Richard Guzda et al. v. Lon A. Deleon et al. (2012)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT # 125

The plaintiffs, Richard Guzda and Mackey Harris, bring this action for injuries they allegedly sustained as a result of an altercation which occurred on September 22, 2008, while they were patrons at Bleacher's Sports Bar in Bristol, Connecticut.   They allege they were assaulted by the defendant, Lon Deleon, and further allege that Deleon was served alcohol while he was intoxicated at Bleacher's.   The complaint consists of ten counts;  the first two counts are claims of assault against the defendant, Deleon.   Counts three and four are against the defendant Goodlind Enterprises, LLC, a limited liability company doing business as Bleachers Sports Bar & Restaurant, sounding in negligent supervision, as to the plaintiffs Guzda and Harris, respectively;  counts five and six are for Dram Shop liability pursuant to General Statutes § 30–102, against the defendant Goodlind Enterprises, as to the plaintiffs, Guzda and Harris, respectively;  and counts seven and eight allege Dram Shop Liability against the defendant, Randy J. Goodine, permittee of Bleachers Sports Bar, again as to each plaintiff.   The defendants, Goodlind Enterprises, LLC, and Randy Goodine assert they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on counts three, four, five, six, seven, and eight.¹

The defendants filed the motion for summary judgment together with a memorandum of law in support of said motion.   In addition to supporting documentation filed with their memorandum, they also filed with the court a compact disc which contained a security video of the bar which allegedly showed the altercation between the plaintiffs and Deleon.   The plaintiffs filed their objection, together with an affidavit of Richard Guzda (Exhibit A) and the deposition transcript of the defendant, Lon Deleon (Exhibit B).  The defendants filed a reply to the plaintiffs' objection, and the court heard argument on the motion on February 6, 2012.

DISCUSSION

“Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sherman v. Ronco, 294 Conn. 548, 553–54, 985 A.2d 1042 (2010).  “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.”  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).  “Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984).  “Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where ․ the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation ․ [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975).

The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiffs cannot establish that (a) the intoxication of Deleon was the proximate cause of the injuries the plaintiffs sustained;  and (b) the defendants' conduct legally caused the injuries.   They contend that based upon the deposition testimony of Guzda the injuries were as a result of a fight he started with Deleon.   Also, based upon the video of the altercation submitted with their motion, it also shows that the plaintiffs assaulted Deleon prior to Deleon taking any physical action against them.

“To prevail in an action brought pursuant to [General Statutes] § 30–102, a plaintiff must prove that there was (1) a sale of intoxicating liquor (2) to an intoxicated person (3) who, in consequence of such intoxication, causes injury to the person or property of another.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  O'Dell v. Kozee, 128 Conn.App. 794, 799, 19 A.3d 672, (2011), cert. granted, 302 Conn. 928, 28 A.3d 343 (2011).

“The statute ․ does require proof that the injuries complained of were in consequence of the intoxication of the person to whom the liquor was sold ․ For the plaintiffs to establish liability under the statute, it was essential for them to prove that the intoxication proximately caused the injuries for which they sought damages.”  (Citations omitted.)  Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 254, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15, 78 S.Ct. 36, 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957).   See also Sanders v. Officers Club of Connecticut, Inc., 196 Conn. 341, 349, 493 A.2d 184 (1985).  (“A proximate cause is a direct cause.   It is an act or failure to act, followed in its natural sequence by a result without the intervention of any other superseding cause ․ Where the sequence of events is unbroken by any intervening cause, an act or failure to act is a proximate cause of the result.   Proximate cause is thus an act or failure to act which is a substantial factor in producing a result.”  (Citation omitted.)   Thus, while it is clear that Connecticut courts require the plaintiff to show that the third party's intoxication was a proximate cause of their injuries, “[t]he intoxication need not be the sole proximate cause, so long as it is a substantial factor in producing the injuries.”  Pierce v. Albanese, supra, 144 Conn. 255.

“To be intoxicated is something more than to be merely under the influence of, or affected to some extent by, liquor.   Intoxication means an abnormal mental or physical condition due to the influence of intoxicating liquors, a visible excitation of the passions and impairment of the judgment, or a derangement or impairment of physical functions and energies.   When it is apparent that a person is under the influence of liquor, when his manner is unusual or abnormal and is reflected in his walk or conversation, when his ordinary judgment or common sense are disturbed or his usual will power temporarily suspended, when these or similar symptoms result from the use of liquor and are manifest, a person may be found to be intoxicated.   He need not be ‘dead-drunk.’   It is enough if by the use of intoxicating liquor he is so affected in his acts or conduct that the public or parties coming in contact with him can readily see and know this is so ․ [I]n order to qualify as intoxicated pursuant to § 30–102, an individual must exhibit some type of physical symptomology in such a way that an observer reasonably could perceive that the individual was indeed under the influence of alcohol to some noticeable extent.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  O'Dell v. Kozee, supra, 128 Conn.App. 800.

The plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether Deleon was intoxicated, and whether his intoxication was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.   Although the defendants assert that it was the plaintiffs who initiated the fight, there is contradicting testimony submitted which raise enough of a question of fact as to the cause of the altercation.   The plaintiff, Harris, testified in his deposition that he and the plaintiff, Guzda, had drank several beers at Bleacher's.   Deleon and another patron by the name of Agnes had been to a couple of bars, and Deleon “seemed to have some drinks in him.”   Deleon became disruptive and abusive, yelling at Agnes.   Guzda testified that Deleon “had a violent demeanor on him,” and displayed these openly hostile mannerisms.   Deleon then threatened to kill Guzda, reached into his pocket, and stabbed Guzda in the ribs, while Guzda struck Deleon.   The altercation then ensued between Guzda and Deleon, and eventually Harris joined in to assist Guzda.   The parties remained fighting, and eventually Guzda brought Deleon to the floor where the tussle continued before Deleon eventually got up and left the premises.

The court viewed the video which also raises enough of a question of fact as to what actually occurred on the night of the fight.

“The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established:  duty;  breach of that duty;  causation;  and actual injury.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Precision Mechanical Services, Inc., 122 Conn.App. 448, 454, 998 A.2d 1228, (2010), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 926, 5 A.3d 487 (2010).  “Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Busque v. Oakwood Farms Sports Center, Inc., 80 Conn.App. 603, 607, 836 A.2d 463 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 919, 841 A.2d 1190 (2004).

The defendants contend that there is no causal relation established between the defendants' conduct and the plaintiffs' injuries.   They assert that the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries was their own negligence, and the plaintiffs have offered no evidence to support their allegation that the defendant establishment was negligent in failing to prevent or stop the assault.   However, after review of all the supporting documentation submitted, there exists several issues of material fact that the defendants are liable as tavern keepers in failing to implement any security measures on the premises at the time of the incident which led to the plaintiffs' injuries, and that failure was the substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injuries.

CONCLUSION

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that factual issues exist.   The defendants have failed to exclude any doubt as to the existence of any genuine issues of material fact.   Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Any reference to the defendants shall be as to Goodlind Enterprises, LLC and Randy Goodine..  FN1. Any reference to the defendants shall be as to Goodlind Enterprises, LLC and Randy Goodine.

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.