Maria Reis v. Kimberly E. DeSautelle et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE (# 125) MOTION FOR ADDITUR AND (# 127) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND FOR NEW TRIAL

This case involves a claim for economic and non-economic damages by the plaintiff, Maria Reis as a result of an October 25, 2008 motor vehicle collision with a vehicle owned by the defendant, Robert DeSautelle and operated by the defendant, Kimberly DeSautelle.

The case was tried to a jury which then returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $3,942.00 in economic damages but nothing for her claimed non-economic damages.

At the time of the rendition of the verdict, the court informed the jury that the import of their verdict was to award the plaintiff an amount less than the full amount of her claimed monetary expense and to award her nothing for her claimed pain and suffering and other non-monetary claims.

Having so informed the jury, the court instructed them to retire and to discuss whether or not that was their proper intention.   The jury returned a short time later and did not change the verdict.   The court ordered the verdict accepted and recorded.   The plaintiff then filed the instant motions.

The plaintiff argues that pursuant to P.B. Sec. 16–35, the court should provide additur for non-economic damages in the amount of $35,000.00.   The defendant objects to that request.

The plaintiff claims that the jury's verdict in awarding some economic damages but no non-economic damages is “internally inconsistent” and evidences a profound misunderstanding of the instructions by the court.

The defendant points out that there is precedence in this state for such verdicts and cites Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107 (1995) wherein our Supreme Court held that there is no requirement under Connecticut law that requires a jury to award non-economic damages each and every time it awards economic damages.  Id., p.121.

In Santa Maria v. Klevecz, 70 Conn.App. 10 (2002), our Appellate Court held that when considering a request to set aside a verdict after a jury award of economic damages but no noneconomic damages, “the trial court must review the decision in light of all the circumstances of the particular case before it.”   Id., p.13.

“[T]he determination of the amount to be awarded, if any, is solely the jury's function.”  Conn. General Statutes § 52–216(b);  Daigle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Conn.App. 473–75 (2000).

“[T]he amount of a damage award is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact;” Mather v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 138 (1988);  and “[i]f on the evidence, the jury could reasonably have decided as they did, [the reviewing court] will not find error in the trial court's acceptance of the verdict ․” Malmberg v. Lopez, supra, 208 Conn. 679 (1988).

In the instant case, the jury awarded the plaintiff only $3,942.00 of her claimed medical expenses which totaled $12,958.00.   Those bills for which the jury awarded the plaintiff compensation included the ambulance cost and various examinations and diagnostic tests.   However, the jury made no award to the plaintiff for the bill from Griffin Hospital in the amount of $3,049.00 and the bills for all 71 of the plaintiff's chiropractor office visits, totaling $5,967.00.

In opposing the relief sought in the two instant motions, the defendant cites the selectivity of the payments awarded by the jury as evidence of the jury's conclusion that the negligence of the defendants caused the plaintiff to undergo examinations and tests (which showed minimal if any injuries) but did not cause the plaintiff any appreciable pain or suffering.   To that end, the defendant cites Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174 (2000), wherein the Supreme Court held that it is permissible for a jury to return a plaintiff's verdict awarding economic damages without also awarding non-economic damages.

That court went on to hold that, “a case specific standard should apply to the instance in which a party seeks to have a verdict set aside on the basis that it is legally inadequate.”  Id., p. 181.

“Accordingly, the trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether the jury reasonable could have found that the plaintiff had failed in his proof of the issue.   That decision should be made, riot on the assumption that the jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that the jury did exactly what it intended to do.  Id., p. 188–89.

In her brief in support of the instant motions, the plaintiff presumptiously states that “the evidence presented in the case led the jury to conclude that the defendant was at fault, and to award the plaintiff damages for medical expenses resultant from her “injuries.”  (Emphasis added.)

The defendants did not contest the fact that they were at fault for causing the collision, but contested the claim by the plaintiff that the plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of that collision.   By its award, the jury did indicate that the plaintiff was entitled to be reimbursed for a portion of her medical bills which involved diagnostic tests and examinations.   Nothing in that award indicates that the jury found that the plaintiff had proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that she was injured as a result of the negligence of the defendants.

In response to the relief sought in this motion, the court has reviewed the record and the exhibits in this case, including the medical report from Griffin Hospital Radiology Department regarding an MRI of the plaintiff of the lumbar spine noted minimal or no significant disc bulge or canal stenosis at each of the vertebra examined.   A report written by Orthopaedic & Sports Medicine Center on October 31, 2008 stated that a review of the x-rays of the plaintiff's cervical spine, lumbar spine and thoracic spine taken at St. Vincent's Hospital on the date of the incident indicated that all of the x-rays were negative.   Also, the St. Vincent Hospital Emergency Physician Record made on October 25, 2008, the date of the incident, indicated that at the time the plaintiff was seen in the emergency room on October 25, 2008, she presented with “no acute distress” and “no evidence of trauma.”

Having reviewed those documents which the jury used in reaching its verdict, the court has determined that the verdict, while disappointing to the plaintiff, is not contrary to the law nor against the evidence.   For that reason, the plaintiff's motion for additur in the form of non-economic damages for pain and suffering is denied.   Having made that finding, the court also denies the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict or to order a new trial.

BY THE COURT,

JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, JUDGE

Doherty, Joseph W., J.