX'S MOTION TO STRIKE

This case is an action by the plaintiff, Christopher Aubin, against six defendants.   The plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that he was a passenger in a car being driven by Samantha Reiss in May 2011, when she lost control of the car.   It is alleged that she was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time.   He alleges that the car went off Interstate 395 in Killingly, CT and struck a tree, causing him severe injuries.   Pertinent to the defendant, Randy Rioux, Jr., the alleged owner of the car, the plaintiff seeks to hold Rioux liable for compensatory damages in the Fifth Count of the complaint which alleges negligence under, inter alia, the family car doctrine, General Statutes § 52–182.   He seeks double or treble damages against the defendant in the Sixth Count of the complaint which alleges statutory recklessness under, inter alia, the family car doctrine.   Also, he seeks damages under the Seventh Count of the complaint for common-law recklessness under, inter alia, the family car doctrine.   The defendant moves to strike the Sixth and Seventh Counts, and the corresponding requests for damages in the prayer for relief.   For the following reasons, as to the defendant, Rioux, the defendant's motion is granted with respect to the Sixth Count and the corresponding claim for double or treble damages.   It is denied as to the Seventh Count except that to whatever extent the plaintiff seeks punitive damages for this count in his prayer for relief, that request is stricken.

I

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).   “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “The role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

“[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 252.   Nevertheless, “[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.

II

As mentioned above, the plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that he was a passenger in a car being driven by Samantha Reiss in May 2011, when she lost control of the car.   It is alleged that she was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time.   He alleges that the car went off Interstate 395 in Killingly, CT and struck a tree, causing him severe injuries.   In paragraph 11 of the First Count, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, Randy Rioux, Jr., owned the vehicle that Reiss was driving.   In paragraph 12 of that count, he alleges, in pertinent part, as follows:  “At all times relevant hereto, the defendant, Samantha Reiss, was operating said ․ vehicle within the scope of the express and/or implied permission of the defendant, Randy Rioux, Jr., and/or within the scope of her authority, and/or pursuant to the family car doctrine, Connecticut General Statutes Section 52–182.”   In the prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages;  costs;  double and treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14–295;  and such other relief as the court deems just and proper, all without specification as to which counts each prayer for relief applies.   The defendant moves to strike the Sixth and Seventh Counts and the corresponding claims for damages in the prayer for relief as against the defendant, Rioux.   The issues are discussed seriatim.

A

The defendant, Rioux, moves to strike the Sixth Count against him, concerning statutory recklessness, and the corresponding claim for double or treble damages, on the grounds that the complaint fails to allege any actions committed by the defendant that fall within the purview of the statute.   The statute provides as follows:

In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222, 14–227a, 14–230, 14–234, 14–237, 14–239 or 14–240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.   The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle

General Statutes § 14–295.

The defendant first argues that this statute is not applicable as to him because he was not the operator of the vehicle at the time of the accident, was not present at the scene or even with the other defendants prior to the accident.   It is correct that the plaintiff does not make any such allegations.   It is also correct that this statute, by its plain language, only applies to the operator of the motor vehicle and not to its non-operating owner.   Redding v. Boucher, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Doc. No. CV 07–5003381 (August 22, 2007);  Thomas v. Cassetti, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia–Milford (Doc. No. 95–4003437 (October 13, 2005).

Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the defendant, as owner of the vehicle, can be vicariously liable and subject to the double or treble damages available under this statute under the family car doctrine or if he gave the driver permission or authorization.   The doctrine is codified as follows:

Proof that the operator of a motor vehicle or a motorboat, as defined in section 15–127, was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle or motorboat was being operated as a family car or boat within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.

General Statutes § 52–182.

Support for such a claim is found in General Statutes § 52–183.   That statute provides:

In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment.   The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.

General Statutes § 52–183.

There is a split of authority among the Superior Court judges as to whether a cause of action under General Statutes § 14–295 may lie against the owner of a family car when a member of the family is charged with reckless driving, or if the owner gave authorization or permission.   Some courts have granted motions to strike § 14–295 counts and the corresponding requests for double or treble damages.   See, e.g. Keough v. Dayton Construction, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Doc. No. CV 09–5016265 (November 23, 2011, Blawie, J.);   Goodkind v. Sharma, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Doc. No. CV 02–282415 (November 25, 2003, Frazzini, J.);   Krisak v. Pendagast, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Doc. No. CV 263835 (June 21, 1993, Lager, J.) [9 Conn. L. Rptr. 286].   Others have not.   See, e.g., Santillo v. Arredono, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Doc. No. 442323 (March 21, 2001, Blue, J.) [29 Conn. L. Rptr. 458].

This court is persuaded by the analysis used by the courts that have stricken such claims due to the plain language of General Statues § 14–295.   The court is bound to follow the text if there is no ambiguity in that language.   “The principles that govern statutory construction are well established.   When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ․ In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ․ In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ․ When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 333, 984 A.2d 684 (2009).   The language of the statute imposing liability and punitive-type damages used in General Statues § 14–295 is unambiguous.   It applies only to drivers.

Moreover, there is a common-law principle that punitive damages may not be assessed against parties whom the law holds vicariously liable for the acts of others.  Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 843, 836 A.2d 394 (2003).   Neither party has directed the court to any legislative history of § 14–295 that indicates the legislature intended to impose vicarious liability for punitive damages under the family car doctrine or other theory, or to abrogate the common-law rule against such liability.   Accordingly, there is no such vicarious liability under this statute.  Keough v. Dayton Constuction, supra, citing Reis v. Hendel, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Doc. No. CV 10–6016353 (September 7, 2011, Sheldon, J.) [52 Conn. L. Rptr. 526], and Hronis v. EBO Logistics, LLC, 641 F.Sup.2d 139, 140–41 (D.Conn.2009).

Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the statute should be construed to expose owners to vicarious liability because the statute “explicitly excludes owners of rented and leased vehicles from damages found under the statute, which clearly demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to preclude others, including non-renting/non-leasing owners like the defendant, Randy Rioux, Jr., from damages found under the statute.”   Plaintiff's Brief, p. 5 (emphasis in original).   This argument, too, has been effectively refuted by the court decisions which have demonstrated that this language was added in 2003 to withdraw the liability of rental car businesses created by the legislature under General Statutes § 14–154a, and it does not imply that all other owners should be exposed to such liability and punitive damages.   See Reis v. Hendel, supra.   No other grounds for exposure find factual support in the complaint.

Accordingly, the motion to strike the Sixth Count, and the corresponding prayer for relief for double or treble damages, is granted as against the defendant, Rioux.

B

In the Seventh Count, the plaintiff alleges a cause of action for common-law recklessness against the defendant, again pursuant to the family car doctrine or other permission or authorization, and his prayer for relief seeks money damages.   Again, the defendant moves to strike the claims and the corresponding prayer for relief against the defendant, Rioux, on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support such a common-law claim.

Defendant argues that he cannot be liable for recklessness under the common law because he was not the operator of the vehicle at the time of the accident, was not present at the scene or even with the other defendants prior to the accident.   It is correct that the plaintiff does not make any such allegations.   However, as noted earlier, the plaintiff's claim against this defendant rests not on his personal actions, but on allegations of vicarious liability under the family car doctrine or due to permission or authorization.   On this point, the Supreme Court has held “the common-law principle of respondeat superior, renders the owner vicariously liable for compensatory damages arising out of the negligent and reckless conduct of the operator, but not vicariously liable for punitive damages stemming from that conduct.”   (Emphasis in original.)  Matthiessen v. Vanech, supra, 266 Conn. 840.   Accordingly, the motion to strike the Seventh Count must be denied.   See Redding v. Boucher, supra.   Likewise, to the extent that the prayer for relief can be read to seek compensatory damages, the motion to strike that request is denied.   However, to whatever extent the plaintiff is seeking punitive damages under this count,¹ it must be stricken.   No exceptions to this rule appear applicable from the allegations in the complaint.

Defendant argues, further, that there is a question as to whether the co-defendant, Samantha Reiss, had permission to be operating the vehicle in the first place, as the defendant, Rioux, was in the process of selling the vehicle.   That point, and other similar claims by the defendant, involves contested facts not in the complaint.   Those types of disputes cannot be considered or resolved in a motion to strike.  “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

III

For all of the foregoing reasons, as to the defendant, Rioux, the defendant's motion is granted with respect to the Sixth Count and the corresponding claim for double or treble damages.   It is denied as to the Seventh Count except that to whatever extent the plaintiff seeks punitive damages for this count in his prayer for relief, that request is stricken.

THE COURT

Robert F. Vacchelli

Judge, Superior Court

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The prayer for relief does not expressly request punitive damages.   Ordinarily, for recovery of such damages, the request must be explicit.   See Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 77, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985)..  FN1. The prayer for relief does not expressly request punitive damages.   Ordinarily, for recovery of such damages, the request must be explicit.   See Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 77, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985).

Vacchelli, Robert F., J.